Evans v. State of Mississippi et al

Filing 66

Memorandum Opinion and Order re 58 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, 1 Complaint, 65 MOTION for settlement conference. Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as "frivolous." Motions 58 and 65 are denied as moot. A separate judgment will be entered. (Copy mailed to Plaintiff at address listed on docket sheet.) Signed by Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball on 5/10/13. (YWJ)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
OLLIE LEE EVANS

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO.3:12cv88-FKB

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court held an omnibus hearing1 in this matter, at which time it conferred with
Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants in this suit founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At that
hearing, the parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all
further proceedings in the case and order the entry of final judgment, and the District Judge
subsequently entered an order of reference. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Evans is
proceeding in this matter in forma pauperis and pro se.
For the reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as “frivolous.”2 Accordingly, this matter is dismissed
with prejudice, and a separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58.

1

See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).

2

The term "frivolous" in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) does not mean that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim, "but it is to be equated with the raising of a wholly
insubstantial federal claim." Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1991). In other
words, the action may be dismissed if it has no arguable basis for relief either in law or fact.
Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, a case may be found to be legally
"frivolous" where it seeks to assert a "right" or address a "wrong" clearly not recognized by
federal law. See, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).

I. Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff’s claims arise from the time he was housed as a convicted prisoner at the Central
Mississippi Correctional Facility, located in Pearl, Mississippi, and at the Mississippi State
Penitentiary, located in Parchman, Mississippi. Plaintiff has sued various prison officials located
at both facilities. According to his complaint, the filings in the docket, and his omnibus hearing
testimony, Evans is aggrieved that Defendants denied his request for a prison job located at the
Mississippi Governor’s Mansion in Jackson, Mississippi, because of his “sex charge.” With this
denial, Evans alleges that Defendants have discriminated against him because of his race and
have committed “gender” discrimination against him based on the nature of his conviction,
which he describes as a “sex charge.” Plaintiff alleges that the denial of the job at the
Mississippi Governor’s Mansion also demonstrates “deliberate indifference” to him. Plaintiff
admitted at the omnibus hearing that no inmates currently work at the Mississippi Governor’s
Mansion as a part of a prison work program. As relief, Plaintiff requests three million dollars in
damages and release from prison. Although his complaint admits that he filed this action before
completing any administrative remedy regarding these claims, at the omnibus hearing he stated
that he has completed the Administrative Remedy Program.
II. Discussion
Having considered the Plaintiff’s omnibus hearing testimony, his Complaint, and his
various filings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations simply do not state a claim of
constitutional proportions. In simple terms, Plaintiff complains that he was denied a prison job
based upon his inmate classification which, according to his filings, is based in part upon his
conviction of a “sex charge.” His claim fails on two bases. First, it is well-settled that a prisoner

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does not have a legitimate property interest in certain jobs which would entitle him to due
process protection. Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1995).
Second, the restrictions on his privileges and classifications fail to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation because they do not “impose atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
(1995). Because “a prison inmate does not have a protectable liberty or property interest in his
custodial classification,” logic dictates that “an inmate’s disagreement with a classification is
insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.
1995)(citing Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1992)). Put another way, because the
plaintiff relies on a "legally nonexistent interest, any alleged due process or other constitutional
violation arising from his classification is indisputably meritless." Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d
716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (a Mississippi case). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are meritless and are
hereby dismissed.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed with prejudice, as “frivolous.” Because the Court finds that dismissal of the action is
appropriate, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 58) and Motion for
Settlement Conference (Docket No. 65) are denied as moot. Pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a separate judgment will be entered.
SO ORDERED, this the 10th day of May, 2013.
/s/ F. Keith Ball
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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