McGuffie v. Anderson Tully Company et al
Filing
17
ORDER granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable David C. Bramlette, III on 9/17/2014 (ECW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
KNOXIE MCGUFFIE
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-cv-888(DCB)(MTP)
ANDERSON TULLY COMPANY AND
ANDERSON TULLY MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, LLC
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the defendant AndersonTully Lumber Company (incorrectly identified by the plaintiff as
Anderson Tully Company and Anderson Tully Management Services, LLC,
and hereinafter referred to as “Anderson-Tully”)’s motion for
summary judgment (docket entry 12).
Having carefully considered
the motion, which is unopposed by the plaintiff, and the applicable
law, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds as
follows:
This case originated with the filing of a Complaint in the
Circuit Court of Warren County, Mississippi, seeking recovery of
survivor death benefits from an ERISA plan under state law theories
of embezzlement from a vulnerable adult pursuant to Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 43-47-5(n) and 11-7-165.
The defendants timely removed to this
Court by reason of complete preemption of ERISA, a point which has
not been refuted by the plaintiff.
In addition, the plaintiff has
not produced any pre-discovery disclosures nor sought any discovery
in this case.
Anderson-Tully moves for judgment as a matter of law as to all
of the plaintiff’s claims.
The material facts are undisputed and
are limited to the administrative record submitted under seal to
the Court on November 15, 2013.
Robert McGuffie married Mary Jo
McGuffie on or about July 2, 1950. (Admin. Record 100098). During
his lifetime, Robert McGuffie was employed by Anderson-Tully and
covered by an ERISA pension plan administered by Anderson-Tully
Lumber Company, the Anderson-Tully Salaried Employees’ Pension Plan
(the “Plan”).
1993,
Robert
(Admin. Record 10008 – 100091).
McGuffie
benefits under the Plan.
retired
and
began
On February 1,
receiving
(Admin. Record 100098).
retirement
At the time of
his retirement, Robert McGuffie’s retirement benefits commenced
while he was still married to Mary Jo McGuffie.
100098).
(Admin. Record
Mary Jo McGuffie is identified as Robert McGuffie’s
spouse on his Retirement Election Form.
(Admin. Record 100098).
Subsequent to his retirement and the commencement of his receiving
retirement benefits, Robert McGuffie married the plaintiff, Knoxie
McGuffie, on September 23, 2000.
(Admin. Record 100093, 100096).
Knoxie McGuffie made a claim for death benefits under the Plan
on or about January 31, 2013.
(Admin. Record 100096).
On or about
February 28, 2013, the Plan denied Knoxie McGuffie’s claim because
she was not married to Robert McGuffie on February 1, 1993, the
date of Robert McGuffie’s retirement.
(Admin. Record 100096).
As
previously noted, the plaintiff filed suit in state court and the
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defendant timely removed the case to this Court on grounds of
complete preemption under ERISA. The present controversy is within
the scope of ERISA § 502(a), and an abuse of discretion standard of
review applies to Anderson-Tully’s denial of post-retirement death
benefits to the plaintiff.
A party should be granted summary judgment when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-325 (1986).
The substantive
law governing the suit identifies the essential elements of the
claims at issue and which facts are material.
Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The initial burden falls on
the movant to identify areas essential to the non-movant’s claim in
which there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005).
Once the movant meets its burden, however, the non-movant must
direct the court’s attention to evidence in the record sufficient
to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Id. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Electric Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Instead, the nonmoving party must produce
evidence upon which a jury could reasonably base a verdict in its
favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson,
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420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
The Court is not required under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to sift through the record in
search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary
judgment.
Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458
(5th Cir. 1998)(citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909,
915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Mere conclusory allegations are not
competent summary judgment evidence and are insufficient to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325
(5th Cir. 1996).
Where
an
ERISA
Plan
administrator
or
fiduciary
has
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan, as is the case here, the reviewing
court
applies
an
abuse
of
discretion
standard
to
the
plan
administrator’s decision. Anderson v. Cytec Indus., Inc., 619 F.3d
505, 512 (5th Cir. 2010).
