Voyles v. Management Training Corporation Inc. et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 20 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 22 Report and Recommendations of U. S. Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball for the reasons set out in the order. A judgment will be entered in a separate docket entry to follow. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on October 22, 2014. (SP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL EDWARD VOYLES
V.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV1030 DPJ-FKB
SCOTT MARQUARDT, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This pro se prisoner case is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment [20]. Plaintiff Michael Edward Voyles, an inmate at the East Mississippi Correctional
Facility (EMCF), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his right to
privacy was violated by a prison official. Voyles sued Scott Marquardt, president of
Management and Training Corp. (the private prison administrator of EMCF), and K. Butler, the
Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) assistant. The matter was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball for Report and Recommendation, and he recommended granting
Defendants’ motion. The Court agrees.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
Voyles suffers from Hepatitis C. In February 2013, he filed an ARP grievance
complaining that he had not received adequate medical treatment. Later that month, Voyles
alleges that Defendant Butler delivered the ARP response letter and read it aloud, divulging his
Hepatitis C status to two nearby inmates. Compl. [1] at 4. Voyles’s cellmate was also present,
but he was already aware of Voyles’s condition. Omnibus Hr’g Tr. [20-1] at 36. According to
Voyles, Butler spoke loud enough to overcome background noise, but it appeared to him that her
intent was to communicate just with him. Id. at 37–38. As a result of the disclosure, Voyles
claims that “inmates are partial to conversate with me for worry of my condition be contagious
which is irreparable and (irremediable) in relationship [sic].” Compl [1] at 4.1
After referral, Judge Ball held an omnibus hearing on March 26, 2014, where he
considered Voyles’s testimony regarding the incident. In light of that testimony and Defendants’
unopposed motion for summary judgment, Judge Ball recommended [22] dismissal of Voyles’s
claim for failure to raise a claim cognizable under § 1983. Specifically, Judge Ball found that
“‘[a] prisoner has no clearly recognized constitutional right in the privacy of his medical records,
particularly not in the Fifth Circuit.’” Report and Recommendation [22] at 2 (quoting Wells v.
Pinion, Civ. Action No. 07-6844, 2008 WL 2185329, at *6 (E.D. La. May 20, 2008)). Voyles
filed a timely objection, but it was conclusory and failed to address any of the substantive legal or
factual issues.
II.
Analysis
While the undersigned agrees that Voyles has not stated a claim for relief, one
unpublished Fifth Circuit decision must be considered. In Alfred v. Corrections Corp. of
America, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a prisoner’s claim that officials violated his
14th Amendment right to privacy by allowing another inmate to see his medical records, which
included information about his HIV-positive status and Hepatitis B diagnosis. 437 F. App’x 281,
282–83 (5th Cir. 2011). Unlike this case, the inmate in Alfred had kept his conditions secret,
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Voyles also alleged in his Complaint that Butler’s decision to read the response aloud
was racially discriminatory, but at the omnibus hearing, he backed away from that claim.
Omnibus Tr. at 37. Voyles explained that he had been coached by other inmates to include a race
discrimination claim and confirmed that he had no evidence or reason to believe race
discrimination actually motivated Butler’s conduct. Id. at 40.
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even from his family. Id. at 283. Though the court agreed with the lower court’s holding that
“prisoners have no absolute constitutional right in the privacy of their medical records,” it
concluded that this “says nothing about whether there is, in fact, such a right in this particular
case.” Id. at 285 (reversing and remanding).
The precedential value of Alfred is hard to determine. As noted, it was not published and
is therefore not binding. In addition, it is difficult to tell whether the court’s holding would have
been different had Alfred suffered from a condition less stigmatic than HIV. The court noted that
it remains unclear whether a disclosure that does not serve a penological interest
is a constitutional violation or whether the disclosure in this case did or did not
serve a penological interest. We note that other circuits have found that
disclosures of this kind can be constitutional violations.
