McCoy v. Meridian Police Department et al
Filing
40
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Plaintiff's 1 Complaint is dismissed with prejudice; Final Judgment in favor of all Defendants to be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 4/7/2014. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
BONNIE JEAN MCCOY
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV1010-LRA
OFFICER SHARP, ET AL
DEFENDANTS
________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Plaintiff Bonnie Jean McCoy, pro se, and the attorneys for Defendants,
Lee Thaggard (Sgt. Rush and Lauderdale County), Jason Varnado (Nurse Shelia
Hamlin), and Bill Simmons (Asst. Chief Sharp1 and the City of Meridian),
appeared for a hearing before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
on the 16th day of January, 2014, at the Jackson Federal Courthouse. The
hearing was conducted under the authority of Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179
(5th Cir. 1985), and its progeny. Plaintiff is currently housed at the Lauderdale
County Detention Facility [LCDF] in Meridian, Mississippi.
Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status by this Court by Order
entered June 11, 2013 [12]. A district court may dismiss an IFP complaint as
frivolous or for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). A
complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). A pro se prisoner is entitled to
1
Ms. McCoy voluntarily dismissed Asst. Chief Sharp at the omnibus hearing, and he is
dismissed on that basis. [39, p. 13].
develop his complaint factually before a proper frivolousness determination can
be made. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1994). The purpose of
a Spears hearing is to "bring into focus the factual and legal bases of prisoners'
claims." Id. at 9 (quoting Spears, 766 F.2d at 181). At this hearing, McCoy was
granted an opportunity to fully explain in her own words the factual basis of her
claims.
According to her sworn testimony at the hearing,2 and the pleadings,
Plaintiff has been in and out of the LCDF since she was 18 years old, and she is
now 35. One year she was in jail 18 different times; she was arrested on one day
and released the next day several times. [39, p. 39]. Plaintiff asserts that these
Defendants know that she suffers from explosive anger disorder, schizophrenia,
panic disorder, and anti-social personality disorder; she is known for fighting.
When she is inside the LCDF, the jail officials intimidate her because they know
that she will fight them. She fights because of her condition; it is not because she
wants to fight. The jail officials take advantage of that.
Sometime in July 2012, Plaintiff was at a club called The Shed and saw
Sgt. Rush (off-duty) there. She and Sgt. Rush had a verbal and physical
altercation. Sgt. Rush later had charges of simple assault brought against her
because of this confrontation, and Plaintiff pled guilty to those charges. Then, on
the night of October 31, 2012, Plaintiff got into an altercation with her boyfriend at
2
The transcript of this hearing is filed at [39].
2
the same club [39, pp. 8-10, 15-16]. Officers with the Meridian Police Department
were called and arrested her, and she was taken to jail after they restrained her
by using mace. She had already told Nurse Shelia and other jail personnel that
she was allergic to mace, and the officers should not have maced her. She
cannot name any of the officers involved, and they have not been named as
defendants and/or served with process. Her purse was left at the club, and it has
never been returned.
Although Sgt. Rush was not at the club when Plaintiff was maced and
arrested, Plaintiff saw her the next day at the jail. Plaintiff charges that Sgt. Rush
tried to make her be photographed so it would be in the weekly Jail Times and
embarrass her. Sgt. Rush also took her shoes out of the property room.
Plaintiff contends that when she arrived at the LCDF about 1:00 a.m. on
November 1, she was placed in a cell with no bathroom or mat. They did not
wash the mace out of her face on the night she was arrested. She slept for two
days, but when she awoke on the third day, her face was swollen and she could
not see. She filled out a sick call, but Nurse Shelia did not give her proper
medical assistance. Nurse Shelia charged her $10 just to wash out her eyes.
Her face stayed like that for two months, and that is why she has permanent rings
around her eyes, according to Plaintiff. [39, p. 10].
