Beauchene v. Mississippi College et al
Filing
10
ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss; granting 4 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 11/8/2013. (kf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
MARK BEAUCHENE
PLAINTIFF
v.
Cause No. 3:12-CV-784-CWR-LRA
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE and
JOHN DOES 1-10
DEFENDANT
ORDER
The above-styled matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the
alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Docket No. 4. Plaintiff has responded in opposition
[Docket No. 7] and Defendant has submitted a rebuttal [Docket No. 9]. Having carefully
considered the parties’ motions, their opposition thereto, applicable case law, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court orders that Defendant’s motion be granted.
I. Background
This cause arose from sanctions that were imposed on Plaintiff Mark Beauchene by
Defendant Mississippi College School of Law (hereinafter “MC Law”)—mainly a suspension
and an eventual expulsion—for committing multiple acts of plagiarism in violation of section
VIII(C) of its Student Honor Code entitled, “Inappropriate Use of the Work of Others.”1 See
1
Section VIII(C) defines a violation of plagiarism as follows:
Using the words, thoughts, or ideas of another without attribution consistent with legal
citation manuals (e.g., ALWD Citation Manual or Bluebook). . . The most blatant forms
include copying someone else’s work word-for-word . . . Other examples include
rewriting someone else’s work with only minor changes, or summarizing another’s work
or taking another person’s ideas without acknowledging the source through proper
attribution and citation.
Id.
1
Docket No. 1, at 4.2 After he was expelled, Beauchene filed this action on November 16, 2012,
asserting claims of breach of contract and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and demanding compensatory and punitive damages. Docket No. 1, at 9-13. He also
included in his complaint a motion for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, which he has
since abandoned. Docket No. 1, at 13.
A. First Act of Plagiarism
In the Spring semester of 2012, Beauchene submitted a research paper as part of a writing
requirement under the supervision of Professor Cynthia Nicoletti. Docket No. 1, at 3; Docket No.
5, at 7. Nicoletti was displeased with his submission, ostensibly because of the blatant plagiarism
it contained. Id. On March 8, 2012, Nicoletti submitted to Professor Matt Steffey, the Honor
Code Advisor, a copy of Beauchene’s paper with her handwritten notations describing her
findings of plagiarism and a copy of the article she believed to have been plagiarized. Docket
No. 4-1, at 4 (“Affidavit of Matt Steffey”). See also Docket No. 4-2, at 3 (“Affidavit of Cynthia
Nicoletti”) (“I . . . concluded that [Beauchene’s paper] contained multiple instances of plagiarism
and the inappropriate use of the work of another.”). That same day, Beauchene received an email
from Steffey seeking to schedule a meeting the following afternoon, after which Beauchene
inquired as to what the meeting would entail so that he could prepare. Docket No. 1-1, at 1-2. In
reply, Steffey stated, “[N]o worries. [N]o need to prep[are].” Docket No. 1-1, at 2. They agreed
to meet the following day. Id.
During the more than two hour meeting, Steffey and Beauchene discussed what Steffey
believed to have been obvious plagiarism and clear violations of the Honor Code, and the
2
MC Law erroneously numbered this portion as section “VIII” in the text of the Honor Code, when it is
actually preceded by section VI. Docket No. 1-1, at 50. In order to be consistent, this Order will continue
to use the Roman Numeral VIII when referring to this section.
2
consequences that Beauchene would face for the infractions. See Docket No. 11, at 3; Docket
No. 1-1, at 7.
On March 14, Steffey sent an email to Beauchene offering him the option to have his
paper reviewed by law faculty at another institution. If, after that blind evaluation, the reviewers
found no plagiarism, the matter would be dismissed. However, if the review concluded there was
plagiarism, Beauchene would be expelled. Docket No. 1-1, at 3. Beauchene turned down that
option. In an email to Steffey, he explained:
I don’t think sending my paper to another institution is necessary. I want [you to]
know I am taking a thorough review of my paper and that I plan to get back to
you with a detailed response and my response will demonstrate that I understand
the magnitude of what I did.
Id. Beauchene also declined to appeal to the Honor Court.3 See Docket 1-1, at 12.
Later that day, in a letter to Steffey, Beauchene provided a more detailed response. In it,
he acknowledged, among other things, that what he did “was wrong”; that he “failed to uphold
the standards of the Honor Code”; that some of his acts were improper; and that he violated the
Code’s prohibition against plagiarism.4 See Docket No. 4-11. He also acknowledged that the
3
Under Section XI of the Student Honor Code, Beauchene had a right to Appeal the decision of the
Advisor to the Honor Court. Docket No. 1-1, at 59. These proceedings, as described in the Honor Code,
mirror conventional courtroom proceedings: there is a notice of appeal, a pre-hearing procedure,
discovery and motions, a hearing, a ruling, and an opportunity to have the decision reviewed by the Dean.
Id. The Dean’s review is discretionary and is “limited to a determination that the process has been
fundamentally fair and that an appropriate sanction has been imposed.” Id. at 60. The Honor Code does
not provide for a review by faculty from another institution. It is not clear from the record why that was
offered, but it appears that such an option would provide even more protection to Beauchene.
4
In addition to admitting guilt, Beauchene gave specific examples of how he plagiarized:
I obtained four of my citations, notes 1, 10, 19, and 22, directly from the Anger
Comment, notes 16, 26, 47, and 52. This was improper. . . . I took two quotations from
primary sources from the Anger Comment at notes 18 and 41. . . . At points in the
introductory section of my draft, I used the Anger Comment in part as a source of
primary authorities, to interpret those authorities, and to identify material language in
those authorities. Having done so, I ought to have indicated this use of the Anger
Comment by proper citation. I failed to do so.
3
Code authorized a range of sanctions, but he offered to cooperate and implored Steffey to not
sanction him “in a manner that will substantially impair [his] opportunity to pursue a career in
law.” Id.
