True the Vote et al v. Hosemann et al

Filing 147

Memorandum Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Nancy F Atlas on 8/29/2014 (Atlas, Nancy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
TRUE THE VOTE, JANE COLN,
BRANDIE CORRERO, CHAD HIGDON,
JENNIFER HIGDON, GENE HOPKINS,
FREDERICK LEE JENKINS, TAVISH
KELLY, DONNA KNEZEVICH, JOSEPH
KNEZEVICH, DORIS LEE, LAUREN
LYNCH, NORMA MACKEY, ROY
NICHOLSON, MARK PATRICK, JULIE
PATRICK, PAUL PATRICK, DAVID
PHILLEY, GRANT SOWELL, SYBIL
TRIBBLE, LAURA VANOVERSCHELDE,
and ELAINE VECHORIK,
Plaintiffs,

§
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v.
§
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THE HONORABLE DELBERT
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HOSEMANN, in his official capacity as
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Secretary of State for the State of
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Mississippi, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
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OF MISSISSIPPI, COPIAH COUNTY,
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MISSISSIPPI ELECTION COMMISSION,
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HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
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ELECTION COMMISSION, JEFFERSON
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DAVIS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
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ELECTION COMMISSION, LAUDERDALE §
COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI ELECTION
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COMMISSION, LEAKE COUNTY,
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MISSISSIPPI ELECTION COMMISSION,
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MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
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ELECTION COMMISSION, RANKIN
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COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI ELECTION
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COMMISSION, SIMPSON COUNTY,
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MISSISSIPPI ELECTION COMMISSION,
§
and YAZOO COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
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ELECTION COMMISSION,
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Defendants.
§

C.A. NO. 3:14-CV-532-NFA

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

BACKGROUND.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.
The Primary and Primary Runoff Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.
Plaintiffs’ Allegations and Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C.
Procedural Posture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

II.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.
Summary Judgment Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.
Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.
Have Plaintiffs Sued the Proper Defendants?. . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
Is the Republican Party a Proper Defendant?. . . . . . . .
b.
Are the County Defendants Proper Defendants?.. . . . .
i.
Mississippi’s Registration and Election
Oversight Structure and Procedure. . . . . . . . . . .
ii.
Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c.
Is Hosemann a Proper Defendant?.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.
Does Section 1973gg-9 Pose a Procedural Bar
to Plaintiffs’ Suit?.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.
What Documents Do Plaintiffs Seek?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.
Are Plaintiffs Entitled Under the NVRA to Inspect the
Requested Documents?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
Statutory Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i.
Plain Meaning – Overall Principles.. . . . . . . . . .
ii.
Statutory Context of the Public Disclosure
Provision Within the NVRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii. Statutory Purpose of the NVRA. . . . . . . . . . . . .
iv.
Context of the NVRA Public Disclosure
Provision in Light of Other Federal and
State Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b.
Requested Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i.
Voter Roll.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ii.
Poll Books. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii. Absentee Ballot Applications and Envelopes. . .
iv.
Federal Post Card Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.
Does the NVRA Preempt Mississippi Law?. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2

17
17
19
21
21
22
22
26
28
30
37
39
39
39
42
43

46
47
47
49
54
57
59

a.
b.
c.

Preemption Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mississippi Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Does the NVRA Require Disclosure of
Unredacted Records?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i.
Project Vote is Distinguishable.. . . . . . . . . . . . .
ii.
The NVRA Does Not Require Disclosure
of Unredacted Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii. Birthdates, Like Social Security Numbers,
Are “Uniquely Sensitive.”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision Does Not
Preempt Mississippi’s Redaction Provisions.. . . . . . . .

60
62

III.

PLAINTIFFS’ PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION. . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.
Preliminary Injunction Standard.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.
Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.
Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits.. . . . . . . . . .
2.
Irreparable Injury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.
Balance of Hardships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.
Disservice to the Public Interest.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79
79
80
80
80
82
82

IV.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY’S SANCTIONS MOTION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.
Legal Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
B.
Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

V.

RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

VI.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

d.

63
64
67
71
78

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court in this case is required to construe the scope of the National Voter
Registration Act (“NVRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.,1 a federal law that has seldom

1

On September 1, 2014, the NVRA provisions and all U.S. Code provisions relating
to voter registration and elections will be transferred to a new Title 52 of the U.S.
(continued...)

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generated litigation. A particular focal point of this case is the June 24, 2014 primary
runoff election held to determine the Republican Party of Mississippi’s candidate in
the November 2014 U.S. Senate election. Plaintiffs2 state that they seek certain
unredacted voting records from that election pursuant to the NVRA Public Disclosure

1

(...continued)
Code. No substantive changes to the statutes will be made through this recodification.
The new relevant provisions of the NVRA are recodified as follows:
Original Codification

Post-Sept. 1, 2014 Codification

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg

52 U.S.C. § 20501

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-1

52 U.S.C. § 20502

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2

52 U.S.C. § 20503

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3

52 U.S.C. § 20504

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4

52 U.S.C. § 20505

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5

52 U.S.C. § 20506

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6

52 U.S.C. § 20507

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7

52 U.S.C. § 20508

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-8

52 U.S.C. § 20509

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9

52 U.S.C. § 20510

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10

52 U.S.C. § 20511

The parties’ briefs cite the code sections in Title 42. All applicable case law cites the
original code references in that Title. The Court accordingly cites to Title 42
throughout this Memorandum and Order.
2

Plaintiffs, collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs,” are True the Vote, Jane Coln,
Brandie Correro, Chad Higdon, Jennifer Higdon, Gene Hopkins, Frederick Lee
Jenkins, Mary Jenkins, Tavish Kelly, Donna Knezevich, Joseph Knezevich, Doris
Lee, Lauren Lynch, Norma Mackey, Roy Nicholson, Mark Patrick, Julie Patrick, Paul
Patrick, David Philley, Grant Sowell, Sybil Tribble, Laura VanOverschelde, and
Elaine Vechorik. The “Individual Plaintiffs” are all Plaintiffs other than True the
Vote.

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Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (“Public Disclosure Provision”), in order to
investigate potential irregularities or inaccuracies concerning the primary runoff
election and possibly to raise a challenge to the outcome of that election. Defendants3
have refused some of Plaintiffs’ requests citing multiple grounds, but primarily
Defendants contend that Mississippi law requires redaction of certain personal voter
registrant information from the records before they are publicly disclosed.
Before the Court are the following motions, each of which is ripe for
consideration:
C

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [and Preliminary
Injunction]4 [Doc. # 8] (“Preliminary Injunction Motion”);5

3

Defendants in this case, collectively referred to as “Defendants,” are The Honorable
Delbert Hosemann, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of
Mississippi (“Hosemann” or “Secretary of State”), The Republican Party of
Mississippi (the “Republican Party”), Copiah County, Mississippi Election
Commission (“Copiah County”), Hinds County, Mississippi Election Commission
(“Hinds County”), Jefferson Davis County, Mississippi Election Commission
(“Jefferson Davis County”), Lauderdale County, Mississippi Election Commission
(“Lauderdale County”), Leake County, Mississippi Election Commission (“Leake
County”), Madison County, Mississippi Election Commission (“Madison County”),
Rankin County, Mississippi Election Commission (“Rankin County”), Simpson
County, Mississippi Election Commission (“Simpson County”), and Yazoo County,
Mississippi Election Commission (“Yazoo County”). Copiah County, Hinds County,
Jefferson Davis County, Lauderdale County, Leake County, Madison County, Rankin
County, Simpson County, and Yazoo County are together referred to as the “County
Defendants.”

4

Defendant Republic Party has filed two Responses [Docs. # 12 and # 91], Defendant
Jefferson Davis County has filed a Response [Doc. # 23], and Defendant Hosemann
has filed a Response [Doc. # 92]. Defendants Copiah County, Rankin County,
Jefferson Davis County, Simpson County, Lauderdale County, and Madison County
join Hosemann’s Response. See Docs. # 94, # 95, # 96, # 97, # 98, # 99, # 101, # 104,
and # 108. Plaintiffs have filed multiple Replies [Docs. # 20, # 115, # 118, and
(continued...)

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5

C

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docs. # 83 and # 84]
(“Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion”);6

C

Defendant Hosemann’s Summary Judgment Request [Doc. # 114];7

C

Defendant Copiah County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 79]
(“Copiah County’s Motion”);8

C

Defendant Hinds County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 80
and # 81] (“Hinds County’s Motion”);9

(...continued)
# 119]. Republican Party filed a Sur-Reply [Doc. # 137], as did Hosemann [Doc.
# 140]. Plaintiffs also briefed some of the issues presented in their Preliminary
Injunction Motion in “bench briefs” submitted before the July 24, 2014 preliminary
injunction hearing [Docs. # 42, # 44, and # 45].
5

Plaintiffs did not specifically move for a preliminary injunction in this case, though
language in Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief suggests that they seek both a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. As the Court stated at the
outset of the hearing on the motion, Plaintiffs’ motion will be deemed a request for
a preliminary injunction.

6

Defendant Republican Party filed a Response [Doc. # 110]. Defendant Hosemann
filed a Response [Docs. # 113 and # 114], containing his own request for summary
judgment. Copiah, Simpson, Rankin, Madison, and Lauderdale Counties join
Hosemann’s Response [Docs. # 126, # 127, # 128, # 129, # 130, # 132, # 135, and
# 136]. Plaintiffs filed a Reply [Doc. # 142].

7

Hosemann’s Response [Doc. # 114], at 2, 35 (noting that the Court should order relief
as it “may find appropriate here,” including entering judgment against Plaintiffs under
Rule 56(f)).

8

Plaintiffs filed an “Omnibus” Response to the County Defendants’ Summary
Judgment Motions [Docs. # 111 and # 112].

9

Plaintiffs filed an “Omnibus” Response to the County Defendants’ Summary
Judgment Motions [Docs. # 111 and # 112].

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C

Defendant Jefferson Davis County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc. # 82] (“Jefferson Davis County’s Motion”);10

C

Defendant Rankin County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 85
and # 86] (“Rankin County’s Motion”);11

C

Defendant Republican Party’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative,
for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 87 and # 88] (“Republican Party’s
Summary Judgment Motion”);12

C

Defendant Lauderdale County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
# 89] (“Lauderdale County’s Motion”);13

C

Defendant Hosemann’s Motion to Strike [Docs. # 116 and # 117].14

C

Defendant Republican Party’s Motion for Sanctions [Doc. # 67]
(“Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion”);15

10

Plaintiffs filed an “Omnibus” Response to the County Defendants’ Summary
Judgment Motions [Docs. # 111 and # 112].

11

Plaintiffs filed an “Omnibus” Response to the County Defendants’ Summary
Judgment Motions [Docs. # 111 and # 112].

12

Plaintiffs filed a Response [Docs. # 120, # 121, # 122., # 123, and # 124], and
Republican Party filed a Reply [Doc. # 141]. The Republican Party seeks either
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit under Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment against
Plaintiffs under Rule 56. The Court treats the Republican Party’s Motion as one for
summary judgment.

13

Lauderdale County filed a Supplement to its Motion [Doc. # 103]. Plaintiffs filed an
“Omnibus” Response to the County Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions [Docs.
# 111 and # 112]. Lauderdale County filed a Reply [Doc. # 144].

14

Lauderdale County joined Hosemann’s Motion to Strike [Docs. # 133 and # 134].
Plaintiffs filed a Response [Doc. # 143]. Hosemann filed a Reply [Doc. # 146].

15

Plaintiffs filed a Response [Doc. # 131], and the Republican Party filed a Reply [Doc.
(continued...)

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7

The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion on July
24, 2014 (the “July 24th Hearing”). Plaintiffs and Defendants presented evidence and
made legal arguments to the Court at that time.16 The parties have furnished
additional evidence in support of their claims, defenses, and motions.17
Having considered all the parties’ briefing, the parties’ oral arguments at the
July 24th Hearing, all evidence of record, and the applicable legal authorities, the
Court grants summary judgment to each of the moving County Defendants and to
Hosemann, grants in part and denies in part the Republican Party’s Summary
Judgment Motion, denies Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment and Preliminary Injunction
Motions, denies the Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion, and denies Defendant
Hosemann’s Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs’ first two claims are dismissed with
prejudice.

15

(...continued)
# 145].

16

See generally Transcript of July 24, 2014 Hearing [Doc. # 50] (“Tr.”).

17

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants filed various post-hearing declarations. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Exhibits [Docs. # 120, # 121, # 122, and # 123];
Exhibits to Hosemann’s Response [Exhs. 1-4 to Doc. # 113]. Plaintiffs filed a Bill
of Particulars [Doc. # 25], providing, at the Court’s request, supplemental information
in support of their Preliminary Injunction and Summary Judgment Motions. Plaintiffs
have also filed additional evidence, specifically, “Incident Reports,” relating to the
Mississippi counties they have sued [Doc. # 49]. Defendants Copiah County and
Lauderdale County have raised objections regarding certain of Plaintiffs’ evidence.
See Copiah County’s Objection to Notice of Filing of Incident Reports [Doc. # 64];
Lauderdale County’s Objection to Notice of Filing of Incident Reports [Doc. # 70].
Plaintiffs filed a Response to Copiah County’s Objection [Doc . # 71]. Plaintiffs also
filed a Response to Lauderdale County’s Objection [Doc. # 72], to which Lauderdale
County replied [Doc. # 100].

