Anderson et al v. Virginia College, LLC et al
Filing
17
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 6 First MOTION to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings as set out herein. The Clerk of Court is directed to adminstratively close this case pending arbitration. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 9/13/12 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
TIFFENY ANDERSON; DIANNA BOND;
VERONICA BOYD; CRYSTAL
LARKIN; SHARONDA NIXON;
BARBARA TURNER; SHIRLEY
WASHINGTON, TANKIA AMOS,
DIANNA BOND, JOSEPHINE CAMERON,
TIFFANY PERKINS AND ROSALYN REESE
VS.
PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV503TSL-MTP
VIRGINIA COLLEGE, LLC;
EDUCATION CORPORATION OF
AMERICA; EDUCATION
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC.;
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendants
Virginia College, LLC, Education Corporation of America and
Education Corporation of America, Inc. (collectively Virginia
College) to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pursuant to
Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 4, or,
in the alternative, to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs Tiffeny Anderson, Dianna Bond, Veronica Boyd, Crystal
Larkin, Sharonda Nixon, Barbara Turner, Shirley Washington, Tanika
Amos, Dianna Bond, Josephine Cameron, Tiffany Perkins and Rosalyn
Reese have responded in opposition to the motion and the court,
having considered the memoranda of authorities, together with
attachments, submitted by the parties, concludes that the motion
to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is well taken and
should be granted.
According to the complaint, all the plaintiffs herein were at
some point enrolled in the Medical Assistant program at Virginia
College in Jackson, Mississippi.
In this case, they have sued
Virginia College alleging, among other things, that it made
fraudulent misrepresentations “about the educational quality and
career advancement opportunities provided by the school,” and that
it engaged in a pattern and practice of specifically targeting
African-Americans and women with this fraudulent scheme.
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of defendants’ scheme, they are
now burdened with significant student loan debt and yet due to
manifest deficiencies in their educational instruction at Virginia
College, they do not possess the necessary qualifications for
employment in their chosen fields.
In short, they are now deeply
in debt and have worthless degrees from Virginia College.
Plaintiffs’ complaint includes claims for violation of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.; violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et
seq.; fraud in the inducement of the contract; negligence;
negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and control; gross
negligence; negligence per se; fraudulent misrepresentation;
breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of the
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implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and fraud.
As
relief, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
economic damages, non-economic damages, punitive damages, and
attorney’s fees and costs.
Defendants’ motion is based on an arbitration provision
included in the Enrollment and Tuition Agreement
executed by each
plaintiff prior to her enrollment at Virginia College.
The
provision states:
ARBITRATION: Any claim, controversy or dispute arising
out of or relating to this Contract or any alleged
breach, violation or default of this Contract, together
with all other claims, controversies or disputes of any
nature whatsoever arising out of or in relation to the
Student’s enrollment and participation in courses at the
College (provided such dispute is not resolved by
negotiation between the parties within thirty days after
notice of such alleged or threatened breach, violation
or default by either party), shall, upon notice by
either party to the other party, be resolved and settled
by binding arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association in accordance with its
Commercial Arbitration Rules. Such arbitration shall
take place in Birmingham, Alabama. The arbitrator is
authorized to fashion remedies, which make the
prevailing party whole for the demonstrated losses
incurred, including determining that the Student should
be enjoined from certain actions or be compelled to
undertake certain actions, provided, however, that the
arbitrator shall have no authority to award punitive or
other damages (including without limitation
consequential or incidental damages or damages for lost
profits or lost opportunities) not measured by the
prevailing party’s actual compensatory damages. The
arbitrator’s decision and award shall be final, binding
on the parties, and non-appealable, and may be entered
in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce it.
