Fincannon v. Epps et al
Filing
25
ORDER granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball on 11/11/13. Copy mailed to Plaintiff. (WS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
DARRELL FINCANNON
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-604-FKB
CHRISTOPHER EPPS, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants.1 Docket No. 22. Having considered the motion, as well as the response in
opposition and the entire record in this matter, the Court concludes that the motion should be,
and is hereby, granted.
THE CLAIM
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate, housed in the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman,
Mississippi. In this suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges that his constitutional
rights have been violated by Defendants’ failure to follow state law and procedures for
calculating his early release time.2 Defendant Epps is the Commissioner of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections. Defendant Gibbs is the Chief Records Officer of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections, and Defendant Box is Records Officer at the South Mississippi
Correctional Facility in Leaksville, Mississippi. Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied due
process and that his equal protection rights have been violated by these Defendants because he
1
The parties consented to the undersigned conducting all proceedings in this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Docket No. 19.
2
Referred to herein as Plaintiff’s “ERS date.” ERS stands for Early Release Supervision.
1
has not been considered for early release. Based on Plaintiff’s interpretation of state law and the
inmate handbook, he asserts that he was eligible for early release in 2009, but was never even
considered for same.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants’ refusal to grant him an
ERS date violates his constitutional rights and an injunction requiring Defendants to immediately
consider Plaintiff for ERS, as well as requiring Defendants to re-calculate his ERS date. Plaintiff
also seeks the following monetary relief: $10,000.00 in compensatory damages from each
Defendant for not allowing Plaintiff to be considered for ERS, $20,000.00 in punitive damages
from each Defendant for every day Plaintiff has served past the ERS date he has calculated, plus
another $20,000.00 in punitive damages from each Defendant, and court costs.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief regarding his release date, the
matter is not properly before the Court on a Section 1983 claim. Plaintiff must instead file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus if he seeks to be released. See, e.g., Coleman v. Dretke, 409
F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2005)(“release from physical confinement in prison constitutes release
from custody for habeas purposes, even though state retains a level of control”). Since Plaintiff
has not demonstrated that he has exhausted available remedies for habeas purposes, his habeas
petition, to the extent his complaint may be construed as such, is dismissed without prejudice.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Cass County Dist. Court, 178 F.3d 1291 (5th Cir. 1999).
However, Plaintiff also seeks damages for the alleged violation of his constitutional
rights, and those claims are arguably before the Court in this Section 1983 claim. “[I]t is
generally not proper to dismiss an entire complaint on non-exhaustion grounds merely because
the complaint raises both habeas and § 1983 claims.” Cook v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice
2
Transitional Planning Dept., 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994)(“The line between claims which
must initially be pressed by writ of habeas corpus and those cognizable under § 1983 is a blurry
one.”). This case, though, is analogous to Mendenhall v. Valdez, 376 Fed. Appx. 372-73, in
which the Fifth Circuit held:
[Plaintiff’s] assertions amount to an attack on the validity of determinations
made by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) regarding his
eligibility for release on mandatory supervision. “[W]hen a state prisoner is
challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the
relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or
a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ
of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827,
36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Mendenhall cannot seek an earlier release from
prison in a civil rights action, so he cannot obtain declaratory and injunctive
relief. See id.
Mendenhall likewise cannot obtain monetary damages on his
claims regarding the correctness of determinations on his eligibility for
release on mandatory supervision. Where, in a state prisoner's suit for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ...
the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Because
Mendenhall cannot show that the TDCJ's determination regarding his
eligibility for release on mandatory supervision has been invalidated, under
the principles of Heck he cannot maintain a suit for damages under § 1983
based on those determinations. See McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 160-61 (5th Cir.1995).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s entire complaint must be dismissed without prejudice.3
3
The Court also held an omnibus hearing in this matter on June 26, 2013, during which it
became clear to the Court that Plaintiff seeks habeas relief. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d
179 (5th Cir. 1985)(overruled on other grounds, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
3
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
Alternatively, and in the event the Court has erred in determining that all Plaintiff’s
claims are habeas claims, Defendants seek summary judgment based on Eleventh Amendment
immunity and qualified immunity. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages
against the defendants in their official capacities, his claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed. Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)(suits against officials in their official
capacities are claims against the state).
