Winding v. Colbert et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION: granting 8 motion to dismiss; that all other motions should be denied; that a separate order in conformity with and incorporating by reference the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order shall issue. Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Roper on 5/10/13 (SEC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
JAMES WINDING, #K8115
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO: 3:13-cv-101-JMR
KEVIN COLBERT; LILLIE BLACKMON SANDERS;
CRAIG GODBOLD; NATCHEZ POLICE
DEPARTMENT; RONNIE HARPER;
PAMELA FERRINGTON; ADAMS COUNTY JAIL;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
CHRISTOPHER EPPS
DEFENDANTS
_____________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Motion of the Defendants Christopher Epps,
Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, District Attorney Ronnie Harper,
and Circuit Court Judge Lillie Blackmon Sanders [collectively, State Defendants] to Dismiss [8]
this case pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey and the statute of limitations. Also pending before the
Court are the Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants Adams County, Mississippi [10];
Adams County Jail [12]; Kevin Colbert [17]; the Natchez Police Department [21];and Pamela
Ferrington [24]. Winding has filed various motions of his own, including a Motion for Order to
Show Cause [14]; Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Adams County's Motion to Dismiss
[15]; Motion to Issue Federal Habeas Corpus [16]; Motion for Summary Judgment [25]; Motion
to Continue [26]; Motion for Injunctive Relief [27]; Motion to Strike [28]; Motion to Amend
[29]; Motion to Strike [30]; and another Motion to Amend [32]. The complaint in this case
contends that the named defendants kidnapped Winding when he was arrested on September 28,
2002, and placed in the Adams County Jail on charges of sexual battery. [1-1, pp. 5, 12-13.]
On May 21, 2012, a lawsuit styled James Winding v. Lillie Blackmon Sanders, Ronnie
Harper, Craig Godbold, Eileen Maher, Kevin Colbert, Natchez Police Department, Pamela
Ferrington, and the Adams County Jail, 5:12cv88-DCB-JMR was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Western Division. That suit was based on
Windings' arrest on September 28, 2002, on charges of kidnapping and sexual battery. Winding v.
Sanders, 1:12cv88DCB-JMR, Doc. 1-2, p. 6. Winding contended in that suit that he was
unlawfully held in custody on the charge of sexual battery because he was never arrested on that
charge. [1-2, p. 6.] The suit was dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey1 on March 6, 2013.
[1:12cv88, Doc. 78.]
According to the allegations of the complaint in this case, Winding contends that he was
kidnapped by "all said defendants" when he was jailed on charges of sexual battery, a charge
"that does not exist on NCIC report," "conspired with each other to deprive [Winding] of his
liberty" "without any due process." [2, pp. 7-8.] These same allegations formed the basis of the
complaint in Winding v. Sanders, 5:12cv88DCB-JMR, as outlined by Winding in his motion for
summary judgment filed in that case. [Winding v. Sanders, 5:12cv88DCB-JMR, Doc. 50.] In that
earlier lawsuit filed in Adams County, Mississippi, each defendant was sued for a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" and the "unlawful arrest" when "all named defendant[s] knowingly placed
[Winding] in prison on sexual battery when they knew [Winding] was never finger printed,
arrested nor booked on said charge." [1:12cv88, 8, p. 7.]
A district court is authorized to conduct limited screening and to dismiss a complaint if it
appears the allegations are “totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
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512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)). In addition, district courts have “the right to
take notice of [their] own files and records” in adjudicating cases between the same parties
raising substantially similar issues as those addressed in previous cases. Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v.
Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). “[I]f a court is on notice that it
has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even
though the defense has not been raised. . . . This result is fully consistent with the policies
underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens
of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.”
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 432 (1980). In this case Winding has brought suit in
the Southern District of Mississippi, Western Division, for the identical claims raised in this
case, and that suit was dismissed with prejudice on March 6, 2013. [5:12cv88, 78.]
Generally, res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, not raised sua
sponte. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(c). There are two limited exceptions to this rule; the first exception
allows “[d]ismissal by the court sua sponte on res judicata grounds . . . in the interest of judicial
economy where both actions were brought before the same court.” Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435,
436 (5th Cir. 1980); accord United Home Rentals, Inc. v. Tex. Real Estate Comm'n, 716 F.2d
324, 330 (5th Cir. 1983). Both of these actions were brought in the same federal district court, in
different divisions. In fact, these actions are almost identical.
Winding had full and fair opportunity to raise the claims in the previous federal suit that
are now raised before this Court. See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389
(5th Cir. 2001). The previous suit was found barred by the provisions of Heck v. Humphrey and
the Court finds no reason not to apply the same principals to this case. Winding has not shown
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that the conviction that formed the basis of this suit and the previous suit was overturned. The
Court, therefore, finds that both the principals outlined in Heck v. Humphrey and res judicata bars
the plaintiff from relitigating the claims against the defendants in the present case. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the State Defendants' Motion to dismiss [8] should be granted and all of
plaintiff's claims be dismissed. Based on this finding the Court further finds that all other
motions in this case including the Motions filed by the Defendants Adams County, Mississippi
[10]; Adams County Jail [12]; Kevin Colbert [17]; the Natchez Police Department [21];and
Pamela Ferrington [24] along with any motions filed by Winding, to include the Motion for
Order to Show Cause [14]; Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Adams County's Motion to
Dismiss [15]; Motion to Issue Federal Habeas Corpus [16]; Motion for Summary Judgment [25];
Motion to Continue [26]; Motion for Injunctive Relief [27]; Motion to Strike [28]; Motion to
Amend [29]; Motion to Strike [30]; and another Motion to Amend [32] be denied as moot. All
claims advanced against these Defendants in their individual and official capacities, whether
under § 1983 or state law, are dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court finds that Winding’ claims should be dismissed for failing to first
achieve favorable termination of available state or federal habeas opportunities challenging his
underlying conviction. Alternatively, if the claims were not barred by Heck, this Court is of the
opinion that res judicata bars consideration of the plaintiff's claims in this case. Therefore, the
Court finds that all claims against all Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice, both in
their individual and official capacities. In addition, the Court finds that the Motions to Dismiss
filed by the Defendants Adams County, Mississippi [10]; Adams County Jail [12]; Kevin Colbert
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[17]; the Natchez Police Department [21];and Pamela Ferrington [24] and Winding's Motion for
Order to Show Cause [14]; Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Adams County's Motion to
Dismiss [15]; Motion to Issue Federal Habeas Corpus [16]; Motion for Summary Judgment [25];
Motion to Continue [26]; Motion for Injunctive Relief [27]; Motion to Strike [28]; Motion to
Amend [29]; Motion to Strike [30]; and Motion to Amend [32] should be denied. A separate
Order in conformity with and incorporating by reference the foregoing Memorandum Opinion
shall issue. Each party shall bear their respective costs associated with this motion. A copy of this
Memorandum Opinion was mailed to Plaintiff at his last known address by certified mail, return
receipt request.
DATED, this the 10th day of May, 2013.
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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