The parties shall, respectively, pay any expenses
incurred as American Arbitration Association fees,
administrative fees, arbitrator fees, mediation fees,
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hearing fees, and postponement/cancellation fees in
accordance with the rules and procedures adopted by the
American Arbitration Association. Notwithstanding the
provisions of this Paragraph, in the event a breach,
violation or default of this Contract (or any of its
terms) is alleged, the College shall have the option to
seek injunctive relief in any court of competent
jurisdiction barring further breach or violation of this
Contract pending arbitration. BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT,
THE STUDENT (AND, IF APPLICABLE, HIS/HER PARENT OR LEGAL
GUARDIAN) GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO GO TO COURT AND THE RIGHT
TO TRIAL BY JURY AND EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE AND
UNDERSTAND THAT HIS, HER OR THEIR RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
WILL BE DETERMINED BY AN ARBITRATOR AND NOT BY A JUDGE
OR JURY. THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT A DETERMINATION BY
AN ARBITRATOR IS AS ENFORCEABLE AS ANY ORDER AND IS
SUBJECT TO VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A COURT.
“The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms.’”
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748
(U.S. 2011) (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109
S. Ct. 1248, 1255 (1989)).
Section 2 of the FAA provides that
written agreements to arbitrate controversies arising out of an
existing contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”
9 U.S.C. § 2.
Section 4 requires
courts to compel arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
agreement” upon the motion of either party to the agreement.
A district court adjudicating a motion to compel arbitration
must engage in a two-step process.
474, 476 (5th Cir. 2003).
Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d
“The court must first determine whether
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the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.
This determination
involves two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the
dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration
agreement.
The court then must determine if any legal constraints
foreclose arbitration of those claims.”
Brown v. Pacific Life
Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations
omitted).
“The FAA expresses a strong national policy in favoring
arbitration of disputes, and all doubts concerning arbitrability
of claims should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
Primerica
Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2002).
“The
party resisting arbitration has the burden of demonstrating why
arbitration is not appropriate.”
Kisner v. Bud's Mobile Homes,
512 F. Supp. 2d 549, 556-557 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (citing Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81, 121 S. Ct. 513, 517, 148
L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000)).
Defendants maintain in their motion that the arbitration
provision in the Enrollment and Tuition Agreement is valid, and
that the claims asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint fall within the
scope of that provision so that defendants are entitled to an
order compelling arbitration according to the terms of the
agreement.
In their response memorandum, plaintiffs “concede that
there is a valid arbitration agreement between themselves and
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VC.”1
However, they contend their federal claims are beyond the
scope of the arbitration agreement and further, that there are
external constraints that preclude enforcement of the arbitration
agreement as to their federal claims.2
Plaintiffs base their argument that their (federal) claims
are outside the scope of the arbitration provisions is based
entirely on Rogers-Dabbs Chevrolet-Hummer, Inc. v. Blakeney, 950
So. 2d 170 (Miss. 2007).
The plaintiff in Blakeney signed an
arbitration agreement in connection with his purchase of a vehicle
1
While plaintiffs purport to concede the validity of the
agreement, they go on to point out that “[t]he very same agreement
at issue in this case was found to be invalid in Blackmon, et al.
v. Virginia College at Jackson, et al., [Cause No. 251-11-954.3]
due to fraud in the inducement.” In fact, however, as defendants
note, the court in the Blackmon case held only that the plaintiffs
therein had “pled facts sufficient to support a finding of fraud
in the making of the agreement to arbitrate, thereby extinguishing
the validity of the arbitration provision.” Blackmon, Opinion and
Order, PACER Doc. 11-12. However, while fraud in the inducement
of an arbitration agreement will render the arbitration agreement
invalid, see Downer v. Siegel, 489 F.3d 623, 627-628 (5th Cir.
2007) (“Even if this contract had been induced by fraud, the
arbitration clause is enforceable unless the plaintiffs were
fraudulently induced into agreeing to the arbitration clause
itself.”) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 406, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 1807, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270
(1967)), plaintiffs herein have not contended that they were
fraudulently induced to enter the arbitration agreement.
2
Plaintiffs do not deny that their state law claims would
be subject to arbitration, but they argue that since the
arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to their federal claims,
then the court ought not compel arbitration of their state claims
and should instead decide the state law claims in an exercise of
pendent jurisdiction. The court will not address this argument as
it concludes that all of plaintiffs’ claims, state and federal,
are subject to arbitration.
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from Rogers-Dabbs Chevrolet-Hummer.