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8

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

The Primary and Primary Runoff Elections

On June 3, 2014, Defendant Republican Party conducted a primary election to
determine the party’s candidate for the November 2014 United States Senate election.
The two highest vote-getters in the primary,18 incumbent U.S. Senator Thad Cochran
(“Cochran”) and State Senator Chris McDaniel (“McDaniel”), then participated in a
primary runoff election three weeks later, on June 24, 2014.19 According to the
Republican Party, Cochran was victorious in the runoff election, receiving
approximately 7,600 more votes than McDaniel.20 The Republican Party officially
certified Cochran as the primary winner on July 7, 2014, and submitted that
information to the Mississippi Secretary of State, Defendant Delbert Hosemann.21
McDaniel continues to challenge the outcome of the primary runoff.22
18

Under Mississippi law, “[i]f no candidate receive[s] [a] majority of popular votes in
the first primary, then the two (2) candidates who receive the highest popular vote for
such office shall have their names submitted as such candidates to a second
primary . . .” M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-191.

19

Neither Cochran nor McDaniel is a party to this suit.

20

See Letter from Joe Nosef to Hosemann, dated July 7, 2014, and accompanying
exhibit [Doc. # 12-2].

21

See id.

22

On August 14, 2014, McDaniel filed a lawsuit in Jones County, Mississippi, styled
Chris McDaniel v. Thad Cochran, C.A. No. 2014-76-CV8, challenging the outcome
of the primary runoff election. See Petition for Emergency Hearing in McDaniel v.
Cochran [Doc. # 113-5]; Hosemann’s Response to TRO [Doc. # 93], at 24; see also,
e.g., Geoff Pender, McDaniel challenge could require three more elections, J ACKSON
C L A R I O N - L E D G E R ,
A u g .
2 1 ,
2 0 1 4 ,
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/20/mcdaniel-hearing/14
338425/ (last visited August 29, 2014). That case was dismissed on August 29, 2014,
(continued...)

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9

B.

Plaintiffs’ Allegations and Evidence

True the Vote characterizes itself as a “non-profit organization that works to
protect the integrity of local, state, and federal elections.”23 “True the Vote monitors
elections for compliance with state and federal law and identifies instances of voting
irregularities or possible fraud.”24 True the Vote also “examines official lists of
eligible voters and other voter registration data to verify their accuracy and
currency . . . to protect the integrity of the electoral process and to ensure that
accurate and current voter rolls are maintained by each state.”25 True the Vote’s
President, Catherine Engelbrecht (“Engelbrecht”), testified that, as part of its mission,
the organization trains volunteers to get involved in elections, researches the
country’s voter files to ensure their accuracy, and provides support to individuals
concerned about election integrity in communities.26
In June 2014, True the Vote initiated a campaign to seek “voter records” from
the State of Mississippi.27 The purpose of True the Vote’s initiative was to determine

22

(...continued)
but McDaniel may appeal that decision. See Geoff Pender, Will McDaniel give up?,
J A CK SO N
C LA RION-L ED G E R,
A u g .
2 9 ,
2 0 1 4 ,
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/08/29/mcdaniel-lawsuit-dismissed/
14810485/ (last visited August 29, 2014).

23

First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief [Doc. # 58]
(“Amended Complaint”), ¶ 41.

24

Id.; see also Declaration of Catherine Engelbrecht [Exh. 2 to Doc. # 120]
(“Engelbrecht Decl.”), ¶ 2.

25

Engelbrecht Decl., ¶ 3.

26

Tr. at 25:17-26:12 (Testimony of Catherine Engelbrecht (“Engelbrecht Testimony”)).

27

Amended Complaint, ¶ 43.

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“whether ineligible voters had been allowed to cast ballots in the Mississippi
Republican Primary Runoff Election.”28 Engelbrecht testified that True the Vote
started this initiative after Mississippi voters reached out to the organization about
concerns they had regarding “whether or not their vote would be counted.”29
Engelbrecht first traveled to Mississippi to request records the week prior to
the June 24th runoff election. Specifically, Engelbrecht visited Hinds, Rankin, and
Panola Counties.30 In Hinds and Rankin Counties, Engelbrecht requested absentee
ballot applications and envelopes. Both counties denied her request.31 In Panola
County, Engelbrecht requested a report of individuals who voted in the Republican
Primary held on June 3rd.

Panola County granted her request and provided

Engelbrecht an unredacted list of voters.32 It is unclear exactly what list and what
information about each voter was included on that list.33
After the runoff election, True the Vote assembled a team of roughly twenty
volunteers, organized into ten teams of two, and instructed them to go to various
Mississippi Counties and examine the counties’ voting records from the runoff

28

Id.

29

Tr. at 26:16-22 (Engelbrecht Testimony). Neither Panola County nor its Election
Commission are Defendants in this case.

30

Id., at 27:18-21; Engelbrecht Decl., ¶ 4.

31

Tr. at 27:22-28:19 (Engelbrecht Testimony); Engelbrecht Decl., ¶¶ 5-8.

32

Tr. at 28:20-29:3 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

33

It appears that the list Engelbrecht received was a VR-28 Report. See id., at 28:21-24
(“In Panola, I asked to see the report of Republican voters in the primary, an
electronic version, sort of like the poll book, if you will, without the signatures, but
just the voting record.”).

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election.34 True the Vote gave the volunteers training about the Mississippi election
process prior to the volunteers’ visits.35 True the Vote also provided its volunteers
with a memo from its counsel purporting to describe the Counties’ obligations under
the NVRA,36 blank “incident report” forms,37 a list of documents the volunteers were
supposed to request, and a list of the counties to which each team of volunteers was
assigned.38 True the Vote volunteers canvassed the State in early July 2014,
including on July 7th and 8th.39
The experiences of Ellen Swensen (“Swensen”) and Susan Morse (“Morse”),
two True the Vote volunteers who are not plaintiffs in this lawsuit, are illustrative.40
Swensen and Morse were charged with requesting records from Covington, Leake,
and Jones Counties.41 At each office in these Counties, Swensen and Morse

34

Id., at 41:1-42:4.

35

Id., at 197:14-18 (Testimony of Ellen Swensen (“Swensen Testimony”)).

36

See Memorandum from Eades L. Hogue to Catherine Engelbrecht [Doc. # 106-5] (the
“Hogue Memo”).

37

“Incident Report” forms are internal True the Vote forms that volunteers used to
document incidents they encountered in their search of voter records in the
Mississippi counties. See Tr. at 40:16-25 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

38

Id., at 197:19-198:18 (Swensen Testimony).

39

Id., at 41:3-7 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

40

For purposes of this Memorandum and Order, the Court assumes that document
requests made by True the Vote volunteers were made on behalf of True the Vote, and
thus that True the Vote has standing to assert alleged violations based on the denial
of any such requests.

41

The Election Commissions of Jones and Leake Counties are Defendants in this
lawsuit; the Election Commission of Covington County is not.

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requested electronic files listing everyone who voted in the primary and primary
runoff elections (both Democrat and Republican voters); poll books; and absentee
ballots, ballot envelopes, and applications.42 These requests were denied, for various
reasons specific to each County.43 Swensen and Morse did not expressly state to any
County’s Circuit Clerk that their request was made pursuant to the NVRA.44
Other individuals made similar requests from Mississippi counties. For
example, on June 27, 2014, three days after the runoff, Plaintiff Roy Nicholson
(“Nicholson”) requested copies of poll books from Rankin County, but the County
denied his request.45 Nicholson made a similar request from Hinds County and was
permitted to view unredacted poll books.46 Plaintiff Julie Patrick (“Patrick”), also
after the runoff, similarly requested poll books from Marshall and Tunica Counties,

42

Tr. at 203:6-209:11 (Swensen Testimony); see also, e.g., Jones County Incident
Report [Doc. # 106], at 5; Covington County Incident Report [Doc. # 106-1], at 5.

43

In Covington County, the Circuit Clerk asked Swensen and Morse to put their request
in writing, but told them that she was too busy to deal with their request that day and
that they should come back the following Monday (July 14, 2014). Tr., at 203:6-14,
205:18-23 (Swensen Testimony). Swensen and Morse did not return that Monday.
Id., at 217:8-12. In Leake County, Circuit Clerk Cathy Henderson told Swensen and
Morse that the requested documents would have to be redacted; Swensen told
Henderson that she was not interested in paying for the redactions. Id., at 207:16208:6, 211:19-212:8. In Jones County, Swensen and Morse were told that the Circuit
Clerk was out of the office and that no one else in the office had the authority to grant
their request. Id., at 208:20-209:7.

44

Id., at 221:15-19. In Leake County, however, Swensen gave the Circuit Clerk the
Hogue Memo, which references the NVRA. Id.

45

Id., at 181:7-182:19 (Testimony of Roy Nicholson (“Nicholson Testimony”)).

46

Id., at 186:9-19.

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but was told that she could not review the poll books, even in redacted form.47
Plaintiffs’ evidence indicates that other individuals made similar requests in other
Mississippi Counties, and all were denied access to unredacted poll books or other
records.48
47

Id., at 249:5-252:11, 253:11-254:6 (Testimony of Julie Patrick (“Patrick
Testimony”)). Patrick also reviewed the ballot boxes in Tunica County on behalf of
the McDaniel campaign. See id., at 247:4-9. The Court notes that the Election
Commissions of Marshall and Tunica Counties are not Defendants in this case.

48

See, e.g., Incident Report for Copiah County [Exh. 1 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballot
applications and envelopes and poll books); Incident Report of Yazoo County [Exh.
2 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballots and poll books); Incident Report for Simpson County
[Exh. 8 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballots and poll books); Incident Report for Simpson
County [Exh. 9 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballot applications and envelopes and poll
books); Incident Report for Rankin County [Exh. 12 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballot
information); Incident Report for Rankin County [Exh. 17 to Doc. # 49] (absentee
ballots, poll books, and “electronic files”); Incident Report for Rankin County [Exh.
18 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballot applications and envelopes); Incident Report for
Madison County [Exh. 21 to Doc. # 49] (voter rolls and absentee ballots); Incident
Report for Lauderdale County [Exh. 23 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballots and
envelopes); Incident Report for Jefferson Davis County [Exh. 25 to Doc. # 49]
(absentee ballots, applications, and envelopes and poll books); Incident Report for
Hinds County [Exh. 31 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballots); Incident Report for Hinds
County [Exh. 33 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballots); Incident Report for Hinds County
[Exh. 37 to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballots); Records Request to Hinds County [Exh. 38
to Doc. # 49] (absentee ballot applications and envelopes and poll books).
Copiah County and Lauderdale County object to these incident reports on the grounds
that: (a) the Court never agreed to receive them into evidence; (b) the documents are
hearsay and have no “indicia of reliability”; and (c) Copiah County and Lauderdale
County never had a chance to address the documents at the July 24th Hearing. See
Copiah County’s Objection [Doc. # 64], ¶¶ 2, 3, 5; Lauderdale County’s Objection
[Doc. # 70], ¶¶ 1-3. Hosemann has moved to strike certain of these incident reports
on the basis of hearsay. See Hosemann’s Motion to Strike [Doc. # 117], at 7-17. The
Court clarifies its comments at the end of the July 24th Hearing regarding these
submissions by Plaintiffs. The Court receives these incident reports in evidence for
(continued...)

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C.

Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 9, 2014.49 In their Amended Complaint,
True the Vote seeks a declaratory judgment that it has the right, under the NVRA, to
inspect certain voter records (Count 1).50 Plaintiffs further seek a declaration that the
NVRA preempts Mississippi law and that they are entitled to unredacted copies of
voter records (Count 2, and together with Count 1, the “NVRA claims”).51 The
Individual Plaintiffs also assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contending that their votes were
diluted by “unlawful double voting” in the Republican primary runoff election (Count
3).52 Contemporaneously with their Complaint [Doc. # 1], Plaintiffs filed the pending
Preliminary Injunction Motion, seeking immediate relief on their NVRA claims.

48

(...continued)
the proposition that volunteers visited the Counties designated in the reports and that
the County officials denied their document requests, but does not rely on the
substance of the information in the reports as to what transpired during those visits.
Accordingly, the Court overrules Copiah County and Lauderdale County’s objections
and denies Hosemann’s Motion to Strike to this extent.

49

Some Plaintiffs in this case initially filed an identical lawsuit in the Northern District
of Mississippi on July 1, 2014. See True the Vote v. Hoseman, 3:14-cv-144-M-S
(N.D. Miss., Oxford Division). On July 7, 2014, the district court in that case issued
an Order directing plaintiffs to show cause why the case should not be transferred to
the Southern District of Mississippi. See True the Vote v. Hoseman, __ F. Supp. 2d
__, 2014 WL 3339569, at *5 (N.D. Miss. July 7, 2014). Plaintiffs in that case
voluntarily dismissed that suit the following day, and thereafter filed the pending case.

50

Amended Complaint, ¶ 79.

51

Id., ¶ 86.

52

Id., ¶¶ 87-95.

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In their Preliminary Injunction Motion, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction
preventing Defendants from destroying, tampering with, or permanently redacting
information from the voting records Plaintiffs seek in this case.53 Plaintiffs also seek
an injunction requiring Defendants to make available the requested voter records
“without redaction of birthdates.”54 In a telephone hearing held on July 15, 2014,
counsel for all Defendants that had appeared by that date agreed not to destroy or
alter any requested voter records during the pendency of this lawsuit.55 Defendants
also acknowledged that other applicable law prohibits alteration or tampering with
these records. The first request in Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion is thus
moot. Plaintiffs’ requests for unredacted voter records is the focus of the pending
motions.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction
Motion on July 24, 2014.