After considering Beauchene’s written statement, conferring with faculty and staff, and
meeting with Beauchene a second time on March 20, see Docket No. 1-1, at 15, Steffey issued
an exhaustive memorandum to Beauchene detailing the matter of plagiarism discussed in their
March 9 meeting, the portions of the Honor Code which were breached, and the sanctions to be
imposed. See Docket No. 1-1, 5-12.5 Steffey explained, in part:
The first 25% of your paper, for starters, is taken line-by-line and footnote-byfootnote from a single source . . . yet you cite that source nowhere in your paper. .
. . [Y]our basic approach was to use a computer to ‘copy, paste, edit’; that is, you
copied text and footnotes from [the] article and other sources, changed the text
slightly, and retained the footnotes verbatim . . . .
....
In sum: you actually wrote very little of what you submitted as your paper.
Instead, the great bulk of you[r] paper consists of a ‘copy, paste, edit’ process,
whereby you [ ] copied the published work of various authors; pasted it into your
submission with little or no attribution; and merely edited the material so that the
text is slightly paraphrased and the authors’ footnotes are retained verbatim.
Id. at 7-8, 10. Among the numerous sanctions to be imposed, Beauchene was permanently
suspended from the law school effective immediately. No earlier than the Fall semester of 2012,
however, he would have the right to petition to have his suspension lifted. Id. at 10. If he were
successful in having his suspension lifted, Beauchene would have to retake the course under the
supervision of and as directed by a different instructor, Professor Cecile Edwards. Id. at 11. As
Id.
5
This memo reveals that Steffey and Beauchene had an additional meeting on March 20. During this
meeting, Beauchene discussed the reasons for his actions and attempted to explain that he did not realize
his actions constituted plagiarism at the time. Docket No. 1-1, at 7-8.
4
for the course in which he submitted the plagiarized writing, Beauchene would receive a failing
grade, in the discretion of Professor Nicolleti. Id. With respect to the remaining courses in which
he was currently enrolled, Beauchene would receive a grade of “W.” Id.
The memo also reminded Beauchene that he had declined his right to either have the
matter reviewed by the Honor Court, see id. at 12,6 or have his paper reviewed by faculty from
another law school. Id. at n.6. Steffey, however, gave Beauchene until March 30 to change his
mind and seek review. If Beauchene did not accept this offer, the sanctions imposed, including
but not limited to suspension, would be final. Id.
The memo prompted a string of emails between Beauchene and Steffey from March 28
through March 30. Steffey assured Beauchene that his suspension was final, but he could meet
with Dean Rosenblatt to discuss how he may have his suspension lifted in the future. Before
meeting with the Dean, however, Beauchene could submit a written statement to him raising any
disputes regarding the facts stated in the memo. Additionally, through one of the emails,
Beauchene requested a ten working-day extension to seek Honor Court review, but Steffey
denied the request and kept the deadline at March 30. Docket No. 1-1, 12-17.
On April 2, 2012, Beauchene sent a two-page apology letter in which he characterized his
violations as mistakes. Docket No. 4-14. He also used the letter to attack Professor Steffey about
how Steffey had treated him and to complain that the procedures of the Student Honor Code had
not been followed. Id. at 2. He closed his letter with the following:
I beg to be allowed to finish my off campus externship with the Army National
Guard. I respectfully and mercifully ask however, that I not be sanctioned in a
manner that will impair my opportunity to pursue a career in law, or with JAG.
6
Had Beauchene sought review by the Honor Court, the Court could (1) decline to affirm the
determinations of violations; (2) affirm the violations and recommend imposition of lesser or greater
sanctions; or (3) affirm the determination of violations and sanctions. Docket No. 1-1, at 12.
5
Id.
The following day, on April 3, Beauchene met with Rosenblatt and Steffey. Docket No.
1, at 12; Docket No. 4-16. After the meeting, Steffey issued a revised memo to Beauchene,
which was reviewed and approved by Rosenblatt, setting forth his findings and the final
sanctions that would be imposed. Apparently Rosenblatt was swayed by Beauchene’s plea
because the final Memo, although in most respects was the same as the first Memo, included a
modified Sanction No. 8, which imposed a grade of “W” for all of his courses “with the
exception only of [his] externship with the Army National Guard.” Docket No. 1-1, at 24.
(emphasis in original). As in the first memo, Steffey extended to Beauchene another opportunity
to seek review by the Honor Court by April 4, and the memo once again noted that Beauchene
turned down the opportunity to have his paper reviewed by faculty from another law school. Id.
at 25.
After receiving the memo, Beauchene wrote a letter expressing contrition for his
wrongdoing and accepting all sanctions, including the path for readmission as described in
Steffey’s memo. See Docket No. 4-16 (“I truly do understand my errors and the gravity of them
as well as the fact that I need some personal growth . . . I look forward to completing the
assigned sanctions to not only show my contrition and acknowledgment of wrongdoing but also
to demonstrate my desire to positively move forward with my legal career. I know that I will
return to school in the fall as a better person and strong student. . . . I have made mistakes, but
now moving forward it is my duty . . . to develop into a better person and lawyer.”).
B. Second Act of Plagiarism
6
After satisfying the requirements set forth in the conditions for readmission, see Docket
No. 1-1, at 23-4, Beauchene resumed his studies in the Fall semester of 2012 as a student on
disciplinary probation.7 See id. at 26.
By October, Beauchene’s legal education at MC Law was in serious jeopardy because he
was accused of plagiarism again. See Docket 1-1, at 36. This time, as part of his required writing
course under Professor Cecile Edwards, Beauchene submitted a draft paper pregnant with
passages unaccompanied by proper attribution. In a string of emails, Edwards chided Beauchene
for not citing references and scheduled a meeting for them to discuss his paper. Docket No. 1-1,
at 27-30.8 That meeting, which Steffey also attended, occurred on October 24, 2012. See Docket
No. 1-1, at 36. A second meeting between Steffey and Beauchene occurred on October 29, 2012,
whereupon they fully discussed the matter and the serious implications for Beauchene. See
Docket No. 1-1, at 35.
Following the meeting, Steffey delivered a memo to Beauchene regarding his subsequent
violations. See Docket No. 1-1, at 42.9 The findings contained within this memo were strikingly
similar to those made the prior semester:
7
Beauchene was notified that as a student on disciplinary probation, he would be held to strict
compliance of the Student Honor Code; otherwise, any “subsequent violation of the Honor Code or
failure to comply fully with these sanctions, [would] be grounds for immediate expulsion from law
school.” Docket No. 1-1, at 24.
