Thomas v. Gallespie et al

Filing 54

Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court granted Defendants' 46 Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Complaint is dismissed. Final Judgment shall be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 9/23/2015. (ACF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
NATHANIEL ANTONIO THOMAS
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV973-LRA

WARDEN GALLESPIE, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants the GEO Group, Inc., Dr. Ricardo Gillespie (named in Complaint as
“Warden Gallespie”), Autumn Wedgeworth, and Patricia Hart filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment [46] requesting that the Complaint filed against them by Plaintiff
Nathaniel Antonio Thomas be dismissed. Defendants allege that Thomas failed to
exhaust the remedies available through the Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections [MDOC] at the East Mississippi Correctional
Facility [EMCF] in Meridian, Mississippi, as to many of his claims. Additionally,
Defendants contend that the claims he did exhaust (regarding his 15-day stay in lockdown
upon his arrival at EMCF) should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Facts and Procedural History
Thomas filed this complaint on August 15, 2012, while an inmate at the EMCF,
naming these Defendants, as well as others who have not been served with process. GEO
ran the EMCF until July 13, 2012, and the unserved Defendants were no longer employed
at the facility when service of the summonses was attempted. Process was returned

unexecuted as to Warden Bart Grimes, Warden Horton, Dr. Faulks, Unit Manager Hurk,
and Lieutenant N. Brandon [17]. No current addresses have been provided for these
persons. Although the “psychiatrist,” “psychologist,” “medical director,” “Ms. Unknown
V,” “Educational Director,” and the “John Doe Members of the Atlanta Black Team”
were also named as defendants by Plaintiff, no process was issued because the Court was
not provided the current addresses and full identities of these persons.
In his complaint, Thomas charges that he arrived at EMCF on April 3, 2012, along
with 60 other inmates. They were placed in the gym for quick orientation by all the
EMCF staff. Thomas and some of the others were sent to Unit 6-C, and the unit was
placed on 24-hour a day lockdown. During this period, conditions were very limited.
Plaintiff had no bath for the first 15 days. Riots occurred, and the prison conditions were
extremely dangerous. Plaintiff testified that on one occasion, he was left in the yard with
cuffs on, and many other inmates were not restrained. Gas bombs were used to control
the violence, and Plaintiff was not allowed proper showering to remove the ingredients.
The rioting which resulted due to the conditions caused many life-threatening situations
for all inmates, according to Thomas. Thomas remained in this lockdown situation until
April 16, 2012, or 13 days.
Thereafter, Thomas was moved from the lockdown, but he still alleges that his
conditions of confinement violated his constitutional rights thereafter. According to
Thomas, his medical care was inadequate. He suffered from high blood pressure and did
not receive the required medication. He also suffered from bleeding hemorrhoids and did
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not receive proper treatment. He complains that the conditions at the prison were
constitutionally inadequate during the period of time that GEO operated the prison, but he
concedes that GEO’s last day was July 13, 2012. These Defendants had no power after
that date to change the conditions at EMCF.
According to Thomas, he was not granted his proper custody status; his religious
and educational programs were all denied; he was not given law library access; and, he
was not given proper mental health care. He was given rules violation reports in
retaliation for the complaints he filed. He received an RVR for stabbing another inmate.
Because it was in self-defense, the RVR was later expunged, according to Thomas.
Summary Judgment Standard
These Defendants contend that Thomas did not properly exhaust all of the claims
set forth in his Complaint, and that they are entitled to a summary judgment in this case
for that reason. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In response to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must provide specific proof demonstrating a triable issue of fact as to each
of the elements required to establish the claim asserted. Washington v. Armstrong World
Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122–23 (5th Cir. 1988). The court must resolve all reasonable

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doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the movant. Byrd v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 85, 87 (5th Cir. 1982).
Legal Analysis
1.

