Irby v. Sollie
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION dismissing Petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Section 2241. Signed by District Judge Henry T. Wingate on 4/30/14.(RRL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
JAMES TERRYL MARQUIS IRBY
versus
LRA
PETITIONER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-cv-283-HTW-
W.O. “BILLY” SOLLIE, Sheriff of Lauderdale County
RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Petitioner Irby,
filed this pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He is
currently a pre-trial detainee incarcerated in the Lauderdale County Detention Facility
(“LCDF”). On April 7, 2014, Irby filed a Response [3] to the Court’s Order [2] for more
information. Upon review of the pleadings and applicable case law, the Court finds as follows.
I. Background
Irby states that he was arrested by the City of Meridian Police Department on May 23,
2013, for the charges of aggravated assault and armed robbery. As grounds for relief, he claims
that (1) his continued incarceration is illegal because he has not been indicted; and (2) that he is
serving a punitive sentence because the “State of Mississippi refuses to take [him] to trial in a
timely fashion.” Pet. [1] at 7. Irby argues that his Due Process rights are being violated because
“[t]he law states” that if you are not indicted within 270 days, a “habeas motion must be fil[]ed
for proper release and dismissal of [the] case.” Id. at 16. He also states that he has retained
counsel representing him in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court and that he has “been through
5 indictments.” Id.; Resp. [3] at 1. As relief, he is requesting an evidentiary hearing and then he
states that he is “just asking for justice and for the State of Mississippi to abide by the law.” Pet.
[1] at 15-16.
II. Discussion
A pre-trial prisoner’s suit challenging his incarceration is properly brought pursuant to
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final
judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against
him.” Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.1987). The “purpose of the writ
[filed pursuant to section 2241] is not to examine the validity of any judgment, but merely to
inquire into the legality of a detention.” Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1973).
While a pre-trial detainee has the right to seek federal habeas relief, the availability of such
relief is not without limits. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 488-89
(1973). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the
merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a
state court.” Id. at 489. Furthermore, a petitioner is not permitted to derail “a pending state
proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” Id. at
483.
The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a pre-trial petitioner
seeking to “abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial
processes” when litigating a speedy trial defense and “one who seeks only to enforce the state’s
obligation to bring him promptly to trial.” Id. at 489 (citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374
(1969)). The Fifth Circuit has held that the distinction is based on the type of relief requested by
the petitioner. See Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976). If the petitioner is
attempting to prevent the prosecution of the case, then he is seeking to “abort a state proceeding
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or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial processes.” Id. If the petitioner is
attempting to “force the state to go to trial,” then he is merely seeking to force the state to fulfill
its obligation to provide petitioner with a prompt trial. Id. “[A]n attempt to dismiss an
indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution is of the first type,” and this “objective is normally
not attainable through federal habeas corpus.” Id.
To the extent Irby’s claims can be construed as a request for dismissal of his state criminal
charges, he is attempting to assert “an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a
judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 508-09. Thus, federal habeas
relief is not available for these claims.
To the extent Irby’s claims can be construed as a request to force the State of Mississippi
to bring him to trial, he is required to exhaust his claims in state court prior to pursuing a federal
habeas corpus petition. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228. The exhaustion requirement gives “the
State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoner’s federal rights.”
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)).
In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, Irby must present his claims to the state’s highest
court in a procedurally proper manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 840 (1999).
In the form Petition that Irby filed, under each ground for relief the inmate is asked, “[i]f
you did not exhaust your state remedies on [this ground], explain why.” Pet. [1] at 5, 7. In
response, under Ground One, Irby states that his requests “to the LCDF authorities . . . has been
willfully ignored in bad faith by LCDF.” Pet. [1] at 5. As for Ground Two, Irby answers, “I
have been wilfully denied access to the court to seek redress of grievance at the time of my arrest
. . . continuing up to and past the date of my filing this writ of habeas corpus, furthermore my
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requests have been ignored.” Id. at 7. The Court’s Order [2] for more information directed Irby
to file a written response to:
specifically state if he has filed any petitions, applications, or motions with respect to
the grounds presented in this petition in any court, state or federal, and if so state: (a)
the name of the court(s); (b) nature of the proceedings; (c) the grounds raised; (d)
whether or not an evidentiary hearing was held; (e) the results; and (f) the date of the
results.
Order [2] at 1. In his response to this portion of the Order, Irby states, “I have been ignored by
the circu[i]t court.” Resp. [3] at 1. He does not elaborate or provide any additional information
about his purported attempts to present his claims to the state courts. In his Response [3], Irby
also verifies that he has retained counsel representing him in the Lauderdale County Circuit
Court. Id.
The State of Mississippi provides available remedies for a criminal defendant to assert that
his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. See e.g., Reed v. State, 31 So. 3d 48,
56-57 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)(finding criminal defendant may assert a demand for a speedy trial
in the trial court and then he is required to obtain a pretrial ruling on that motion). Irby’s
pleadings fail to demonstrate that he has completed the exhaustion of his state court remedies for
the claims presented in this Petition. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228 (finding inmate’s numerous
preindictment motions in the state court requesting that he be tried as soon as possible did not
satisfy exhaustion of speedy trial issue for federal habeas petition). Therefore, to the extent
Irby’s claims can be construed as a request to force the State of Mississippi to bring him to trial,
they are dismissed as unexhausted.1
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Irby does not claim, nor does the Court find, the presence of exceptional circumstances to excuse
the exhaustion requirement. See Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795-96 (5th Cir.1993)(holding exhaustion
requirement may only be excused in “rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency
mandate federal court interference”); see also Nelson v. State of Miss., No. 95-60516, 1996 WL 46734, at *3
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Finally, the Court notes that Irby states that he has been incarcerated without a “bond
reduction.” Pet. [1] at 16. To the extent he is requesting that this Court order the Lauderdale
County Circuit Court to hold a bond reduction hearing, such relief is not available. As the Fifth
Circuit has explained, “federal courts are not empowered to order the state courts to make
remedies available nor are they authorized to dictate the type of hearing which is to be conducted
by the state courts.” Dixon v. Beto, 472 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir.1973); see also, Tarter v. Hury,
646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981)(dismissing Petitioner’s request for equitable relief based on
excessive bail); Moore v. Dretke, 369 F.3d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 2004)(vacated and remanded
district court’s conditional grant of habeas relief predicated upon state court holding a hearing or
commuting sentence).
III. Conclusion
In sum, Petitioner Irby is (1) seeking relief not available via federal habeas corpus; or (2)
he has not completed the exhaustion of his state court remedies prior to filing this Petition.
Therefore, this pro se Petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to § 2241 will be dismissed.
A Final Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 30th day of April, 2014.
s/ HENRY T. WINGATE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
n.7 (Jan. 8, 1996)(noting that petitioner seeking to excuse exhaustion for excessive delay bears the burden
of demonstrating the excessive delay and showing he has not contributed to the delay).
Memorandum Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:14cv283HTW-LRA
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