8
Despite having had his topic since August 18, by October 9, Beauchene had done nothing. In an email
to Beauchene, Edwards stated: “I am appalled at what you sent me today . . . . You have not done what
you said you would do or what is expected of a third-year law student. Either you have not done enough
work, or you simply do not have the skills needed to be a lawyer. I am extremely concerned about your
work ethic.” Docket No. 4-18. Edwards lamented, “Even with a draft due tomorrow, you have no paper
at all. You have not written anything.” Id.
9
The memo stated, in addition to violations of plagiarism, Beauchene was being punished for “failing to
seek clarification” from his professor to ensure proper attribution, and for being dishonest about his
conduct in the meeting on October 24. “Importantly,” the Memo explained, Beauchene committed these
violations “while on disciplinary probation, following a suspension and other sanctions for similar
violations.” Docket No. 1-1, at 36.
7
I have determined that great portions of the papers you submitted embody
examples of the foregoing type of academic misconduct. I have also determined
that you lied about and misrepresented your work during our meeting with the
course professor on Wednesday, October 24, 2012.
....
. . . [I]n submitting your writing requirement paper this semester, you once again
committed significant and serious acts of plagiarism. As before, you used a
computer to ‘copy and paste’ text from various Internet sources. And, as before,
you used this work of other authors without proper attribution to the true source of
the text. Indeed, long passages of your paper are taken word-for-word from
uncited internet sources without any attribution whatever [sic].
. . . . Given your prior suspension for this same conduct, and the clear and
unambiguous instructions and warnings from the course professor orally and in
writing, this lack of candor only confirms a culpable state of mind. Indeed, given
the extent of the plagiarism, and the nature of some of the plagiarized sources, the
only credible conclusion is that your misconduct was fully willful, and taken with
full knowledge that it constituted academic dishonesty of the ‘most blatant’ form
as described by the Honor Code.
Docket No. 1-1, at 38-39 (emphasis in original).10 As a consequence, Beauchene was expelled.
He was also notified that because this was a revocation of his probationary status, there was “no
further review of this decision as a matter of right.” Id. at 41.
Despite having no right to seek review, Rosenblatt granted Beauchene’s request to meet
with him. Id. at 43. In light of the scheduled meeting, Steffey exercised his discretion as advisor
and suspended the imposition of the sanctions of expulsion and withdrawal, which allowed
Beauchene to attend class while he sought review of the Dean. Id. at 42. On November 5, 2012,
Beauchene met with Dean Rosenblatt, Associate Dean Phillip McIntosh and Professors Edwards
and Steffey, during which time he expressed his dissatisfaction of being accused of plagiarism
and the process in which the matter was handled. Id. at 43. Two days later, Dean Rosenblatt
10
In contrast to the Memo from the previous semester, which included a list of thirteen sanctions, this one
carried only three: (1) expulsion; (2) a failing grade for the special projects course under Professor
Edwards; and (3) a grade of “W” for the other law courses in which Beauchene was currently enrolled.
Docket No. 1-1, at 40.
8
furnished a memo to Beauchene stating that the sanctions set forth in Steffey’s memo would be
duly imposed. Docket No. 1-1, at 43. Specifically, Rosenblatt explained that in consideration of
the matters Beauchene raised at the November 5 meeting, together with the letter Beauchene had
provided and Steffey’s Memorandum, the sanctions were appropriate. Id. He also informed
Beauchene that the sanctions would be imposed immediately; thus, he could no longer attend
classes. Id. He was expelled.
In a November 8, 2012 email to Associate Dean McIntosh, Beauchene requested an
appeal pursuant to Section XI of the Honor Code. Docket No. 1-1, at 44.11 Subsequently, on
November 14, 2012, Dean McIntosh denied his appeal and informed Beauchene that Dean
Rosenblatt’s decision, as articulated in his November 7, 2012, memo, was final. Docket No. 1-1.
at 46. This lawsuit followed.
II. Standard of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and makes reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ashcroft v. Iqubal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). The complaint must contain “more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation,” but need not have “detailed factual allegations.” Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted). The plaintiff’s claims must also be plausible on their face, which means there is
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court need not accept as true
11
Section XI(A) of the Student Honor Code states that “[a] student who has been sanctioned by the
Advisor may, as of right, appeal the sanction and the Advisor’s findings to the Honor Court.” Id.
9
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Id. (citation omitted).
Since Iqbal, the Fifth Circuit has clarified that the Supreme Court’s “emphasis on
plausibility of a complaint’s allegations does not give district courts license to look behind those
allegations and independently assess the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to prove them at
trial.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 803 n.44 (5th Cir. 2011).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “Once the moving party has initially shown that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party’s cause, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts
showing a genuine factual issue for trial.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Washington, 276
F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Court must “view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant.” Maddox v. Townsend and Sons, Inc., 639 F. 3d 214, 216 (5th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). “Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable
inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute
for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” TIG Ins. Co., 276 F.3d at 759 (citing SEC v.
Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Because Beauchene has invoked this Court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28,
Section 1332 of the United States Code,12 the applicable substantive law is that of the forum
state, Mississippi. Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2011); Smith v.
12
Beauchene is a resident of Arizona. MC Law is part of Mississippi College, a coeducational liberal arts
institution located in Clinton, Mississippi. Docket No. 1.
10
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 495 F.3d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 2007). State law is determined by
looking to the decisions of the state’s highest court. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Convalescent Services, Inc., 193 F.3d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).
III. Discussion
In response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff invokes the provision in Rule 56 and
attaches his affidavit required by the Rule. Docket No. 7-1. Rule 56(d) states:
[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court
may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other
appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “Rule 56(d) motions are generally favored and should be liberally granted,
but the movant must demonstrate (1) why he needs additional discovery, and (2) how the
additional discovery will likely create a genuine issue of material fact.” Chenevert v. Springer,
431 F. App’x 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2011). A review of the record shows that the Court has sufficient
information to rule on Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how discovery may
reveal evidence which creates a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, there is no need to defer
ruling on the motion.