Plaintiffs presented live witness testimony and

documentary evidence in support of their Motion. Defendants relied solely on crossexamination of Plaintiffs’ witnesses. The parties also presented oral argument.
Since the hearing, the parties have submitted additional evidence and extensive
briefing. Plaintiffs, five of the County Defendants, Hosemann, and the Republican
Party have moved for summary judgment.

53

Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion [Doc. # 8], ¶ 28.

54

Id., at 11, PRAYER Section, sub. (b).

55

See Hearing Minutes and Order [Doc. # 40], at 2. Only Defendant Yazoo County did
not appear, and still has not.

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II.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Workers Union v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment “should
be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23; Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008).
For summary judgment, the initial burden falls on the movant to identify areas
essential to the non-movant’s claim in which there is an “absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005).
The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the non-movant’s case.
See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). The moving
party may meet its burden by pointing out “‘the absence of evidence supporting the
nonmoving party’s case.’” Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir.
1992)).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond
the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th
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Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). “An issue is material if its resolution could
affect the outcome of the action. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” DIRECT TV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal
citations omitted).
In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the
court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit &
Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-movant’s burden is not
met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non-movant’s pleadings. See
King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that unverified pleadings
do not “constitute competent summary judgment evidence”). Likewise, “conclusory
allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions” do not meet the non-movant’s burden.
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th
Cir. 2008). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific facts which show “the
existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.” Am.
Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 343 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2003)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of any proof, the court
will not assume that the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts. Little,
37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
The Court may make no credibility determinations or weigh any evidence, and
must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required
to believe. See Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing Reaves Brokerage Co., 336 F.3d at 412-413). The Court is not required to
accept the non-movant’s conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated
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assertions which are either entirely unsupported, or supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence. Id. (citing Reaves Brokerage, 336 F.3d at 413). Affidavits cannot preclude
summary judgment unless they contain competent and otherwise admissible evidence.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4); Love v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 776 (5th Cir.
2000).
Finally, “[w]hen evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the
nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary
judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court. Malacara v. Garber,
353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court
a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition
to summary judgment.” See id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiffs, five County Defendants, Hosemann, and the Republican Party seek
summary judgment in this case. The parties’ pending motions primarily seek
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims.56 Through these claims, Plaintiffs
seek a declaration of its right to inspect unredacted versions of certain voter records.57
In this Memorandum and Order, the Court considers only Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims
and not their Equal Protection vote dilution claim.58
56

See Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 69-86.

57

The Court notes that Plaintiffs have standing to assert their NVRA claims because
they allege they suffered an “informational injury” when Defendants denied the
disclosure of records they sought. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 19-26 (1998); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 448-51
(1989); Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 752 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702-04 (E.D.
Va. 2010).

58

Defendant Republican Party also seeks dismissal or summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
(continued...)

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The crux of Plaintiffs’ allegations in their NVRA claims is that, under the
NVRA, they are entitled to unredacted voting records, particularly “poll books.”
Defendants raise a bevy of arguments why they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ claims.59 First, certain Defendants argue that they are not proper parties
to this litigation. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the
notice and cure requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9 prior to bringing this lawsuit,
and the case therefore is statutorily barred. Third, Defendants contend that the NVRA
does not cover the particular documents Plaintiffs seek. Finally, Defendants contend
that the NVRA does not allow Plaintiffs access to unredacted voting records. Thus,
Defendants contend that Mississippi law, which requires Defendants to redact
birthdates before disclosing the documents, does not “directly conflict” with the
58

(...continued)
vote dilution claim. See Republican Party’s Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 88],
at 17-23. No other party has asked the Court to rule on this claim. The Court’s Order
seeking the parties’ position on filing motions for summary judgment was specifically
limited to the NVRA claims. See Order [Doc. # 46], at 1-2 (“Accordingly, the Court
invites the parties to file motions for summary judgment on the NVRA claims to
resolve on the merits Plaintiffs’ claims under that statute.” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim necessarily depends on whether “double
voting” occurred in the primary runoff election and, if so, whether such voting
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The parties have not engaged in discovery on
this issue. The Court accordingly declines to address at this time the Republican
Party’s arguments for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim, and denies the
Republican Party’s Summary Judgment Motion to the extent it seeks disposition of
that claim.

59

Not all named Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ NVRA
claims. Because most of the arguments asserted by the moving Defendants apply
equally to all Defendants, the Court deems these arguments made by all Defendants.
See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted)) (recognizing
that when one defending party establishes that the plaintiff has no cause of action, the
defense generally inures also to the benefit of other similarly situated defendants).

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NVRA and is not preempted by the NVRA under the applicable preemption standard.
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Hosemann’s request for
summary judgment, grants the five County Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, grants in part and denies in part the Republican Party’s Summary Judgment
Motion, and denies Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion. Various reasons, as set
forth below, warrant granting summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiffs’
NVRA claims. Because many issues presented are novel and because time is of the
essence, the Court addresses each ground for summary judgment raised by the parties.
1.

Have Plaintiffs Sued the Proper Defendants?
a.

Is the Republican Party a Proper Defendant?

Defendant Republican Party contends that it is an improper Defendant under
the NVRA. The Republican Party argues that it is not a “State” under the NVRA, and
that only States are subject to the NVRA’s requirements. The Court agrees. The
Fifth Circuit has held that “the NVRA only pertains to records maintained by the
State.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 399 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court
of Appeals concluded that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision did not cover
documents in the possession of volunteer deputy registrars “before they are officially
received or maintained by the State.” Id. Steen dictates the same result in this case.
The Republican Party is not an arm of the State, and the NVRA Public Disclosure
Provision therefore does not apply to it. Indeed, Plaintiffs appear to concede that its
NVRA claims are not directed at the Republican Party.60 Plaintiffs have offered no
evidence that the Republican Party possesses any of the documents at issue in this
60

See Plaintiffs’ Response [Doc. # 124], at 1 (“While the [Republican Party] is not the
target of Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims . . .”). However, in their Response to the
Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion, Plaintiffs maintain that the Republican Party
“is a proper defendant to Counts I and II.” Plaintiffs’ Response [Doc. # 131], ¶ 17.

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case61 or that True the Vote or any another individual requested documents from the
Republican Party other than absentee ballot applications and envelopes.62
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Republican Party is proper on
Plaintiffs’ two NVRA claims.63
b.

Are the County Defendants Proper Defendants?

In this case, Plaintiffs sue the Election Commissions of nine Mississippi
Counties (collectively, the “County Defendants”). The County Defendants contend
that they are not proper parties and seek dismissal on that basis.
i.

Mississippi’s Registration and Election Oversight
Structure and Procedure

Under Mississippi law, various individuals and entities oversee voter
registration and elections. Indeed, both Federal and Mississippi law contemplate that
voter registration activities will be conducted at the State and local (e.g., County)
levels.64 Mississippi has created an intricate system for voter registration, updating
61

Plaintiffs contend that the Republican Party, “at least at one point,” had control of the
documents they requested from Defendants. Plaintiffs’ Response [Doc. # 124], at 8.
There is no genuine issue of material fact, however, that Republican Party did not
have the documents at the time Plaintiffs’ filed this lawsuit and do not now have the
documents.

62

See Republican Party’s Response [Doc. # 110], at 1-2 (conceding that Plaintiffs
requested absentee ballot applications and envelopes from Republican Party).

63

Because the Court does not address in this Memorandum and Order Plaintiffs’ third
count (i.e., the Equal Protection vote dilution claim), it does not reach whether the
Republican Party is a proper party for purposes of that claim.

64

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a)(2) (noting that “it is the duty of the Federal, State,
and local governments to promote the exercise of” the right to vote); id., § 1973gg(b)
(stating that the NVRA was designed “to make it possible for Federal, State, and local
governments to implement this subchapter . . .”); M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-33 (detailing
(continued...)

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of voter eligibility lists, and management of election ballots, ballot applications, and
ballot boxes, all designed to preserve the integrity of the registration and electoral
processes.
At the top of the Mississippi Equal Protection administration pyramid sits the
State Board of Election Commissioners, which is comprised of “the Governor,
Secretary of State and the Attorney General.”65 The Secretary of State also serves as
Mississippi’s “chief election officer.”66 As the State’s chief election officer, the
Secretary of State must coordinate all State responsibilities under the NVRA.67 The
Office of the Secretary of State is responsible for implementing and maintaining the
Statewide Elections Management System (“SEMS”), “a centralized database of all
registered voters in the [S]tate.”68 Finally, the Secretary of State is authorized to
collect data concerning voter participation in elections and to develop a program to
train poll workers and Circuit Clerks.69
In each county, the Clerk of the Circuit Court serves as the “Registrar.”70 The

64

(...continued)
Registrar’s responsibilities regarding registering electors to vote); id., § 23-15-41
(same); id., § 23-15-165 (detailing particular responsibilities of Secretary of State).

65

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-211(1)(a).

66

Id., § 23-15-211.1(1).

67

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-8.

68

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-165(1).

69

Id., §§ 23-15-211(6), 23-15-211(7), 23-15-211.1(2).

70

Id., §§ 23-15-35(1), 23-15-211(1)(c), 23-15-223.

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Registrar serves a four-year term of office.71 The Registrar is primarily responsible
for registering citizens to vote.72
Each County must also elect a board of five Election Commissioners (the
“Election Commission”).73 Election Commissioners serve four-year terms.74 The
Election Commission internally selects a chairman and a secretary.75 The Registrar
is not a member of the County Election Commission.76

County Election

Commissions are responsible for overseeing and running elections. The Chairman
of a County’s Election Commission is charged with printing and distributing the
ballots for “each general or special election.”77 The Election Commission as a whole
must “canvass the returns, give certificates of election, and make report to the
Secretary of State.”78
County Executive Committees oversee primary elections.79 Each political party

71

Id., § 23-15-223.

72

Id., §§ 23-15-33, 23-15-35(2). Mississippi statutes often refer to citizens entitled to
vote as “electors.” See, e.g., id., § 23-15-33.

73

Id., § 23-15-211.

74

Id., § 23-15-213.

75

Id.

76

See id., § 23-15-211(1) (distinguishing between the Election Commission and the
Registrar); see also id., § 23-15-161 (stating that the “registrar shall attend the
meetings of the commissioners . . . and shall render them all needed assistance of
which he is capable . . .”).

77

Id., § 23-15-213.

78

Id., § 23-15-215.

79

See id., § 23-15-263(1).

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has its own Executive Committee for each County.80 County Executive Committees
“shall perform all duties that relate to the qualification of candidates for primary
elections, print ballots for primary elections, appoint the primary election officers,
resolve contests in regard to primary elections, and perform all other duties required
by law to be performed by the county executive committee.”81 After a primary is
held, the County Executive Committee meets to “receive and canvass the returns” and
to “declare the result” for that County.82 A County Executive Committee may
authorize the Circuit Clerk or County Election Commission to perform primary
election-related duties.83
County Registrars and Election Commissions act in concert with respect to
ballots received before and during an election. Election Commissions are responsible

80

See id., § 23-15-1053 (“[T]he state executive committee of each political party shall
determine the method and procedures by which county executive committees and the
state executive committee are selected.”); § 23-15-1054(1) (“If there be any political
party, or parties, in any county which shall not have a party executive committee for
such county, such political party, or parties, shall within thirty (3) days of the date for
which a candidate for county office is required to qualify in such county, select
qualified electors of that county and of that party’s political faith to serve on a
temporary county executive committee until members of a county executive
committee are elected at the next regular election for executive committees.”). The
State Executive Committee may temporarily serve as a County Executive Committee
in the case that no County Executive Committee can be formed. Id., § 23-15-1054(2).

81

Id.; see also id., § 23-15-265 (“The county executive committee of each county shall
meet not less than two (2) weeks before the date of any primary election and appoint
the managers and clerks for same . . .”).

82

Id., § 23-15-597(1).

83

See id., §§ 23-15-265(2)(a), 23-15-267(4)(a).

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for procuring ballot boxes for use at all general elections.84 These ballot boxes are
also used at primary elections, and County Executive Committees are responsible for
distributing the boxes before a primary election.85 Registrars receive absentee ballots
and deposit them into ballot boxes.86 The Registrar is responsible, after the votes in
an election have been counted, for preserving “all applications, envelopes and the list
of absent voters along with the ballots and other election materials.”87 After an
election, “the ballot boxes shall be delivered . . . to the clerk of the circuit court of the
county for preservation; and he shall keep them for future use, and, when called for,
deliver them to the commissioners of election.”88
ii.

Analysis

Copiah County, Jefferson Davis County, and Lauderdale County contend that
they are not proper parties to this lawsuit because Plaintiffs asked only their
respective Circuit Clerks, and not the County Election Commissions (i.e., the County

84

Id., § 23-15-247.

85

Id., § 23-15-267(1).

86

Id., § 23-15-637.

87

Id., § 23-15-645.

88

Id., § 23-15-247; see also id., § 23-15-267(3) (“After each election, the ballot boxes
of those provided by the regular commissioner of election shall be delivered . . .
without delay to the clerk of the circuit court of the county.”); id., § 23-15-911
(“When the returns for a box and the contents of the ballot box and the conduct of the
election thereat have been canvassed and reviewed by the county Election
Commission in the case of general elections or the county executive committee in the
case of primary elections, all the contents of the box required to be placed and sealed
in the ballot box by the managers shall be replaced therein by the election commission
or executive committee, as the case may be, and the box shall be forthwith resealed
and delivered to the circuit clerk, who shall safely keep and secure the same against
any tampering therewith.”).

