Billups v. Hinds Medical Dept.
Filing
35
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's 30 Motion for Summary Judgment; Final Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 6/12/2012. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
CHARLIE JUNIOR BILLUPS
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11cv54-LRA
JOE OWENS
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Joe Owens.1 The Court has considered all the pleadings and exhibits, Plaintiff
Charlie Junior Billups’s sworn testimony given at the omnibus hearing, his medical
records,2 and the applicable law. This review compels the Court to find that the motion is
meritorious and should be granted.
1.
Facts3
Jurisdiction of this case is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Billups was booked into
the Hinds County Detention Facility [HCDF] in Raymond, Mississippi, on or about
August 19, 2010, after having been arrested for burglary. While at HCDF, Billups was a
pre-trial detainee; he was convicted of burglary on November 4, 2011, and is now
incarcerated in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections [“MDOC”] at
the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in Pearl, Mississippi.
Defendant Joe Owens is the medical director at the HCDF and has been employed
at the Hinds County Sheriff’s Department since September 13, 2010.
1
ECF No. 30.
2
ECF No. 30-4, Exhibit D to Defendant’s Motion.
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The facts are taken primarily from Plaintiff’s Complaint, his omnibus hearing
testimony, and his medical records, and are presented in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff.
Billups’s “Statement of Claim” contained in his Complaint filed in this case on
January 31, 2011, states as follows:
I went to medical in Sept. 2010 for a right knee injury. Doc
order[ed] x-ray in which I did not receive until Nov. 2010. I
wrote to Major Rushing and two days later on Dec. 24 I saw
Doc Sutton. He said I needed an orthopedic. Now this is Jan.
21 and my leg is still painful and swollen. This is failing to
provide proper, essential medical care. It’s the obligation of
the medical department of Hinds County to contract
physicians in order to maintain an incarcerated person’s
health care, because if I was free to seek my own help I
would.
As relief, Billups stated: “I want my knee fix and whatsoever is right for the bad
way I was treated. I say $1,000,000.”
Billups expanded on his claims at the omnibus hearing. Billups testified that he
fell from a top bunk in August 2010 and hurt his knee. Two weeks later, he was seen by
a physician. He testified that he was treated for the knee pain at HCDF by three different
doctors, including Dr. Williams, Dr. Sutton, and Dr. Tatum. Billups alleges that these
physicians all suggested that he be examined by an orthopedic physician, but he was
never allowed to see the specialist. He was given pain pills at one point and told that he
may have arthritis. Billups complained that the pain medications did not stop his pain.
He testified that he was able to walk without assistance, although his knee does swell.
Billups also testified that he had been gradually going blind in one eye for 1 ½
years. He was taken to an eye doctor and was supposed to go back for a follow-up
appointment; HCDF did not take him.
Billups’s medical records reveal that he had no medical condition when he
underwent a medical screening at booking on August 19, 2010. He was assessed by a
physician on September 6, 2010, and prescribed Ibuprofen 800 mg. On September 28,
2010, he was again treated by a physician for pain and inflammation to his knee. X-rays
were taken, and he was prescribed Naprosyn 500 mg.
2
Billups was seen again on November 30, 2010, and an x-ray was taken at that
time; the results were normal. He was seen by Dr. Lawrence Sutton on December 24,
2010. Dr. Billups ordered a Toradol 60 mg shot and a Decadron 12 mg shot, as well as a
Medrol dose pack, Flexeril 10 mg, and Naprosyn 500 mg. Dr. Sutton recommended that
Billups be referred to an orthopedic surgeon [ECF 30-4, p. 6, 8].
Dr. Michael Reddix denied the referral on March 28, 2011, stating that a second
opinion was needed [ECF No. 30-4, p. 5]. Dr. Tatum discontinued the referral after
examining Billups on March 31, 2011.
Billups was referred to an eye specialist by Dr. Tatum on March 31, 2011. His
right eye had vision loss, as well as a cloudy pupil, and Dr. Tatum diagnosed a cataract.
Billups was taken to the eye specialist, Dr. Bear, on April 19, 2011. Dr. Bear did not
order medication, but he changed Billups’s glasses prescription and directed him to return
in six weeks. Billups was seen by Dr. Bear again on May 31, 2011, and on September
23, 2011.
Billups testified that he had never met Defendant Joe Owens. He is suing
Defendant Owens because he is “over the nurses” in the medical department at HCDF.