A. State Tort Law Claims13
MC Law’s arguments as to Beauchene’s state tort law claims will be reviewed under the
motion to dismiss standard.
13
Lawsuits stemming from actions taken by university officials for alleged plagiarism have been
premised upon the theories of defamation, violation of due process, breach of contract, negligence,
promissory estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress and the First Amendment. See generally,
Latourette, Plagiarism: Legal and Ethical Implications of the University, 37 J.C.U.L. 1, 53 (2010)
(hereinafter “Plagiarism”). In this case, the only claims brought by Beauchene are negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and breach of contract, which, in turn, will be
discussed below.
11
1. Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
To assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant’s conduct is “wanton and willful” and that it evoked “outrage or revulsion.” Speed
v. Scott, 787 So. 2d 626, 630 (Miss. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is difficult to prove, as the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals explained:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or
even that his conduct has been characterized by “malice,” or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.
Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 548 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Beauchene has not pled any facts showing that MC Law’s actions meet the high standard
required to maintain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in Mississippi. In his
complaint, Beauchene merely provides one statement, claiming, “[b]y its actions, omissions, and
extreme and outrageous conduct, MC Law defamed and has intentionally and negligently
inflicted emotional distress upon him.” Docket No. 1, at 13. In his brief, Beauchene argues that
he has properly set forth a cognizable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress through
his allegations that MC Law’s denial of his due process protections was intentional and that
Professor Steffey “yelled at [him] and berated him with vulgarity.” Docket No. 8, at 9 (“Memo.
of Auth. in Supp. of Resp. in Oppos. to Defendant’s Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Mot.
for Summ. Judgment”). He further claims that the wrongful expulsion constitutes a medically
cognizable treatable injury. Id. Even taking these allegations into consideration, the Court finds
12
that Beauchene has failed to state a claim. These allegations do not meet the tall order of alleging
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
4:10cv11, 2013 WL 4876373, at *7 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 11, 2013) (“Conduct that rises to the level
of nervewracking, upsetting, and even improper is not enough to reach the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct required for recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); Speed, 787 So.2d at 630 (employer’s repeated
references to plaintiff as liar and thief did not constitute claim for IIED); Haun, 81 F.3d at 548
(conduct which was not praiseworthy and even wrongful was not so extreme as to rise to the
level to support claim for IIED); Smith v. Wesley Health Sys., LLC, No. 2:05cv2179, 2006 WL
2404566, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 2006) (where employee was singled out to perform
undesirable tasks and falsely accused of mistakes did not state claim for IIED).
Beauchene also has not stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
“Unlike the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff may not recover for a
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress without showing that he or she suffered a
physical injury.” Hambrick v. Bear Stearns Residential Mortg., Civil Action. No. 1:07CV258-PD, 2008 WL 5132047 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 5, 2008). As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained in
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hawkins,
[m]ental anguish is a nebulous concept and requires substantial proof for
recovery. Further, if the case is one of ordinary garden variety negligence, the
plaintiffs would have to prove some sort of injury, whether it be physical or
mental. If the conduct was not malicious, intentional or outrageous, there must be
some sort of demonstrative harm.
830 So. 2d 1162, 1174 (Miss. 2002) (brackets, citations and ellipses omitted). Beauchene does
not allege that he suffered any physical injuries as a result of Defendant’s actions. Therefore, his
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress too must be dismissed.
13
2. Defamation
In order to prove defamation, Beauchene must show: “(1) a false and defamatory
statement concerning plaintiff; (2) unprivileged publication to third party; (3) fault amounting at
least to negligence on part of publisher; (4) and either actionability of statement irrespective of
special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication.” Franklin v. Thompson, 722 So.
2d 688, 692 (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted). As previously stated, Beauchene provided only one
statement asserting that MC Law defamed him. MC Law correctly argues that like the claim for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, Beauchene’s defamation claim is
conclusory.
It appears that Beauchene contends that MC Law has defamed him by asserting that he
confessed to intentional plagiarism. See Docket No. 7-1, at 2 (“Contrary to the defendants’
assertions, I did not confess to intentional plagiarism at any time.”). The only publication about
which Beauchene must be asserting are those which are included in the arguments presented in
MC Law’s papers requesting relief from this Court. But, “[s]tatements made in connection with
judicial proceedings, including pleadings, are, if in any way relevant to the subject matter of the
action, absolutely privileged and immune from attack as defamation, even if such statements are
made maliciously and with knowledge of their falsehood.” Central Healthcare Serv., P.A. v.
Citizens Bank of Philadelphia, 12 So.3d 1159, 1168 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). To
the extent that Beauchene is asserting that accusations of plagiarism made by his professors, the
Honor Code Advisor and the Dean constitute defamation, that contention must also be rejected.
The communications made by, among and between these individuals concerning Beauchene’s
alleged plagiarism are shielded by qualified privilege.
A communication made in good faith and on a subject-matter in which the person
making it has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if
14
made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest or duty, even though
it contains matter which without this privilege would be slanderous, provided the
statement is made without malice and in good faith.
Smith v. White, 799 So.2d 83, 86 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss.
609, 618-19, 157 So. 705, 708 (1934)).
The faculty members and the Dean had an educational responsibility to make sure that
Beauchene was meeting its academic standards without resorting to plagiarism. It was their duty
to report, investigate and impose discipline for the violations. Universities have the highest
obligation to ferret out such conduct because when an academic institution confers a degree, it is
certifying to other academic institutions, the private and public sector and the world at large that
a student has met the academic standards of the institution. See generally, Mary Ann Connell &
Donna Gurley, The Right of Educational Institutions to Withhold or Revoke Academic Degrees,
32 J.C. & U.L, 51, 51-52 (2005). These communications are protected by qualified privilege.
Therefore, Beauchene has failed to supply sufficient allegations to render his defamation claim
plausible.
B. Breach of Contract Claim
Defendant’s arguments as to Beauchene’s breach of contract claim will be reviewed
under the motion for summary judgment standard.