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Defendants), for specified documents.89 In other words, these County Defendants
contend that there is no possibility that they violated the NVRA because there is no
evidence that they were asked for NVRA documents.
While these County Defendants appear to be correct factually, their dismissal
from this suit on this basis is not warranted. First, each County Circuit Clerk and
Election Commission has access to certain voter election records at different times
during the pre-election registration, election day voting, and post-election tabulation
processes. Plaintiffs’ requests for documents appear to have spanned periods when
the materials were in the custody of different election oversight entities, and the
actual custodians for any given County are unclear. Summary judgment in favor of
these County Defendants on this basis is not warranted.
Further, the Counties implement Federal and State voter registration and
election laws through the coordinated work of the Circuit Clerks, Registrars, and
Election Commissions. If relief were granted to Plaintiffs, various entities and
officials would need to implement the ruling. The Counties, through one or more of
these election-related entities and individuals, are therefore necessary parties in this
action, and dismissal of the County Defendants is unwarranted.90 See FED. R. CIV. P.
19(a)(1)(A) (requiring joinder of any person without whom “the court cannot accord
complete relief among the existing parties”); Cornhill Insurance PLC v. Valsamis,
Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 69 (1997).

89

Though other County Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on this
basis, this argument applies equally to all County Defendants, because Plaintiffs’
evidence generally indicates that document requests were made to County Circuit
Clerks, not County Election Commissions. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 768.

90

The Court does not decide whether County Election Commissions would be proper
parties if sued under the NVRA on a different set of facts.

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Defendant Hinds County asserts a different argument as to why it is an
improper defendant. According to Hinds County, the NVRA Public Disclosure
Provision applies only to State election officials, not County Election Commissions,
because the provision specifically refers to States.91 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)
(“Each State shall maintain . . .”). While State election officials are certainly
responsible for enforcing Federal laws relating to elections, the Counties also must
comply with these statutes, including the NVRA’s voter registration provisions and
other rules and procedures dictated by the statute. Other courts confronted with
NVRA lawsuits have likewise recognized that Counties or County officials were
proper parties to the suit. See generally Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc., 682 F.3d
331 (4th Cir. 2012) (city registrar sued as defendant); Steen, 732 F.3d at 399-400
(rejecting application of NVRA to “volunteer deputy registrars,” and noting that the
NVRA “pertains to records maintained by the State,” including the counties, such as
was the case in Project Vote). Accordingly, the Court denies Hinds County’s Motion
on this basis.92
c.

Is Hosemann a Proper Defendant?

Hosemann also contends that he is an improper party because “[he] does not
have any documents [P]laintiffs claim to have requested from local Circuit Clerks,

91

See Hinds County’s Motion [Doc. # 81], at 14.

92

The Court is unpersuaded by Hinds County’s argument relying on McLaughlin v. City
of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Miss. 1995), that only “State officials” like the
Governor and Attorney General are proper parties. That case involved the question
whether the defendants were proper defendants for alleged constitutional violations,
in light of the sovereign immunity and Ex Parte Young doctrines. No claims were
asserted under the NVRA.

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and [P]laintiffs have never directed any NVRA requests to him.”93 While Hosemann
concedes that he is Mississippi’s “chief election official,” he argues that he neither
has the “authority or duty” to enforce the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision, nor the
authority to compel local County Clerks to disclose documents.94
The Court concludes that Hosemann is a proper Defendant in this case. The
Public Disclosure Provision places the burden on “[e]ach State” to maintain records
and make them available for inspection. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1) (emphasis
added). The responsibility to ensure disclosure of required records thus ultimately
falls on the State itself, and Hosemann as its chief election official. To the extent a
State delegates record-maintenance and disclosure duties to local governments, the
State nevertheless remains responsible if documents are not properly disclosed under
the Public Disclosure Provision. See United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 849
(8th Cir. 2008) (“For example, Congress expressly used the term ‘ensure’ for the
requirement that ‘the identity of the voter registration agency through which any
particular voter is registered is not disclosed to the public. Missouri is directly
responsible for ensuring this identity remains undisclosed, and if Missouri delegated
this responsibility, it could not avoid liability for any failure to maintain such
nondisclosure.”); Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“Congress grafted the NVRA onto the existing public assistance structure, under
which the fifty states, not their political subdivisions, have the ultimate
accountability . . . [T]he Secretary, as Ohio’s chief election officer, is responsible for

93

Hosemann’s Response [Doc. # 114], at 33.

94

Id.

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“harmonious combination”—or implementation and enforcement—of that program
on behalf of Ohio.”). Accordingly, Hosemann is a proper party in this lawsuit.95
2.

Does Section 1973gg-9 Pose a Procedural Bar to Plaintiffs’
Suit?

The NVRA creates a private right of action for individuals whose rights under
the statute are violated. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b). The NVRA, however, requires
claimants to take certain steps before filing an action. First, “a person who is
aggrieved by a violation of this subchapter may provide written notice of the violation
to the chief election official of the State involved.” Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(1). Second,
an aggrieved person must wait 90 days after the State officer’s receipt of notice (or
wait 20 days if the violation occurred within 120 days before an election), and, if the
violation is not corrected, the person may then bring a civil action in federal court.
Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(2). If, however, “the violation occurred within 30 days before the
date of an election for Federal office,” the aggrieved person does not have to provide
notice to the State’s chief election official, and thus does not have to wait 90 days,
before filing a lawsuit. Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(3).
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the notice requirements of
Section 1973gg-9(b), and that this case therefore should be dismissed. The Court
agrees in substantial part. Plaintiffs complain that Defendants violated the NVRA by
failing to provide them documents in accordance with the statute’s Public Disclosure
Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). Plaintiffs requested the vast majority of these
documents after the June 24, 2014 Republican primary runoff election. Testimony
elicited at the July 24th Hearing and evidence Plaintiffs later submitted show that

95

The Court also notes that the Virginia Secretary of Elections, its chief election
official, was a defendant in Project Vote.

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Plaintiffs’ document requests occurred largely on or about July 7 and 8, 2014.96
Because these alleged violations occurred after—and not within 30 days before—the
primary runoff election, the NVRA required Plaintiffs to provide notice of these
violations to the Mississippi Secretary of State and to give the State 90 days to correct
any violations before filing suit.
Engelbrecht, the President of True the Vote,97 on the other hand testified that
she made document requests in Panola, Hinds, and Rankin Counties prior to the
election. In Panola County, Engelbrecht requested a report of individuals who voted
in the June 3, 2014 Republican primary.98 Because Panola County granted that
request, there was no NVRA violation. In Hinds and Rankin Counties, Engelbrecht
requested absentee ballot applications and envelopes a few business days before the
primary runoff election, and both Counties denied her request.99 Because these
alleged violations of the NVRA occurred within 30 days prior to the election, True
the Vote was not required to provide pre-suit notice to the State. Thus, Plaintiffs’
NVRA claims are statutorily barred under Section 1973gg-9(b) except to the extent
that Plaintiff True the Vote sues Defendants Hinds County and Rankin County
seeking disclosure of absentee ballot applications and envelopes.100

96

See, e.g., Tr. at 41:1-11 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

97

For purposes of this Memorandum and Order, the Court assumes that Engelbrecht
requested documents from Panola, Hinds, and Rankin Counties as a representative of
True the Vote. See Engelbrecht Decl., ¶ 4.

98

Tr., at 28:20-29:3 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

99

Id., at 27:22-28:19 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

100

As the Court details below, see infra Part II.B.4.b.iii, absentee ballot applications and
envelopes are not subject to disclosure under the Public Disclosure Provision.

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Plaintiffs offer four reasons why Section 1973gg-9(b)(2) does not bar their suit.
None of these contentions is persuasive. First, Plaintiffs argue that under Section
1973gg-9(b)(3), notice need not be given for any violation that occurs “within 30
days of” a Federal election, and the violations in this case occurred within 30 days
“of” the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election.101 To the extent Plaintiffs urge that
violations that occur within thirty-days after an election are exempt from notice, the
contention is belied by the plain language of the statute. Section 1973gg-9(c)
specifically limits this exemption to violations that occur “within 30 days before the
date of an election.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c) (emphasis added). Violations that
occur after an election must be addressed through the statute’s notice and opportunity
to cure provisions.
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that no notice was necessary for any of their
requests because all of the violations in this case occurred within 30 days prior to the
election, Plaintiffs’ own evidence defeats their argument. Only Engelbrecht, on
behalf of True the Vote, made any document request prior to the primary runoff
election. The pre-election requests that were denied were in Hinds and Rankin
Counties and pertained only to absentee ballot applications and envelopes.102 All
other requests were made, and the alleged violations at issue occurred, after the June
24, 2014 primary runoff election. Thus, True the Vote has authority to sue Hinds and
Rankin Counties for these alleged NVRA violations without satisfying the NVRA
notice and cure requirements. However, True the Vote and the other Plaintiffs did not
meet the notice requirements regarding any of the other alleged violations.

101

Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 12.

102

As noted above, Panola County gave Engelbrecht the lists of voters she requested, and
thus no claim exists regarding that County.

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Second, Plaintiffs argue that Section 1973gg-9(b)(2) is not jurisdictional; they
contend the requirements are simply “a practical guide for enabling states in violation
of the NVRA to correct the violation.”103 Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Section 1973gg9(b)(2) is unpersuasive. Although the notice provision uses the term “may,” the
context of this provision establishes that pre-suit notice is mandatory. See Broyles
v. Texas, 618 F. Supp. 2d 661, 691-92 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (Rosenthal, J.), aff’d on other
grounds 381 F. App’x 370 (5th Cir. 2010).104

The provision’s requirements,

including the requirement to wait 90 days before bringing suit, would otherwise serve
no purpose and make no sense. Reading the statute otherwise would render those
requirements nugatory. See National Council of La Raza v. Miller, 914 F. Supp. 2d
1201, 1208-13 (D. Nev. 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under NVRA for failure
to comply with statute’s notice requirements); Broyles, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92
(same).
Third, Plaintiffs argue that even if the NVRA’s notice requirements are
normally a bar to relief, notice was not required in this case because “the act would
be futile” given that the State “openly and plainly refuses to comply with the
NVRA.”105 The Sixth Circuit endorsed a similar view on the facts before it. See
Ass’n of Community Organizers for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 838 (6th
103

Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 13.

104

See also S. R EP. 103-6, at 21 (1993) (“Private civil enforcement should be designed
to assure and to encourage, to the fullest extent possible, the cooperation of local and
State election officials responsible for implementation of the voter registration
programs. An essential element of an effective civil enforcement program is a
requirement for notice of any complaint regarding its implementation to the
appropriate election officials together with a process for its administrative resolution
before legal action may be commenced.”).

105

Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 13.

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Cir. 1997). The Miller Court noted that the “purpose of the notice requirement” was
“to provide states in violation of the [NVRA] an opportunity to attempt compliance
before facing litigation.” Id. The Court of Appeals held that because Michigan had
“received actual notice” of the plaintiffs’ complaints and made clear its refusal to
comply with the NVRA, requiring the plaintiffs to file individual notice would
amount “to requiring performance of futile acts.” Id.106
Miller is factually inapposite and its reasoning is thus unpersuasive in this case.
In Miller, the defendants asserted that the NVRA violated the 10th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and refused to enforce the statute at all. See id. at 835. In the case
at bar, there is no wholesale refusal by Mississippi or the County Defendants to
comply with the NVRA. Rather, the parties’ positions differ on the scope of a single
section of the law, the Public Disclosure Provision. Also, the timing of Plaintiffs’
demands for inspection and copying of documents distinguishes Miller. Plaintiffs
filed suit only one or two days after making the vast majority of document requests
at issue. The requests here were made to several Counties directly, not to the State,
and were made shortly after the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election. The Secretary
of State denied receiving any NVRA requests or written notice of alleged violations
prior to commencement of this suit.107 Had Plaintiffs provided the Secretary of State
106

Plaintiffs also rely on Condon v. Reno, another case where a State refused to enforce
the NVRA. See Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 960 (D.S.C. 1995) (“[H]ere the
State of South Carolina has made it plain that it refuses to comply [with the NVRA],
so the purpose of the [Section 1973gg-9(b)] is fulfilled.”).

107

See Tr. at 104:11-14 (Testimony of Kim Turner (“Turner”), Assistant Secretary of
State (“Turner Testimony”)) (“I am aware, through secondhand knowledge, that
public records requests were made by people affiliated with True the Vote but not
necessarily that they were made through the National Voter Registration Act.”); id.,
at 105:17-22 (“Q: Do you think True the Vote made a request under state law or
(continued...)

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written notice of exactly what materials they sought and their claims of NVRA
violations, the parties may well have worked out an expeditious solution that would
have prevented this litigation. See Ga. State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Kemp, 841
F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“The apparent purpose of the notice
provision is to allow those violating the NVRA the opportunity to attempt compliance
with its mandates before facing litigation.”). For example, Defendants could have
provided Plaintiffs the age of each voter for whom information was requested, which
may have obviated much of the need for Plaintiffs to obtain the exact birthdate of
each voter.108
Fourth, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Engelbrecht’s pre-election request to
certain counties is sufficient to clear the statutory hurdle for the rest of the requests
at issue.109 The Court disagrees. The NVRA’s notice provision provides that if a
violation is not corrected within 90 days, “an aggrieved person may bring a civil
action in an appropriate district court for declaratory or injunctive relief with respect
to the violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, the
statute contemplates that an aggrieved person will file a complaint with the chief
election official of a State, and, if the violation is not corrected, will file a lawsuit
relating to the particular violation about which the plaintiff provided notice. Section
107

(...continued)
federal law? A: Again, the State of Mississippi has seen no request. Our office
received no request. Information I received is secondhand from circuit clerks’ offices
or other sources of information.”).