Assuming the facts as stated by the Plaintiff are accurate, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the
3
United States Constitution. Because she may have been a pretrial detainee
during her stay in the LCDF, McCoy had a clearly established due process right
to be free from punishment; this includes the right not to be subjected to jail
conditions that are imposed for the purpose of punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996). In order
to succeed on a claim under § 1983 alleging unconstitutional jail conditions, a
pretrial detainee must establish that the complained-of conditions have been
imposed for a punitive purpose and that they have resulted in “serious
deficiencies” in providing for her “basic human needs.” Shepherd v. Dallas
County, 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009); Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203,
206 (5th Cir. 2011) (the conditions of a pretrial detainees's detention may be so
harmful or dangerous that the conditions themselves may amount to
impermissible “punishment.”).
Constitutional challenges may be brought by a pretrial detainee under two
alternative theories: as an attack on a ‘condition of confinement’ or as an
‘episodic act or omission.” Id. at 452. In this case, Plaintiff’s claims focus on the
episodic acts of Sgt. Rush and Nurse Shelia.3 To prove a violation of
3
Determining whether to classify a claim as a conditions-of-confinement claim or an
"episodic acts" claim is not always straightforward. See, e.g., Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 5354
(5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that the "episodic act" branch of the doctrine governed a
detainee's claim arising out of sexual assault by a guard); id. at 56 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (the
assault was traceable to "regular and systematic" staffing policies that were the "antithesis of
episodic").
4
constitutional rights in connection with an episodic act or omission case, a
detainee must establish that the defendant acted with subjective deliberate
indifference. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). This requires that the plaintiff establish that the defendant was actually
aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’s health or safety, yet
consciously disregarded the risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 827 (1994).
Neither Nurse Shelia or Sgt. Rush were there when Plaintiff was maced,
and they cannot be held responsible for her injuries. The Court finds that the
actions of these Defendants about which Plaintiff complains did not pose a
substantial risk of serious harm to her health or safety. There is no constitutional
prohibition against cross “words” or taking booking photographs or charging a
detainee for medical care. Further, Nurse Shelia did render medical treatment to
Plaintiff; she simply was not pleased with the care. The Eighth Amendment does
prohibit conduct which evinces deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
by its ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and this standard also applies to
pretrial detainees. Hare, 74 F.3d at 646. However, Plaintiff’s testimony confirms
that Nurse Shelia did treat her eyes for the mace; Plaintiff simply was not pleased
with being charged or with the results. Plaintiff cannot show that Nurse Shelia
was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need under these circumstances.
The Court cannot interfere with the day-to-day administration of the jails.
Federal courts are not prison managers, and, ordinarily, courts accord great
5
deference to the internal administrative decisions of prison officials. Gentris v.
O’Connel, 2009 WL 5195777 (W.D. La. 2009) citing Royal v. Clark, 447 F.2d 501
(5th Cir. 1971); Krist v. Smith, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971); and, Haggerty v.
Wainwright, 427 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1970). The fact that Plaintiff stayed for two or
three days in the holding cell under the conditions she described also posed no
serious risk of harm to her. No cause of action has been stated against the City
of Meridian or Lauderdale County under the circumstances described in the
Complaint or by Plaintiff’s sworn testimony. The officers who actually maced and
arrested Plaintiff on October 31, 2012, have not been named as Defendants.
Even so, the use of mace does not state a constitutional claim under these stated
facts.
Accepting all of Plaintiff’s testimony as accurate, the actions of Defendants
simply do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. The Court, having
carefully considered the complaint, as augmented by the sworn testimony of
Plaintiff at the hearing, as well as the applicable law, finds that McCoy's claims
have no basis either in law or in fact and, therefore, are frivolous4 and fail to state
a claim on which relief may be granted. For these reasons, this action shall be
4
“Frivolous” in this context is a legal term of art that indicates that, although the
Plaintiff’s allegations are serious to him, and may, indeed, be based on a tangible injury, the
theory on which his claims are based are “indisputably meritless” in a legal sense. See Allison v.
Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1995).
6
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and(ii). Final
Judgment in favor of Defendants shall be entered.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice. A separate Final Judgment in favor of Defendants shall be entered on
this date.
THIS the 7th day of April, 2014.
S/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?