Beauchene’s breach of contract claim grows out of MC Law’s alleged failure to give him
notice of his alleged violations prior to the meetings he held with Steffey and other members of
the faculty. Because he had no notice, Beauchene contends that “he was essentially ambushed
and unable to adequately defend himself against the allegations of academic misconduct.”
Complaint, Docket No. 1, at 9. This failure to provide notice, he argues, denied him due process
rights which was “contractually promised to him” in MC Law’s Student Honor Code. Id. See
15
also Docket No. 8, at 5 (“Beauchene was denied the process he was promised by the Honor
Code.”). He also claims that other acts taken by MC Law in violation of his rights to due process
promised to him caused him to suffer damages in the form of lost tuition as well as future
damages related to his lack of a law degree and the inability to transfer to another law school to
complete his degree. Id. at 12.
In challenging the internal decision-making process of academic institutions, students
frequently predicate their claims on constitutional due process and contractual theory. See, e.g.,
Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Senu-Oke v. Jackson State
Univ., 283 F. App’x 236 (5th Cir. 2008); Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992);
Henson v. Honor Comm., Univ. of Virginia, 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983); Slaughter v. Brigham
Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898, 96 S.Ct. 202, 46 L.Ed.2d
131 (1975).
At the outset, it should be noted that MC Law is not a public university; it is a private
institution. This distinction is crucial: Unlike public universities where policies and procedures
regarding forms of academic dishonesty must comport with due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment—as students’ continued enrollment is deemed a protected property—,
those same protections are not available to students enrolled in private colleges and universities.
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (1982) (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits states from denying federal constitutional rights and which
guarantees due process, applies to acts of states, not to acts of private persons or entities”);
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (“Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords
16
no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be.”). Therefore, causes of actions against
private colleges are usually limited to only breach of contract claims. See id.; see also Blouin v.
Loyola Univ., 506 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1975); Slaughter, at 624.
Courts have exercised reluctance in interfering with the disciplinary procedures and
decisions of educational institutions, even where constitutional due process rights are guaranteed.
See, e.g., Senu-Oke v. Jackson State Univ., 521 F.Supp.2d at 559 (declaring that “the Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit have made clear that the process which must attend student dismissals,
whether for academic or disciplinary reasons, is minimal.”), aff’d per curiam, Senu-Oke v.
Jackson State Univ., 283 F. App’x 236 (5th Cir. 2008); Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Hughes, 765
So. 2d 528, 534 (2000) (“In many instances, elements of the law of contracts have been applied
to the student-university relationship, but rigid importation of the contractual doctrine has been
rejected.”) (citing Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1984); Lyons v. Salve
Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 450 (5th
Cir. 1976); Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.1975))). Likewise,
courts have given considerable discretion to private schools’ decisions. See State v. Schmid, 84
N.J. 535, 567, 423 A.2d 615, 632 (1980) (“[P]rivate colleges and universities must be accorded a
generous measure of autonomy and self-governance if they are to fulfill their paramount role as
vehicles of education and enlightenment.”); Ahlum v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 617
So. 2d 96, 98 (La. Ct. App. 1993), writ denied sub nom., 624 So. 2d 1230 (La. 1993) (“A] private
institution has almost complete autonomy in controlling its internal disciplinary procedures.”
(citing Flint v. St. Augustine High School, 323 So.2d 229, 233 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ
denied, 325 So.2d 271 (La. 1976))).
17
When reviewing dismissals that are academic in nature (such as plagiarism), as opposed
to disciplinary dismissals, academic institutions are given even more discretion. See Hughes, 765
So. 2d at 534 (“A disciplinary dismissal requires that the student be given oral or written notice
of the charges and evidence against him and the opportunity to present his side of the story. . . .
In contrast, an academic dismissal calls for far less stringent procedural requirements.” (citations
omitted)); Salcido v. Univ. of S. Miss., 2:11cv173, 2013 WL 2367877, at *4 n.2 (S.D. Miss. May
29, 2013) (university faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making judgment as to
the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation because a
graduate or professional school is the best judge of its students’ academic performance and their
ability to master the required curriculum). In Mahavongsanan, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
sheds light on the difference of treatment for actions that breach academic standards and those
that breach standards of conduct:
Misconduct and failure to attain a standard of scholarship cannot be
equated. A hearing may be required to determine charges of misconduct,
but a hearing may be useless or harmful in finding out the truth concerning
scholarship. There is a clear dichotomy between a student's due process
rights in disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals.
529 F.2d at 450. To be clear, “[a] student dismissed for academic reasons is not entitled to any
type of due process hearing, and all that is required for disciplinary actions is an ‘informal giveand-take’ between the student and the administrative body dismissing him that would, at least,
give the student ‘the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the
proper context.’” Senu-Oke, 521 F.Supp.2d at 559 (quoting Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722,
731 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85-86)). There is no question that in MC
Law’s Honor Code, plagiarism is a form of academic misconduct. Indeed, it falls under Section
VIII of the Honor Code entitled, “Types of Academic Dishonesty and Misconduct.” Docket No.
4-4, at 4.
18
Having been called to review MC Law’s actions, this Court must determine whether MC
Law’s procedures were carried out with fundamental fairness so as to ensure that the decisions
rendered were not arbitrary and capricious. See Hughes, 765 So.2d at 535; see also Ahlum, 617
So. 2d at 99 (“The disciplinary decisions of a private school may be reviewed for arbitrary and
capricious action.” (citations omitted)). In balancing the Court’s interest in safeguarding students
from unfair procedures that result in arbitrary or capricious decisions, with the importance of
giving judicial deference to an academic institution’s decision-making process, the Court may
look to the degree in which MC Law deviated from its established procedures and whether there
was substantial evidence to support its decisions. See Napolitano, 186 N.J. Super. at 548; Ahlum
617 So. 2d. at 99 (stating that a decision is capricious when it is made “without substantial
evidence” and arbitrary when it disregards the weight of evidence); Boehm v. Univ. of
Pennsylvania Sch. of Veterinary Med., 392 Pa. Super. 502, 511, 573 A.2d 575, 580 (1990). But
see, Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 439 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that
with good reason, a deviation from its procedures will not trigger judicial intervention).
