Crest Audio, Inc. v. QSC Audio Products, LLC

Filing 183

ORDER granting 175 Motion to Appoint a Special Master for Claim Construction; granting 179 Motion for Leave to File Sur-rebuttal; denying 181 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 8/18/2016. (AC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CREST AUDIO, INC.

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-755-CWR-FKB

QSC AUDIO PRODUCTS, LLC

DEFENDANT
ORDER

The plaintiff has moved to appoint a special master for claim construction. The defendant
objects. It argues that a special master cannot be appointed without both parties’ consent, and
that the purported benefits of a special master are illusory.
I.

Law
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may appoint a special master to

“address pretrial and posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an
available district judge or magistrate judge of the district.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
The federal courts have the inherent power to appoint persons unconnected with
the court to aid judges in the performance of specific duties. Although here the
parties agreed to the appointment of a master, the court has the power to appoint
masters without the consent of the parties. Reference of issues to a master, even
compulsory reference, does not violate the 7th Amendment right to trial by a jury
to which a master’s findings may be read under Rule 53(e)(3). Masters can
properly aid the court in evaluating issues of patent validity and infringement in
the context of motions for summary judgment, and have often done so.
Constant v. Adv. Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
Since Constant was decided, the law has become more favorable to the use of special
masters. “As the Advisory Committee specifically recognized, ‘the appointment of masters to
participate in pretrial proceedings has developed extensively over the last two decades’ to aid
district courts in ‘managing complex litigation.’” Glover v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 629 F.
App’x 331, 338 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2388 (2016) (brackets omitted).

II.

Discussion
The above authorities suffice to overrule the defendant’s first objection: consent of the

parties is not required for a special master to be appointed for pretrial matters. And, despite the
defendant’s spirited invocation of Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837
(2015), claim construction remains a pretrial matter. E.g., Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google,
Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2013). One doubts that the Supreme Court intended in
Sandoz to abrogate Rule 53(a)(1)(C).
In this case, claim construction will be addressed more effectively and quickly with the
assistance of a special master. The defendant will not be deprived of Article III review, as the
Court will decide de novo all objections to the special master’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3)-(4), and the special master will not preside over the actual
trial. Lastly, the defendant’s claims of undue delay are unavailing since it is unlikely the case
would proceed on its current schedule even without a special master.
III.

Conclusion
The motion is granted. Within 21 days, one of two things should happen: (1) if the parties

agree on a particular special master, they shall submit a proposed Order of appointment; or (2) if
they disagree, they shall submit three recommendations per side, with CVs and compensation
rates, again with an accompanying proposed Order.1 The motion for leave to file a sur-rebuttal is
granted, and the motion to amend the litigation schedule is denied.
SO ORDERED, this the 18th day of August, 2016.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1

See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., No. 4:03-CV-1384, 2007 WL 6457158 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23,
2007). The lists should include only those individuals willing to serve under the parties’ proposed schedule. In
addition, the individuals should have no relationship to the parties, counsel, this action, or the Court which would
require disqualification of a judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455.

2