Johnson v. City of Jackson et al

Filing 35

ORDER granting 32 Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons stated in the order. A judgment will be entered in a separate docket entry to follow. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on January 21, 2015. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT JOHNSON

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12cv646-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, et al.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

This § 1983 case is before the Court on the City of Jackson’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [32]. Finding no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court grants the motion.
I.

Facts and Procedural History
This lawsuit arises from the January 2, 2010 arrest of Plaintiff Robert Johnson. On that

date, Jackson Police Officer Adrienne Coleman stopped a vehicle Johnson was driving for an
expired tag and no lights. After she approached the vehicle, Coleman smelled alcohol, instructed
Johnson to exit the automobile, and observed an open container of beer in the vehicle. In the
meantime, Jackson Police Officer Lakeith Williams, who was en route to a disturbance call,
observed Officer Coleman conducting a traffic stop and stopped to assist. While Coleman was
looking inside Johnson’s vehicle, Williams noticed Johnson fidgeting, so he “placed him in
handcuffs for his protection and for the [officers’] safety.” Williams Aff. [32-2] ¶ 5. Williams
admits that he “placed [his] hands on [Johnson’s] shoulder to stop him from moving” but states
that he did not “strike” Johnson. Id. Coleman issued Johnson citations for driving with a
suspended license, improper equipment, and an expired tag and transported him to the City Jail.
On January 8, 2010, Johnson completed a Citizen Complaint and Injury Form with the
Internal Affairs Division of the Jackson Police Department. In his complaint, Johnson alleged
that Williams “struck [him] from behind into [his] left ear,” damaging his hearing. Citizen

Compl. [32-3] at 3. Internal Affairs conducted an investigation into Johnson’s complaint, during
which the investigating officer interviewed both Coleman and Williams as well as the clerk on
duty at the store in front of which Johnson’s stop and arrest took place. The investigating officer
also obtained a copy of surveillance footage of the parking lot that showed Johnson’s traffic stop
and arrest. The investigating officer concluded that there was “[i]nsufficient evidence to prove”
Johnson’s allegations. Internal Affairs Report [32-4] at 6.
Johnson filed this lawsuit on September 17, 2012, against the City of Jackson and several
John and Jane Doe JPD officers “IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS POLICE OFFICERS.”
Compl. [1] at 1. The lawsuit asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force.
Through a letter docketed April 13, 2013, Johnson sought to add Jackson Mayor Harvey
Johnson, Governor Phil Bryant, Officer Adrienne Coleman, and Sergeant Freeman as defendants.
Letter [6]. Summonses were subsequently issued for Phil Bryant, Adrienne Coleman, Rebecca
Coleman, and C. Daughtry. Summonses [7]. The Court dismissed the claims against Governor
Bryant, leaving only the City of Jackson and several of its officers in their official capacities as
defendants. After the time for discovery expired, the City of Jackson filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment [32]. Johnson failed to respond, and the Court entered a show-cause order,
directing him to “either respond to the motion or advise the Court that he intends to confess the
motion” on or before December 22, 2014. Order to Show Cause [34]. Johnson never responded.
The Court has personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.
II.

Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). Conclusory allegations,
speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute
for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash.,
276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993).
“[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to
respond to the motion . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, advisory committee notes to 2010 amendments.
But Rule 56(e) explains:
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party’s assertion of fact . . . , the court may:
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including
the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
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Having given Johnson an opportunity to respond, the Court considers the facts and evidence
submitted by the City undisputed.
III.

Analysis
Johnson’s claims against the named officers are asserted against them “IN THEIR

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS POLICE OFFICERS,” so his lawsuit is “to be treated as a suit
against the entity,” in this case, the City of Jackson. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985). In order to impose § 1983 liability against a municipality, “[a] plaintiff must identify:
‘(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or
custom.’” Valle v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City
of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). Johnson’s claim fails on each element.
First, Johnson fails to identify a policy or custom. To the extent he asserts that an alleged
failure to train constitutes an actionable policy or custom, there is no allegation or evidence of
deliberate indifference necessary to establish liability for failure to train. See City of Canton,
Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Second, Johnson does not identify “a municipal
policymaker who could be held responsible, through actual or constructive knowledge, for
enforcing a policy that caused [his] injuries.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578–79
(5th Cir. 2001).
Finally, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of an underlying
constitutional violation. Johnson alleges that the City violated his right to be free from excessive
force under the Fourth Amendment. To succeed on an excessive-force claim, a plaintiff “must
show that []he suffered (1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that
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was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Flores v.
City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004). In this case, the undisputed evidence shows
that Officer Williams merely “placed [his] hands on [Johnson’s] shoulder to stop him from
moving” and never struck Johnson. Williams Aff. [32-2] ¶ 5. There is no evidence to suggest
that Williams or anyone else used “objectively unreasonable” force against Johnson. The City is
entitled to summary judgment on Johnson’s excessive-force claim.
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not specifically addressed would not

have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, the City of Jackson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [32] is granted. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 21st day of January, 2015.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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