Beauchene asserts that the Student Honor Code formed a contractual agreement which
guarantees “contractual” due process rights, the terms of which were violated by MC Law. In
assessing such claim, the proper inquiry before the Court then is whether in Mississippi, an
Honor Code constitutes a recognizable contract between a private university and its student. If
not, the Court would be compelled to dismiss Beauchene’s claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Federal Procedure.
If, on the other hand, the agreement is contractual, the Court must analyze whether MC Law’s
procedures were fundamentally fair and whether Beauchene’s suspension and expulsion were not
arbitrary or capricious.
19
Mississippi law recognizes an implied contractual relationship between a university and
its students. See Hughes, 765 So. 2d at 535. Pointing to the general law of other jurisdictions, the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Hughes insisted “that the student-university relationship is
contractual in nature and that the terms of the contract may be derived from a student handbook,
catalog, or other statement of university policy.” Id. (citing Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d
410 (7th Cir. 1992); Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988); Corso v.
Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.1984); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1976); Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1977); Bleicher v. Univ.
of Cincinnati Coll. of Med., 78 Ohio App.3d 302, 604 N.E.2d 783 (1992); University of Tex.
Health Science Ctr. at Hous. v. Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982)). 14
In Hughes, a former medical student brought an action for breach of contract against the
University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMC), because he was dismissed for failure to pass
the first step of the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE). 765 So.2d at 531.
Plaintiff argued that, upon matriculation, passing the USMLE was not a requirement for
promotion to the School of Medicine or for graduation; thus, the University’s alteration of
promotion and graduation requirements and Hughes’ dismissal for not meeting those
requirements constituted a breach of contract, the terms of which were “set out in the catalog
then in force at the time of his admission.” Id. at 533. Instead of dismissing the student’s claim,
the court found that “the student-university relationship is contractual in nature and that the terms
of the contract may be derived from a student handbook, catalog, or other statement of university
policy.” Id. at 534. However, following the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Mahavongsnan, the court
ultimately ruled in favor of UMC on the contractual claim. Id. It stated, “while the student14
Although Hughes deals with a public university and its students, this holding that recognizes implied
contractual relationships between the student and his or her university is equally applicable to private
academic institutions.
20
university relationship is contractual in nature, implicit in the university’s general contract with
its students is a right to change the university’s academic degree requirements if such changes
are not arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (citing Mahavongsnan, 529 F.2d at 450).
In his Complaint, Beauchene argues that MC Law breached the due process rights
guaranteed to him in the Student Honor Code in the following ways: (1) they did not provide him
with notice of the alleged violations prior to both the March 9, 2012, and October 24, 2012,
meetings in violation of Section X(B)(3) of the Student Honor Code, Docket No. 1, at 9; (2) at
the meetings, he was not provided with “a summary of the information gathered” from the
school, he was denied “a reasonable opportunity to respond,” and he was not provided an
explanation of the disciplinary procedures in violation of Section X(B)(4), id. at 9-10; (3) MC
Law gave him false information about his right to have a witness available, and he was
prohibited from having one in violation of Section X(B)(5), 15 which stunted his ability to defend
himself adequately, id.; and (4) MC Law denied him the right to appeal, a right promised in
Section XI(A), id.
1. Beauchene’s accusation that he was not provided notice prior to his meetings
pursuant to Section X(B)(3) of the Student Honor Code
Rule X(B)(3) provides the procedures that must follow after the Honor Code Advisor
determines that there is a sufficient basis to believe a violation has occurred:
If the Advisor concludes that a sufficient basis exists to believe that the
accused violated the Honor Code, then the Advisor will promptly notify
the student, in writing, of the alleged violation, will set a time to meet with
the student in person, and will gather any other information needed to
resolve the matter.
15
Section X(B)(5) states, “During the meeting with the student, both the Advisor and the student may –
but need not – have witness available. However, the witnesses need not be in the same room as the
student, and the student, while having the right to understand the witnesses’ testimony, does not have a
right to examine the witnesses or know their identity. The Advisor may choose to record the meeting.”
21
Docket No. 1-1, at 58. The record shows that before Beauchene’s initial meetings with Steffey,
he was not provided notice, “in writing,” of his violations as established in MC Law’s Honor
Code. Indeed, before being notified of the first accusation of plagiarism in the March 9 meeting,
Beauchene inquired about the nature of their meeting so that he may prepare, but Steffey
withheld information about the meeting from Beauchene, telling him that there was no need to
worry about it. Id. at 2.
Although Beauchene was not given notice before these initial meetings, this deviation
alone did not make MC Law’s procedures unfair. While Beauchene was accused of plagiarism at
these meetings, he was put on notice of his violations and he was given the opportunity to have
additional meetings with Steffey to discuss his violations prior to any sanctions being imposed.
See id. at 15, 35. After the initial meeting on March 9 (which lasted more than two hours), for
example, Beauchene and Steffey met again on March 20. That second meeting followed several
exchanges of emails and other written communications between Steffey and Beauchene
concerning the plagiarism allegations. At those meetings, they fully discussed the plagiarism
allegations, and Beauchene was allowed to present information and offer explanations.
Additionally, Steffey also informed Beauchene of the “presumptive sanctions for plagiarism.” In
total, all meetings between Steffey and Beauchene lasted nearly six hours. Id. at 8.
Similarly, with respect to the investigation of the second charge of plagiarism,
Beauchene engaged in multiple communications, verbal and email, with his Professor and
Steffey concerning the second charge of plagiarism. After his meeting on October 24, Beauchene
was provided a second meeting with Steffey on October 29 to discuss matters, see id. at 42, and,
on November 5, he met with Dean McIntosh and Professors Edwards and Steffey. Id. at 43.
Notably, these meetings were held before any sanctions were imposed. Thus, the meetings and
22
other communications between Beauchene and MC Law officials more than compensate for their
minor deviations from the Student Honor Code’s written procedures.
