McGhee v. United States District Court of Southern District of Mississippi et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss. Copy mailed to plaintiff at address listed on docket sheet. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 09/04/2014. (AC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
GEORGE LEE MCGHEE, JR.

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-95-CWR-LRA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI,
HONORABLE DANIEL P. JORDAN, III

DEFENDANT

ORDER
Before the Court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss. [6-7]. The plaintiff has responded
[8-9] and the defendant has replied [10]. The Court has reviewed the facts, arguments, and
applicable law, and is ready to rule.
I.

Background
On October 2, 2013, United States District Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III, issued an order

resolving a lawsuit pending before his Court. See Order, McGhee v. Shaw, Docket No. 11, No.
3:13-CV-290-DPJ-FKB (S.D. Miss. Oct. 2, 2013) [hereinafter DPJ Order]. The lawsuit consisted
of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim filed by George McGhee, Jr., an inmate in custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections, against Frank Shaw, the warden of McGhee’s
correctional facility. See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 8, No. 3:13-CV-290-DPJFKB (S.D. Miss. Sept. 11, 2013).
After reviewing McGhee’s claim and federal case law, Judge Jordan concluded that
McGhee could not sue Shaw under § 1983 “until such time as McGhee successfully has [his]
state-court conviction invalidated via appeal, post-conviction relief, habeas, or otherwise.” DPJ
Order at 2 (applying Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). Judge Jordan then dismissed
McGhee’s case. Id.

McGhee did not appeal Judge Jordan’s order. Instead, he sued Judge Jordan in the Circuit
Court of Hinds County. [5]. There, McGhee alleged that “the United States District Court Judges
have something against me[.] They have been protecting the State of Mississippi for ten years[.]
I have file[d] case after case in this court and all [were] dismiss[ed].” Id. McGhee sought a
judgment requiring Judge Jordan to “pay the sum of (10,000,000) ten million dollars for this
unconstitutional act.” Id.
The Department of Justice stepped in to represent Judge Jordan. [1]. The Department
subsequently removed the case into this Court by invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Id. This motion
followed.
II.

Present Arguments
Through counsel, Judge Jordan contends that this case must be dismissed under the

doctrine of judicial immunity. [7]. Because McGhee’s claim stems from judicial acts performed
in Judge Jordan’s official capacity, dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), he says. Id.
McGhee responds that dismissing this case would prove that the Judges of this Court
have something against him. [8 ¶1]. He argues that Judge Jordan’s dismissal of the § 1983 suit
against the warden was inappropriate. Id. ¶3. McGhee adds that it was fundamentally unfair for
Judge Jordan’s order to refer McGhee to the habeas process, as McGhee had already sought
habeas relief years ago and was denied. Id. ¶5.
III.

Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and makes reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must contain “more than an

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unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” but need not have “detailed
factual allegations.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff’s claims must also
be plausible on their face, which means there is “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation
omitted). The Court need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. (citation omitted).
IV.

Discussion
“A judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v. Tarrant

Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). According to the Supreme
Court, the purpose of judicial immunity is to enable judges to impartially and faithfully apply the
law:
When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to
their official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or
otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the
objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988). Judicial immunity also encourages aggrieved
parties to take their concerns to the appellate courts, rather than file new litigation. Id. at 225-27.
Judicial “immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.” Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though
judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11-12 (citations
omitted).
This circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining whether a judge’s
actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a
normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or
appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the

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controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the
acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.
Davis, 565 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted). “These factors are broadly construed in favor of
immunity.” Id. at 223 (citation omitted).
Taking McGhee’s allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, he has not met the
standard required to overcome judicial immunity. His claim against Judge Jordan stems from the
Judge’s Order dismissing McGhee’s case. Compare [1] with DPJ Order. Judge Jordan’s Order,
however, was a normal judicial function, of the type expected to issue from judicial chambers,
and on a case pending before the Court. See id. at 222. The law of judicial immunity requires
McGhee’s suit to be dismissed.
McGhee’s frustration at being required to obtain forms of post-conviction relief he had
already sought, without success, is understandable. Civil procedure can frustrate even the most
experienced practitioners. But “the nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently
to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have.”
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226.
It also should be noted that Judge Jordan’s order of dismissal simply quoted and applied
controlling law. He did not have the authority to change Heck v. Humphrey. And even if his
application of that binding Supreme Court decision was wrong, which it was not, the proper
remedy was to appeal, not sue the judge. Id. at 227. A suit such as this cannot be maintained.
V.

Conclusion
The motion to dismiss is granted. A separate Final Judgment will issue this day.
SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of September, 2014.

s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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