Unexhausted Claims

The applicable section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.”
This statute clearly requires an inmate bringing a civil rights action in this Court to
first exhaust his available administrative remedies. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739
(2001). Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is
mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Exhaustion will not be excused
when an inmate fails to timely exhaust his administrative remedies; the exhaustion
requirement also means “proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84
(2006). It is not enough to merely initiate the grievance process or to put prison officials
on notice of a complaint; the grievance process must be carried through to its conclusion.
Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). This is so regardless of
whether the inmate’s ultimate goal is a remedy not offered by the administrative process,
such as money damages. Id.

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In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007), the Supreme Court confirmed that
exhaustion was mandatory under the PLRA and that “unexhausted claims cannot be
brought in court.” The PLRA governs all of Thomas’s claims. Accordingly, he is
required to complete the ARP process in its entirety as to all of his claims before he is
able to file suit under § 1983.
The pleadings reflect that Thomas entered EMCF on April 3, 2012, and he was
released from lockdown on April 16, 2012. He filed his ARP regarding the conditions for
those 13 days on April 17, 2012, the day after he was released. GEO ended its
management at EMCF on July 13, 2012, and Thomas filed this lawsuit in federal court on
August 16, 2012, regarding his conditions of confinement for the 13-day period of
lockdown and the conditions under which he was housed thereafter. Because Thomas
filed his ARP on April 17th, the only exhausted claims are those regarding the 13-day
period of lockdown where he was housed when he first arrived at EMCF.
The exhaustion Thomas refers to only involved this lockdown period, and
Defendants concede this issue was exhausted. Thomas may not agree with the procedures
used in the ARP process. However, this Court has no power to construct the ARP
policies for a prison. The requirement of exhaustion applies regardless of a plaintiff’s
opinion on the efficacy of the institution’s administrative remedy program. Alexander v.
Tippah County, MS, 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not for this Court to decide
whether the procedures “satisfy minimum acceptable standards of fairness and
effectiveness.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 740 n. 5. Plaintiff’s opinion regarding how ineffective
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the EMCF ARP process was is insufficient to overcome Supreme Court precedent
mandating exhaustion of remedies available under the ARP.
The Fifth Circuit has confirmed that “the PLRA pre-filing exhaustion requirement
is mandatory and non-discretionary,” and that “district courts have no discretion to waive
the PLRA’s pre-filing exhaustion requirement.” Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 787-88
(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d
781, 788 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gonzalez). In this case, Thomas clearly did not fully
exhaust his administrative remedies as to all his claims before filing this lawsuit, and the
Court has no choice but to dismiss his Complaint as to any claims which arose after
Thomas filed his ARP on April 17, 2012.
Additionally, the Court notes that GEO has not managed EMCF since July 2012,
and any requested injunctive relief would not be possible as to these Defendants. They no
longer have any authority at EMCF and have no ability to provide any relief for Thomas
regarding his current conditions of confinement.
2.

Exhausted Claims

This Court has the authority to dismiss the unexhausted claims in the Complaint
but to move forward in this lawsuit with the exhausted claims. See Jones, 549 U.S. at
219-224. Accordingly, Thomas’s complaints regarding his 13 days in lockdown when he
first arrived at EMCF have been considered on the merits. It was difficult for the Court to
determine precisely which claims related to this period when Thomas testified at his
omnibus hearing. However, a transcript of the hearing was filed by Defendants in support
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of the Motion for Summary Judgment [46-1], and the Court has thoroughly reviewed all
of Thomas’s sworn testimony at this hearing, along with the pleadings. This review
compels the Court to find that Thomas’s claims are legally frivolous, and he has failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), applies to prisoner
proceedings in forma pauperis and provides that "the court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that . . .(B) the action or appeal -- (I) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." A plaintiff’s claim
shall be dismissed if “it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, such as when a prisoner
alleges the violation of a legal interest that does not exist.” Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578
(5th Cir. 1998).
Thomas concedes that during this period of time in April 2012, there were riots
and gang fights on his unit and the unit “turned really violent.” [46-1, p. 14].

