Woods v. Epps et al

Filing 20

ORDER: As discussed in the order, Plaintiff's request for release from incarceration is denied as moot. Plaintiff's request for monetary damages is dismissed with prejudice, as legally frivolous until the Heck conditions are met. A judgment will be entered in a separate docket entry to follow. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on August 27, 2012.(SP)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
CASEY WOODS
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-cv-460-DPJ-FKB

CHRISTOPHER EPPS, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

This cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff
Woods was an inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) when he filed
filed this pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was granted in forma
pauperis status prior to his release from incarceration.1 The named Defendants are
Christopher Epps, Commissioner of MDOC; and the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
Upon liberal review of the Complaint and subsequent pleadings, the Court has reached the
following conclusions.
I.

Background
On October 20, 2009, while incarcerated within the MDOC, Plaintiff was found guilty of

a rule violation report for “possession of major contraband -electronic devices or parts.” Compl.
at 2. As a result, Plaintiff lost 180 days of “earned time” sentence credits.2 Plaintiff claims that
he was serving a mandatory sentence in 2009, thus he was not receiving earned time and

1

Plaintiff was granted pauper status on August 17, 2011, and according to the Plaintiff, he was
released from incarceration on December 14, 2011.
2

Plaintiff also states that as punishment he was placed in segregation for 20 days, his
classification level was reduced and his visitation and canteen usage was limited. Plaintiff only asserts
complaints regarding the loss of earned time in this case.

essentially this punishment caused him to serve an additional 180 days of imprisonment.3
Plaintiff seeks immediate release from incarceration and monetary damages as relief.
II.

Analysis
The in forma pauperis statute mandates dismissal “at any time” if the Court determines

an action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “is frivolous or malicious.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). The Fifth Circuit deems a complaint to be frivolous “if it lacks
an arguable basis in law or fact or if there is no realistic chance of ultimate success.” Henthorn v.
Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 1992). Since the Court has permitted Plaintiff Woods to
proceed in forma pauperis in this action, his Complaint is subject to the case screening
procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).4
A. Release from incarceration
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s request for release from incarceration is
properly sought in a habeas corpus action and not a civil rights complaint pursuant to § 1983.
See Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)(holding habeas corpus is exclusive
federal remedy available to state prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their
confinement and seeking speedier or immediate release from incarceration). With that said,
the Court finds that a habeas petition seeking the restoration of sentence credits to a term of

3

Plaintiff states that starting in 1993, he began serving a non-mandatory 7-year term of
imprisonment which he completed, with the benefit of earned time credits, in June of 1996. Plaintiff
maintains that at that time, he began serving a consecutive 15- year term of imprisonment for a
subsequent conviction as a habitual offender, which is a mandatory sentence.
4

Plaintiff’s release from incarceration during the pendency of this case does not effect the
Court’s ability to dismiss this case under § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Hoffman v. Stulga, 464 F. App’x 229
(5th Cir. 2011)(affirming dismissal of former prisoner’s § 1983 complaint under § 1915(e)(2)).

2

imprisonment that has been completed is moot. See Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278
(5th Cir. 1987) (holding prisoner’s appeal from the denial of a habeas petition challenging
prison disciplinary infraction which sought restoration of good-time credits was moot after
petitioner’s release). In order to defeat mootness, Plaintiff must show that he will be subject
to a future adverse consequence as a result of the disciplinary action. Id. Plaintiff has made
no such showing. See Watkins v. Vasquez, 451 F. App’x 429, 430 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding
prisoner’s need for a favorable habeas decision invalidating his prison disciplinary conviction in
order to pursue a civil rights action for damages is not sufficient to defeat mootness); see also
Adair v. Dretke, 150 F. App’x 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2005)(dismissing appeal as moot that
sought reversal of an order reinstating good-time credits finding such relief “would have no
effect on either party” after the prisoner’s release). Thus, Plaintiff’s request for release from
incarceration is denied as moot.
B. Request for monetary damages
A civil rights action under § 1983 is the appropriate or available remedy for a prisoner’s
damages claim. In order to recover damages for unconstitutional imprisonment that would
necessarily imply the invalidity of an inmate’s sentence, he must demonstrate that the conviction
or sentence has previously been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
The Heck doctrine applies to § 1983 claims by state prisoners challenging the validity of
disciplinary actions and the loss of good-time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648
(1997). In Balisok, the Court found a prisoner’s claims for declaratory relief and money damages
based on alleged defects in his disciplinary process to be barred by the Heck doctrine because
such claims would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.” Id. If the
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Court were to find in Plaintiff’s favor and determine that his punishment from a prison
disciplinary action was invalid, it would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment
imposed.” Id. Plaintiff’s disciplinary action and resulting punishment have not been
invalidated.5 Furthermore, the Court notes that Heck’s favorable termination rule applies to
Plaintiffs that are no longer in custody and unable to file a habeas petition. See Thomas v. La.,
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App’x 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010)(citing Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d
300, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2000)). For the same reasons set forth in Balisok, Plaintiff’s claim for
damages is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time.
III.

Conclusion
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s request for release from incarceration is denied as moot.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary damages is dismissed with prejudice, as legally frivolous until
the Heck conditions are met. See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996)(finding
Heck barred claims are legally frivolous); Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir.
1996)(holding Heck barred claims are properly dismissed with prejudice).
A Final Judgment in accordance with this Order will be entered.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 27th day of August, 2012.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5

Plaintiff was ordered to specifically state if his rule violation report had been invalidated by any
of the means set forth in Heck. See Order [ECF No. 8]; Resp. [ECF No. 9].

4