Chapman v. City of Ridgeland, MS et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's 24 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Complaint with prejudice. Final Judgment in favor of Defendant shall be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 9/30/2013. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
MARCUS DEONTA CHAPMAN
V.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-cv-60-HTW-LRA
SHERIFF RANDALL C. TUCKER
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [24] filed
by Defendant Sheriff Randall C. Tucker, who was substituted as Defendant for former
Madison County Sheriff Toby Trowbridge under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court has considered all of the pleadings, including the responses [26 &
29] filed by Marcus Deonta Chapman [hereinafter “Plaintiff”], his sworn testimony given
at the omnibus hearing, his medical records, additional supporting documents, and the
applicable law. This review compels the Court to find that the motion is meritorious and
should be granted.
1.
Facts
Jurisdiction of this case is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was incarcerated
in the Madison County Detention Center (hereinafter referred to as “MCDC”) in 2006
where he was diagnosed with HIV. During this incarceration, Plaintiff contends that he
received four HIV prescriptions and extra portions of food for 3 ½ years until he was
released to the free world in May 2010. On or around September 20, 2010, Plaintiff was
arrested by the Ridgeland Police Department and was again housed at the MCDC. Upon
admission to the jail this second time, Plaintiff told the staff that he was unable to
remember the names of his prescription medications that he took in the free world. Yet
Plaintiff confirmed to the Court during his hearing that he was not taking nor had he been
taking any medication to treat his HIV infection since his release in May 2010.
Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive any HIV medication for his entire stay at
MCDC during this September 2010 through February 2011 incarceration. During the
Plaintiff’s initial medical staff screening at MCDC he gave the name of three HIV
prescribed medications that he had taken at the time of his release from the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections [“MDOC”] in May 2010. The Plaintiff signed an
authorization for release of medical information to the MSP (a/k/a MDOC) regarding all
information relating to his prior HIV treatment on September 20, 2010. According to
these records, Plaintiff only received the HIVdrug, Epivir, during his first incarceration.
There is no explanation of the discrepancy between the records and Plaintiff’s testimony.
Plaintiff’s medical records show that he received 150 mg of Epivir twice a day and
a One-A-Day vitamin, along with other medications, while housed at MCDC, i.e., from
September 23, 2010, through February 11, 2011. Additionally, the nurse who first
assessed Plaintiff when he arrived at MCDC gave an order to provide him with a nightly
snack; however, this order was subsequently withdrawn once it was determined that the
Plaintiff was not at any risk of losing weight. Plaintiff’s medical records verify that blood
urinalysis tests were performed on January 12, 2011, and that he had a chest x-ray
performed on October 1, 2010.
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The MCDC physician examined Plaintiff and referred him to an infectious disease
physician. An appointment was scheduled for Plaintiff with the specialist on March 1,
2011. However, Plaintiff was transferred from the MCDC on February 10, 2011, prior to
his scheduled appointment.
Dinah Hannah, the head nurse at the MCDC, employed by Southern Health
Providers [“SHP”], the inmate medical provider, executed an affidavit regarding the
procedure in place on September 20, 2010, for commencing a plan of care for a chronic
illness inmate brought from the free world to MCDC. Under the SHP’s policies and
procedures, detainees who have entered the MCDC from the free world will not be
prescribed any medication solely on the detainee’s representation unless he could provide
the MCDC medical staff with the actual prescription medication, and the prescription
could be verified by the prescribing physician.
The policy further stated that in the event a detainee is unable to present the
prescription medication, the medication will only be prescribed once it can be confirmed
through either his free world health care provider or through a previous prison facility
where the detainee has been housed. If medication cannot be confirmed, the detainee will
only be prescribed medication after being seen by a physician who is qualified to treat his
chronic illness.
Plaintiff explained to the Court his concern about the release of his medical
records and his health information. He testified that numerous officers asked him about
his HIV infection and told other officers about his illness. He alleges that the MCDC
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“medical field” is responsible for the release of his confidential medical information to
the officers.
Plaintiff testified that he was a female impersonator and that he dresses as a female
in the free world. When he was first arrested, he had long hair, eyelashes, and nails.
According to Plaintiff, the jail officials questioned him about whether he would be safe if
he were housed with men. The officials segregated him from the other male inmates, and
this is one of Plaintiff’s complaints. Plaintiff does admit that he could have been
segregated for his own safety. Plaintiff testified that he was segregated from the general
population on numerous occasions, nearly the entire time he was housed in MCDC.
According to Plaintiff, the officials explained it was because of the way he looked. His
MCDC records corroborate that he had caused problems while housed with other
prisoners and complained to Captain Watson about other male prisoners’ sexual advances
towards him. The detention center records indicate that the Plaintiff requested to be
placed in segregation or in a medical cell to keep him separate from sexual advances of
other male inmates. On one occasion, Plaintiff was placed in segregation for a period of
four days on suicide watch after he expressed suicidal thought to a detention center
officer. Plaintiff alleges that when he was segregated from other inmates he was deprived
privileges such as watching TV and using the phone.
