Thomas v. Scott County, Mississippi et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting 7 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 8/21/2015 (kf)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
RONALD CALVIN THOMAS

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CAUSE NO. 3:14-cv-328-CWR-LRA

SCOTT COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; THE SCOTT COUNTY
MISSISSIPPI SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; MIKE LEE, SHERIFF
OF SCOTT COUNTY; DONALD SIMPSON AND BRAD ELLIS;
SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS, AND DOES 1 – 10

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is a motion for summary judgment premised on immunity filed by
Defendants Sheriff Mike Lee and Deputy Sheriffs Brad Ellis and Donald Simpson (collectively,
“Defendants”) in their individual capacities. Docket No. 7. Plaintiff Ronald Thomas has filed a
response, Docket No. 16, to which Defendants have submitted a rebuttal, Docket No. 17. After
careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable authorities, the court rules as follows:
BACKGROUND
This suit stems from Thomas’s allegations that he was severely beaten and arrested in
Scott County, Mississippi by Simpson and Ellis on or around December 17, 2012. Docket No. 11, Compl. at 6. Plaintiff claims that, without provocation, Defendants forced him onto the
ground, tightly placed handcuffs around his wrists, and severely beat his head, neck, back, his
torso, arms and legs. Id. at 9. Thomas alleges that he does not know why Defendants approached
and arrested him. Id. at 8. However, the following background sheds light on what led to
Thomas’s arrest.
Of course, the parties tell two different versions of the events.

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Plaintiff’s version. According to Thomas, on December 4, 2012, he and his wife,
Christie, were involved in a domestic dispute in which the police was called to Thomas’s house.
Docket No. 18-2, Pl.’s Dep. at 31, 34-37. Simpson arrived at the scene and began speaking to
Thomas outside of his home. Id. at 40. A fight eventually erupted between the two men, leaving
Simpson with a broken nose. Id. at 41, 44-45, 48-49.
Thomas was arrested, booked and held in the Scott County Jail on a number of charges,
including malicious mischief, domestic violence, assault on a law enforcement officer and felon
in possession of a firearm. He had his initial appearance, on December 6, 2012, and bond was set
for him at $300,000. Pl.’s Dep. at 51. On that day, he hired Maury Walley as his bail bondsman
and posted bond. See id. Thomas asserts that he was released on the condition that he get no
closer than 500 feet1 from his home where his wife was staying.2 Id. at 69. His wife and her three
children were granted a protective order against him on December 5, 2012, with an expiration
date of December 15, 2012.3 See Docket No. 7-4, Protective Order at 6. The protective order
prohibited Thomas from contacting them either in person, by phone, electronic communication
or through any third person, in addition to prohibiting him from going within 500 yards of them.
Id. at 4. He was also served a summons ordering him to appear in court at 1:00 p.m. on
December 11, 2012, to answer to the charges in the Order of Protection. Id. at 2-3.
On December 17, 2012, Thomas visited his wife’s home to place Christmas presents
under the pine tree outside the house. Pl.’s Dep. at 74. When his wife saw him, Thomas fled into

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Thomas testifies that he could not get closer than 500 feet, but the protective order states that he could get
no closer than 500 yards. Docket No. 7-4, Protective Order at 6.
2
Counsel for Plaintiff points out that the Initial Appearance setting bond does not show any conditions
attached to his bond.
3
There is a discrepancy in the effective expiration date. One portion of the document says it is December
15, see, Docket No. 7-4, at 1, while another portion of that same document shows that it is December 16. Id. at 6.

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the woods. Id. As he was running, Thomas called his friend, David Brantley, and told Brantley to
pick him up. Id. at 89.
After some time passed, Thomas began receiving numerous calls from Walley, to which
he did not respond. Id. 109-12. Thomas believed that he may have gotten himself into trouble for
violating the protective order, so he eventually called Walley so that they could meet and discuss
what had occurred. Id. at 103. He suspected that he would have to go back to jail.4 Id.
Once Thomas called Walley, Walley told Thomas to meet him in the parking lot of the
Good Hope IGA. Id. at 104. When Thomas arrived, there were no other cars in the parking lot.
Id. at 107. He walked up to Walley’s window to tell him what had happened, and in the midst of
his conversation with Walley, he alleges that he was beaten by the Defendants. Id. at 110.
Although he cannot remember the incident clearly, Thomas believes that two officers were
hiding in the truck, emerged with their flashlights, and began beating him with them from
behind. Id. at 129.
Next, Thomas remembers seeing “blue lights” appear and guns being drawn as the two
individual police officers from the truck beat on him. Id. at 129-31. As he was being beaten,
Walley forced his knee on Thomas’s back. Id. at 131. He does not know how many officers
participated in beating him, but he recalls “getting hit from everywhere with flashlights.” Id. He
claims that he recognized Ellis and Simpson among those officers beating him with flashlights
on the face. Id. at 137-38. Thomas contends that he did not resist the officers at any point. Id. at
139. As a result of his beating, Thomas claims that he sustained “numerous wounds, bruises,
contusions, abrasions, cuts, scrapes, and a broken nose.” Pl.’s Brief at 6.

