Torns v. Epps et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set out in the order. A judgment will be entered in a separate docket entry to follow. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on August 28, 2012. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
CHARLES TORNS, JR.
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-563-DPJ-FKB

CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, Commissioner for MDOC,
EMMITT L. SPARKMAN, Deputy, RONALD KING,
Superintendent for SMCI, JOHN/JANE DOES, Liability
and Insurers for Each Defendant

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This civil-rights action is before the Court on the unopposed motion [13] of Defendants
Christopher Epps, Emmitt Sparkman, and Ronald King for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Court, having considered Defendants’ submission and the
pertinent authorities, finds that Defendants’ motion should be granted.
I.

Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff Charles Torns, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other statutes, for alleged
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Torns alleges that Defendants, as
employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) charged with running MDOC,
prevented Torns from corresponding by U.S. Mail with MDOC prisoner Garry Lee Moore on
several dates in March, April, and May 2011. Compl. [1] ¶ 4. He contends that Defendants
prohibited him from sending and Moore from receiving correspondence involving pending
litigation and that such correspondence was opened and scanned for contraband. Id. ¶¶ 8–14.
Torns seeks a money judgment against Defendants in their official and individual
capacities. Id. at 4. There are no claims for injunctive relief, perhaps because Torns was

released before filing suit. Defendants answered [6] the Complaint and later filed the instant
Motion to Dismiss [13] all claims against them based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Torns
failed to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. The Court is prepared to rule.
II.

Standard
Defendants move to dismiss Torns’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The party asserting subjectmatter jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Davis v. United States, 597 F.3d 646, 649 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). “A
Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted only ‘if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a
plausible set of facts that establish subject-matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (citation omitted). In ruling
on a 12(b)(1) motion, “the court may consider any one of the following: (1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint plus undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint, undisputed
facts, and the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Id. at 649–50 (citing Lane v. Halliburton, 529
F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008)); see Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1981).
III.

Analysis
A.

Official Capacity Claims

According to Defendants, Torns’s claims against them in their official capacities are
barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment “bars suits in federal court
by citizens of a state against their own state or a state agency or department.” Delahoussaye v.
City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 146 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Such claims must be
pursued in state court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“We hold that the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power
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to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts”). An officialcapacity suit for damages is essentially a suit against the State and is subject to sovereign
immunity. See Marquez v. Woody, 440 F. App’x 318, 324 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(citation omitted) (noting that claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the state that employs the officers is the
real party in interest); Fennell v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 273 F.3d 1100, No. 00-50374, 2001 WL
1075862, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001) (per curiam table decision) (“Suits against state officers
in their official capacities seeking the payment of moneys from the state treasury for alleged
compensatory damages, monetary damages, and payments in the nature of equitable restitution
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” (citation omitted)). Torns failed to respond to the
Motion to Dismiss. The Court finds that Torns’s claims for damages against Defendants in their
official capacities should be dismissed.
B.

Individual Capacity Claims

Defendants also seek dismissal of the individual capacity claims “on grounds of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Defs.’ Mot. [13]. But the Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage
suits against state officials in their individual capacities. Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 183
(5th Cir. 2006). Defendants’ Motion therefore fails to plead grounds for dismissing the
individual capacity claims. That said, the Court has authority to dismiss the Complaint “at any
time,” sua sponte, if the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to “any IFP suit.” Allard v. Quinlan Pest
Control Co., 387 F. App’x 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (applying § 1915 to suit by

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released prisoner). The Court therefore considers the federal and state claims under §
1915(e)(2)(B).1
1.

Federal Claims

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who, while acting under color of state
law, violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well-settled, however, that
“there is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under § 1983.” Rios v. City
of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Thus, a supervisory
official may be held liable under § 1983 only “if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that
cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally
result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
Here, Torns avers that each Defendant is an MDOC employee “with the duty and
responsibility to ensure that their actions and the orderly running of the Department are in
compliances [sic] with the applicable Federal and State Laws.” Compl. [1] ¶ 3. Torns alleges
generally that “defendants prohibited the mail correspondences” and that “defendants
actions/inactions” violated his constitutional rights. He fails, however, to plead any specificity
regarding Defendants’ alleged actions, their personal involvement in alleged deprivations, or a

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Section 1915(e)(2)(B) “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Here, Defendants’ Memorandum [14]
references a fact-based argument for dismissal of the § 1983 claims in footnote 3, and supports
that argument with record evidence. But because Defendants failed to move under Rule 56, the
Court finds that review of this issue should be limited to the allegations of the Complaint
resulting in dismissal without prejudice.
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causal connection. See Compl. [1] ¶¶ 8–14. The Court therefore concludes that Torns has
impermissibly pleaded respondeat superior liability. See Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382
(5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”).
Because there is no such liability, Torns’s federal claims against these Defendants in their
individual capacities are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Tuma v.
Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., No. 3:09cv517-DPJ-FKB, 2012 WL 1229133, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
Apr. 10, 2012) (“Although a court may dismiss the claim, it should not do so without granting
leave to amend, unless the defect is simply incurable or the plaintiff has failed to plead with
particularity after being afforded repeated opportunities to do so.” (citation omitted)).
2.

State Law Claims

Defendants also claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars “any claims” asserted under the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) applies. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq.; see Defs.’
Mem. [14] at 9. The argument is true as for claims against the state or its employees in their
official capacities filed in federal court because the MTCA “preserves all immunities granted by
the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461
F.3d 584, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-46-5(4)). But the Eleventh
Amendment argument falls short when applied to individual-capacity claims. See Modica, 465
F.3d at 183.
That said, the MTCA itself bars Torns’s claims. The MTCA begins by acknowledging
that Mississippi “has always” recognized sovereign immunity for the state and its political
subdivisions. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3. It then waives its sovereign immunity as a state “from
claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such governmental entities and the torts of
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their employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment.” Id. § 11-465(1). But that waiver is limited, and the MTCA maintains immunity for government employees
sued in their individual capacity:
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held personally liable
for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee’s
duties.
Id. § 11-46-7(2). Exceptions to this provision exist, but none apply.2
To the extent Torns seeks damages under the MTCA against the individual defendants in
their official capacities, the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed
without prejudice. To the extent he pursues MTCA claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities, the claims are barred by the MTCA and dismissed with prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff Charles Torns’s state-law claims

against Defendants Epps, Sparkman, and King in their individual capacities are dismissed with
prejudice. All other claims are dismissed without prejudice.
A separate final judgment shall issue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 28th day of August, 2012.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Defendants cited section 11-46-7(2) in their Memorandum, but couched the argument in
terms of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Defs.’ Mem. [14] at 9–10. Torns never responded,
and never explained how he is entitled to pursue individual capacity claims against governmental
employees under the MTCA. Regardless, the Court has authority to dismiss the claim sua sponte
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
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