Plaintiff summarized his charges in his Complaint as: (1) that he was HIV positive
and had not received his needed medication for this illness; (2) that MCDC officials failed
to provide him with proper medication to treat his illness; (3) that he was segregated
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because of his sexual orientation; (4) that officers at MCDC called him names and
criticized him; and (5) that medical staff released his confidential medical information.
2.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that the
court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a). The United States Supreme Court has held that this language “mandates
the entry of summary judgement, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make sufficient showing to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The substantive law
establishes those elements on which a plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial; only
facts relevant to those elements of proof are considered for summary judgment purposes.
Id. at 332. There is a genuine factual dispute between the parties only “when a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3.
Legal Analysis
A.
Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment does prohibit conduct which evinces deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need by its ban on cruel and unusual punishment; this
standard also applies to pretrial detainees. Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, on rehearing en
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banc, 74 F.3d 633, 644-646 (5th Cir. 1996), appeal on remand, 35 F.3d 320 (5th Cir.
1998). Because Chapman was a pretrial detainee during the time he was held in the
Madison facility, the Court has reviewed his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mayfeather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.
1987). “[P]retrial detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care unless the failure to
supply that care is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Cupit, 835
F.2d at 85.
The medical care received by a pretrial detainee may be deemed objectively
unreasonable where jail officials act “with subjective deliberate indifference to the
detainee’s rights.” Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t., 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996).
Nerren defined “subjective deliberate indifference” as subjective knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious medical harm, followed by a response of deliberate
indifference.” Id.
The evidence submitted in support of the dispositive motion contains 59 pages of
medical records regarding Plaintiff’s treatment received while he was housed in Madison
County. These records also contain charts regarding the suicide watch he was placed on
for a period of time while housed there. The records confirm that Plaintiff was not taking
any HIV medications while in the free world, and the jail’s policy prevented him from
receiving immediate medications. The medical records do indicate that Plaintiff was
prescribed 150 mg. of Epivir twice a day after he was initially assessed on September 23,
2010, and that this medication was ordered from the pharmacy. The records also confirm
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that Plaintiff was scheduled for an appointment with an infectious disease clinic in March
2011, but he was transferred by MDOC prior to this appointment. Although Plaintiff
testified that he lost weight, the records disprove this allegation. His medical records
show that Plaintiff weighed 168 pounds when he entered MCDC on September 20, 2010;
173 pounds on September 30, 2010; 171 pounds on January 12, 2011; and 168 pounds on
February 8, 2011, two days before he left the MCDC. He was seen by medical staff on
September 23, 2010, and prescribed amudivine and a multivitamin. Chest x-rays and
other tests were performed on September 30, 2010. He was treated again on January 12,
2011, and on February 9, 2011.
The medical records confirm that Plaintiff complained of a sore in his mouth in
late December 2010 and in January 2011. He was examined by medical personnel and
the referral to an infectious disease specialist was made. While he was incarcerated in
Madison County, Chapman filed approximately seven sick call requests; he was
examined or treated by medical personnel on each occasion, according to the records.
Plaintiff was only housed in Madison County the second time for approximately
five months. The records do not confirm that his health suffered during this period. His
weight was maintained. Although he claims to have not received “his medications,” he
did receive the medication ordered by medical personnel. Apparently Plaintiff wanted to
be treated the same and to be prescribed all of the same medications he had been getting
during the earlier incarceration. However, there is no constitutional requirement that the
same medical regimen be granted him.
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To defeat a summary judgment motion, Chapman must rely on specific evidence in
the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claims.
Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996). He cannot rely on
unsubstantiated, conclusory assertions or merely present a scintilla of evidence. Fiesel v.
Cherry, 294 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002), citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Chapman has not pointed to any objective medical evidence in his
records which would support his claims that he was not treated for his HIV. Although he
testified that he did not receive any medications, his primary complaint is that he did not
receive the HIV medications that he had taken during his first stay at MCDC. The
records confirm that he did, in fact, receive an HIV medication soon after his arrival at
Madison County. The treatment he received may not have been what he desired, but this
Court does not monitor precise treatments given by the medical providers. He has not
shown that Defendant Sheriff Trowbridge, or any medical personnel, denied him care for
that condition which was constitutionally inadequate. The fact that Chapman may not
have been satisfied with the treatment or the type and amount of care he received while
housed in Madison County is not indicative of its "unreasonableness.” “The decision
whether to provide additional treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment’”and “[a] prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment, absent
exceptional circumstances” does not satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235
(5th Cir. 1995).
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Chapman’s own testimony defies a finding of “indifference.” He admits that he
was seen by medical personnel upon his arrival and thereafter. He was simply displeased
with the care he received. He also confirms that Sheriff Trowbridge was not personally
involved in his care; he simply wrote him several letters. Case law in the Fifth Circuit
confirms that a prisoner is not entitled to his choice of treatments. Gobert v. Caldwell,
463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992). The
fact that a plaintiff was not satisfied with his care does not confirm that his constitutional
rights were violated.