Subsequent to his purchase,
employees of Rogers-Dabbs stole his identity and used his title to
forge fraudulent titles for stolen vehicles which were sold to
unsuspecting buyers.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that
Blakeney's claim of civil fraud was not subject to the arbitration
agreement in the sales contract as such claim was “totally outside
the formation of the agreement” and thus outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
Blakeney, 950 So. 2d at 178, n.9.
Plaintiffs herein argue that just as Blakeney was unaware at
the time he executed the arbitration agreement of the fraud
perpetrated by Roger-Dabbs’ employees and thus was not bound to
arbitrate his claims relating to such fraud, they likewise were
unaware when they executed the Enrollment and Tuition Agreements
that they had been targeted for defendants’ predatory fraudulent
scheme because of their race, African-American, and their gender,
female.3
In other words, plaintiffs reason that since they had no
3
Plaintiffs argue as follows:
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were engaged in a
larger fraudulent scheme of which [plaintiffs] were
unaware at the time they agreed to the arbitration of
claims. Plaintiffs never contemplated that they may be
falling victim to a scheme in which they were targeted
(based on their race, African-American, and gender,
female) with a predatory product in violation of federal
law. They never intended to sign away their civil
rights protections against discrimination based on race
or gender. These claims are beyond the scope of the
arbitration agreement because they were beyond
Plaintiffs’ contemplation, and therefore, there was no
mutual assent to submit claims of this nature to
arbitration.
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knowledge of defendants’ discriminatory fraudulent scheme, then
they could not have intended that a claim for such alleged
violation of their civil rights would be subject to the
arbitration agreement.
As plaintiffs have clearly noted, the court in Blakeney did
observe that Blakeney was “presumedly totally unaware” at the time
he executed the arbitration agreement that he would fall victim to
Roger-Dabbs’ employees’ fraudulent scheme; but that was not the
basis of the court’s ruling.
Rather, the court found that
Blakeney’s claim was not covered by the arbitration agreement
because it did not involve any fraud relating to his purchase of
the vehicle, which was what the arbitration agreement covered, and
instead, the claim related to Roger-Dabbs’ employees’ post-sale
fraudulent scheme to use Blakeney’s identity and documents in a
criminal enterprise involving the sale of stolen vehicles.
See
Blakeney, 950 So. 2d at 177 (stating that “today's case does not
involve a claim of fraud in the inducement of the formation of the
contract containing the arbitration clause, all in an effort to
invalidate the arbitration agreement; instead, today's case
involves the claim of civil fraud totally outside the formation of
the agreement”); see also Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC.
v. J&J Tire Co., LLC., 602 F. Supp. 2d 770, 773 (S.D. Miss. 2009)
(discussing and distinguishing Blakeney); Harris v. Coldwell
Banker Real Estate Corp., Civil Action No. 4:05CV176-P-A, 2007 WL
8
2127585, 2 (N.D. Miss. July 23, 2007) (observing that “the
Blakeney decision, by its own terms, limited its ruling to the
facts of that case”).
In the court’s opinion, plaintiffs’ claims in this case arose
“in relation to [their] enrollment and participation in courses at
the College” and thus are subject to the arbitration clause.
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case do not fall outside the scope of
the arbitration agreement simply because plaintiffs were allegedly
oblivious to defendants’ alleged scheme to fraudulently induce
them to enter the Enrollment and Tuition Agreement.
Plaintiffs’
further allegation that defendants’ alleged scheme targeted
African-American women and hence violated federal civil rights
laws, does not alter the fact that their claims ultimately
involves discrimination and fraud relating to the formation of the
contract and as such, fall within the broad scope of the
arbitration agreement.
As noted, plaintiffs also argue that even if their federal
claims could fairly be considered to be covered by the arbitration
agreement, they still may not be compelled to arbitrate them as
there are various external legal constraints to enforcement of the
arbitration agreement.
In this vein, they first argue that the
arbitration provision conflicts with the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA) because the ECOA provides for the recovery of punitive
damages whereas the arbitration clause prohibits the award of
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punitive damages.
