Simmons v. Hinds County Detention Facility Board of Supervisor's et al
Filing
55
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 48 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 51 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 11/3/14. Copy mailed to Plaintiff. (WS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN (JACKSON) DIVISION
AUNDREA TYRONE SIMMONS
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-cv-624-LRA
TYRONE LEWIS, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [48] filed by
Defendant Floyd Brown, Health Services Administrator, as well as the Motion for Summary
Judgment [51] filed by Defendants Sheriff Tyrone Lewis, Captain Sean Goforth and Warden Phil
Taylor. Having considered the entire record in this matter, the Court finds that Defendant
Brown’s motion is well-taken and should be granted; the motion filed by Defendants Goforth
and Taylor is granted; and the motion filed by Defendant Lewis is denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se in this litigation, brought this lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conditions of his confinement.1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
while he was housed at the Hinds County Detention Facility (HCDF) in Raymond, Mississippi,
he was subjected to unconstitutional living conditions and denied medical care. [1].
The Court held an omnibus or Spears hearing in this matter on April 9, 2014, at which
Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to fully explain his claim.2 At the hearing, all parties
1
Plaintiff was incarcerated when this suit was filed but is not at this time.
2
See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 180 (5th Cir. 1985).
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consented to the undersigned deciding this case in its entirety. [43]. 28 U.S.C. § 636. As the
Court noted in its Omnibus Order [38], Plaintiff elaborated on his claims at the hearing:
According to Plaintiff, he was housed in conditions at HCDF
which were hazardous to his health and violated his constitutional
rights. The cells were dark; the floors were unsanitary; the showers
were moldy and dirty and had no light fixtures; there were fire
hazards everywhere; the food was unsanitary; there were security
breaches. These conditions caused him to get an infection in his scalp.
Dr. Sutton told him it was caused by the mold, and he has to use an
antibacterial shampoo to treat it. He has no other physical injuries as
a result of the conditions of his confinement.
Plaintiff also contends that his medical care was
constitutionally insufficient. He complained of a hernia and made many
medical requests. Defendant Floyd Brown told him it was not lifethreatening and refused him care. The hernia was diagnosed by Dr. Sutton
and Dr. Tatum in August 2012, and both of those doctors requested that
he be provided surgery. The jail officials, and Floyd Brown, refused to
let him have it. The hernia worsened, and on Thanksgiving 2013,
Dr. Sutton sent him to the emergency room because the hernia had
caused an abscess in his testicles. A Catscan was taken on December 5,
2013, and surgery was performed. Prior to that, he was only given pain
pills, nerve pills, Flexeril and Neurontin. According to Plaintiff, these
were not the correct medications for his hernia. Defendant Floyd Brown
was the health administrator and called the shots about who gets surgery.
Plaintiff contends that Brown told him to take his medication and he
would be okay. If Brown had done what the doctors said instead, Plaintiff
asserts that he would not have gotten the abscess.
[38] at 2-3.
All Defendants have moved for summary judgment [48, 51] and the Court has considered
the parties’ filings, together with the entire record in this matter.
II. Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party can show that ‘there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” United
States v. Renda Marine, Inc., 667 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “A
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factual dispute is ‘genuine’ where a reasonable party would return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 282 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lukan v. North
Forest Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 1999)). When considering a summary judgment
motion, a court “must review all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2013). However,
“[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.
2003) (citing Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2003); Hugh Symons Group,
plc v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 2002)).
III. Defendants Brown, Goforth and Taylor
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Brown, Goforth and Taylor denied him proper medical care
for his hernia in violation of his constitutional rights. [1], [7]. As noted supra, Defendant Brown
was the health services administrator at HCDF. Defendant Goforth was a captain at HCDF during
Plaintiff’s incarceration, and Defendant Taylor was the warden. [53-1] at 11-12. Plaintiff alleges
that these Defendants knew he needed surgery for his hernia, and had he been operated on earlier,
he would not have developed an abscess and now need another surgery. Though Plaintiff primarily
blames Defendant Brown for the denial of medical care, Plaintiff also testified that he wrote both
Defendant Goforth and Defendant Taylor regarding his need for surgery, but they did not act. [53-1]
at 11-12.
Pretrial detainees, which is what Plaintiff was when he entered HCDF, have a Fourteenth
Amendment right to medical care while incarcerated. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633,
650 (5th Cir.1996). Where, as in this case, an alleged deprivation of this right is due to an episodic
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act or omission, the relevant inquiry is whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical need. Id. Plaintiff must show both that Defendants had knowledge of
a substantial risk of serious harm, and were deliberately indifferent to that risk. Id.