108

See Declaration of Madalan Lennep [Doc. # 113-2] (“Lennep Decl.”), ¶ 15 (stating
that SEMS is “designed to calculate and report a voter’s age in years without
disclosing a voter’s actual date of birth.”).

109

See Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 13 (“Not all Plaintiffs need
have requested the records in order to maintain an action under the NVRA.”).

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1973gg-9(b)(3), as noted, waives notice where a violation occurs within 30 days
before an election, and allows an aggrieved person to immediately file a civil action
“under paragraph (2).” Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(3) (cross-referencing subsection 9(b)(2)).
Under the plain statutory language, Engelbrecht may sue to enforce only the alleged
NVRA violations she experienced prior to the primary runoff election. True the Vote
and the Individual Plaintiffs present no statutory basis authorizing them to bootstrap
alleged post-election NVRA violations onto the alleged pre-election violations.110
Accordingly, Section 1973gg-9(b)(2) is a procedural bar to the majority of
Plaintiffs’ claims in this lawsuit. On this basis alone, summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants is proper on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims except with respect to True the
Vote’s claim that Hinds and Rankin Counties violated the NVRA by failing to
disclose absentee ballot applications and envelopes pursuant to the NVRA Public
Disclosure Provision.111
110

Plaintiffs rely on National Coalition for Students with Disabilities Education and
Legal Defense Fund v. Scales, 150 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2001), to support this
“bootstrapping” argument. Scales is inapposite. In Scales, an advocacy group sought
a declaratory judgment that a state university’s voter registration procedures failed to
comply with the NVRA. Id. at 847-48. On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court
concluded that because plaintiff alleged that certain of the advocacy group’s clients
had sought services from the university within 30 days before the election, its
allegations were sufficient to state a claim that no “notice and cure” was required. Id.
at 851-52. But the plaintiff in Scales sought one form of relief—compelling the
university to change its practices vis-a-vis disabled students—which it had standing
to do as long as one of its clients was injured within 30 days before the election.
Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs seek relief on a range of different sources and types of
documents, each of which must be considered independently with regard to Section
1973gg-9’s procedural bar.

111

Lauderdale County contends that Plaintiffs failed to comply with certain procedural
requirements concerning public records requests under Mississippi’s Public Records
Act. See Lauderdale County’s Motion [Doc. # 89], ¶ 15. Because Plaintiffs seek
(continued...)

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3.

What Documents Do Plaintiffs Seek?

The Court next addresses the question of what documents Plaintiffs seek.
Plaintiffs’ various pleadings, briefs, and statements at the July 24th Hearing have
painted varying pictures. In their pleadings, Plaintiffs seek an injunction barring
Defendants from redacting information in “voter registration applications, absentee
voting envelopes, absentee ballots and any other associated applications therewith,
voter rolls, voter poll books, and federal post card applications.”112 In various other
places, Plaintiffs request disclosure of only a more limited set of documents. For
example, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs request a declaration that the NVRA preempts
Mississippi law “regarding the redaction of information from voter rolls and the costs
of the same.”113 Elsewhere, Plaintiffs focus on “poll books,” which they term “the
records at issue in this case.”114 At the July 24th Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel
repeatedly restricted Plaintiffs’ requests to unredacted voter rolls, poll books,
absentee ballot applications and envelopes, and “overseas applications to vote”
(presumably, Federal Post Card Applications).115 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ witnesses at
111

(...continued)
records pursuant to the NVRA, and not the Mississippi Public Records Act, those
procedural requirements are inapplicable.

112

Complaint, at 20, PRAYER Section, sub. (d); Amended Complaint, at 26, PRAYER
Section, sub. (d); see also Complaint, ¶¶ 62, 76; Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 79, 86;
Preliminary Injunction Motion, ¶ 28 & PRAYER Section, sub. (a).

113

Complaint, ¶ 69 (emphasis added); see also id., PRAYER Section, sub. (b).

114

Preliminary Injunction Motion, ¶ 12; see also generally Bench Brief on the
Application of the NVRA to Pollbooks [Doc. # 42] (focusing on whether Plaintiffs
are entitled to unredacted poll books under the NVRA).

115

See Tr. at 266:23-267:15; 268:6-10 (Argument by Joseph Nixon, counsel for Plaintiffs
(continued...)

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the hearing testified that they requested only a limited set of documents from the
various Counties, namely, poll books and absentee ballot applications and
envelopes.116 Finally, and notably. in moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs did
not brief or present evidence on the applicability of the NVRA to voter registration
applications. Plaintiffs limited their submission to the documents enumerated at the
July 24th Hearing, i.e., “voter rolls, pollbooks, federal post card applications and
absentee ballot applications and envelopes.”117
The Court accordingly deems Plaintiffs to have abandoned claims for
disclosure of documents not enumerated at the July 24th Hearing or in their briefing,
such as voter registration applications. The Court addresses Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims
with respect to voter rolls, poll books, absentee ballot applications and envelopes, and
Federal Post Card Applications (collectively, the “Requested Documents”).

115

(...continued)
(“Nixon Argument”)).

116

See id., at 27:23-28:24 (Engelbrecht Testimony) (testifying that she requested
absentee ballot applications and envelopes from Hinds and Rankin Counties and a list
of people who voted in the June 3rd Republican Primary from Panola County); id., at
169:19-23 (Testimony of Phil Harding (“Harding Testimony”)) (testifying that he
requested “absentee ballot materials, the envelopes and applications” from Harrison
County); id., at 181:7-11 (Nicholson Testimony) (testifying that he requested poll
books from Rankin County); id., at 203:17-204:1, 207:17-18 (Swensen Testimony)
(testifying that she requested from Covington, Leake, and Jones Counties lists of
everyone who voted in the various primary and primary runoff elections, poll books,
and absentee ballot envelopes, applications, and request forms); id., at 249:5-251:25,
253:11-254:6 (Patrick Testimony) (testifying that she requested poll books and ballot
boxes from Marshall and Tunica Counties).

117

See Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 14-22, 28-29.

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4.

Are Plaintiffs Entitled Under the NVRA to Inspect the
Requested Documents?

The Court next addresses the merits of Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims. Central is the
question whether the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i),118
applies to the Requested Documents. The Court turns to that question.
a.

Statutory Construction
i.

Plain Meaning – Overall Principles

“[T]he starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681
(5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409
(1993)); see also United States v. Renda, 709 F.3d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 2013). In
interpreting a statute, a Court should look to “the particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Renda, 709 F.3d
at 481 (quoting Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Courts should “give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning, absent an indication Congress intended them to bear some different import.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000).
The Public Disclosure Provision provides:
(1)

118

Each State shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make
available for public inspection and, where available,
photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the
implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of
eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a
declination to register to vote or to the identity of a voter

Other courts have referred to the Public Disclosure Provision as “Section 8(i),” a
reference to the provision’s place in the enacted law. See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at
334-36.

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registration agency through which any particular voter is
registered.
(2)

The records maintained pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include
lists of the names and addresses of all persons to whom notices
described in subsection (d)(2) of this section are sent, and
information concerning whether or not each such person has
responded to the notice as of the date that inspection of the
records is made.

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). As the Fourth Circuit aptly stated, the language of the
Public Disclosure Provision “embodies Congress’s conviction that Americans who
are eligible under law to vote have every right to exercise their franchise, a right that
must not be sacrificed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.”
Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 334-35.
The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision requires States to permit inspection
and copying (i.e., disclosure) of “all records” that: (1) concern the implementation of
a program or activity; (2) that is conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy
and currency; (3) of official lists of eligible voters.
First, the term “all records,” as the Fourth Circuit has observed, has an
“expansive meaning,” and encompasses a variety of voter registration and removal
documents. See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 336. To be within this disclosure
provision, a record must “concern the implementation of programs and activities.”
The word “concern” is a broad term meaning “to relate or refer to.”119

119

To

W EBSTER’S T HIRD N EW INTERNATIONAL D ICTIONARY OF THE E NGLISH L ANGUAGE
(“W EBSTER’S”) 470 (2002); see also T HE R ANDOM H OUSE D ICTIONARY OF THE
E NGLISH L ANGUAGE (“R ANDOM H OUSE”) 304 (1966) (“to relate to” or “be connected
with”).

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“implement” means to “fulfill” or “carry out.”120 A “program” is “a schedule or
system under which action may be taken towards a desired goal”121 and an “activity”
is “a specific deed, action, function, or sphere or action.”122 Thus, records disclosable
under the Public Disclosure Provision must relate to specific plans, functions, or
actions carried out for the purposes of ensuring official lists of eligible voters are
“accurate” and “current.”123
A list of voters is “accurate” if it is “free from error or defect”124 and it is

120

R ANDOM H OUSE, at 715; see also W EBSTER’S, at 1134 (same).

121

W EBSTER’S, at 1812; see also R ANDOM H OUSE, at 1149 (“a plan or schedule to be
followed”). Elsewhere in the statute, the NVRA uses the term “program” in a similar
manner. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(4) (“[Each state shall] conduct a general
program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from
the official lists of eligible voters . . .”); id., § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) (“A State shall
complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for
Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the
names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.”).

122

R ANDOM H OUSE, at 15; see also W EBSTER’S, at 22 (“an occupation, pursuit, or
recreation in which a person is active”).

123

See generally Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 335 (“[T]he process of reviewing voter
registration activities is a ‘program’ and ‘activity’ . . . . This process of review is a
‘program’ because it is carried out in the service of a specified end—maintenance of
voter rolls—and it is an ‘activity’ because it is a particular task and deed of Virginia
election employees.”); Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (“[R]ecords which relate
to carrying out voter registration activities are subject to the Public Disclosure
Provision’s requirements.”).

124

R ANDOM H OUSE, at 19; see also W EBSTER’S, at 14 (“free from error or mistake
especially as the result of care”); id. at 13 (defining “accuracy” as “the quality, state,
or degree of being accurate”).

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“current” if it is “most recent.”125 Thus, “a program or activity covered by the Public
Disclosure Provision is one conducted to ensure that the state is keeping a ‘most
recent’ and errorless account” of voter lists. Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d 697, 706
(E.D. Va. 2010).
Further, the records must relate to “official lists of eligible voters.” A list is
“official” if it is “authorized or issued authoritatively.”126 A voter is “eligible” if she
is “fit or proper to be chosen.”127 Put simply, an “official list of eligible voters” is an
authoritative list of those individuals in a State that are “qualified or entitled to vote.”
Id.
Thus, to be subject to disclosure under the NVRA, a record must ultimately
concern activities geared towards ensuring that a State’s official list of voters is
errorless and up-to-date. These activities generally relate to voter registration and
removal, the processes by which a State updates its lists to ensure they reflect all
eligible voters. The Court must consider each component phrase or term of the Public
Disclosure Provision in interpreting and applying the statute.
ii.

Statutory Context of the Public Disclosure
Provision within the NVRA

The Court must ensure that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision is
interpreted in light of the surrounding statutory provisions. The Public Disclosure
Provision appears near the end of a detailed statute relating to voter registration and

125

R ANDOM H OUSE, at 355; see also W EBSTER’S, at 557 (same).

126

R ANDOM H OUSE, at 1000; see also W EBSTER’S, at 1567 (“made or communicated by
virtue of authority”).

127

R ANDOM H OUSE, at 463; see also W EBSTER’S, at 736 (“fitted or qualified to be chosen
or used”).

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removal of ineligible voters from eligibility lists. The NVRA, as its title indicates,
focuses on voter registration and removal, not on who voted in specific elections.
Multiple provisions in the NVRA reflect this focus. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg2(a) (“[I]n addition to any other method of voter registration provided for under State
law, each State shall establish procedures to register to vote in elections for Federal
office . . .”); id., § 1973gg-3(a) (“Each State motor vehicle’s license application . . .
shall serve as an application for voter registration with respect to elections for Federal
office . . .”); id., § 1973gg-5 (detailing what shall serve as a “voter registration
agency” and what services should be provided by those agencies); id., § 1973gg-6(b)
(“Any state program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by
ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for
elections for Federal office . . .”). The NVRA, by its terms and structure, is designed
to ensure that eligible applicants in fact are registered and that ineligible registrants
are removed from the States’ official voter lists. These features advance the NVRA’s
goal of safeguarding the integrity of those eligibility lists. No provision of the NVRA
governs the actions of States, Counties, or individuals in administering elections.
iii.

Statutory Purpose of the NVRA

The Court may also look to the purposes of a statute to construe its meaning.
See U.S. ex re. Babalola v. Sharma, 746 F.3d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2014) (“This Court
looks at the language of the statute as well as the design, object and policy in
determining the plain meaning of a statute.”). In passing the NVRA, Congress found
that:
(1)

the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental
right;

(2)

it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to
promote the exercise of that right; and

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(3)

discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can
have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in
elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter
participation by various groups, including racial minorities.

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a). Accordingly, Congress enacted the NVRA:
(1)

to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible
citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office;

(2)

to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to
implement this subchapter in a manner that enhances the
participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal
office;

(3)

to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and

(4)

to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are
maintained.

Id., § 1973gg(b). Furthermore, in considering the NVRA, the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration stressed that the law was meant to combat a trend of
“declining numbers of voters who participate in Federal elections,” a contributing
factor to which was “difficulties encountered by some who desire to register to
vote.”128 The legislative record is replete with statements from Congressional
Committees and Members of Congress stressing that law targeted voter registration.129

128

S. R EP. 103-6, at 2 (1993). The Court does not rely primarily on the NVRA’s
legislative history in ascertaining its meaning. Rather, the Court cites here to the
NVRA’s legislative history for the purposes of reinforcing the Court’s understanding
of the statute’s plain meaning and clear policy objectives.