MC Law asserts that those initial meetings on March 9 and October 24 were part of MC
Law’s investigation to determine “that a sufficient basis exists to believe that [Beauchene]
violated the Honor Code.” Id. at 58; see also Docket No. 5, at 9. Section X(B)(1) of the Honor
Code states that Steffey could “interview the person making the referral and other persons with
information” during the investigation stage of the accused to determine whether a violation was
committed. Docket No. 1-1, at 57. This provision does not prohibit Steffey from interviewing the
person being accused of violations during the investigatory stage. Given the fact that Beauchene
was afforded additional meetings for his offenses and allowed to plead his case, the Court finds
that MC Law gave sufficient notice in substantial compliance with its procedures.
2. Beauchene’s accusation that MC Law deviated from procedures set forth in
Section X(B)(4) of the Student Honor Code16
Beauchene’s accusations that the procedures set forth in Section X(B)(4) were not
followed is not supported by the record. In fact, the record shows that the procedures were
followed or at least substantially complied with on March 9 and October 24, respectively.
In the March 9 meeting, for example, Beauchene and Steffey discussed Beauchene’s
violations of the Student Honor Code for over two hours. Steffey explicitly explained to him the
16
Section X(B)4 states,
At the meeting with the Advisor the student will be provided with (a) an explanation of
any Honor Code section at issue and the nature of the conduct underlying the accusation;
(b) a summary of the information gathered; (c) a reasonable opportunity to respond; and
(d) an explanation of the applicable disciplinary procedures.
Docket No. 1-1, at 58.
23
source of his plagiarism (which was clearly evident), and pointed out to him specific examples in
his paper where he used someone else’s work without giving them credit. More specifically,
Steffey told Beauchene that the “first 25% of [his] paper…[was] taken line-by-line and footnoteby-footnote from a single source (Miranda Anger, International Aviation Safety: An Examination
of the U.S., EU, and the Developing World, 72 J. Air L. & Com. 141).” See Docket No. 1-1, at 7.
Beauchene was given the chance to respond several times during the meeting, yet he evaded
accepting responsibility until he finally confessed to his wrongdoings in his March 15, 2012,
email to Dean Rosenblatt.17 This confession came after Beauchene and Steffey met on at least
two prior occasions and, at each of those meetings, Beauchene had an opportunity to respond to
the allegations.
In addition, Beauchene was given multiple opportunities to have his paper reviewed by
professors from another law school—an option not mentioned in the terms of the Honor Code
and thus another added benefit made available to Beauchene—or to seek review by the Honor
Court. He chose neither path. Beauchene was also apprised that he would fail the course and face
additional sanctions if the findings of Nicoletti and Steffey that Beauchene engaged in plagiarism
were sustained.
In similar fashion, during the October 24 meeting, Beauchene was told that long passages
of his paper were taken, verbatim, from an uncited internet source. Docket No. 1-1, at 39. He
was given the opportunity to respond and explain his errant behavior. His response included an
admission that he copied and pasted information from the internet onto his paper. As a student on
probation, the rules for his readmission and subsequent matriculation were quite different. As
17
Despite compelling evidence to the contrary, Beauchene, in his reply, claims that he never admitted to
plagiarism. The record clearly shows otherwise.
24
explained in the Memo to Beauchene dated April 3, 2012, his probationary status made him
subject to immediate expulsion should he ever violate the Honor Code again. Docket No. 1-1, at
24. Even as a student who had been stripped of the protections of a regularly enrolled student,
Beauchene was allowed to meet with the Dean.18 Therefore, he received more protection and
process than that which he was entitled. Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, MC Law met the
requirements of Section X(B)(4).
3. Beauchene’s accusation that he was denied rights outlined in Section X(B)(5) of
the Student Honor Code19
Beauchene’s third argument that he was prohibited from having witnesses available is
also inaccurate. As Steffey stated in a March 30 email to Beauchene, Beauchene never actually
exercised his right to have a witness present or have witness testimony heard during the
investigation and review of his first offense. Docket No. 1-1, at 17. Nothing in the record
contradicts this point.
During the process of investigating the second offense, Beauchene inquired of Steffey
whether he may have a professor present, Docket No.1-1, at 31, but he never really received a
definitive answer from Steffey. Id. However, he was never specifically prohibited from
18
Since Beauchene was notified of this fact and he admitted to plagiarism, the Court finds that he was
actually given more process than he was owed.
19
Section X(B)(V) provides:
During the meeting with the student, both the Advisor and the student may – but need not
– have witnesses available. However, the witnesses need not be in the same room as the
student, and the student, while having the right to understand the witnesses’ testimony,
does not have a right to examine the witnesses or know their identity. The Advisor may
choose to record the meeting.
Docket No. 1-1, at 58.
25
discussing matters with his professors during the process of investigating his second offense, nor
was he denied the right to have a professor present. Id. at 34.
Even if MC Law explicitly told Beauchene that he could not have any witness present,
this fact would be inconsequential. It is clear from the record that Beauchene submitted work
without attribution to the actual authors. His plagiarism was blatant and pervasive, and he
admitted as much.20 Therefore, having a witness present would have been fruitless and would not
have altered the outcome of Beauchene’s dismissal.
4. Beauchene’s accusation that he was denied his right to appeal as promised in
Section XI(A) of the Student Honor Code
Finally, Beauchene argues that he was denied his right to appeal MC Law’s decisions.
Section XI(A) of the Student Honor Code states that “[a] student who has been sanctioned by the
Advisor may, as of right, appeal the sanction and the Advisor’s findings to the Honor Court.” Id.
at 59. Before Beauchene was suspended for his first violation, the record shows that he was
given numerous opportunities to have the matter reviewed by an Honor Court. Beauchene
outright refused to do so. Docket No. 1-1, at 3. Moreover, he admitted that he understood that he
had violated the Honor Code, accepted the sanctions, and completed the tasks necessary for his
readmission. Id.; Docket No. 4-11.
20
Having admitted to the charge, Beauchene may have forfeited his right to due process. See Anvar v.