In fact, however, the arbitration provision
does allow for the recovery of punitive damages; it merely
provides that any such award must be “measured by the prevailing
party’s actual compensatory damages.”4
Moreover, this court has
rejected a similar argument in a case involving alleged violations
of the Truth-in-Savings Act, stating,
[T]he plaintiffs maintain that they are entitled to
pursue punitive or exemplary damages under the [Truth in
Savings Act] and that the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable because it specifically excludes such
recovery. The Third Circuit rejected a similar argument
by finding that a contractual waiver of punitive damages
is irrelevant to the issue of whether the plaintiff’s
claims should be arbitrated, even if such damages are
recoverable under the statute. Great Western Mortgage
Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute: it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.” [Mitsubishi Motors Corp., v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).] Thus, the
Court finds that a contractual waiver of punitive
4
Plaintiffs must acknowledge that the Supreme Court has
previously upheld the application of the FAA to the ECOA. See
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S. Ct.
513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000); Cronin v. CitiFinancial Servs.,
2008 WL 2933869 *7 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has upheld the application of the FAA to claims under many
important statutory schemes, including . . . the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.”); see also Scott v. EFN Investments, LLC, 312
Fed. Appx. 254, 2009 WL 368333 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that car
buyer was required to arbitrate dispute against dealership and
others alleging violations of ECOA arising from rescission of car
sales agreement). Thus, plaintiffs’ contention is not that the
FAA conflicts with the ECOA, but that certain provisions of the
specific arbitration agreement at issue herein conflict with the
ECOA.
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damages is not a valid ground for refusing to compel
arbitration.
Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026
(S.D. Miss. 2000).
Along these lines, plaintiffs also argue that the arbitration
clause conflicts with the ECOA because, in direct conflict to the
ECOA which provides that costs of the action and a reasonable
attorney’s fee shall be added to damages awarded to a successful
claimant, see 15 U.S.C. 1691e(d), the arbitration clause requires
each party to pay fees associated with the arbitration in
accordance with the rules and procedures adopted by the American
Arbitration Association and makes no provision for an award of
costs or attorney’s fees.
However, the arbitration provision does
not preclude an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
On the
contrary, the arbitration clause specifies that disputes are to
“be resolved and settled by binding arbitration administered by
the American Arbitration Association [AAA] in accordance with its
Commercial Arbitration Rules”; and the AAA's Rules provide that
the “award of the arbitrator(s) may include ... an award of
attorney's fees if all parties have requested such an award or it
is authorized by law or their arbitration agreement.”
Arbitration Rule R-43(d)(ii).
arbitrator to assess costs.
Commercial
The AAA's Rules also allow an
R-43(c); R-50.
Since an award of
attorney’s fees and costs is included as part of the substantive
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damage award under the ECOA, then plaintiffs would be entitled to
such fees and costs as damages if they were to succeed on their
claim.
Cf. James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1039
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (attorney’s fees and litigation costs were
categorized as a subset of damages under False Claims Act
whistleblower statute recoverable as damages in arbitration)
(citing Moran v. Superior Court, No. F061801, 2011 WL 5560178, at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2011) (“An award of costs to the
prevailing party is also authorized by statute and, in accordance
with the applicable substantive law, must be made by the
arbitrator as a matter of right unless an exception applies.
Consequently, the arbitration agreement does not impermissibly
deny or limit the availability to plaintiff of an award of
attorney fees or costs, or any other relief available under the
applicable substantive law.”).
Plaintiffs next declare that “[t]he arbitration of claims
against educational institutions that are largely funded by
taxpayer dollars is against public policy.”
This bald assertion,
for which plaintiffs offer no authority, cannot be squared with
the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
See Washington Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364
F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The FAA expresses a strong
national policy favoring arbitration of disputes, and all doubts
12
concerning the arbitrability of claims should be resolved in favor
of arbitration.”).
Though they do not explicitly characterize the arbitration
agreement as unconscionable, plaintiffs do object that the
arbitration provision is unduly burdensome in at least two
respects.
See Kisner, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (“Plaintiffs may
prove substantive unconscionability if they can establish that the
terms of the arbitration clause were oppressive.”).