Id. at 285–86 (emphasis added). In the first sentence of this quote, the court left unanswered
whether disclosing a medical condition without penological interest can ever violate a prisoner’s
right to privacy. Id. The Court then concluded that disclosure of “this kind” (i.e., HIV status)
might, citing cases from other circuits that dealt with HIV-positive and transsexual status. See
Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding “individuals who are transsexuals
are among those who possess a constitutional right to maintain medical confidentiality”); Doe v.
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (considering disclosure of HIV-positive status).
Voyles is not HIV positive. And other courts have held that prisoners have no
constitutional privacy interest in less stigmatic medical conditions. See Warren v. Epps, Civ.
Action No. 2:10CV22-MTP, 2011 WL 3349829, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 2, 2011) (dismissing
prisoner’s privacy claim based on physician’s statements regarding his arthritic condition in front
of other inmates); Morgan v. Mississippi, Civ. Action No. 2:07CV15-MTP, 2009 WL 1609060,
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at *11–12 (S.D. Miss. June 8, 2009) (dismissing prisoner’s privacy claim based on inmates
overhearing his discussions with medical personnel about his urinary tract infections and
required urinary supplies); Barnes v. Brownlow, Civ. Action No. 6:08cv194, 2008 WL 2704868,
at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2008) (adopting Report and Recommendation; dismissing right to
privacy claim where prisoner complained that nurse made him announce his medical problem
(rectal bleeding) in front of other prisoners).
In Perez v. Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, the court held that a prisoner’s diagnosis of
Hepatitis C is not an “extremely sensitive medical condition, such as HIV, that might entitle him
to the very limited constitutional protection recognized in two circuits, but not the Fifth Circuit.”
Civ. Action No. 10-2073, 2011 WL 1226482, at *10 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2011) report and
recommendation adopted, Civ. Action No. 10-2073, 2011 WL 1212940 (E.D. La. Mar. 28,
2011). The court noted that “prisoners do not have a constitutional privacy interest in other types
of medical conditions, which, even though potentially embarrassing, are not of the excruciatingly
private and intimate nature of HIV and transsexualism.” Id. at *10 (citation omitted, punctuation
omitted, text modified). This Court agrees, and for that reason Voyles fails to state a claim.2
Alternatively, even assuming that Voyles could state a claim for violation of his privacy
rights, his claim for monetary damages is barred by the physical-injury requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq. In his Complaint, Voyles seeks “a
financial judgment” against Defendants “as a sum in excess of maximum jurisdictional limitation
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Even if such a right exists, the claim against Defendant Marquardt must be dismissed
because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
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of this Court [and] adequate to reasonable compensate the plaintiff,” which the Court construes
as a request for compensatory damages alone. Compl. at 4–5.
Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA provides that “no federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injuries
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” Yet it is undisputed that
Voyles suffered no physical injuries. Thus, for this additional reason, Voyles’s claim for
damages should be dismissed. See Allen v. Morgan, 66 F. App’x 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (affirming dismissal of inmate’s privacy claim where inmate did not show that he
suffered a specific physical injury as a result of the alleged privacy violation); see also Geiger v.
Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions
in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental
or emotional injuries nonrecoverable, absent physical injury.”); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d
716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting PLRA requires physical injury before a prisoner can recover for
psychological damages).3
III.
Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Report and
Recommendation [22] is adopted as the opinion of the Court and Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment [20] is granted. This action is dismissed with prejudice.
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Voyles also suggested that the disclosure hindered his hair-cutting business at EMCF
because inmates were worried about exposure to Hepatitis C. Ominbus Tr. at 32. To the extent a
prisoner could seek damages for “lost business,” Plaintiff did not articulate such damages in his
Complaint, nor did he raise the argument in response to Defendants’ motion—which addressed
Voyles’s inability to recover damages.
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A separate judgment will be entered.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 22nd day of October, 2014.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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