According

to Thomas, this was because the inmates were not being fed properly and were not given
showers. Yet he does concede that food was provided. Thomas testified that “sometimes
we ate. Sometimes we didn’t. ... sometimes we got all three hots. Sometimes we didn’t.”
[46-1, p. 13.] Thomas charges that sometimes it was too chaotic to eat because of the
prison riots and fights, and sometimes the food was stolen. According to Thomas, the
administration attempted to stop the fighting and rioting by using gas-bombs. They also

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restrained Thomas, and some of the other inmates, with plastic cuffs. During this period
Thomas was also unable to get medical help.
Although conditions may have been poor at EMCF during this two-week period,
Thomas concedes that it became an emergency situation due to the rioting and gang
movement. The Supreme Court’s statement regarding interference by the courts into
prison administration has often been quoted: It is well-settled that the courts, unless
presented with patently unreasonable conduct, are reluctant to interfere with the day-today operations of a prison. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). A prison’s internal
security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n. 15 (1982). “Prison administrators ... should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) (quoting Bell, 441
U.S. at 547). Federal courts are not prison managers, and, ordinarily, courts accord great
deference to the internal administrative decisions of prison officials. Royal v. Clark, 447
F.2d 501, 501-502 (5th Cir. 1971) (“Federal Courts will not interfere in the administration
of prisons absent an abuse of the wide discretion allowed prison officials in maintaining
order and discipline.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has continuously
cautioned federal courts from assuming “a greater role in decisions affecting prison
administration.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 (2001).

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This Court recognizes that a prison riot is a serious emergency, and immediate
precautions must be taken to end it. Gas-bombing is an often used measure, and this
Court cannot dictate the appropriate measures which should be taken. Providing rioting
prisoners with regular meals and showers would obviously not be a priority in such
dangerous situations. Thomas admitted he was provided food, and he did not claim to
have been physically injured during this two-week period. He testified that he was not
harmed when he was restrained during the riot. [46-2, p. 34].
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, taken in a light most favorable to him,
simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Harsh "conditions of
confinement" may constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless such conditions are
"part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1985) quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981). In order to successfully prove an Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim, a civil rights plaintiff must allege facts which suggest that the prison
officials' conduct resulted in the plaintiff being incarcerated under “conditions which
[posed] an unreasonable risk of damage to [the prisoner's] future health." Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir.2001). This "risk must be of such a level that today's
society would not tolerate it.” Id. In order to prevail on such a conditions of confinement
claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which establish: (1) objectively, that the deprivations
are sufficiently serious; and (2) subjectively, that the defendant prison officials knew of

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the deprivations but nevertheless have shown a “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff's
“health or safety.” Id.
A prisoner must show that the inflicting officer has exhibited "deliberate
indifference" to the conditions. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). Mere
negligence does not satisfy the "deliberate indifference" standard. Id. The prisoner must
suffer from an extreme deprivation of any “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Id. at 304.
In Plaintiff’s case, neither the objective or subjective components can be met. It is
obvious that these prison officials were not attempting to punish Thomas by attempting to
stop the rioting or by withholding showers and food. The situation was an emergency,
regardless of why the prisoners rioted, and unusual measures were necessary. Although
Thomas suffered from discomfort during this 13-day lockdown, he was not physically
injured and the short-term deprivations were not extreme under the circumstances. None
of these Defendants, including Thomas’s mental health counselor and his case manager,
intended to punish him with these conditions. No facts have been alleged which would
establish the requisite “deliberate indifference” to Thomas’s health and safety for this 13day period.
An action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when it is clear that the
prisoner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Oliver v.
Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2002). Under the circumstances, wherein Plaintiff has
not set forth any fact or testimony with which to show an intent to punish, or deliberate
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indifference, on the part of these individuals, the conditions complained of do not rise to
the level of an Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment violation. Plaintiff has
shown no actual injury; he primarily claimed discomfort and the fear of becoming harmed
by other inmates. This does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim, and
these exhausted claims regarding Thomas’s 13-day stay in lockdown must be dismissed.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[46] must be granted, and Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice as
to all Defendants as to the unexhausted claims as discussed above. The Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice as to Thomas’s claims regarding his 13-day period in lockdown
in EMCF from on or about April 3, 2012, until April 16, 2012.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed, and Final
Judgment shall be entered.
SO ORDERED this the 23rd day of September 2015.

/s/Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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