Howard et al v. Hyundai Motor America

Filing 12

ORDER granting 8 Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons stated in the order. A judgment will be docketed in a separate docket entry to follow. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on June 17, 2013. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
GERALD HOWARD AND
GLORIA HOWARD

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13cv229-DPJ-FKB

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

DEFENDANT
ORDER

This car-wreck case is before the Court on Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [8]. In response, Plaintiffs have filed their two-page Answer to Motion
for Summary Judgment [10] (“Response”). The Court, having considered the parties’
submissions and the applicable law, finds that Defendant’s motion should be granted.
I.

Background
On July 7, 2007, Plaintiffs Gerald and Gloria Howard were involved in a single-car

accident while operating their 2006 Hyundai Sonata. Nearly five years later, on July 5, 2012,
Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging negligence, products-liability, and breach-of-warranty
claims. See Howard v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 3:12-cv-590-DPJ-FKB. That case was removed
to federal court, and eventually dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute and to comply with a court order. Id., Order [9]
(Jan 14, 2013).1 Alleging the same claims, Plaintiffs refiled their Complaint [1] in this Court on
April 16, 2013. Defendant has moved for summary judgment asserting that all of Plaintiffs’
claims are untimely, or in the alternative that Plaintiffs have previously settled and released all

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The Court also denied Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to reopen and noted that the claims
appeared to be time barred. Id., Order [15] (Apr. 12, 2013).

possible claims and otherwise have failed to state a warranty claim. The Court has subjectmatter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.
II.

Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). When such contradictory
facts exist, the court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations omitted).
But factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “only when . . .
both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Significant
to the present motion, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and
legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for
trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093,
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1097 (5th Cir. 1993). The 2010 amendments to Rule 56 make this clear. Pursuant to Rule
56(c)(1), a party asserting that a fact “is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Plaintiffs have not complied with these rules.
III.

Analysis
A.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant contends, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ claims are time barred. Plaintiffs
fail to show otherwise. Under Mississippi law, both negligence and products-liability claims are
governed by the general three-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49; Lincoln
Elec. Co. v. McLemore, 54 So. 3d 833, 836 (Miss. 2010) (applying section 15-1-49 to productsliability claim). Further, state-law breach-of-warranty claims against automobile manufacturers
are barred six years from the date of delivery of the vehicle unless the warranty “explicitly
extends to future performance of the goods.” Miss. Code Ann. § 72-2-725; Forbes v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 993 So. 2d 822, 824–25 (Miss. 2008); see also Estate of Hunter v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 729 So. 2d 1264, 1277 (Miss. 1999).
In this case, the negligence and products-liability claims stem from the July 7, 2007 car
accident. The applicable three-year limitations period for those claims ran on July 7, 2010, well
before this suit—or the preceding action—was filed, so those claims must be dismissed. As to
Plaintiffs’ breach-of-warranty claim, Defendant has submitted unrebutted evidence showing that
Plaintiffs purchased their vehicle on June 29, 2006, and argues that Plaintiffs’ warranty claim
expired six years later on June 29, 2012. Def.’s Mot. [8] Ex. 9, Certificate of Title; see also id.,
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Ex. 7, Appl. for Certificate of Title; id., Ex. 8, Odometer Statement. Plaintiffs baldly deny these
averments and demand proof thereof, but they otherwise fail to address Defendant’s timeliness
argument in their Response or with record evidence. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs’
breach-of-warranty claim expired June 29, 2012, and is untimely. The Court declines to address
Defendant’s alternative arguments.
B.

Is Motion Premature

The only other issue Plaintiffs raise in their Response is the assertion that Defendant’s
motion “is prematurely filed.” Pls.’ Resp. [10] at 1. But Rule 56(b) states that “a party may file
a motion for summary judgment at any time . . . .” And it is well established in the Fifth Circuit
that “Rule 56 does not require that any discovery take place before summary judgment can be
granted.” Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990).2
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments and those not addressed would not

have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.

2

Plaintiffs do not appear to seek discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
But if they did intend that relief, the Response fails to comply with Local Rule 7(b)(3)(C), which
precludes seeking relief in the body of a response. The request would likewise fall short under
Rule 56(d) because there was no “affidavit or declaration” as the rule requires and no explanation
how the discovery would address the basis for the motion. See Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of
Columbus v. Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 2013); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1396 (5th Cir. 1994). So to the extent Plaintiffs
assert a Rule 56(d) motion, it is denied.
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A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
58.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 17th day of June, 2013.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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