Anderson-Tully’s ERISA Plan (“the Plan”)
provides:
2.3 POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR . . .
[Anderson-Tully] shall administer the Plan in accordance
with its terms and shall have the power and discretion to
construe the terms of the Plan and to determine all
questions arising in connection with the administration,
interpretation, and application of the Plan . . . (a) the
discretion to determine all questions relating to the
eligibility of Employees to participate or remain a
Participant hereunder and to receive benefits under the
Plain . . . (e) to interpret the provisions of the Plan
. . .
2.7 CLAIMS PROCEDURE. Claims for benefits under the Plan
may be filed in writing with the Administrator.
The
Administrator shall have full and complete discretion to
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make all determinations as to the eligibility of any
person to a benefit under the terms of this Plan.
(Admin. Record 100029 - 100030).
A review for abuse of discretion is the functional equivalent
of an arbitrary and capricious review.
Anderson, 619 F.3d at 512
(“[t]here is only a semantic, not a substantive, difference between
the arbitrary and capricious and the abuse of discretion standards
in the ERISA benefits review context”). A decision is arbitrary if
it is “made without a rational connection between the known facts
and the decision.”
Id.
In addition to not being arbitrary and
capricious, the plan administrator’s decision must be supported by
substantial evidence.
Id. at 512 (citing Ellis v. Liberty Life
Assurance Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273 (5th Cir. 2004)).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a
preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (citing
Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 398
(5th Cir. 2007); see also Lain v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 279
F.3d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 2002)(stating that the administrator’s
decision must be “based on evidence, even if disputable, that
clearly supports the basis” for its determination.).
Ultimately,
this Court’s review of Anderson-Tully’s eligibility determination
“need not be particularly complex or technical; it need only assure
that
[the]
decision
fall[s]
somewhere
reasonableness - even if on the low end.”
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on
a
continuum
of
Id. (citing Corry, 499
F.3d
at
supported
398
by
(quotation
substantial
omitted)).
evidence
capricious, it must prevail.
If
and
the
is
determination
not
arbitrary
is
and
Ellis v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of
Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273 (5th Cir. 2004).
This Court’s assessment of factual questions is limited to the
evidence available at the time the benefit determination was made
(i.e., the administrative record). Anderson, 619 F.3d at 515 (“The
administrative record consists of the relevant information made
available to the administrator prior to the complainant’s filing of
a lawsuit and in a manner that gives the administrator a fair
opportunity to consider it.”
Id.
As discussed above, the plaintiff’s state law claims are
preempted
by
ERISA,
and
she
has
no
basis
for
recovery
from
Anderson-Tully as long as Anderson-Tully’s decision is not an abuse
of discretion and is supported by substantial evidence in the
administrative record. The Plan gives discretion to Anderson-Tully
to make benefit determinations and interpret the terms of the Plan.
In this case, Anderson-Tully determined that under the terms of the
Plan, the plaintiff is not eligible for post-retirement death
benefits from the Plan unless the spouse was married to the
participant on the Annuity Starting Date, the date that the
participant’s retirement benefits commenced (in this case, February
1, 1993). (Admin. Record 100015, 100096, 100098). Pursuant to the
terms of the Plan, Anderson-Tully’s determination is conclusive and
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binding.
(Admin. Record 100029).
Anderson-Tully’s determination
is also supported by substantial evidence in the administrative
record.
The plaintiff’s Complaint incorrectly alleges that there
had been no election prior to Robert McGuffie’s death.
¶ 4.
Complaint,
The record shows that on January 14, 1993, Mr. McGuffie
completed
the
Retirement
Election
Form,
identifying
Mary
Jo
McGuffie as his spouse entitled to receive benefits in the form of
a qualified joint and survivor annuity.
The Court finds that
(Admin. Record 100098).
Anderson-Tully’s interpretation passes
the abuse of discretion standard and is, in fact, the most logical
and pragmatic interpretation.
provides:
“Unless
otherwise
Section 5.7(a)(1) of the Plan
elected
as
provided
below,
a
Participant who is married on the Annuity Starting Date and who
does not die before the Annuity Starting Date shall receive the
value of all his benefits in the form of a joint and survivor
annuity.
