Torns v. Majestic Burger's Company, Restaurants Incorporations et al

Filing 27

ORDER denying 22 Motion for Reconsideration for the reasons stated in the order. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on February 3, 2014. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER BERNARD TORNS

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV272 DPJ-FKB

MAJESTIC BURGER COMPANY, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This employment-discrimination case is before the Court on the motion [22] of Plaintiff
Christopher Bernard Torns, proceeding pro se, for reconsideration of the Court’s Order [20]
granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants oppose the motion for reconsideration. The
Court, having considered the parties’ submissions in light of the applicable authority, finds
Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.
I.

Standard
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to alter or amend a

judgment. But reconsideration “is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”
Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). And “such a motion is not the
proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered
or raised before the entry of judgment.” Id. (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159
(5th Cir. 1990)). Instead, “a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) must
clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence
and cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the
judgment issued.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations and
quotations omitted). Extensions of time for filing Rule 59(e) motions are expressly prohibited
pursuant to Rule 6(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II.

Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that the two Mississippi Supreme Court cases cited within the Court’s

Order [20] do not contain specific statutory authority for the “employment at-will doctrine.”1
Pl.’s Mot. Recons. ¶¶ 1- 2 [22]. Further, Plaintiff states that “each of [the] cases relied on by the
district judge says nothing to an at will employment of Mississippians.” Id. at ¶ 2 [22].
To the contrary, as referenced within the Court’s Order [20], “Mississippi has followed
the ‘employment at will’ doctrine since 1858.” Order [20] Dec. 18, 2013 at 2 (quoting
HeartSouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865 So. 2d 1095, 1108 (Miss. 2003)). It is well settled that
employers may terminate employees for “a good reason, a wrong reason, or no reason at all.”
Brown v. Inter-City Fed. Bank for Sav., 738 So. 2d 262, 264 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
Additionally, “where there is no statute upon the subject the common law prevails[.]” City of
Jackson v. Wallace, 196 So. 223, 225 (Miss. 1940). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet his
burden under Rule 59(e) and the Court need not reconsider its Order.2
As for Plaintiff’s alternative motion for an extension of time within which to complete
and submit a motion to alter the judgment, the Court “must not extend the time to act” under
Rule 59(e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).

1

See Order [20] Dec. 18, 2013 at 2 (citing Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc.,
852 So. 2d 25, 26 (Miss. 2003); HeartSouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865 So. 2d 1095, 1108 (Miss.
2003)).
2

Since Plaintiff’s complaint [1] failed to establish cognizable claims necessary to survive
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [17], and the instant motion fails to establish manifest error of law
or fact, Plaintiff’s request for extension of time [23] to serve process for Defendant Arlene
Caviness is moot.
2

III.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all the parties’ arguments. Those not addressed would not have

changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend/Alter or for
Reconsideration [22] is denied.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 3rd day of February, 2014.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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