This Court cannot interfere with medical personnel’s diagnoses or judgment or
with the decisions they make relating to the appropriate treatment given an inmate. To
prove deliberate indifference, Chapman must show that this Defendant “refused to treat
him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical
needs.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. The records rebut any showing of intentional
mistreatment; Chapman’s complaints were addressed, not ignored, and there was no
“refusal” to treat.
Based upon the unrebutted medical evidence, no constitutional claim has been
stated, and the Court shall dismiss Chapman’s complaint with prejudice as to his medical
care. Additionally, “[u]nder § 1983, supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the
actions of subordinates under any theory of vicarious liability.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828
F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). Sheriff Trowbridge and his successor contracted the
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medical care provided at the jail with SHP. If his medical care was inadequate, Plaintiff
must establish pursuant to § 1983 that the policy promulgated by Sheriff Trowbridge at
the MCDC was the cause of the alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1381 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff must show the Court
that Sheriff Trowbridge executed a policy, custom, or practice which demonstrates a
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs, as well as showing that the challenged
policy was the driving force of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Monell v.
Dept. of Social Sciences, 426 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The deliberate indifference standard
is a very difficult burden to meet, and Plaintiff has failed to do so under the circumstances
of this case. See Domino v. Texas Dept. Of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.
2001).
B.
Segregation
Plaintiff charges that while he was housed at MCDC from September 2010 until
February 2011, he was segregated from the general population because he was a
homosexual female impersonator and because of his HIV-positive status. Plaintiff
testified at his omnibus hearing that due to his feminine nature, there was a concern that
other male prisoners might be attracted to him. His MCDC records corroborate the
Plaintiff’s testimony, and confirm that when he was housed among other male prisoners
he created a risk both to himself and other detainees. “[T]he identification and segregation
of HIV-positive prisoners obviously serves a legitimate penological interest.” Moore v.
Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992). In Luken, the court found that correctional
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facilities have a real interest in protecting detainees and held that “administrative
segregation without more, does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally
cognizable liberty interest.” Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1196 (1996).
Courts seldom interfere with the administration of correctional facilities. “A
detainee’s constitutional rights must be exercised with due regard for the ‘inordinately
difficult undertaking’ that is modern prison administration[.]” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)). Further, a
detainee retains only those rights that are “not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrective system.” Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Based upon Plaintiff’s testimony, his MCDC file, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that no constitutional claim has been stated.
C.
Right to Privacy
In Plaintiff’s omnibus hearing, he testified that several unnamed officers informed
him that they were aware of his HIV-positive status. He further testified that his
confidential medical information must have been released by someone on the medical
staff at MCDC. However, nowhere in his Complaint or his testimony does he identify
any detention center official who actually made derogatory remarks to him regarding his
sexual orientation or his medical status. Generally, the constitutional rights of prisoners
are necessarily subject to considerable restrictions and limitations in order for correctional
officials to achieve legitimate penological goals and maintain institutional security. Pell,
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417 U.S. at 822. Segregation of AIDS sufferers from the general population does not
violate a prisoner’s constitutional right, including privacy, so long as the constitutional
right asserted is outweighed by the legitimate penological interest. Moore, 976 F.2d at
271. Additionally, abusive language of a custodial officer does not, even if true, amount
to a constitutional violation. McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s vague allegations regarding the remarks made
by unknown jail officials, or the release of his medical information by an unknown
person, do not state a constitutional violation against the Sheriff.
D.
Defendant Sheriff Toby Trowbridge or Sheriff Tucker
The Court finds that, taking everything Plaintiff has stated as being true, he still
will not be able to set forth a constitutional claim upon which relief can be granted. Even
if a constitutional violation has been stated, there could be no liability on the part of the
Defendant Sheriff. There are insufficient facts stated by Plaintiff to sustain a claim of
supervisory liability against Defendant Sheriff Trowbridge or his successor under § 1983
as to any of Plaintiff’s claims.
As stated earlier, there is no respondeat superior theory of liability under § 1983.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95. To impose liability against the Sheriff in his official capacity
under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate a policy promulgated by the Sheriff at the
MCDC that was the cause of the alleged constitutional violation. Richardson v. Oldham,
12 F.3d 1373, 1381 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff admitted at his omnibus hearing that
Defendant Sheriff Trowbridge was not personally involved in the provision of his medical
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treatment while at MCDC. He stated that the only reason he sued Defendant Sheriff
Trowbridge was because he “is over everybody.”
Plaintiff’s case is not based on Defendant Sheriff Trowbridge’s personal
involvement or his enforcement of a policy, custom or practice. There is no policy in
place at MCDC that provides for inadequate care to detainees, or for releases of
unauthorized medical information, or for segregating inmates due to discriminatory
policies. There is no §1983 liability based upon a conclusory theory that a defendant is
liable because of his supervisory capacity. For these reasons, the Complaint must be
dismissed in its entirety against Defendant Sheriff Trowbridge, as well as his successor.
4.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [24] should be and is hereby granted, and the Complaint is dismissed
with prejudice. Final Judgment in favor of Defendant Trowbridge and his successor,
Randall C. Tucker, shall be entered on this date.
SO ORDERED, this the 30th day of September 2013.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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