...
Participant’s
spouse’s
Such
joint
and
death
shall
continue
lifetime
....”
survivor
(Admin.
to
benefits
the
Record
following
spouse
100041).
during
a
the
Section
5.7(j)(iv) (A) also notes that the participant’s spouse as of the
date distributions commence must be the spouse who waives a
Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity (“QJSA”).
100048).
(Admin. Record
The election form completed by Mr. McGuffie identified
his then spouse, Mary Jo McGuffie.
The case law supports the Plan’s interpretation reached by
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Anderson-Tully prior to suit.
See Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d
1041, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010)(the statutory scheme is based on the life
expectancy of the spouse at the annuity starting date as “it is
important for the plan administrator to know, with some finality,
who is the spouse at the time that the benefits become payable”).
The case law also supports Anderson-Tully’s interpretation and
decision that the plaintiff is not entitled to survivor benefits
because she was not Robert McGuffie’s spouse at the time of his
retirement.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a
husband’s ERISA plan pension benefits irrevocably vest in favor of
his wife on the date of his retirement.
Rivers v. Central and
South West Corp., 186 F.3d 681, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1999)(adopting
rationale of Fourth Circuit in Hopkins v. AT&T Global Information
Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1997)). The Ninth Circuit has
also found that “once a participant retires, the spouse at the time
becomes the ‘surviving spouse’ entitled to QJSA benefits.” Carmona
v. Carmona, 544 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008)(opinion amended and
superseded on denial of rehearing en banc, 603 F. 3d 1041 (9th Cir.
2010)(affirming that participant’s spouse at time of retirement was
entitled to benefits after participants death; reasoning that
“[a]llowing participants to change surviving spouse beneficiaries
after the participant has retired and already begun receiving
benefit payments would make it difficult for trustees to administer
plans based on the actuarial value of both the participant and the
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surviving spouse”)).
Further, from a practical and actuarial
perspective, the survivor annuity cannot be transferred to a
subsequent spouse post-retirement.
The life expectancy of the
participant and his or her spouse (in this case, Mary Jo McGuffie)
at the Annuity Starting Date determines the payout period for the
annuity.
There is no mechanism in the Plan to permit transfer and
recalculation of the survivor annuity based on the second spouse’s
life expectancy.
The Court finds that a reasonable mind would accept the
relevant evidence and case law as adequate to support AndersonTully’s interpretation of the Plan.
Anderson, 619 F.3d at 512
(citing Corry, 499 F.3d at 398)(“Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”)).
Substantial evidence in the administrative
record supports Anderson-Tully’s decision, and because such facts
are rationally connected to the determination made by AndersonTully, the plaintiffs’ ERISA claim must be dismissed.
See Ellis,
394 F.3d at 273 (“If a plan fiduciary’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious, it must
prevail.”).
Anderson-Tully properly denied the plaintiff death benefits on
the
basis
that
the
plaintiff
was
not
married
to
the
Plan
participant, Robert McGuffie, at the time his retirement benefits
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commenced,
February
1,
2003.
The
denial
is
supported
by
substantial evidence, consistent with the undisputed facts, the
terms of the Plan, and case law under ERISA, and is not an abuse of
discretion.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s state law claims are
preempted by ERISA.
The suit filed by the plaintiff specifically
alleges that she is a plan beneficiary and that she is entitled to
recover plan benefits.
A claim “to recover benefits” under an
ERISA plan fits squarely within the civil enforcement provision of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
The Court finds that the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is well-taken, and the defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant Anderson- Tully Lumber
Company (incorrectly identified by the plaintiff as Anderson Tully
Company and Anderson Tully Management Services, LLC)’s motion for
summary judgment (docket entry 12) is GRANTED.
A final judgment dismissing this case with prejudice shall be
entered.
SO ORDERED, this the 17th day of September, 2014.
/s/ David Bramlette
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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