Chandler v. Raymond Detention Center et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendants' 28 Motion for Summary Judgment, without prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 9/26/2013. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
MELVIN CHANDLER
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV519LRA
TYRONE LEWIS, SHERIFF OF HINDS COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI; LIEUTENANT THERALON;
DEPUTY SCOTT; CAPTAIN MICHAEL IVY; DEPUTY CARTER;
DEPUTY INGRAM; DEPUTY KNIGHT;
DEPUTY MILLER; DEPUTY LOGAN; DEPUTY
MURPHY and DEPUTY JIMMY BARNES
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This conditions of confinement action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 came before the
Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [28]. Plaintiff Melvin Chandler was
housed as a pretrial detainee at the Hinds County Detention Facility [HCDF] from April 1, 2011,
to May 6, 2012. Chandler alleged in his Complaint that the conditions in which he was confined
violated his constitutional rights.
On October 11, 2012, Chandler appeared before this Court for a hearing to further
supplement or clarify his claims. When questioned about whether he had presented his claims
through the Detention Facility’s grievance program, Chandler testified as follows:
CHANDLER: You know, I tried to contact through the other – the administrative
remedy program. Hinds County don’t have one. Raymond Detention Center don’t
have one as far as I know because I have talked to – you know, to my military
training, I went to follow your chain of command. I assume that’s what you’re
talking about. You start from the lowest and go to the top.
COURT: Did you ask for grievance forms?
CHANDLER: They don’t go no further than the pod, ma’am. He got a box. You
write your grievance forms, turn them into the deputies, they don’t go no further.
You don’t get no response from no grievance form.
COURT: They give you the forms?
CHANDLER: You fill them out.
COURT: If you ask for them?
CHANDLER: Fill them out, turn them in, you don’t get no response from them.
Later in the hearing, Chandler testified that he wrote several letters to Captain Ivy about the
conditions at the facility, but never got a response from him.
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on several grounds – the first being
failure to exhaust his claims through the grievance procedure available at the Hinds County
Detention Facility. Chandler admits that he failed to submit his complaints through the facility’s
grievance program. In his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Chandler
stated:
I’ve written inmate requests, and administrative remedies pertaining to conditions
of confinement pertaining to their correctional institutions policy and procedures and
the definitions of that policy and procedure. Hinds County Detention Center has a
history of not responding to administrative remedies or documents pertaining to
condition of confinement complaints with the Detention Center. I’ve taken so many
steps trying to get some understanding with the staff and administration pertaining
to this situation. The only thing I was getting was no response. The Hinds County
Detention Center gave me no other choice, but to file a “1983" complaint.
An inmate must comply with a facility’s grievance procedure before he can bring his
conditions of confinement case to court. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Here, Chandler
admits that he did not raise his claims through the Inmate Grievance Procedure of the Hinds County
Detention Center, but also alleges that he got no response to his complaints. Where a prisoner
alleges that he could not exhaust his administrative remedies because the grievance procedure is
inadequate, he may be excused from the exhaustion requirement. McDonald v. Cain, 426 F. App’x
332, 333 (5th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Ford, 261 F. App’x 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We have
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recognized, as a basis for excuse, circumstances where administrative remedies are inadequate
because prison officials have ignored or interfered with a prisoner’s pursuit of an administrative
remedy.”) (citing Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The Fifth Circuit has explained the process by which courts may make credibility
determinations in ruling on exhaustion. ” Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2010).
Exhaustion is a threshold issue, similar to jurisdiction, that should be resolved prior to proceeding
on the merits. Id. Factual disputes about exhaustion may be resolved by a judge without resort to
a jury, and summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for making that determination. Id. at 272.
The familiar standard for the entry of summary judgment comes from Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which
requires its entry “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment is appropriate “against
a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party “bears the burden of identifying those portions
of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Lincoln Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005).
If the prisoner survives summary judgment because factual issues remain concerning
exhaustion, the court may resolve the disputed facts by allowing discovery or holding an evidentiary
hearing. Dillon, 596 F.3d at 273. That resolution should occur before reaching the merits of any
of the substantive claims. Id. The Court is of the opinion that additional evidence is necessary to
resolve the issue of exhaustion at this time. Defendants, who have the burden of showing that they
are entitled to summary judgment, have provided no factual support to counter Chandler’s allegation
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that he never received a response to his grievances. Instead, Defendants rely simply on Chandler’s
admission that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. In the absence of evidence that the
Hinds County Detention Center’s grievance procedure was actually available to inmates, other than
on paper, this Court cannot conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact relevant to whether
Chandler should be excused from exhausting his administrative remedies.
In light of this
conclusion, the Court is further of the opinion that summary judgment should be denied at this time.
The Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment shall be denied, but without
prejudice. Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s directives in Dillon, an evidentiary hearing may be
conducted by the Court to further explore the defense of exhaustion prior to further consideration
of the merits of Chandler’s claims. Or, Defendants may choose to waive their exhaustion defense
and move forward on the merits. An evidentiary hearing will then be conducted on the merits, or
Defendants may elect to refile the motion after the exhaustion issue is resolved.1 On or before
October 30, 2013, defense counsel shall notify the Court and Plaintiff, in writing, as to how they
wish to proceed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [28] is
DENIED without prejudice. Defendants shall file the written report referenced above on or before
October 30, 2013.
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In reviewing the facts, the Court does note that it has concerns regarding whether or not
the merits of the claims could be resolved without benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Because
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the majority of the time he was housed in HCDF, there
may be material issues of genuine fact existing involving Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement
which prevent the Court from entering a judgment at law.
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SO ORDERED, this the 26th day of September 2013.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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