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In his deposition, Thomas revealed that he had violated the protective order before around December 13,
2012. Id. at 113.

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Defendants’ version. Defendants fill in some points missing from Thomas’s side of the
story.
Defendants allege that on December 17, 2012, the Scott County Sheriff’s Department
(the “Department”) received notice that Thomas violated the protective order by entering his
house where his wife stayed. Docket No. 7-5. Walley informed the Department that he and
Thomas would meet at the Good Hope IGA parking lot so that Thomas could surrender. Id.
Defendants Lee and Simpson were among the officers asked to assist in the bond surrender, so
they waited across the street from the parking lot in a county-issued SUV. Id. As Thomas began
speaking to Walley, the officers drove their car up to them with their blue lights on. Id. The
officers exited their vehicle with guns drawn5 but holstered them to assist Walley with
restraining Thomas. Id. Ellis and Simpson stood on the side of Thomas as Walley attempted to
handcuff Thomas from behind, but Walley dropped his handcuffs. Id. At this point, Thomas
resisted and a struggle ensued, with the officers falling to their knees and Thomas’s face
smacking the concrete. Id. The officers finally handcuffed Thomas, and were forced to place leg
restraints on him because he would not stop kicking. Id.
On December 18, 2012, Thomas was charged with resisting arrest, and a probation order
was entered the following day placing Thomas on house arrest and other restrictions. See Docket
No. 7-5 at 7-8. On March 18, 2014, Thomas filed the instant lawsuit against several defendants,
including Scott County, Sheriff Mike Lee, and Simpson and Ellis in their individual capacities,6
alleging the following claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: excessive force, unlawful arrest,

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According to a police report, Lee believed that Thomas had hidden a handgun in his yard on December 4,
2012. Docket No. 7-5 at 2. Lee believed that Thomas returned to his yard on the night of December 17 in order to
retrieve this firearm. Docket No. 7-5 at 2. Lee explains that when they approached Thomas in the parking lot, they
had their guns drawn and demanded him to hold his hands up out of their suspicion that Thomas had retrieved his
handgun and may have had it in his possession. Docket No. 7-5 at 2.
6
Lee is also being sued in his official capacity.

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unlawful search and seizure, and deprivation of due process. The Complaint also advances state
law claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Compl. at 12-17. Thomas’s claims arise from his arrest on December 17,
2012.
In their motion for summary judgment filed on June 14, 2014, Defendants argue that they
are entitled to qualified immunity on Thomas’s individual capacity claims against them under
federal law. Defendants also assert that Thomas’s state law claims are all subject to dismissal
under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1, et seq.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). When confronted with these motions, the Court focuses on “genuine” disputes of
“material” facts. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence supporting its resolution in favor of the
party opposing summary judgment, together with any inferences in such party’s favor that the
evidence allows, would be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of that party.” St. Amant v.
Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing
to particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The Court will “view
the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant,”
Maddox v. Townsend & Sons, Inc., 639 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted), but

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unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence, Forsyth v. Barr, 19
F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. Qualified immunity
Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability from civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A two-part test is used to determine
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Martinez–Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459
F.3d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 2006). The Court must determine “(1) whether an official’s conduct
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (2) whether the right violated was clearly
established at the time of the violation.” Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 637 (5th Cir.
2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). The Court has discretion to decide which prong of the
test should be answered first. Id. at 637–38.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Federal Law Claims Against Defendants Simpson and Ellis

False Arrest.
Thomas argues that his arrest on December 17, 2012, violated the Fourth Amendment
because the officers lacked probable cause.
“In order to prevail in a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that he was
arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Parm v. Shumate, 513
F.3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “Probable cause exists when the totality of the
facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient
for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an

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offense.” Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655–56 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest
was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 164
(quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).
When the defense of qualified immunity is asserted in a false arrest case, “the plaintiff
must show that the officers could not have reasonably believed that they had probable cause to
arrest the plaintiff for any crime.” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). “[L]aw enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present are entitled to [qualified] immunity.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181,
206 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants argue that they arrested Thomas on December 17, 2012, in response to a
Scott County 911 dispatch request to assist Walley with the bond surrender of Thomas for the
violation of his protective order. Docket No. 8 at 11. As Defendants’ motion notes, Mississippi
law states that a violation of a protective order “or a bond condition pursuant to § 99-5-37 is a
“misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months . .
. .” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-21. In addition, Mississippi law provides that an officer may arrest
a person “with or without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the person has”
knowingly violated such protective order. Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-3-7(3)(a).
The record shows that the protective order may not have been in effect at the time of
Thomas’ arrest; however, the law protects Defendants even if they mistakenly believed that
Thomas violated the protective order if that belief was reasonable. See Club Retro, 568 F.3d at
206. In the instant case, Thomas himself believed that he had broken the law by going near his
wife’s house, and the officers were responding to a dispatch that Thomas was in violation of the

