Torns et al v. City of Jackson, ET AL et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for the reasons stated in the order. A judgment will be entered in a separate docket entry to follow. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on October 17, 2013. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
CHARLES TORNS, JR. AND
CHRISTOPHER B. TORNS

PLAINTIFFS

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-45-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF JACKSON, et al

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

This pro se civil-rights suit is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs have responded in opposition. Having fully considered the premises, the Court
concludes that the motion should be granted.
I.

Background
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Charles Torns, Jr., received a call on August 23,

2011, informing him that Jackson Police Department officers were detaining and searching
Torns’s relatives at the Jackson West Apartment Complex. Compl. [1-1] ¶ 4. Torns then
enlisted his son, Plaintiff Christopher B. Torns, and the two proceeded to the scene “to see why
the JPD’s officers and [n]arcotic agents were searching” his relatives. Id. Plaintiffs contend that
in their
attempts to avoid the area where the officers and agents were conducting their
investigation and search, these agents, especially defendant[] Dear called the
plaintiffs’s [sic] over to the area where they were allegedly conducting their
search and investigations, but then JPD’s officer W. Horton apprehended, handcuffed both the plaintiffs’s [sic] . . . .
Id. Plaintiffs were then jailed before the charges were later dropped. Id. Plaintiffs contend that
these actions violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. ¶ 7. They therefore sued Dear; Horton; the

City of Jackson, Mississippi; the Jackson Police Department (JPD); Rebecca Coleman, Chief of
the Jackson Police Department; Pieter Teeuwissen, Jackson City Attorney; Mayor Harvey
Johnson, Jr.; and Jackson’s City Council’s Board’s Members.
Defendants now move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. More specifically, Defendants Dear and Horton claim qualified immunity, and the
rest generally assert that the Complaint fails to state a claim because it makes no specific
allegations as to them.
II.

Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th
Cir. 1999)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). That “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and
footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It follows that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has

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not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
The Supreme Court’s examination of the issue in Iqbal provides a framework for
examining the sufficiency of a complaint. First, the district court may “begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Id. Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
Regardless, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
III.

Analysis
A.

Qualified Immunity as to Defendants Dear and Horton

Section 1983 precludes deprivation of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws” of
the United States by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Daniel v.
Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1988). Dear and Horton seek qualified immunity as to
the § 1983 claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity is a
shield from individual liability for “‘government officials performing discretionary functions . . .
as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated.’” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). “[P]laintiffs who invoke § 1983 must plead specific
facts that, if proved, would overcome the individual defendant’s immunity defense.” Geter v.
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Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553 (5th Cir. 1988). “Further, plaintiffs must demonstrate prior to
discovery that their allegations are sufficiently fact-specific to remove the cloak of protection
afforded by an immunity defense.” Id.
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from money damages unless a
plaintiff shows: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Khan v. Normand, 683 F.3d 192, 194
(5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)). “The clearly
established part of the test is a high bar for a plaintiff to meet as he must show that ‘the contours
of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates a right.’” Batiste v. Theriot, 458 F. App’x 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). “An officer is entitled to qualified immunity even if [she] violated a
constitutional right, so long as [her] actions were objectively reasonable.” Id. (citing Spann v.
Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993)). “Unless all reasonable officers in the defendants’
circumstance would have known that the conduct in question violated the constitution, the
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245
F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)).
The Complaint in the present case is difficult to follow. Reading between the lines,
Plaintiffs suggest that the officers called them over and then for no reason arrested them for
interfering with a police investigation. Compl. ¶ 4. If so, then probable cause would arguably
be lacking. See United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2006). But the factual
averments are far from clear and also suggest that Plaintiffs went to the scene for the very
purpose of injecting themselves into the investigation. See id. (averring that Plaintiffs went to
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the apartment complex “to see why [t]he JPD’s officers and Narcotic agents were searching”
their relatives). These averments leave too many uncertainties for the Court to find that Plaintiffs
have pleaded facts that are “sufficiently fact-specific to remove the cloak of protection afforded
by an immunity defense.” Geter, 849 F.2d at 1553.
Plaintiffs response to the Defendants’ motion fails to clarify their position. In it,
Plaintiffs merely state in conclusory fashion that their “complaint pleads enough facts to state a
claim . . . .” Pl.s’ Resp. [10] at 3. And as to the qualified-immunity argument more specifically,
Plaintiffs state that the law is clearly established and that “given the opportunity to prove[] these
sworn [sic] facts at a trial, indeed the plaintiff’s [sic] would be []as a matter of law, entitled to the
reliefs [sic] they seek.” Id. at 6. Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, and the sum total of
Plaintiffs’ submissions fail to demonstrate that they are entitled to proceed on these claims. That
said, the Court cannot conclude that the pleading defects are incurable. Therefore, dismissal is
without prejudice. Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000).
B.

Defendants Coleman, Teeuwissen, Johnson, and Unnamed Board Members in
Individual Capacities

Defendants Coleman, Teeuwissen, Johnson, and the unnamed members of the board all
move for dismissal of claims against them in their individual capacities. These Defendants
correctly note that the Complaint fails to make any specific allegations as to them and does not
place any of them at the scene of the arrest. Plaintiffs never address this deficiency in their
Response to the pending motion, offering instead the insufficient and conclusory assertion that
their Complaint states a claim.

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Section 1983 “does not create vicarious or respondeat superior liability.” Evett v.
DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Yet the Complaint in this case offers no hint as to what these
Defendants did or did not do. The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim against them in their
individual capacities and all such claims are due to be dismissed without prejudice. See Hart,
199 F.3d at 247 n.6.
C.

Claims Against the City of Jackson

The remaining claims, whether asserted against the City of Jackson directly or against
individuals in their official capacities, are ultimately claims against the City. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
A municipality like the City of Jackson may be held liable under § 1983, but that liability
may not rest on respondeat superior and instead must be premised upon “‘some official action or
imprimatur.’” Valle v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Piotrowski v.
City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). In order to impose § 1983 liability against a
municipality, “[a] plaintiff must identify: ‘(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a
policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional
violation whose “moving force” is that policy or custom.’” Id. at 541–42 (quoting Pineda v. City
of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
In the present case, Plaintiffs make no effort in their Complaint to plead facts that could
establish the elements of municipal liability. And their Response to the pending motion is no
better, asserting simply that they have said enough. Because Plaintiffs fail to plead a facially

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plausible claim, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, their claims against the City of Jackson are due for
dismissal without prejudice. See Hart, 199 F.3d at 247 n.6.
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not addressed would not alter the result.

For the reasons stated, all motions to dismiss are granted. But because the claims could
conceivably be pleaded in a sufficient way, dismissal is without prejudice. A separate judgment
will be entered in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 58.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 17th day of October, 2013.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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