First, it
imposes upfront costs of arbitration that plaintiffs claim are
prohibitively expensive for them, and second, it requires that
“arbitration shall take place in Birmingham, Alabama.”
Neither
objection is well taken.
In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79, 121 S. Ct. 513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000), the Supreme Court
considered “whether an arbitration agreement that does not mention
arbitration costs and fees is unenforceable because it fails to
affirmatively protect a party from potentially steep arbitration
costs.”
Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 82, 121 S. Ct. 513.
The Supreme
Court noted that “the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum,” making the agreement
unenforceable.
Id. at 90, 121 S. Ct. 513.
The Court held that
"where ... a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on
the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that
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party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such
costs."
Id. at 92, 121 S. Ct. 513.
In Green Tree, the Court
found that the claimant did not meet that burden because she
presented only unsupported statements in her brief, and provided
no factual evidentiary basis on which to ascertain the actual
costs and fees to which she would be subject in arbitration.
at 90–91 & n.6, 121 S. Ct. 513.
Id.
Likewise, here, plaintiffs have
presented no proof that they are likely to incur costs, what those
costs are likely to be, that the amount would be prohibitively
expensive or that they would not be entitled to relief under
applicable FAA rules.5
Here, as in Green Tree, “[t]he ‘risk’ that
Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative
to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”
Id. at
91, 121 S. Ct. 513.
There is no merit to plaintiffs’ further assertion that the
arbitration agreement is enforceable because it is calculated to
deter students from bringing claims by requiring arbitration in
Alabama (corporate headquarters of Virginia College), “regardless
of the student’s state of residence or ability to travel.”
Even
if the forum selection clause in the arbitration provision were
found to be unenforceable, that would not be grounds for
5
Defendants point out that the rules of the AAA provide
plaintiffs with avenues to request fee-paying relief. Rule 49 of
the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules specifically provides that
“[t]he AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on the part of
any party, defer or reduce the administrative fees.”
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invalidating the entire agreement; at most, the court would rule
that provision unenforceable.
However, plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that even such limited relief is warranted.
Under Mississippi law, a mandatory forum selection clause is
presumptively valid and enforceable unless the resisting party can
show:
1. Its incorporation into the contract was the result of
fraud, undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power;
2. The selected forum is so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the resisting party will for all
practical purposes be deprived of its day in court; or
3. The enforcement of the clause would contravene a
strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is
brought, declared by statute or judicial decision.
Titan Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 895 So. 2d 138, 146 (Miss. 2004)
(quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13, 92
S. Ct. 1907, 1914, 1916-1917, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1972)).
In their
memorandum, plaintiffs argue that requirement of arbitration in
Alabama is “oppressive” and that arbitration in Alabama would not
be “feasible,” yet they plainly have not even attempted to show
that the Alabama forum “is so gravely difficult and inconvenient
that [they] will for all practical purposes be deprived of [their]
day in court.”
Id.
Plaintiffs finally argue that “[t]he arbitration of federal
civil rights claims is against public policy.”
also without merit.
This position is
As defendants note, the Supreme Court has
explicitly held that arbitration agreements which encompass
statutory claims are generally enforceable under the FAA, see
15
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.
Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed.2 d 26 (1991) (finding claim under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act subject to compulsory
arbitration), and held that the burden is on the party opposing
arbitration to show that Congress specifically intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for the subject statutory
claims, id.
Plaintiffs have not, and cannot meet this burden.
See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90, 121 S. Ct. 513 (stating that “even
claims arising under a statute designed to further important
social policies may be arbitrated because ‘”so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,”’ the statute
serves its functions.”) (citing inter alia Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28,
111 S. Ct. 1647)); cf. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939
F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (observing that “[a]ny broad public
policy arguments against [subjecting Title VII claim to compulsory
were necessarily rejected by Gilmer[,]” and holding that “Title
VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration”).
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is ordered that
defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is granted, and it is
further ordered that this cause is stayed pending arbitration.
See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (requiring that court stay litigation of arbitral
claims pending arbitration of those claims in accordance with the
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terms of the agreement).
The clerk of court is directed to
administratively close the case pending arbitration.
SO ORDERED this 13th day of September, 2012.
/s/ Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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