Blount et al v. Mississippi Department of Human Services et al

Filing 43

ORDER granting 29 Motion to Dismiss as set out in the order. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 41 is stricken. The parties shall contact the chambers of United States Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball within ten days of the entry of this order to set the case for a case-management conference. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on January 5, 2015. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
WINDELL C. BLOUNT, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv336-DPJ-FKB

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, et al.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This pro se civil-rights case is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Based on
Eleventh Amendment Immunity [29] filed by Defendants the Mississippi Department of Human
Services (“MDHS”), Richard Berry, Linda Slaughter, Walley Naylor, Ruth Ann Williams,
Nelene Ledford, Faye Petersen, Sequoia Eubanks, Andreal Harper, Vernassia Harbin, Judy Price,
and Petra Kay (“Moving Defendants”).1 As to the individual Defendants, the motion is limited to
any claims against them in their official capacities. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
granted.
I.

Background
Four pro se Plaintiffs have sued Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for

allegedly violating their First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendment rights. They
also assert a claim under “the Federal Consumer protection laws,” Compl. [1] ¶ 4, which
Defendants construe as a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681 et seq. Defs.’ Mem. [30] at 2. Plaintiffs seem to accept—or at least have not
disputed—that construction in their Response. See generally Pls.’ Mem. [34].

1

Petra Kay joined in the present motion but also filed a motion to dismiss for improper
service of process [31]. Her separately filed motion to dismiss will be addressed in another
order.

Though each Plaintiff relies on the same federal statutes, they assert distinct factual bases
for their collective suit. The common thread is that each encountered MDHS or its employees
and claims that the department mishandled the matter. In very general terms, some claims relate
to custody and/or visitation rights, others deal with child-support payments and collection, and
two deal with the suspension of driving privileges.2
II.

Standard of Review
Defendants move to dismiss certain claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) based on lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. They also seek dismissal of those same claims under Rule 12(b)(6)
because Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim. If Defendants are correct that this Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, then it is without authority to decide the merits. Accordingly, the
12(b)(1) motion will be addressed first. See In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC, 624
F.3d 201, 209 (5th Cir. 2010).
“[W]here subject[-]matter jurisdiction is being challenged, the trial court is free to weigh
the evidence and resolve factual disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear the
case.” Montez v. Dep’t of the Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004). “The party asserting
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.” Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635
F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011).

2

This description is based on the original Complaint [1]. But Plaintiffs recently filed an
Amended Complaint [41] on December 18, 2014. Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a plaintiff to unilaterally amend a complaint during the first 21 days after
service of a responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12(b). After that, “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was filed beyond the 21-day period and without leave
or consent. It is therefore stricken. Plaintiffs may move the Court for leave to amend under Rule
15(a)(2).
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III.

Analysis
Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars

Plaintiffs’ claims against MDHS and against the individual Defendants in their official
capacities. Though the Complaint fails to indicate whether Plaintiffs sued the individual
Defendants in their individual or official capacities, Defendants limit their motion to any officialcapacity claims Plaintiffs may have intended.
“The Eleventh Amendment grants a state immunity from suit in federal court by
. . . its own citizens . . . .” Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 616
(2002). Immunity also extends to state agencies that are considered “arms of the state.” Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). MDHS is an arm of the state of Mississippi.
See, e.g., Pollard v. Hinds Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 3:13cv324-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL
5324384, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 17, 2014); Williams v. Berry, 977 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628 (S.D.
Miss. 2013). Finally, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment also bars federal-court claims against individual state
employees acting in their official capacities. Id.
Plaintiffs acknowledge the Eleventh Amendment but fail to offer a cognizable legal
argument to prevent its application. Instead, they assert—with no legal authority—that the
Amendment has been misunderstood and was not intended to offer MDHS “complete and
absolute immunity.” Pls.’ Mem. [34] at 3. Plaintiffs are generally correct that Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not absolute, but not for the reasons they state.

3

To begin with, the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a citizen from suing the state in
state court. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 616. Even in federal court, immunity can be evaded in three
ways. First, Congress may use its Fourteenth-Amendment enforcement power to abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Second, a state may voluntarily waive immunity and consent to suit in
federal court. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011). Finally, when an individual
brings an official-capacity claim against a state official for violating the United States
Constitution, federal courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the official from continued violations. See
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). To determine whether Ex Parte Young applies,
“a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Va.
Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Plaintiffs have not suggested that these traditional defenses to Eleventh Amendment
immunity apply in this case, and they do not. Working backwards, Plaintiffs’ Response does not
mention Ex Parte Young, though Defendants raised the issue in their initial memorandum.
Compare Defs.’ Mem. [30] at 3, with Pls.’ Mem. [34] at 1–6. Regardless, the Complaint seeks
monetary rather than prospective relief, so the exception does not apply. See Stewart, 131 S. Ct.
at 1639. As for waiver, the Mississippi Tort Claims Act “preserves all immunities granted by the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d
584, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(4)). Finally, Congress has not
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment as to the claims Plaintiffs pursue in this case. See Hines v.
4

Miss. Dep’t. of Corr., 239 F.3d 366, No. 00-60143, 2000 WL 1741624, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 14,
2000) (per curiam) (“Congress has not chosen to abrogate the states’ immunity for suits under §§
1981, 1983, and 1985(3).”); Sorrell v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n, 314 F. Supp. 2d 813, 817
(C.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for
claims under FCRA).
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all the parties’ arguments. Those not expressly addressed

would not have changed the outcome. For the reasons stated above, the Eleventh Amendment
bars Plaintiffs’ claims in this Court against MDHS and the individual Defendants in their official
capacities.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims against MDHS and any officialcapacity claims against the individual Defendants; all such claims are dismissed without
prejudice to Plaintiffs’ right to pursue those claims in state court;
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint [41] is stricken;
AND the parties shall contact the chambers of United States Magistrate Judge F. Keith
Ball within ten days of the entry of this order to set the case for a case-management conference.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 5th day of January, 2015.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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