Reed v. E.M.C.F. et al
Filing
62
Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court granted the 47 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants MTC, Matthew Naidow, Frank Shaw, and Quincy Moffite are dismissed with prejudice. Defendants Joseph Nabors, Fredrick Young, and Tiffany Poplar are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 3/16/2016. (ACF)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CAVIN EARL REED
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV452-LRA
MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING
CORPORATION, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This § 1983 action is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [47]
filed by Defendants Management & Training Corporation [MTC], Matthew Naidow,
Frank Shaw, and Quincy Moffite.1 The Court has considered all related pleadings,
including the response of Plaintiff Cavin Earl Reed, and his sworn testimony at the
omnibus hearing conducted on January 26, 2015. The Court finds that the motion is well
advised and should be granted for the reasons discussed below.
Jurisdiction of this case is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff testified that on
May 6, 2013, he was a convicted felon housed in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections [MDOC] at the East Mississippi Correctional Facility
[EMCF] in Meridian, Mississippi. According to Plaintiff, he got into an argument with
Defendant officer Joseph Nabors while being escorted from one housing unit to another.
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The remaining persons named as Defendants have not been served with process,
except for Jimmy Mason, who was served by the United States Marshals Service on June
12, 2015 [46]. The unserved Defendants are Joseph Nabors, Fredrick Young, and
Tiffany Poplar. These persons are no longer employed by MTC.
Defendant Jimmy Mason intervened and threatened to mace him, and he and Mason
argued. Plaintiff explained the incident to the Court at the omnibus hearing as follows:
... I was arguing with Officer Nabors at the time, and
Lieutenant Mason walked up. He upped his mace can on me
and put it in my face. I told him to get the mace can out of
my face. He sprayed me. And when he sprayed me, I had
retrieved a weapon that I had on me, and I had attempted to
stab him. And they took the weapon from me or whatever.
And when they got the weapon from me, they handcuffed me.
And they talked to me for a few minutes about what went on.
They told me they was going to take me to medical for
examination. And on the way to medical, I was asked to stop
walking down the hallway by Lieutenant Mason.
Transcript, 47-1, p. 6.
After the macing incident, Plaintiff was being transported to medical, restrained
with his hands in cuffs behind his back, escorted by Defendant officers Fredrick Young
and Tiffany Poplar. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Mason approached them and
asked him to stop. Mason slapped him two or three times in the face with his open hand.
Plaintiff does not know if it was from the mace or the slap, but his face and eye were
swollen for about 1 ½ weeks after that.
Plaintiff was taken to medical after the incident. His only injuries were the
swelling from the slap (or the mace) and a leg injury. He testified that he may have
stabbed himself in the leg during the earlier fight when he took out his knife. After that,
Plaintiff was taken to lockdown and placed in an administrative segregation cell, 6 Delta,
cell 11, by Defendant Quincy Moffite. He “suffered some conditions of confinement
there.” [47-1, p. 11]. Specifically, he claims he was placed in a cell with no light fixtures,
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and wires were hanging out. There was rust in the room, was given “no hygienes ... no
tissue, no spoon, no nothing.” Id. Plaintiff remained in these conditions for 13-14 days
or so. He did not touch the electric wires, so he was not injured by them. The
emergency buttons inside the cell were inoperable. He was forced to eat with his hands.
He went through a lot of emotional stress due to the conditions but was not physically
injured. [47-1, p. 13].
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that
summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The United States Supreme Court
has held that this language “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient
showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted the omnibus
hearing transcript; the incident report; excerpts of Plaintiff’s MDOC offender log; and,
excerpts of Plaintiff’s Drill Down Detail Report [47-1 through 47-4].
Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to an Eighth Amendment violation of
excessive force by Defendant Mason; the remaining Defendants failed to protect him
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from Mason’s alleged assault. Plaintiff’s excessive force claim was only made against
Mason; Mason allegedly slapped him two-three times while he was restrained. He
contends that the remaining Defendants should have protected him from Mason or
somehow prevented the incident. Defendant Warden Shaw was not present when
Plaintiff was slapped, and Plaintiff only charges Defendant Moffite with the conditions
under which Plaintiff was housed after the incident.
Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
inmates, and this duty is derived from the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
in the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Longoria
v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2006); Cantu v. Jones, 293 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir.
2002); Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400-01 (1995). The same standard applies to
claims of failure to protect inmates from prison officials or guards. See Ard v. Rushing,
911 F.Supp. 2d 425, 429 (S.D. Miss. 2012). However, as the Court in Farmer stated,
"[n]ot every injury by one prisoner at the hands of another translates into constitutional
liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." 511 U.S. at 834.
To establish a failure-to-protect claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must show that
he is/was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection. Newton v. Black,
133 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, to act with deliberate indifference, "the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
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substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw the inference." Id. (quoting
Farmer).
It is necessary for both requirements to be met before the Eighth Amendment is
violated: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’ so the
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under “conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm” and, (2) “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the
Eighth Amendment.” Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
A prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” so as to be one of
deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Id.
The standard to be used in Eighth Amendment cases is one of subjective deliberate
indifference, as used in criminal law, not an objective standard as used in civil law.
Williams, 797 F.3d at 281 (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw
cruel and inhuman “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and inhuman “punishments.” Id.
Accordingly, the prison official must be actually reckless, disregarding a risk of harm of
which he is actually aware. “An official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our
cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id., citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
838.
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Even if an officer is not a participant in the excessive force, he could still be liable
if he failed to take reasonable steps to protect the victim. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d
1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002). Yet Plaintiff would have to show that these Defendants
were in a position to intervene but failed to do so. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324,
1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008). Preventing the slaps under the instant circumstances would
have been difficult at best, particularly for Defendant Warden Shaw, who was not even
present.
Plaintiff confirmed by his testimony that it was only Defendant Mason who
slapped him. He testified that he and Defendant Nabors had been arguing minutes
before, and Plaintiff had pulled a knife on Defendant Mason. Plaintiff was restrained
after that, but Mason slapped him, anyway.
The Court finds that under these circumstances, as explained by Plaintiff, the
alleged slap by Mason was episodic in nature and occurred within a very short time frame
after a struggle and Plaintiff’s attempt to stab Defendants. Even so, there were no
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff alleged. The remaining
Defendants were not aware Plaintiff was at risk of being seriously harmed, as the slaps as
described by Plaintiff did not constitute “serious harm.”
As stated, Defendant Warden Shaw, who has moved for summary judgment, was
not present when the incident occurred. Defendant MTC has also moved for summary
judgment, contending that it cannot be held vicariously liable under these circumstances.
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Plaintiff contends that the Warden should have known that Lt. Mason might hurt him, as
he sent a request form on April 10, 2013. [1, p. 13]. In this form, Plaintiff states that he
was “having major problems with your staff here and [he] will no longer tolerate the fear
[he has]. ...” A response was given by a mental health counselor, not the warden, stating
that a transfer for Plaintiff had been submitted. The law requires more than a single
instance of a lack of training or supervision before a showing of "deliberate indifference"
can be shown. Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Proof
of more than a single instance of the lack of training or supervision causing a violation of
constitutional rights is normally required before such lack of training or supervision
constitutes deliberate indifference.”) (citations omitted).
There are insufficient facts stated by Plaintiff to sustain a claim of supervisory
liability, and there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978). Fifth Circuit precedent requires either
personal involvement by an individual Defendant in the alleged violation, or the
enforcement of some policy or practice resulting in the constitutional deprivation.
Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). The
law is clear that § 1983 liability may not be based upon a theory that a defendant was
liable in a supervisory capacity--- known in the law as the theory of respondeat superior.
Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1993), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Oliver
v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 & n. 6 (5th Cir 2002) (§ 1983 does not create supervisory or
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respondeat superior liability.”) Neither MTC or Warden Shaw can be held liable to
Plaintiff on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory under the applicable law.
Plaintiff has not stated a constitutional claim under these circumstances against
any named Defendant regarding his claim of excessive force except Defendant Mason. It
is even questionable as to whether 2-3 slaps with an open hand, causing no serious injury,
would meet the “more than de minimis injury” requirement as to Defendant Mason. Even
so, Plaintiff pulled a homemade knife out as he was being transported, and attempted to
attack Mason while unrestrained. This action justified the use of pepper spray by Mason
and Nabors, and no Eighth Amendment claim could exist as to the spray used to subdue
Plaintiff. The use of pepper spray is not forbidden by the United States Constitution, and
its application in and of itself is not "excessive force." See Stone v. Damons, No. 0661087, 252 F. App'x 581, 582 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (per curiam) (affirming summary
judgment dismissing Eighth Amendment case where officer used pepper spray on
plaintiff resisting arrest).
Because no constitutional claim has been stated under these circumstances as to
either the moving Defendants, or to unserved Defendants Joseph Nabors, Fredrick
Young, and Tiffany Poplar, the Complaint shall be dismissed as to them.
Plaintiff’s second claim is that his conditions of confinement for 14 days in the
isolation cell where Defendant Quincy Moffite placed him were so deplorable that they
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, taken
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in a light most favorable to him, simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Harsh "conditions of confinement" may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment unless such conditions are "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47, 50
(5th Cir. 1987). In order to successfully prove an Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim, a civil rights plaintiff must allege facts which suggest that the prison
officials' conduct resulted in the plaintiff being incarcerated under “conditions which
[posed] an unreasonable risk of damage to [the prisoner's] future health." Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir.2001). This "risk must be of such a level that today's
society would not tolerate it.” Id. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must
plead facts which establish: (1) objectively, that the deprivations are sufficiently serious;
and (2) subjectively, that the defendant prison officials knew of the deprivations but
nevertheless have shown a “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff's “health or safety.”
Id.
A prisoner must show that the inflicting officer has exhibited "deliberate
indifference" to the conditions. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 303. Mere negligence does
not satisfy the "deliberate indifference" standard. Id. The prisoner must suffer from an
extreme deprivation of any “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 304.
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Plaintiff’s living conditions in the holding cell lasted for approximately 14 days,
and he testified that he suffered from no injuries as a result of his stay. He was provided
food and water. He was in lockdown for a month, and he wrote a request form on about
the 13th day complaining about his conditions. [47-1, p. 12-13]. A warden came, and he
complained, and he received his property with his hygiene products soon thereafter.
Plaintiff testified that his suffering was mental due to his conditions; he was not
physically injured.
As Defendants point out, records from his May 9 and May 16, 2013, meetings
with his case manager confirm that Plaintiff had no complaints regarding his living
conditions; he reported that he was “doing fine.” [47-3, p. 3]. He may not have had his
hygiene products for these two weeks, but he was not injured during this short time
period. Plaintiff's claim regarding his conditions is deficient under Section 1983 because
he concedes he had no “physical injury” sufficient to support his claim for monetary
damages for his emotional distress. Specifically, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 includes the following requirement in 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e): “ No Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”
(Emphasis added). Because no physical injuries of any kind have been alleged by
Plaintiff as a result of his confinement in lockdown, he is precluded as a matter of law
from recovering damages for the psychological or other emotional injury he has asserted.
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Thus, his complaint must be dismissed in this regard.
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [47] is hereby
granted, as Defendants are entitled to a judgment at law. Plaintiff's lawsuit is hereby
dismissed with prejudice as to these Defendants. As to the unserved Defendants, Joseph
Nabors, Fredrick Young, and Tiffany Poplar, the Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED this the 16th day of March 2016.
/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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