Billups has not rebutted the assertions in Defendant Owens’s affidavit, quoted as follows:
...
3.
As the medical director, I oversee the medical unit at
the Hinds County Detention Facility in Raymond,
Mississippi, although I do not typically become
personally involved in the day to day medical care of
detainees and/or inmates.
4.
I had no personal involvement in the decision whether
to transfer Plaintiff for eye appointments and/or
appointments to see an orthopedic surgeon, or whether
such appointments were made and/or authorized.
...
ECF No. 30-2, p. 2.
2.
Summary Judgment Standard
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Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that
summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The United States Supreme Court
has held that this language “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient
showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). The substantive law establishes those elements on which a plaintiff
bears the burden of proof at trial; only facts relevant to those elements of proof are
considered for summary judgment purposes. Id. at 322. There is a genuine factual
dispute between the parties only “when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3.
Legal Analysis
A.
Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment does prohibit conduct which evinces deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need by its ban on cruel and unusual punishment; this
standard also applies to pretrial detainees. Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, on rehearing en
banc, 74 F.3d 633, 644-646 (5th Cir. 1996), appeal on remand, 35 F.3d 320 (5th Cir.
1998). Because Billups was a pretrial detainee during the time he was held in the HCDF,
the Court has reviewed his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mayfeather v. Foti,
958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1987). “[P]retrial
detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care unless the failure to supply that care is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Cupit, 835 F.2d at 85.
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The medical care received by a pretrial detainee may be deemed objectively
unreasonable where jail officials act “with subjective deliberate indifference to the
detainee’s rights.” Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t., 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996).
Nerren defined “subjective deliberate indifference” as subjective knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious medical harm, followed by a response of deliberate
indifference.” Id.
The evidence submitted in support of the dispositive motion is replete with proof
of frequent and adequate medical care. The fact that Billups may not have been satisfied
with the treatment or the type and amount of care he received is not indicative of its
"unreasonableness.” “The decision whether to provide additional treatment ‘is a classic
example of a matter for medical judgment’”and “[a] prisoner’s disagreement with his
medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances” does not satisfy the deliberate
indifference requirement. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Banuelos v.
McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995).
Billups’s own testimony defies a finding of “indifference.” He admits to having
been provided medical care by at least three different physicians— he was not satisfied
with the care provided. Medical personnel at HCDF did not fail to treat Billups; there is
much evidence of regular medical care in the records— he was simply not taken to an
orthopedic surgeon. Case law in the Fifth Circuit confirms that a prisoner is not entitled
to his choice of treatments. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006);
Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992). The fact that a plaintiff was not
satisfied with his care does not confirm that his constitutional rights were violated.
This Court cannot interfere with medical personnel’s diagnoses or judgment or
with the decisions they make relating to the appropriate treatment given an inmate. To
prove deliberate indifference, Billups must show that this Defendant “refused to treat
him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
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similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical
needs.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. The records rebut any showing of intentional
mistreatment; Billups’s complaints were addressed, not ignored, and there was no
“refusal” to treat.
To defeat a summary judgment motion, Billups must rely on specific evidence in
the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claims.
Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996). He cannot rely on
unsubstantiated, conclusory assertions or merely present a scintilla of evidence. Fiesel v.
Cherry, 294 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002), citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Billups has not pointed to any objective medical evidence in his
records which would support his claims that he suffers from a serious medical condition
and that his medical care for that condition was constitutionally inadequate.
Based upon the unrebutted medical evidence, no constitutional claim has been
stated, and the Court shall dismiss Billups’s complaint with prejudice.
B.
Immunity
Defendant Joe Owens also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity in
this case “insofar as [his] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). "Qualified immunity provides government
officials performing discretionary functions with a shield against civil damages liability,
so long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights
they are alleged to have violated." Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345. The immunity protects "all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs,
457 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). To overcome the immunity, a plaintiff must show that there
has been a violation of a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right and
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that the official's actions violated that right to the extent that an objectively reasonable
person would have known. Id., omitting citation.
Billups has not stated factual allegations which would overcome Defendant's
qualified immunity, and the Complaint must also be dismissed for this reason.
4.
Conclusion
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in this case
regarding any of Billups’s claims against Defendant Owens. Accordingly, Defendant
Owens is entitled to a judgment at law, and his Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.
30], shall be granted. Final Judgment in favor of Defendant Owen shall be entered on
this date.
SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of June, 2012.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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