Cunningham v. Lewis et al
Filing
49
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants' 45 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Final Judgment in favor of all Defendants shall be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 3/27/2014. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
FELIX CALVIN CUNNINGHAM
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12cv443-LRA
TYRONE LEWIS, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Felix Calvin Cunningham was formerly housed at the Hinds County
Detention Center (HCDC) in Raymond, Mississippi, as a pretrial detainee. He has since
been released. Presently before the Court is the motion of Defendants for summary
judgment. This Court conducted an omnibus hearing on January 24, 2013, and held a
hearing on Defendants' motion for summary judgment on February 18, 2014. Plaintiff
never filed a written response to the motion, but the Court shall consider his sworn
testimony in response to the motion as well as his pleadings. He filed this § 1983 action
alleging unconstitutional conditions at the jail. Having considered the motion and the
competent summary judgment evidence, the Court concludes that the motion should be
granted.
Plaintiff was housed in the Hinds County Detention Center as a pretrial detainee for
approximately 16 months during 2011 and 2012. He filed his Complaint on May 29, 2012,
along with three other inmates, including Demario Walker, Jeffrey Tyrone Harvey, and
Vincent E. Donelson. By Order filed June 29, 2012, [1] the Court directed that the cases
be severed and that four separate lawsuits should proceed. Cunningham, along with the
other inmates, charged that their conditions of confinement in the detention center
violated their constitutional rights. According to the Court’s docket, the lawsuits filed by
the other three plaintiffs have now been dismissed for failure to prosecute or for failure to
pay filing fees. Less than four months later, on September 12, 2012, Cunningham filed
another suit based on the conditions of his confinement in the HCDC [Cause No.
3:12cv634-CWR-FKB].1 That Complaint was dismissed by District Judge Reeves by
Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dismissal filed November 1, 2012, (2012 WL
5384642). Many of the same claims already made in the instant Complaint were repeated
in that Complaint, and Judge Reeves dismissed them as malicious. The primary new
allegations in 3:12cv634 concerned a riot which occurred in July 2012, and Judge Reeves
dismissed those claims on the merits. Many of the claims considered on the merits by
Judge Reeves were similar to those made herein, and the findings in that case are noted
by the Court herein.
The joint statement of the claims is quoted from the Complaint as follows:
Plaintiffs were assaulted, denied access to medical care,
denied adequate medical care, denied adequate, safe, reliable
housing, exposed to disease and contagion. Denied access to
a law library. Denied sanitary clothing & bedding. Denied
healthful nutritious adequate food and diets, sleep deprived,
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Subjected to
inadequate classification and dangers. Unsanitary living and
eating and housing environment. No eating utensils. Violation
of mail privileges. Will amend to quote specifics. Plaintiffs all
have immediate danger and harm.
1
The Court notes that Cunningham has also filed Cunningham v. Jackson Police
Dept., Cause No. 3:12cv615-FKB and Cunningham v. Jackson Police Dept., Cause No.
3:12cv627-WHB-LRA. In the former case, he challenged his arrest, and the Complaint
was dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In the latter case, his
claims were habeas in nature, and the Court dismissed them because Cunningham had
not exhausted in the state courts. See Mem. Opinion and Order of Dismissal [10], dated
September 25, 2012.
2
In the Omnibus Order [43], Plaintiff was directed to amend to specifically state his claims
against each Defendant by April 20, 2013; he has failed to file any additional amendments
since that Order was entered.
Generally, Plaintiff contends that his conditions were constitutionally inadequate at
the HCDC. Specifically, he charges that he did not receive medical care for his neck
when he requested treatment. He had spasms in his neck due to an accident in 1997 and
he should have been prescribed Flexoril but was instead only provided Tylenol or generic
aspirin. He was not provided dental work that he needed in a timely manner. He further
testified that the cells’ doors in the pod could be popped by other inmates at any time, and
several times other inmates came in his cell and stole his belongings. He also charges
that the staff would not bring in cleaning products but one time every week or two, and the
cells were unsanitary. Mold grew in the showers and in the cells, and he could have
gotten sick. The cleaning at the jail improved beginning in July 2012. He did not get sick,
although he believes he developed athletes' foot because of the mold. Plaintiff also
contends that the bedding clothes were not changed regularly; sometime he had to go
weeks without the sheets being washed. Sometimes he had to wash his own clothes.
Plaintiff contends that he was denied access to the law library during most of his
stay; however, he concedes that he did have a lawyer for the legal cases he was
pursuing.
Plaintiff named approximately 15 Defendants, including individual guards and
medical providers. The summonses were returned unexecuted as to all but Sheriffs
McMillin and Lewis, Hinds County, and Captain Ivy. Judge Wingate dismissed the Hinds
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County Board of Supervisors by Memorandum Opinion and Order filed August 20, 2012
[15].
Defendants have asserted that they are entitled to qualified immunity in this case.
When a defendant asserts this defense, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that it is
inapplicable. Hampton v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 480 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir.