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 2005 WL 2789331, at * 6 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Oct. 27, 2005) (“a student may not
assert that his due process rights were violated after admitting the conduct on which the discipline is
based) (citing Keough v. Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1083 (5th Cir. 1984)). Although this
principle stems from cases dealing with constitutional due process rights in public universities, it may be
applied to contractual due process rights in private colleges as well. Here, the Court does not rule that
Beauchene is not owed fundamentally fair procedures simply because he admitted to his violations;
however, the Court does find that his admission, along with the procedures given, gave credence to MC
Law’s decisions.
26
In October, Beauchene sought to appeal his expulsion, but the appeal was denied.
Although Beauchene was denied his right to appeal his expulsion, that decision was not arbitrary
or capricious. The decision to revoke his probationary status was not subject to further review as
a matter of right. Docket No. 1-1, at 41. By meeting with Beauchene before the expulsion,
however, the Dean actually provided Beauchene more process than that to which he was entitled.
Here, MC Law denied Beauchene’s appeal. Nothing in the Honor Code or the law
prohibits the school from denying the appeal to a probationary student who was found to have
committed the same violations that transformed the student to a probationary student. In other
words, that action cannot be deemed arbitrary and capricious. In Hughes, for example, while
recognizing the deference with which courts have given to academic institutions, the court stated
that UMC possessed the implied authority to change the requirements for graduation as long as
that change was not arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 534 (“Implicit in the student’s contract with
the university upon matriculation is the student’s agreement to comply with the university’s rules
and regulations, which the university is entitled to modify so as to properly exercise it
educational responsibility.” (quoting Mahavongsnan, 529 F.2d at 448)).
The Court has already noted the significance of Beauchene’s admission of guilt, see
supra, n. 20. However, even if he did not admit to plagiarism, based on the Court’s own review
of the record, Beauchene’s plagiarism both in the Spring of 2012 and the Fall of 2012 is
overwhelmingly apparent. See Docket No. 4. Consequently, as the defendant argues in its
Motion for Summary Judgment, it was not necessary for an appeal-like procedure for the same
reason it is not necessary for this Court to allow Beauchene’s claim to proceed: the determination
27
of plagiarism can be made from the record alone. 21 See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90 (holding that it
is not necessary for a hearing to be held for a dismissal that is academic in nature). The degree to
which Beauchene plagiarized was so egregious that a finding to the contrary would be
tantamount to an abuse of discretion.
The first time Beauchene plagiarized in the Fall semester of 2012, he wrote a letter to
Steffey explaining that the footnotes of the Anger article from which he copied onto his research
paper “referred to preceding notes that did not exist in [his] paper and stated, incorrectly, that
[he] had visited the reference website in 2006.” Docket No. 4-11. Similarly, Beauchene’s
plagiarism was so pervasive in his second submission that one example revealed that he copied
errors of misspellings from the original author’s text. See Docket No. 5, at 23. These sorts of
violations cannot be dismissed as mere mistakes made in haste; they present iron-clad proof of
plagiarism.
The due process afforded to Beauchene was, at the very least, commensurate with the
academic violations that he committed. He was given an opportunity to be heard, notice that he
would be disciplined for his violations, a detailed explanation as to why he would be punished,
and even an opportunity to be readmitted in substantial compliance with the established rules at
MC Law. Beauchene has no proof that a different result would have been produced had he been
afforded any of the due process purportedly denied to him, such as the opportunity to have been
supplied with written notice of the charges and the opportunity to call witnesses at his meetings
with Steffey and his professors. Even under the “informal give-and-take” requirement applied to
dismissals for academic reasons under the constitutional due process analysis in Senu-Oke, the
21
MC Law attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment exhibits containing Beauchene’s research paper
submissions with copies of the original source’s from which he copied with the intent to represent it as his
own work.
28
Court could still reasonably conclude that Beauchene was afforded all the process to which he
was entitled, and beyond: he was given numerous opportunities to explain his actions in writing
and in several face-to-face meetings with the proper administrative authorities so that he could
“characterize his conduct and put it in what he deem[ed] the proper context.” Id. at 559. In light
of these factors, combined with the practice of judicial nonintervention when reviewing
academic dismissals, and the broad discretion with which private schools are vested, in general,
the decision to suspend Beauchene and ultimately expel him was not arbitrary and capricious.
An educational institution’s decision to suspend or punish a serial plagiarist within the
law school context has special implications. See generally Plagiarism, 37 J.C. & U.L. at 75
(stating that a finding of plagiarism may call into question the student’s moral character and
fitness to engage in the practice of law and can “potentially thwart a law career at the admissionto-the-bar level”). Courts exercise judicial restraint in the academic context so as not to stifle
academic freedom and interfere with the unique relationship inherent between the student and his
or her school. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985):
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional
judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person
or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.
Considerations of profound importance counsel restrained judicial review
of the substance of academic decisions.
. . . . Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students. . . but also,
and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the
academy itself.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
29
The more specialized and individualized the educational regime, the more unique that
relationship becomes and the more deference an institution should be given when dismissing a
student for academic reasons. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90 (explaining the importance of
deferring to educators in dealing with academic dismissals, claiming that this is especially
critical when educational regimes become more “individualized” and “specialized”). Of greater
significance is society’s need to be protected from individuals entering the legal field without
sound skill, competence, and moral aptitude. Along these lines, law schools are in a noteworthy
position (and are somewhat obligated) to shield society by holding their students to certain
academic and moral standards as a requirement to continue their legal education and receive a
Juris Doctor diploma.
Beauchene’s multiple violations of plagiarism exhibit gross academic and ethical
behavioral deficiencies. It is he who breached the contract he had with the law school; as he was
obliged to comply with MC Law’s Honor Code, but he failed miserably.
On this record, there can be only one conclusion: Beauchene engaged in widespread
plagiarism in violation of MC Law’s Honor Code, and the procedures extended and provided to
him during the investigation of those charges were fundamentally fair. Neither the decision to
suspend him nor to expel him was arbitrary and capricious.
In all respects, the Court finds that MC Law acted appropriately.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. All Plaintiff’s claims, including his Motion for
Preliminary and Permanent Relief, is DENIED.
30
SO ORDERED, this the 8th day of November, 2013.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
31
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