Defendant Floyd Brown, a registered nurse, became Heath Services Administrator at HCDF
during Plaintiff’s incarceration there. [48-2]. The medical records submitted by Defendant Brown
in support of his motion reflect that Plaintiff was seen for his hernia five times between July 10,
2013, and October 24, 2013. The hernia was reducible, meaning that Plaintiff was not in immediate
danger of complications arising from the hernia. Plaintiff was given medication to control his pain.
On November 28, 2014, Plaintiff’s hernia became incarcerated, meaning that he needed surgery.
[48-4, 48-5]. Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital and the hernia was repaired.
The medical and grievance records submitted reflect that Plaintiff was being treated
conservatively and without surgical intervention, until surgery became clearly required. Nurse
Brown responded to Plaintiff’s demand for surgery as follows:
Please be advised of our attention to your situation. However, a review
[of] your record shows no documentation of your hernia being incarcerated –
which would place you at risk for lost [sic] of limb or organ. We will
continue to monitor your needs and as your turn is made available proceed
to consider surgical intervention. Please continue to comply with your
treatment to reduce any discomfort or prevent further discomfort. You will be
referred to surgical consult as soon as any available space becomes open. In the
meantime continue to use your medical request for your needs.
[53] at 17. Though Plaintiff also asserts that the delay in having surgery caused an abscess, which
requires further treatment [53-1] at 8, mere disagreement with a prescribed course of medical
treatment does not give rise to a Section 1983 claim, nor does medical malpractice. Gobert v.
Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s condition was monitored and surgery
provided. Plaintiff has failed to establish a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Brown. Plaintiff’s
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claim against Defendants Goforth and Taylor fail as well. Plaintiff claims that he complained to
them about the medical treatment that he received but they took no action. Again, Plaintiff was
being treated and there has been no evidence presented that any Defendant was deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need.
IV. Defendant Lewis
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Hinds County Sheriff Tyrone Lewis concerning the
conditions in which he was housed are of a systemic, as opposed to an episodic, nature. See Duvall
v. Dallas County, Texas, 631 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2011). When systemic conditions are alleged to have
violated constitutional rights, the inquiry differs from that utilized when episodic acts or omissions
are challenged. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment of pretrial detainees, and
conditions of confinement must be reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives. Id. at
206-207. However, the Fifth Circuit has held that “the reasonable-relationship test employed in
conditions cases is functionally equivalent to the deliberate indifference standard employed in
episodic cases.” Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1997)(internal citation omitted).
The conditions of confinement at HCDF as described by Plaintiff in his complaint,
supplemented by his testimony at the omnibus hearing, raise a genuine issue of material fact.
Extensive mold (a sample of which Plaintiff mailed to the Court), exposed live wiring,
overcrowding, cell doors inmates can open and gang member guards who allow gang member
inmates to attack other inmates [1] are just a few of the complaints Plaintiff has made. The Court
concludes that there is a question of fact regarding whether conditions at HCDF were such as to
create a substantial risk of serious harm amounting to punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834-37 (1994). Whether Plaintiff will ultimately prove “a pervasive pattern of serious
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deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs” remains to be determined. Shepherd v. Dallas
County, 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009).
Defendant Lewis also argues that Plaintiff cannot pursue his damages claims because he did
not suffer physical injury, a necessary element of a Prison Litigation Reform Act claim. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e. However, as Defendant also notes, Plaintiff claims he developed a rash of some sort on
his scalp due to the unsanitary conditions. He alleges he was prescribed antibiotics and a special
shampoo. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that he developed a sleep disorder and depression, which
require medication, as a result of the violence he witnessed at HCDF. [1], [51-3] at 11. At this
juncture, the Court concludes there is a question of fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s alleged injuries
meet the threshold.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to identify any policy of Hinds County,
Mississippi, so as to hold Defendant accountable in his official capacity. Rather, Defendant claims,
there are policies in place providing for clean, safe jail conditions. However:
In some cases, a condition may reflect an unstated or de facto
policy, as evidenced by a pattern of acts or omissions “sufficiently extended
or pervasive, or otherwise typical of extended or pervasive misconduct by
[jail] officials, to prove an intended condition or practice.” Proving a
pattern is a heavy burden, one that has rarely been met in our caselaw.
Further, to constitute impermissible punishment, the condition must be
one that is “arbitrary or purposeless” or, put differently, “not reasonably
related to a legitimate goal.”
Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)(internal citations omitted). Though
the standard is high, the Court has determined that a trial is necessary to determine whether housing
conditions of pretrial detainees at HCDF are unconstitutional.
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V. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
Defendant Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment [48] is hereby GRANTED.
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Lewis, Goforth and Taylor [51] is
GRANTED as to Defendants Goforth and Taylor, and DENIED as to Defendant Lewis.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Goforth and Taylor are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lewis will be set for trial by separate Order.
SO ORDERED, this the 3rd day of November, 2014.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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