129

See, e.g., id. (“While there may be no conclusive proof that an increase in the voter
rolls will automatically or necessarily result in an increase in voter turnout, it is
undisputable that it will increase the number of persons eligible to vote.”); id., at 3
(“This legislation will provide uniform national voter registration procedures for
(continued...)

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Thus, Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the NVRA concerned voter registration,
not who voted in a particular election.
The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision is one means of ensuring compliance
with the NVRA’s stated goals. By opening up voter registration records for
inspection, the Public Disclosure Provision shines a light on States’ voter registration
activities and practices. The Public Disclosure Provision thus helps “to ensure that
accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b);
see also Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 710 (“[I]t is evident that the last identified
purpose of the statute is dependent upon, and is the culmination of, the fulfillment of
the other purposes of the statute. Those other purposes clearly point toward
increasing voter registration and ensuring that the right to vote is not disrupted by
illegal and improper impediments . . .”). Congress did not express the purpose of
regulating States’ supervision of individual elections, or enacting procedures to
ensure the integrity of a particular round of balloting per se. The NVRA was not
designed as a tool to root out voter fraud, “cross-over voting,” or any other illegal or
allegedly illegal activity associated with casting a ballot on election day.

129

(...continued)
Federal elections and thereby further the procedural reform intended by the Voting
Rights Act.”); H. R EP. 103-9, at 3 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 107
(“Expanding the rolls of the eligible citizens who are registered is no guarantee that
the total numbers of voters will increase, but it is one positive action Congress can
take to give the greatest number of people an opportunity to participate. The
Committee believes that Congress should assist in reducing barriers, particularly
government-imposed barriers, to applying for registration wherever possible.”);
S. R EP., at 57 (Minority Views of Senators Stevens, Helms, Warner, Dole,
McConnell, and Cochran) (criticizing the proposed NVRA on the grounds that
“[r]ather than assisting state efforts to implement innovative voter registration
program, this legislation will impose obligations that are impractical, ineffective and
an expensive burden for states”).

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Consequently, the purposes of the NVRA do not suggest that the Public Disclosure
Provision mandates the disclosure of voting records from a specific election.
iv.

Context of the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision
in Light of Other Federal and State Laws

The statutory landscape within which the NVRA was enacted also
demonstrates that Congress did not intend the NVRA to regulate voting procedures
in elections or election challenges. Other Federal laws address these matters.130 And
States have enacted detailed election codes establishing procedures for voting and
election contests.131 In enacting the NVRA, Congress gave no indication that it
intended to either supplement other Federal laws or preempt State laws concerning
the election process. The NVRA establishes a uniform code for voter registration and
removal. The Court declines to adopt Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the NVRA Public
Disclosure Provision in a manner that would turn it into a post-election discovery

130

See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 7 (setting a uniform date for Federal general elections); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973ee et seq. (detailing procedures to ensure accessibility of polling places and
voting mechanisms for the elderly and handicapped); 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff et seq.
(detailing procedures for absentee voting by overseas voters and members of the
armed forces). Moreover, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.,
as well as Constitutional law, permit certain challenges to State election laws.

131

See, e.g., A LA. C ODE § 17-1-1 et seq.; C AL. E LEC. C ODE §§ 13000-17903; 10 I LL.
C OMP. S TAT. 5/1-1 et seq.; L A. R EV. S TAT. § 18:1 et seq.; M ASS. G EN. L AWS ch. 54,
§ 1 et seq.; N.Y. E LEC. L AW § 1-100 et seq.; N.C. G EN. S TAT. § 163-1 et seq.; O HIO
R EV. C ODE § 3501.01 et seq.; T EX. E LEC. C ODE A NN. § 1.001 et seq.; V A. C ODE A NN.
§ 24.2-100 et seq. Most States also have laws that permit candidates to contest
election outcomes. See, e.g., A LA. C ODE § 17-16-40 et seq.; C AL. E LEC. C ODE
§§ 16000-16940; T EX. E LEC. C ODE § 221.001 et seq.; V A. C ODE A NN. § 24.2-803 et
seq.

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device for detecting voter fraud.132
With this statutory framework in mind, the Court turns to the applicability of
the NVRA to each set of records Plaintiffs request.
b.

Requested Documents
i.

The Mississippi Voter Roll

Plaintiffs seek access to an unredacted copy of the Counties’ voter rolls
(collectively, the “Voter Roll”).133 In Mississippi, the Voter Roll is “a complete list
of all Mississippi voters [in] all status categories”: active, inactive, pending, purged,
and rejected.134 Mississippi has an electronic election recordkeeping system, SEMS,
132

Prior to seeking documents from Defendants and filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff True the
Vote indicated to Cochran, McDaniel, and the chairs of Mississippi’s Republican and
Democrat parties that they were working “to conduct a forensic audit of publicly
available election documents used in the June 24th Republican Senate Primary Runoff
Election,” which amounts to an effort to determine if an election challenge was
warranted. Letter from True the Vote to Mark Garriga [Exh. 1 to Doc. # 25]
(emphasis added); see also Letter from True the Vote to Mitch Tyner [Exh. 2 to Doc.
# 25]; Letter from True the Vote to Joe Nosef [Exh. 3 to Doc. # 25]; Letter from True
the Vote to Rickey Cole [Exh. 4 to Doc. # 25]. Plaintiffs continue to articulate similar
purposes for their document requests. See Plaintiffs’ Reply [Doc. # 119], at 21
(“Plaintiffs are seeking to canvass the vote, and determine whether sufficient illegal
ballots were cast in the Republican Primary . . . such that Mississippi voters’ voices
are properly heard, and the proper candidate is ensured to be a participant in the
November general election for Senate office.”).

133

Each County Circuit Clerk and Election Commission maintains a roll of its voters.
See Lennep Decl., ¶ 4. County voter roll information is culled from information
inputted into SEMS, a statewide system. The Court therefore refers to all County
voter rolls collectively as the “voter roll.” See also Hosemann’s Response [Doc.
# 93], at 4-5 (referring to the “state-wide voter roll”); Hosemann’s Response [Doc.
# 114], at 24 (same).

134

Tr. at 107:2-3 (Turner Testimony). “Active” voters are voters who have registered
to vote in the State and are eligible to cast a regular ballot in an election. Id., at
(continued...)

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that contains its Voter Roll information.135 The Voter Roll is created from data in
SEMS and is maintained by the State.

Counties receive voter registration

applications from individual registrants and must scan the applications and other
pertinent registration documentation into SEMS.136
The Voter Roll contains each voter’s name, unique identification number,
residential and mailing addresses, voting precinct code, registration date, voter status,
last date voted, and congressional district assignment.137 The Voter Roll does not
contain voters’ dates of birth.138
The Court concludes that there is no live controversy regarding disclosure of
the Voter Roll.

Defendants appear to agree that Mississippi’s Voter Roll is

(...continued)
107:20-21. “Inactive” voters are those as to whom some “trigger” has been activated,
such as “a change of address outside the county or outside the state.” Id., at 107:2124; see also id., at 110:8-14. “Pending” status is a temporary status for “a voter who
submits a mail-in voter registration application” and a County’s Circuit Clerk deems
it necessary to “obtain additional information,” either because the County did not
receive a “complete application” or to ensure the accuracy of the address a voter
provided. Id., at 112:3-10. Voters who register within 30 days of an election are also
placed into “pending” status. Voters who have been removed from the voter roll
because of their ineligibility to vote are in “purged” status. Id., at 114:9-13. Finally,
“rejected” status refers to individuals who have applied to vote but are rejected and
not permitted to register. Id., at 112:15-18. Voters may become ineligible for various
reasons, including death, adjudication of incompetence, and certain disenfranchising
felonies. Id., at 112:18-23.
135

Id., at 124:3-7; see also Lennep Decl., ¶¶ 3-4; M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-165(1).

136

Tr., at 124:7-9; 125:13-15 (Turner Testimony).

137

See generally Mississippi Voter Roll Exemplar [Doc. # 92-1].

138

See id.

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disclosable under the NVRA.139 The Court likewise concludes that the Voter Roll is
a “record” and is the “official list[] of eligible voters” under the NVRA Public
Disclosure Provision. The process of compiling, maintaining, and reviewing the
voter roll is a program or activity performed by Mississippi election officials that
ensures the official roll is properly maintained to be accurate and current.140
At the July 24th Hearing, Engelbrecht testified that True the Vote already has
a copy of the Voter Roll.141 Moreover, the Voter Roll does not contain birthdates, the
primary piece of information Plaintiffs seek over Defendants’ objections.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for the Voter Roll is moot.
ii.

Poll Books

Plaintiffs seek unredacted copies of poll books, contending that disclosure of
these documents is required by the NVRA. Defendants contend poll books are not
within the NVRA disclosure mandate and, alternatively, that poll books, if required
to be disclosed under the NVRA, may be redacted to protect voters’ privacy interests
in their birthdates (when accompanied with their names and current addresses).
“[A] poll book is a list of those voters who are eligible to vote in a particular
139

In opposing Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion and Plaintiffs’ Summary
Judgment Motion, Defendant Hosemann focused only on whether Plaintiffs properly
requested the Voter Roll, not whether the NVRA requires disclosure of the Voter
Roll. See Hosemann’s Response [Doc. # 93], at 15-16; Hosemann’s Response [Doc.
# 114], at 24-25.

140

See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 335 (“The process of review is a ‘program’ because it
is carried out in the service of a specified end—the maintenance of voter rolls—and
it is an ‘activity’ because it is a particular task and deed of Virginia election
employees.”); see also id. (“Indeed, voter lists are not ‘accurate’ or ‘current’ if
eligible voters have been improperly denied registration or if ineligible persons have
been added to the rolls.”).

141

See Tr. at 54:9-25 (Engelbrecht Testimony).

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election who are all . . . on active status.”142 A separate poll book is printed for each
voting precinct for each election approximately one week before an election.143 Poll
books are generated from the electronically stored information on SEMS and contain
each voter’s name, date of registration, voter registration number, current address,
date of birth, and voting district.144 Additionally, poll books contain “a number of
blank columns for the dates of elections.”145 For the elections held in Mississippi in
June 2014, the poll books contained columns both for the June 3rd primary and for
the June 24th primary runoff elections.146 Inactive, pending, purged, and rejected
status voters are not listed in poll books. Voters not listed in poll books may submit
a paper “affidavit ballot.”147 Poll books thus are not precinct-specific subsets of the
voter eligibility lists maintained by the State and the Counties through SEMS.
Plaintiffs’ focus for this NVRA challenge is the June 24, 2014 primary runoff
election. Under Mississippi’s “open primary” system, voters do not register by party

142

Id., at 106:18-20 (Turner Testimony).

143

Lennep Decl., ¶ 7.

144

See M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-125; Tr. at 113:16-18 (Turner Testimony); Lennep Decl.,
¶¶ 6-7; see also Poll Book Exemplar [Docs. # 107-4 and # 107-5].

145

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-125; see also Tr. at 113:18-19 (Turner Testimony).

146

Tr. at 113:19-20 (Turner Testimony).

147

Id., at 111:3-13, 148:5-6. An affidavit ballot is a form of “provisional ballot” that
requires a voter to include certain information on the affidavit envelope, such as the
voter’s name, date of birth, last four digits of her Social Security Number, and former
and current addresses See id., at 111:11-13; 115:18-22. A voter casting an affidavit
ballot must also “state the reason why they believe they are being asked to cast an
affidavit ballot.” Id., at 115:22-24. The affidavit ballot is put in the envelope, sealed,
placed in the ballot box. Each affidavit ballot is evaluated by election officials after
the election. Id., at 114:20-25.

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affiliation.148 Thus, on a primary election day, voters may vote in either party’s
primary. At polling precincts, poll workers for the Republican primary and for the
Democratic primary are each given an identical copy of the county poll book.149 If
an individual votes in a particular election, a poll worker will mark “voted” in the poll
book column relevant to that election.150 Voters do not sign poll books.151 If an
Election Commissioner determines that a voter is “disqualified from voting, by reason
of removal from the supervisor[’]s district, or other cause, that fact shall be noted on
the registration book and his name shall be erased from [that precinct’s] pollbook.”152
The Court concludes that poll books are not subject to disclosure under the
NVRA Public Disclosure Provision. Poll books do not reflect all voters eligible to
vote on election day. Poll books list only active status voters, which is a subset of all
registered and potentially eligible voters. Inactive and pending status voters, for
example, may still vote in an election despite not being listed in a poll book. The fact
that these voters voted in the election will not be recorded in a precinct’s poll book.
Because poll books are only partial lists of eligible voters, they are not records
that are reviewed to ensure the accuracy and currency of “official lists of eligible
voters.” After an election, as in this case, poll books serve as a record of which active

148

Id., at 142:7-14.

149

Id., at 142:8-14.

150

Id., at 142:16-23. After an election, the information about who voted is reported by
the Counties from the poll books, the information is entered into SEMS, and a “VR28 Report” is created. Id., at 143:19-20, 146:14-15.

151

Id., at 111:17-18. Instead, all voters sign a “receipt book” at the polling place. Id.,
at 156:9-13; Lennep Decl., ¶ 11.

152

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-125.