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protection order, that he had been seen inside the residence, and that he “then took off on foot
into the woods.” Docket No. 7-5, at 2. See also Docket No. 7-2, at 2 (“We had been notified by
dispatch earlier in the day that Thomas was in violation of a protective order relating to his wife
and we had been asked by Walley to assist with bringing Thomas to the Scott County7Jail and
surrender Thomas on bond.”). Therefore, Defendants’ belief that he violated the protective order
was reasonable and the court must grant Defendants qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s false
arrest claim under § 1983.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Defendants also contend that “any claim for false arrest, illegal search and seizure and
violation of due process” brought under section 1983 are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). Under Heck, a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages
for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights under Section 1983 if the alleged violation
arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves
“that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. The district
court must consider “whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Jackson
v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied Heck to proceedings that call into question
the fact or duration of probation. Cotton v. Tex. Dep’t Criminal Justice, 35 F.3d 560, 560 (5th
Cir. 1994). Here, Defendants have provided the court with a probation order entered on

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December 19, 2012, stating that Thomas was found guilty of violating the conditions of his bond
by resisting arrest on December 17, 2012. See Docket No. 7-5 at 7-8. Thomas’s allegations of
unlawful search and arrest and violation of due process, if true, would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the probation order entered on December 19, 2012. Therefore, Thomas cannot state
any claims for unlawful arrest, illegal search and seizure, and violations of due process.
Excessive Force.
Because Heck is triggered in this case, the court must assess whether Thomas may retain
his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, even though Defendants did not argue that
Thomas’s excessive force claim is barred by Heck in their motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit has instructed that
the determination of whether [§ 1983 excessive-force] claims are barred
[by Heck] is analytical and fact-intensive, requiring us to focus on whether
success on the excessive force claim requires negation of an element of the
criminal offense or proof of a fact that is inherently inconsistent with one
underlying the criminal conviction.
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008). Under that framework, Heck does not
necessarily bar an excessive force claim where the plaintiff is found guilty of resisting arrest. See
Harvey v. City of Brandon, Miss., No. 3:14CV739-DPJ-FKB, 2015 WL 461811, at *3 (S.D.
Miss. Feb. 4, 2015). In Harvey, for example, Judge Jordan noted “that a plaintiff who concedes
that he resisted arrest but nevertheless contends that excessive force was used against him would
not find his Fourth Amendment claim barred by Heck.” Id. (citing Jenkins v. Town of Vardaman,
Miss., 899 F.Supp.2d 526, 536 (N.D. Miss. 2012)). On the other hand, Heck bars excessive force
claims “based on a single violent encounter during which the officers [] used excessive force and
[the plaintiff claims] he was wholly innocent.” Id. (quoting Whatley v. Coffin, 496 F. App’x 414,
417 (5th Cir. 2012)).

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The Court finds that Heck bars Thomas’s excessive force claim under the facts alleged.
Here, Thomas claims that he did not resist arrest, suggesting that he was “wholly innocent.” See
Pl’s Dep. at 139. As such, a favorable determination of Thomas’s claim would challenge the
probation order which found Thomas guilty of resisting arrest. Therefore, Thomas’s excessive
force claim will be dismissed.
II.

Federal Law Claims Against Sheriff Lee
Thomas has not specifically alleged any claim against Defendant Lee other than stating in

his Complaint that Lee “was responsible for ensuring that his agents, servants, and employees,
including [] Simpson and Ellis, understood and obeyed the laws of the State of Mississippi, the
United States, and [Scott County].” Compl. at 4. It appears that Thomas seeks to hold Lee liable
as supervisors of Simpson and Lee. “Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under section
1983 for the action so of subordinates, such as [Simpson and Ellis], on any theory of vicarious or
respondeat superior liability. Rather, [Thomas] must show that the conduct of [Lee] denied
[him] his constitutional rights.” Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406
F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). If the court must construe a claim against Lee from the Complaint,
that claim must be for failure to train or supervise.
When a plaintiff alleges a failure to train or supervise, “the plaintiff must show that: (1)
the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists
between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the
failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Estate of Davis, 406 F.3d 381.
Here, Thomas has made no attempt to satisfy the requisite elements in order to maintain his
claim. For example, he has not demonstrated that the alleged failure to train was causally

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connected to the constitutional injury. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). The
court therefore finds that this claim must be dismissed.
III.

State Law Claims
As for Thomas’s state law claims, Defendants argue that they cannot be subjected to

personal liability for acts or omissions occurring within the course of employment. See, e.g.,
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2); Roderick v. City of Gulfport, 144 F.Supp.2d 622, 638 (S.D. Miss.
2000); Patton v. Hinds County Juvenile Detention Ctr. (Henley-Young), No. 3:10cv0138, 2011
WL 2912897, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 18, 2011). Thomas folds in response to this argument and
concedes that his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was not timely filed. Thomas
makes no serious attempt to pursue his state law claims beyond the complaint. See Pl.’s brief at
16. As such, Defendants’ motion is granted as to these claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
premised on immunity. Within ten days, the parties are instructed to contact the chambers of the
Magistrate Judge for entry of a scheduling order.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 21st day of August, 2015.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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