Dill v. TransAmerica Life Insurance Company et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 10 Motion to Remand. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 5/30/2012. (AC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
JOHN W. DILL

PLAINTIFF

v.

Cause No. 3:12-CV-139-CWR-FKB

TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY; LOYAL AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY; GREAT
AMERICAN FINANCIAL RESOURCES;
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF
ILLINOIS

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Pending before the Court is the plaintiff’s motion to remand. Docket No. 10. The
defendants oppose the motion. Docket Nos. 12-14. The motion will be denied.
John Dill filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Smith County, Mississippi, alleging that
the defendants failed to pay benefits for the care of Dill’s late wife pursuant to one or more
insurance policies. Docket No. 1-1, at 3-4. He claimed that the defendants’ failures constituted a
breach of their duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 4. The defendants jointly removed the case
to this Court, claiming the presence of a federal question. Docket No. 1.
Dill’s motion summarily asserts that remand is appropriate. Docket No. 10. He cites no
authority and provides no explanation for that conclusion; his two-page motion is a recitation of
purported facts. Id. Dill also failed to file the supporting memorandum brief required by the Local
Rules. L.U.Civ.R. 7(b)(4) (“At the time the motion is served, other than motions or applications that
may be heard ex parte or those involving necessitous or urgent matters, counsel for movant must file
a memorandum brief in support of the motion.”).
The defendants’ response explains that Dill seeks benefits from an employee welfare benefit
plan governed by ERISA. Docket No. 12, at 2-3. His state law claim for their alleged failures to
pay under that plan is therefore preempted by federal law, making federal question jurisdiction
appropriate. Id.
“It is well established that state law claims are preempted if they ‘relate to’ an ERISA plan.
ERISA’s preemption clause states that ERISA ‘shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employer benefit plan.’” McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179,

189 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). “Under ERISA, an ‘employee welfare benefit
plan’ is defined, in part, as ‘any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer
. . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1)).
The defendants’ response brief and attached affidavit establish that the plan at issue is an
employee welfare benefit plan. Docket Nos. 12; 12-1. Without argument or contrary evidence from
the plaintiff, the Court concludes that the coverage in question derives from an ERISA plan. It
further finds that Dill’s state law claim addresses his right to receive benefits from that ERISA plan.
See id. at 191. The claim is therefore preempted by ERISA and “recast” as a federal cause of action,
which establishes federal question jurisdiction in this Court. Blaylock v. Mut. of New York Life Ins.
Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 778, 787 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (citation omitted).
This conclusion should come as no surprise to counsel for plaintiff, considering his prior
involvement in similar cases. E.g., Sims v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 789 F. Supp. 781, 783-84
(S.D. Miss. 1992) (denying plaintiff’s motion to remand case alleging bad faith breach of ERISAgoverned plan, and noting the “absence of any argument by plaintiff to the contrary”).
The motion to remand is denied.
SO ORDERED, this the 30th day of May, 2012.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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