2007); Atteberry v. Nocona General Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005). For the
reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff Cunningham has failed to rebut
Defendants' assertions by competent evidence.
Section 1983 prohibits the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state
law. As the United States Supreme Court has taught, “the treatment a prisoner receives
in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth
Amendment applies to the State of Mississippi and its agencies by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment for crimes. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991). The
amendment’s protection extends to prohibit deprivations that are not specifically a part of
a prison sentence, but are suffered as the result of imprisonment. Id. at 297, citing Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The amendment requires prison officials to provide
humane conditions of confinement, including adequate medical care. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the analysis is much the same. Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 135 F.3d
320, 326-7 (5th Cir. 1998).
4
The elements of proof in a case involving conditions of confinement are twofold and
include: (1) an objective component, under which the inmate must prove his exposure to a
harm or injury that violates contemporaneous standards of decency; and (2) a subjective
component, under which the inmate or pretrial detainee must prove that the prison
authorities’ current conduct evidences a deliberate indifference to that exposure. Helling,
509 U.S. at 35-36; Hare, 135 F.3d 327. In other words, under the objective component,
the deprivation alleged must be “sufficiently serious,” resulting in “a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective component, “the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
In defense, prison officials may show that they did not know of the indications of
substantial danger and were, therefore, unaware of the danger, or that they knew the
indications but believed that the risk involved was “insubstantial or nonexistent,” or that
they “responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.
at 844-45.
Because he was a pretrial detainee during his stay in the HCDC, Cunningham had
a clearly established constitutional right to be free from punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996).
In a conditions-
of-confinement case, the "harm" is caused by the condition itself, such as when
inadequate food, heating, or sanitary conditions themselves constitute miserable
conditions. Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997); Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631
F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) (the conditions of a pretrial detainees's detention may be so
harmful or dangerous that the conditions themselves may amount to impermissible
5
“punishment.”). A constitutional violation may occur when the complained of condition
results in “serious deficiencies” in providing for the detainee’s “basic human needs.”
Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009).
Constitutional challenges may be brought by a pretrial detainee under two
alternative theories: as an attack on a ‘condition of confinement’ or as an ‘episodic act or
omission.” Id. at 452. In this case, most of Plaintiff’s claims primarily focus on the
conditions of his confinement rather than an episodic act or acts.2 Therefore, under the
law he must prove the “existence of an identifiable intended condition or practice that was
not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Id. at 455. The practice
may be an explicit policy, such as a written rule, or it may also be manifested by a de
facto policy. The latter must be by “...acts or omissions sufficiently extended or pervasive
... to prove an intended condition or practice.” Id. In such a case, the intent to punish
may be presumed. Id. at 452.
In this case, Cunningham has not pointed to any "explicit policy" that led to any
injury. Scott, 114 F.3d 51, n. 2. He must establish that a policy or custom was “adopted
2
However, several of Plaintiff’s claims are episodic in nature, such as his specific
medical claims. For episodic acts, a plaintiff must show that the official acted with
deliberate indifference, and Cunningham has not stated facts against individuals which
would rise to this level. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 648. Plaintiff charges that together his
claims violate the Constitution.
Determining whether to classify a claim as a conditions-of-confinement claim or an
"episodic acts" claim is not always straightforward. See, e.g., Scott, 114 F.3d at 53-54
(holding that the "episodic act" branch of the doctrine governed a detainee's claim arising
out of sexual assault by a guard); id. at 56 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (the assault was
traceable to "regular and systematic" staffing policies that were the "antithesis of
episodic"). In this case, Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim regarding his
medical care--- his general displeasure and disagreement with his medical care for his
neck spasms is not sufficient to survive Defendants' qualified immunity defense under the
circumstances of this case.
6
or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the [plaintiff]’s constitutional rights.”
Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n. 4 (cited in Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526
(5th Cir. 1999)). No evidence has been presented which would defeat Defendants' claims
of qualified immunity. The general conditions about which he complains are not shown to
be an explicit policy or a de facto policy that were so pervasive so as to prove it was
intended or was a practice. The law requires supporting evidence to counter Defendants'
claims of immunity. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s sworn statements concerning his
conditions of confinement in the HCDC are not sufficient to create a factual issue as to
whether those conditions constituted punishment and whether they resulted in serious
deficiencies in the provision of Plaintiff’s basic human needs. Plaintiff testified that he did
not receive any actual physical injuries due to the conditions about which he complains.
The conditions described by Plaintiff concerning his confinement in HCDC do not rise to
this level of severity--- his Complaint contains only very generalized allegations and does
not describe a specific policy or practice. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.
Many of Plaintiff's claims regarding specific acts [such as the failure to properly
treat his neck spasms] simply do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
Plaintiff’s allegations against many named Defendants are limited to having complained to
them about conditions or because of their alleged episodic acts. These charges also do
not rise to the level of constitutional violations; qualified immunity protects them from suit.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that Defendants' motion [45] is granted as to all of
Plaintiff’s claims, and Defendants are hereby dismissed. Final Judgment shall be entered,
and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
7
So ordered, this the 27th day of March, 2014.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8
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