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status voters voted in that election.153 Poll books are not used to update lists of
eligible voters.154 Voter statuses do not change as a result of the State’s processing
of poll books. Whether a voter in “active” status voted or failed to vote in a particular
election does not affect that voter’s eligibility to vote in future elections.155
Plaintiffs contend that poll books reflect whether an individual voted in a
party’s primary and thus are necessary to ensure that certain voters do not illegally
vote in the other party’s primary runoff election.156 Plaintiffs thus argue that even if

153

The notation of which active status voters voted in an election is entered into SEMS
after the election and the individual voters’ entries in the voter roll are updated. See
Tr. at 145:25-146:8 (Turner Testimony).

154

See Lennep Decl., ¶ 14 (“Poll books are not involved in the process of removing a
voter from the voter rolls.”). Plaintiffs note that, under Mississippi law, disqualified
voters listed in a poll book may be erased from it. This procedure appears to be
separate from altering the Voter Roll, the official voter eligibility list.

155

Only an “inactive” status voter may be moved to “purged” status on the Voter Roll
as a result of not voting in two consecutive Federal general elections. See Tr., at
109:9-14 (Turner Testimony); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(d)(B). This information
is not gleaned from poll books, however, because poll books do not list inactive status
voters.

156

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they seek poll books for the purpose of detecting “double”
or “cross-over” voting and instances of voter fraud. Thus, in essence, Plaintiffs seek
copies of poll books to determine if an election challenge is warranted. See, e.g.,
Amended Complaint, ¶ 5 (“The purpose of [True the Vote’s] request was to
investigate claims that voters illegally double-voted in both the democratic and
republican primary races or cast improper absentee ballots.”); Preliminary Injunction
Motion [Doc. # 8], ¶ 3 (“In June 2014, in an effort to determine whether ineligible
voters had been allowed to cast ballots in the Mississippi Republican Primary Runoff
election (the “election”), True the Vote requested access to the State of Mississippi’s
voter records.”); Tr. at 334:8-17 (Nixon Argument) (“If I were a Mississippi voter
sitting in this courtroom today, I’m not sure what I would be feeling right now. And
I think that’s important because what I’ve heard is that if someone wants to come in
(continued...)

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poll books do not concern “the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible
voters” regarding a primary or general election, poll books do concern the eligibility
of voters for a primary runoff election.157 Plaintiffs point out that Mississippi’s open
primary system permits a registered voter to vote in any party’s primary, but prohibits
an individual who voted in one party’s primary from voting in the other party’s
primary runoff.158
The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument. While poll books may be
one of multiple bases to determine who is eligible to vote in a specific party’s primary
runoff election, these books are not records used to ensure the accuracy and currency
of official lists of eligible voters.159 Because the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision
concerns records regarding the registration and removal of voters from the

(...continued)
and look to see if the election result is valid, what they’ve heard from the people
they’ve entrusted with responsibility of doing that is that It’s not my job . . . .”
(emphasis in original)).
157

Plaintiffs’ theory relies on the assumption that polling stations used poll books from
the primary election at the primary runoff election to ensure against “cross-voting.”
Plaintiffs concede, however, that some counties in Mississippi use VR-28 reports for
the same purpose. See Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 19. In
such circumstances, even under Plaintiffs’ theory, poll books would not be records
that ensure the accuracy and currency of voters eligible to vote in the primary runoff
election. Plaintiffs have not offered evidence to suggest which of the County
Defendants used poll books, rather than VR-28 reports, to guard against cross-voting
during the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election.

158

It is unclear whether this prohibition against cross-over voting is based on a
Mississippi statute or an opinion of the State’s Attorney General.

159

Moreover, Plaintiffs requested poll books after the primary runoff election, and thus
the requested poll books are documents that reflect only active voters who voted or
did not vote in the primary and primary runoff elections.

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Mississippi statewide voter roll (i.e., the “official list of eligible voters”), poll books
do not fall within the ambit of the Public Disclosure Provision.
iii.

Absentee Ballot Applications and Envelopes

Plaintiffs request access to unredacted absentee ballot applications. Under
Mississippi law, certain registered voters are authorized to vote by absentee ballot.
These eligible voters may request to vote absentee by filling out an “absentee ballot
application form.” The absentee ballot application requires a sworn signature from
the voter and requires the voter to provide the reason for her absence. Valid reasons
include membership in the armed forces, being outside of the county on the date of
the election, being over 65 years old, and being required to work on election day.160
Mississippi law requires that most requests for absentee ballots must be made in
person at the Circuit Clerk’s office.161

160

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-627. Mississippi has three laws relating to absentee voting: (1)
the Absentee Balloting Procedures Law, id., § 23-15-621 et seq.; (2) the Armed
Services Absentee Voting Law, id., § 23-15-671 et seq., which concerns members of
the armed services; and (3) the Absentee Voter Law, id., § 23-15-711 et seq., which
concerns absentee voters who are not members of the armed forces. Mississippi
courts have viewed these laws as complementary. See, e.g., Lewis v. Griffith, 664
So.2d 177, 185 (Miss. 1995); Rogers v. Holder, 636 So.2d 645, 648-49 (Miss. 1994).

161

See M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-715(a); see also Tr. at 120:8-17 (Turner Testimony). The
Mississippi statute provides: “Only persons temporarily residing out of the county of
their residence, persons having a temporary or permanent physical disability, persons
who are sixty-five (65) years of age or older, or any person who is the parent, spouse
or dependent of a temporarily or permanently physically disabled person who is
hospitalized outside of his county of residence or more than fifty (50) miles away
from his residence, and such parent, spouse or dependent will be with such person on
election day, may obtain absentee ballots by mail under the provisions of this
subsection and as provided by Section 23-15-713.” M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-715(b).

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Plaintiffs also request access to absentee ballot “envelopes.”162 When a
Mississippi voter votes by absentee ballot, he must “deposit [the ballot] in the
envelope furnished him by the registrar.”163 On the back of the envelope the voter
must fill out a sworn affidavit that he has marked the ballot “indicating [his] choice
of the candidates.” The Registrar must place the envelope in the ballot box and the
ballot among the other ballots cast in the election.164 The voter’s signature must be
across the back flap of the envelope “so as to insure the integrity of the ballot.”165
Absentee ballot envelopes are also signed by an attesting witness or notary.166
Absentee ballots, envelopes, and applications remain in the ballot boxes until after
the election, at which point they are processed by poll workers “to determine whether
162

Plaintiffs have not clarified whether the envelopes they seek are the envelopes sent
to election officials seeking absentee ballots or the envelopes in which absentee
ballots themselves were sent to the Counties to be counted as votes. Because most
absentee ballot applications must be requested in person, the Court presumes that
Plaintiffs seek access to or copies of absentee ballot envelopes.

163

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-719.

164

Id.; see also Tr. at 130:21-131:1 (Turner Testimony) (“When an absentee ballot is
voted, it is immediately placed into a sealed ballot box until election day, at which
time it goes to the respective precinct for that voter.”); id., at 1333:16-21 (“And all the
materials stay in those sealed ballot boxes to preserve the integrity of the election until
the period of time has passed for a candidate to file a contest.”).

165

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-631. Once a county receives an absentee ballot in the proper
envelope, “[t]he process is to separate the ballot from the envelope . . . so as to ensure
the voter’s privacy in casting their ballot.” Tr. at 135:17-19 (Turner Testimony).

166

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-631; see also Tr. at 134:17-18 (Turner Testimony). Plaintiffs
have not requested in this lawsuit copies of the absentee ballots themselves. The
Court notes, however, that certain volunteers working on behalf of True the Vote did
request access to absentee ballots prior to the filing of this lawsuit. See, e.g., Incident
Report for Yazoo County [Exh. 2 to Doc. # 49], at 2; Incident Report for Simpson
County [Exh. 8 to Doc. # 49], at 2.

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they may be counted or rejected.”167
The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision does not encompass absentee ballot
applications or absentee ballot envelopes. These documents neither concern voter
registration nor are records concerning a program or activity to ensure the accuracy
and currency of the voter roll. Absentee ballot applications are filled out by
individuals already registered to vote in Mississippi. There is no evidence that these
applications are used to update or maintain the voter roll.168 Similarly, an absentee
ballot envelope, which contains only the voter’s affidavit, her signature, and the
signature of a witness, is not used to ensure the accuracy or currency of the official
voter roll. Instead, absentee ballot envelopes serve only as proof that a particular
voter actually cast a ballot in an election. Because they are records of voting, not
voter registration or removal, absentee ballot applications and envelopes are not
within the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision.169

167

Tr. at 131:19-22 (Turner Testimony).

168

Plaintiffs state in a conclusory manner that absentee ballot applications and envelopes
“are directly relevant to whether a voter has voted in the last two years, which is a
factor in active vs. inactive vs. purged registration status.” Plaintiffs’ Reply [Doc.
# 142], at 6. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support this statement.

169

Even if the NVRA permitted Plaintiffs to inspect absentee ballot applications and
envelopes, Plaintiffs’ request for these documents is premature because of the
importance of maintaining the integrity of ballots during the election and an election
challenge. Under Mississippi law, absentee ballot applications and envelopes, which
are records of voting in the most recent election, must remain sealed in the ballot
boxes upon receipt and until any contest over the election is completed. See M ISS.
C ODE §§ 23-15-637, 23-15-911. The purpose of this state law is to ensure the
integrity of elections and enable meaningful election challenges. While the NVRA
Public Disclosure Provision requires States to disclose certain documents, the
provision does not specify a particular time frame in which States must make these
(continued...)

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iv.

Federal Post Card Applications

Under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(“UOCAVA”), uniformed military and overseas citizens may register and vote by
absentee ballot in Federal elections.170

Individuals who vote absentee under

UOCAVA fill out “Federal Post Card Applications.”171

Federal Post Card

Applications require a registrant to provide, among other things, her name,
identifying information such as a birth date, State driver’s license ID, and Social
Security Number (“SSN”), telephone number, email address, and mailing address.172
Counties and the State of Mississippi may use Federal Post Card Applications
both as a registration application and as a request for an absentee ballot.173 When a
Federal Post Card Application is used for this dual purpose, the application, upon

(...continued)
documents available. Nothing in the NVRA suggests that Congress intended Public
Disclosure Provision requests to interfere with the security of ballot boxes, the
counting and review of ballots, or the highly regulated process of election challenges.
Thus, even if the NVRA required disclosure of these documents, the most logical
interpretation of the statute would allow Mississippi to place reasonable restrictions
on access to these documents during the course of an election challenge. McDaniel
continues to contest the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election. Granting Plaintiffs
access to these sealed documents immediately after the election, or even now, would
undermine Mississippi’s efforts to maintain the integrity of the election documents
while an election challenge persists.
170

See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(a) (“Each state shall--(1) permit absent uniformed services
voters and overseas voters to use absentee registration procedures and to vote by
absentee ballot in . . . elections for Federal office . . .”).

171

See Federal Post Card Application Exemplar [Doc. # 92-4]. Plaintiffs refer to these
documents also as “overseas voter applications.”

172

See id.

173

Tr. at 159:20-24 (Turner Testimony).

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submission, is scanned into SEMS and then placed back into the absentee ballot
envelope for processing.174

The original Federal Post Card Applications are

maintained by the “individual county circuit clerk offices.”175
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs in this case are not entitled to inspect
Federal Post Card Applications.

Hosemann concedes that Federal Post Card

Applications are disclosable under the NVRA to the extent the application is
submitted for the purpose of voter registration.176 The Court agrees.177 Nevertheless,
Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief for any violation of the NVRA in regard to Federal
Post Card Applications. Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that they requested
to inspect Federal Post Card Applications.178 Defendants thus never “denied”
Plaintiffs access to these documents. To the extent Plaintiffs’ requests for “absentee

174

Id., at 159:25-160:1.

175

Id., at 121:13.

176

See Hosemann’s Response [Doc. # 114], at 23-24; Hosemann’s Sur-Reply [Doc.
# 140], at 6-7; Tr. at 121:14-19 (Turner Testimony). At the July 24th Hearing, Turner
agreed that the NVRA would require disclosure of birthdates in Federal Post Card
Applications. See Tr. at 121:14-19 (Turner Testimony). In his briefing, however,
Hosemann appears not to accept this concession. See Hosemann’s Response [Doc.
# 93], at 23, 30-31; Hosemann’s Sur-Reply [Doc. # 140], at 5 n.1. The Court is not
bound by Turner’s opinion on the law.

177

Federal Post Card Applications, when used for purposes of registration, are records
that concern “the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.”
State election officials review these applications, like regular voter registration
applications, to maintain and update the voter roll. See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 335.
The program or activity of reviewing Federal Post Card Applications helps ensure that
a State’s voter rolls are accurate and current. See id.

178

The Court does not rely on Defendants’ argument that no Plaintiff cited the NVRA
in requesting records.

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ballot applications” could possibly be construed to encompass Federal Post Card
Applications insofar as the Applications serve as requests for absentee ballots, those
applications are not subject to the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision for the reasons
explained above.179

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for Federal Post Card

Applications is denied.
5.

Does the NVRA Preempt Mississippi Law?

