Jadbabaei v. City of Florence, Mississippi et al

Filing 65

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons stated in the order. The parties are instructed to contact the Court's Courtroom Deputy within 10 days of the entry of this order to reset the pretrial conference in this matter. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on September 12, 2014. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
SEYED RASHID JADBABAEI

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13cv247-DPJ-FKB

CITY OF FLORENCE, MISSISSIPPI and
TRACY HUGHES individually and in his
official capacity as police officer of Florence
Police Department

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This excessive-force case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [47]. Because there are genuine issues of fact as to Defendant Hughes’s liability but
not as to the city’s liability, Defendants’ motion is denied in part and granted in part.
I.

Facts and Procedural History
Officer Eddie Williams of the Florence Police Department pulled over Plaintiff Seyed

Rashid Jadbabaei for speeding. Officer Williams perceived Jadbabaei as nervous and shaky and
obtained his consent to search his car. After Williams called for backup, Defendant Officer
Tracy Hughes arrived. Upon finding the remains of a cigar in Jadbabaei’s car, Hughes asked
Jadbabaei if he had been making blunts. Jadbabaei denied that he had, and Hughes began to
search Jadbabaei’s person. When Hughes instructed Jadbabaei to pull out the waistband of his
underwear, Jadbabaei refused.
What happened next is disputed. According to Defendants, Jadbabaei threw a left-handed
punch at Hughes’s midsection and then struck Hughes’s midsection with his right hand before
Hughes’s open hand made contact with Jadbabaei’s head as he tried to gain control. According
to Jadbabaei, Hughes placed his left hand on Jadbabaei’s shoulder, pulled at his waistband,

struck Jadbabaei’s head with his closed fist, wrestled him to the ground, and placed him in a
choke hold. Jadbabaei was arrested for resisting arrest. The dashboard videocamera footage
shows the encounter, but Hughes’s body blocks much of the disputed contact from view.
Jadbabaei filed this action against Hughes and the City of Florence under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and deliberate
indifference. Jadbabaei seeks damages for pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, and
past and future medical expenses. He also seeks punitive damages. Defendants filed the instant
motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims.
II.

Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). Conclusory allegations,
speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute
for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash.,
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276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993).
III.

Analysis
A.

Hughes’s Liability

Defendants seek summary judgment on the individual-capacity claims against Hughes,
arguing that the undisputed facts establish that he never violated Jadbabaei’s constitutional rights
and is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. But the parties’ accounts materially differ as to
whether the use of force was necessary. And though a dashboard camera recorded the altercation
between Hughes and Jadbabaei, significant portions of the altercation remained obscured. See
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. [47] Exs. 1, 2. For example, it is unclear whether Jadbabaei threw a lefthanded punch or struck Hughes’s chest with his right hand before Hughes struck Jadbabaei. It is
also unclear whether Hughes struck Jadbabaei with a closed or open hand. Finally, it is open to
interpretation whether Jadbabaei raised his hands “to fight the officers” as Defendants put it or
raised them in a defensive posture. Given these factual disputes, summary judgment on the
individual-capacity claims against Hughes is not appropriate.
B.

City of Florence’s Liability

Jadbabaei also alleges that the City of Florence is liable for the violation of his
constitutional rights. As Jadbabaei acknowledges, municipal liability under § 1983 may not rest
on respondeat superior. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). For a municipality like the City of
Florence to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish “three elements: a policymaker;
an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
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custom.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694).
In the absence of any disputed ordinances, policy statements, or regulations, a plaintiff
can establish a policy or custom through proof of “[a] persistent, widespread practice of city
officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated
policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984). “An act performed
pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may
fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread
as to have the force of law.” Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal
citation omitted).
As to the official-policy requirement, Jadbabaei appears to point to the City of Florence’s
“custom” of not conducting psychiatric evaluations when hiring new employees and to Chief
Richard Thomas as the policymaker in this regard. See Pl.’s Mem. [55] at 18 (citing Ex. 9,
Thomas Dep. at 17).1 Assuming Jadbabaei can meet the first and second requirements for
municipal liability, he has not shown that this custom was the “moving force” of the alleged
excessive force. “Moving force” causation requires “‘a direct causal link between the municipal
action and the deprivation of federal rights’ . . . . That is, ‘the plaintiff must demonstrate that a

1

Jadbabaei also references the “single-incident exception,” whereby “[a] single decision
by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which a
[municipality] may be liable.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (quotation omitted) (second alteration in
original). But he makes no attempt to apply this exception to the facts of this case and does not
allege that Hughes was a policymaker. He therefore may not rely on the single-incident
exception to establish the official-policy element of his claim for municipal liability.
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municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular
constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.’” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (quoting Bd. of
the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 411 (1997)). “Deliberate indifference reflects
the policymaker’s conscious choice to disregard constitutional violations caused by its adopted
policy.” Yara v. Perryton Indep. Sch. Dist., 560 F. App’x 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing James
v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Jadbabaei has not shown that the failure to conduct psychiatric evaluations was the
moving force behind Hughes’s actions or that Thomas acted with deliberate indifference in
making that decision. Jadbabaei points to no evidence that Hughes had psychiatric or mental
issues. His bald assertion that “Hughes had mental issues” is not sufficient to defeat summary
judgment. See TIG Ins. Co., 276 F.3d at 759.
Similarly, the previous incidents involving Hughes do not establish that Thomas
“conscious[ly] . . . disregard[ed] constitutional violations” caused by a lack of psychiatric
evaluations. See Yara, 560 F. App’x at 359. Jadbabaei points first to a 2001 civil complaint
alleging that Hughes and a number of other officers violated two plaintiffs’ civil rights when a
police chase of fleeing suspects led to a fatal accident. Even assuming that a mere complaint is
sufficient to create a question of fact regarding Hughes’s conduct, the complaint in that case did
not allege that Hughes was the driver, and Jadbabaei has not shown that he was. Moreover, no
constitutional violation was actually found as the case was ultimately dismissed. The second
incident involved Hughes “put[ting] himself in an intimidating stance” and accusing a man of
using his veteran status to get out of a traffic ticket. See Pl.’s Resp. [54] Ex. O, Norris Compl.
No legal action was taken against Hughes based on this incident, the allegations fail to state a
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constitutional violation, and they further fail to establish the causal link between the lack of
psychiatric evaluation and the incident with Jadbabaei.
Jadbabaei has failed to show that Thomas acted with deliberate indifference and that the
practice of not conducting psychiatric evaluations was the “moving force” behind the alleged
violation of Jadbabaei’s constitutional rights. The City of Florence is therefore entitled to
summary judgment as to Jadbabaei’s claims against it.2
IV.

Conclusion

The Court has considered all the arguments. Those not addressed would not change the
result. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion [47] is granted with respect to the claims
against the City of Florence and denied with respect to the claims against Hughes in his
individual capacity. The parties are instructed to contact the Court’s Courtroom Deputy within
10 days of the entry of this order to reset the pretrial conference in this matter.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 12th day of September, 2014.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

The claims against Hughes in his official capacity are likewise dismissed as they are
treated as claims against the City. See Lewis v. Pugh, 289 F. App’x 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2008).
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