In their individual capacities, Defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986). Once a defendant has raised the issue of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to rebut the defense. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff
must show that 1) there has been a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Plaintiff cites Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-138 in support of his claim, which states in
pertinent part:
(5) For any sentence imposed after June 30, 1995, an inmate may receive
an earned time allowance of four and one-half (4-1/2 ) days for each thirty
(30) days served if the department determines that the inmate has complied
with the good conduct and performance requirements of the earned time
allowance program. The earned time allowance under this subsection shall
not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of an inmate's term of sentence; however,
beginning July 1, 2006, no person under the age of twenty-one (21) who has
committed a nonviolent offense, and who is under the jurisdiction of the
4
Department of Corrections, shall be subject to the fifteen percent (15%)
limitation for earned time allowances as described in this subsection (5).
Additionally, Plaintiff relies on Miss. Code Ann. § 47-3-138.1:
(1) In addition to any other administrative reduction of sentence, an
offender in trusty status as defined by the classification board of the
Department of Corrections may be awarded a trusty time allowance
of thirty (30) days' reduction of sentence for each thirty (30) days of
participation during any calendar month in an approved program
while in trusty status, including satisfactory participation in education
or instructional programs, satisfactory participation in work projects
and satisfactory participation in any special incentive program.
Records submitted by Plaintiff indicate that he has served as a trusty since July 11, 2007.
Docket No. 22-1 at 3. Plaintiff’s 20 year sentence began on May 14, 2007, with credit given for
his having been in jail since March 7, 2006. Plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to time
served day for day, though why is not clear. Adding together his 15% reduction, trusty time and
day for day time, Plaintiff calculates that he should have been released in July, 2012. However,
as of July 14, 2012, Defendants had calculated Plaintiff’s ERS date as December 10, 2017.4
Though both Plaintiff’s argument and Defendants’ response are hard to follow with respect to
potential early release dates for Plaintiff, Defendant Box responded to Plaintiff’s concerns,
before suit was filed, as follows:
Attached is a broken down timesheet that shows step by step how your dates
were calculated. Your 15% total earned time credit of 2 years & 300 days
does not come off of your release dates this earned time simply gives you
your 85% ERS date so if you had not received this credit then you would not
have an ERS date at all. Your Jail time comes off the top of your sentence so
it does not come off of your release dates either it is given up front. Your 20
year sentence is calculated from your sentence begin date instead of your date
4
Using Defendants’ method of calculating, assuming Plaintiff is still a trusty and has had
no disciplinary issues, by this time his ERS date would have moved up approximately eight
months.
5
of sentence therefore giving you credit for your jail time off the top. Your
dates are all correct and will remain as is.
Docket No. 1 at 20. Based on this response, Plaintiff cannot clear even the first hurdle. It is not
clear that the calculation is incorrect, much less that Plaintiff has any constitutionally protected
interest in a correct calculation.
The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners have no federally protected
right or liberty interest in good time credits, but that states may create a statutory right. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 529 (1974). Defendants argue that the Mississippi statutes permit granting
earned time credits, but do not mandate same. See, e.g., Scales v. Mississippi State Parole
Board, 831 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest
in earned time credits. Since it is far from clear that Plaintiff’s rights were violated, it cannot be
said that any such right to earned time credit was clearly established at the time Defendants
allegedly violated it.
The only documentation submitted by Plaintiff reflecting any involvement by Defendant
Gibbs is a Second Step Response Form, signed by Tyesha Evans, EMCF5 Compliance Officer,
indicating that Ms. Gibbs researched Plaintiff’s file and found the dates contained therein to be
accurate. Docket No. 24-1 at 3. Again, the Court cannot determine that the dates are inaccurate.
Accordingly, the Court cannot find that Ms. Gibbs committed even an error in calculating
Plaintiff’s time, much less that she violated constitutional rights of which a reasonable official
would have been aware.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant Epps had any personal involvement in the
5
East Mississippi Correctional Facility.
6
alleged miscalculation of his early release date. Though Plaintiff alleges that this defendant was
in a position of authority over the other defendants, there is no supervisory liability under
Section 1983. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must demonstrate that
each defendant was personally involved in the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Epps fail.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to
first pursue habeas relief. Alternatively, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to Plaintiff’s damages claims, and Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against
the three named Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this the 11th day of November, 2013.
/s/ F. Keith Ball
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?