Plaintiffs contend the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision entitles them to
copies of unredacted voter records, that is, copies of records disclosing voter
birthdates. The Mississippi Public Records Act requires redaction of certain sensitive
information, including birthdates, from public records. To the extent Plaintiffs are
entitled under the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision to voter rolls, poll books,
absentee ballot applications and envelopes, and Federal Post Card Applications,
which the Court has concluded they are not, the seminal legal question becomes
whether the NVRA allows redaction of any information within those records and, if
not, whether the NVRA preempts Mississippi law prohibiting disclosure of certain
information.
For the reasons detailed below, the Court concludes that the NVRA Public
Disclosure Provision does not require automatic public disclosure of voters’ or

179

See supra Part II.B.4.b.iii. Alternatively, even if Plaintiffs’ request for absentee ballot
applications were deemed a request for the Federal Post Card Applications that also
are registration applications, Plaintiffs’ request is premature. All Federal Post Card
Applications, like absentee ballot applications and envelopes, are sealed in ballot
boxes during and for weeks after an election, in order to preserve election integrity
and to enable candidate representatives to inspect unaltered documents during an
election challenge. Given McDaniel’s continued challenge to the primary runoff
election results, Plaintiffs may not access Federal Post Card Applications in the ballot
boxes until that challenge is complete.

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registrants’ birthdates. Accordingly, under the facts presented in this case, the NVRA
does not preempt Mississippi law.
a.

Preemption Standard

The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “the Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Congress has the power under the Elections Clause to
enact laws that “preempt state election laws concerning federal elections.” Voting for
Am., 732 F.3d at 399 (citing Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997)). State laws are
“inoperative” if they “directly conflict with federal election laws on the subject.” Id.;
see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384 (1879) (“[T]he regulations made by
Congress are paramount to those made by the State legislature; and if they conflict
therewith, the latter, so far as the conflict extends, ceases to be operative. No
clashing can possibly arise.”). Because Congress’s power to enact the NVRA derives
from the Elections Clause, see Voting for Am., 732 F.3d at 399, preemption analysis
in this case is governed by that clause, not the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, see
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253-57 (2013).
There is no “presumption against preemption” in Elections Clause cases. See
id. at 2256.180 Rather, “[w]hen Congress legislates with respect to the ‘Times, Places
and Manner” of holding congressional elections, it necessarily displaces some
element of a pre-existing legal regime erected by the States.” Id. at 2257 (emphasis
in original). The Supreme Court thus has noted that in construing whether State law
180

This distinguishes Elections Clause preemption cases form preemption cases
governed by the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.

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conflicts with Federal legislation regarding elections, “the reasonable assumption is
that the statutory text accurately communicates the scope of Congress’s pre-emptive
intent.” Id.
The Court also notes that legislation concerning the conduct of elections must
be examined in light of the particular federal-state balance achieved in that arena.
The Founders of the United States delegated substantial authority over Federal
elections to the States. Congress has the authority to restrict, but has been cautious
to circumscribe, the States’ powers over the conduct of elections. See, e.g., Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (upholding, against a First
Amendment challenge, defendant’s rule permitting independent voters to vote in
party primaries, but noting that “the Constitution grants to the States a broad power
to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives’”).181 A State’s authority over its elections is particularly potent with
regard to procedural regulations and rules to oversee and ensure the integrity of
elections, even to Federal office. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 834 (1995). Under the Elections Clause, “[t]he power of Congress over . . .

181

For example, in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), the Supreme Court explained:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words [of the Elections
Clause] embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices,
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of
fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and
canvassers, and making and public of election returns; in short, to enact
the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved.
Id. at 366.

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congressional elections is paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any
extent which it deems expedient[.]” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253-54 (2013). That Congress may enact laws preempting
conflicting State laws does not mean, however, that it necessarily intends to do so in
the regular course or that its legislation in the field of elections should be read more
broadly than Congress intended. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880).182
In light of this preemption standard and prior case law regarding the federalstate balance in the conduct of elections, the Court turns to a review of the State and
Federal statutes at issue.
b.

Mississippi Law

Two provisions of Mississippi law prevent access to unredacted voting records.
First, Mississippi law requires the Secretary of State “to procure, implement, and
maintain an electronic information processing system and programs capable of
maintaining a centralized database of all registered voters in the state.”183 However,
in the same statute, Mississippi law expressly precludes disclosure of voter
registrants’ personal information:
(a)

Social security numbers, telephone numbers and date of birth and
age information in statewide, district, county and municipal voter
registration files shall be exempt from and shall not be entitled to

182

In Siebold, the Supreme Court observed: “The State may make regulations on the
subject [of elections of representatives to Congress]; Congress may make regulations
on the same subject, or may alter or add to those already made. The paramount
character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by the
State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no farther. There is no such conflict
between them as to prevent their forming a harmonious system perfectly capable of
being administered and carried out as such.” Siebold, 100 U.S. at 392 (emphasis
added).

183

M ISS. C ODE § 23-15-165(1).

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inspection, examination, copying or reproduction under the
Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983.
(b)

Copies of statewide, district, county or municipal voter
registration files, excluding social security numbers, telephone
numbers and date of birth and age information, shall be provided
to any person in accordance with the Mississippi Public Records
Act of 1983 at a cost not exceed the actual cost of production.184

Second, Mississippi law grants “any person . . . the right to inspect, copy or
mechanically reproduce or obtain a reproduction of any public record of a public
body.”185 Public agencies, however, must redact “exempted material” from the
requested records “and make the nonexempted material available for examination.”186
“Such public agency shall be entitled to charge a reasonable fee for the redaction of
any exempted material, not to exceed the agency’s actual cost.”187 The Court refers
to these Mississippi disclosure limiting provisions (i.e., Sections 23-15-165(6) and
25-61-5(2)) as the “Redaction Provisions.”
c.

Does the NVRA Require Disclosure of Unredacted
Records?

Resolution of the issue whether the NVRA preempts Mississippi law in this
case boils down to whether the NVRA mandates disclosure of unredacted documents,
thereby overriding voter registrants’ privacy interests. If so, the NVRA would
directly conflict with Mississippi’s Redaction Provisions, which preclude such

184

Id., § 23-15-165(6).

185

Id., § 25-61-5(1)(a).

186

Id., § 25-61-5(2).

187

Id., § 25-61-5(2).

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disclosures, and the NVRA would preempt Mississippi law. If the NVRA does not
mandate universal disclosure, then the two laws do not conflict, there is no
preemption, and the Mississippi law requiring redaction of birthdates controls.188 For
the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the NVRA does not directly
conflict with Mississippi law on the facts presented, and both the goal of voter
eligibility transparency and the goal of maintaining voter registrants’ privacy interests
can be achieved.
i.

Project Vote is Distinguishable.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on the ruling in Project Vote. Both the district court and
the Fourth Circuit in that case held that the NVRA required full disclosure of
“completed voter registration applications” and declined to allow the defendants to
redact various pieces of registrants’ information, including birthdates.189 Plaintiffs
here argue that they are similarly entitled to inspect the Requested Documents
without redaction of birthdates. Notably, Plaintiffs recognize there are important

188

This section addresses the extent of disclosure of documents encompassed by the
NVRA, not whether the documents must be disclosed in some form in the first place.
The latter issue was addressed above. See supra Part II.B.4.b.

189

The Fourth Circuit stressed “the many benefits of public disclosure,” including “the
identification of both error and fraud in the preparation and maintenance of voter
rolls,” and noted that “[w]ithout such transparency, public confidence in the essential
workings of democracy will suffer.” Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 339. The Fourth
Circuit also suggested that Congress was responsible for balancing transparency and
voter privacy, and had done so in the NVRA. Id. at 339-40 (“It is not the province of
this court, however, to strike the proper balance between transparency and voter
privacy. That is a policy question properly decided by the legislature, not the courts,
and Congress has already answered the question by enacting NVRA Section 8(i)(1),
which plainly requires disclosure of completed voter registration applications. Public
disclosure promotes transparency in the voting process, and courts should be loath to
reject a legislative effort so germane to the integrity of federal elections.”).

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privacy interests at play and do not request disclosure of voter registrants’ SSNs.190
Plaintiffs implicitly concede there is no reference in the NVRA to support this
exclusion.
In Project Vote, pursuant to the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision, the
plaintiff, Project Vote,191 requested to inspect all voter registration applications of
applicants in Norfolk, Virginia, rejected during a nine-month period. Project Vote
made this request after learning that “several students at Norfolk State University, a
historically African-American public university located in Norfolk, Virginia, had their
voter registration applications rejected by Long’s office prior to the November 2008,
primary and general elections.” Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 699. Through a
targeted request,192 Project Vote sought to ascertain whether Defendants, a city
general registrar (Long) and the Virginia Secretary of State, had improperly denied
registering allegedly eligible applicants. Id.

190

Plaintiffs follow the lead established in Project Vote, where the district court
concluded that “a person’s SSN is precluded from disclosure, as disclosure of that
information would undermine the purposes of the statute.” Project Vote, 752 F. Supp.
2d at 711. The district court noted that “SSNs are uniquely sensitive and vulnerable
to abuse, such that a potential voter would understandably be hesitant to make such
information available for public disclosure.” Id. at 711-12.

191

Project Vote is an organization that “endeavors to increase voter registration and
participation among low-income, minority, and younger voters, while working to
enforce and expand public policies and procedures that encourage full participation
in elections.” Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 698.

192

Project Vote requested from a single Virginia city “the completed voter registration
applications of any individual who timely submitted an application at any time from
January 1, 2008, through October 31, 2008, who was not registered to vote in time for
the November 4, 2008 general election.” Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 699.

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Project Vote is distinguishable on its facts and thus is not persuasive authority
for the case at bar. First, Project Vote sought voter registration documents based on
victims’ allegations that they suffered wrongs in the heart of the NVRA, namely,
illegal denial of local college students’ applications to register to vote prior to an
election. Months after that election, Project Vote made a narrow request for the
applications of those individuals denied registration. Because the victims were
students, birthdates listed on the applications were important information in
ascertaining whether registration was improperly denied. The Project Vote courts did
not need to reach the question presented in this case—whether all voter registrants’
birthdates must be disclosed in response to any and all requests, even when there is
no showing that the information is material to the particular request.193 Moreover,
because of the Project Vote defendants’ refusal to provide a range of obviously
pertinent information about registration applications, the Project Vote courts did not
have occasion to address the requirement of disclosure of birthdates independent from
other allegedly personal information.
In stark contrast, Plaintiffs here seek materials for an election challenge, a goal
outside the purposes of the NVRA. Plaintiffs seek voluminous materials from many
(if not all) Mississippi Counties.

Finally, Plaintiffs provide no meaningful

explanation of the need for birthdates in light of the substantial information
Defendants have already produced. Project Vote is not persuasive authority for the
relief Plaintiffs seek here.

193

The Court also notes that Project Vote gave proper notice to state officials pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b), unlike Plaintiffs in this case. See Project Vote, 752 F.
Supp. 2d at 700.

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ii.

The NVRA Does Not Require Disclosure of
Unredacted Documents.

Moreover, Project Vote is not binding authority and this Court respectfully
declines to follow the Fourth Circuit’s ruling on the scope of the required disclosure.
The Public Disclosure Provision requires States to make available for inspection “all
records” concerning voter registration and ineligible voter removal programs and
activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1). The modifier “all” is meant to expand the
range of documents produced. The term “all records” does not require automatic
disclosure of all information within the covered records. Congress’s language in the
Public Disclosure Provision does not preclude redaction of certain highly sensitive
information contained within disclosable records.194 See Texas Democratic Party v.
Bettencourt, H-08-3332, slip op. [Doc. # 35] at 16 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2009) (“The
court also highlights the distinction between making a record available, to which
defendant largely has agreed, and redacting limited, discrete confidential information
contained within a given record.” (emphasis in original)). This conclusion is
grounded on several lines of reasoning.
First, Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “all records” to include all information in each
record is inconsistent with Section 1973gg-6(i)(2), which immediately follows
Section 1973gg-6(i)(1), the provision on which Plaintiffs rely for their requests. If
the State has a ground to believe that a registered voter has changed addresses or
otherwise has become ineligible to vote, the State may not remove that registered
voter from that State’s voter roll without sending the registrant a card which the

194

If “all records” were read to mean “all information,” SSNs could not be redacted.
However, Plaintiffs concede, as the Project Vote district court held, see Project Vote,
752 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12, that SSNs should be redacted prior to disclosure of records
under the NVRA.

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registrant must complete. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6(c), 1973gg-6(d)(1). The registrant
is asked whether she changed her residence and states that if she does not return the
card, she may be required to further affirm or confirm her residence before she votes
in a Federal election. Id., § 1973gg-6(d)(2)(A). The card also states that if the
registrant fails to vote in the next two Federal general elections, her name “will be
removed from the list of eligible voters.”195 Id. Section 1973gg-6(i)(2) requires
States to disclose “lists of the names and addresses of all persons” to whom
Subsection 6(d)(2) notices were sent and “information concerning whether or not
each such person has responded to the notice.” Id., § 1973gg-6(i)(2). Significantly,
Congress here did not mandate disclosure of SSNs or birthdates, despite the potential
utility of that information in identifying registrants’ identities. By restricting the
required disclosure of certain information to “names and addresses,” Congress
recognized that other voter registration information may be sensitive and not subject
to disclosure. Reading “all records” in Section 1973gg-6(i)(1) to necessarily mandate
disclosure of birthdates would thus contradict Congress’s explicit limitation of
disclosable information in Section 1973gg-6(i)(2).196

195

A registrant under these circumstances is placed in “inactive” status.

196

The Court recognizes that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision excepts from
disclosure “records [that] relate to a declination to register to vote or to the identity
of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered.” 42
U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1); see also id., § 1973gg-6(a)(6). To the extent Plaintiffs
contend that this provision limits the universe of information States may redact to
these two issues, the Court disagrees. This exception to the Public Disclosure
Provision relates to types of records that States may not disclose, not kinds of
information that must be redacted, and thus is not relevant to the Court’s analysis of
the scope of disclosure of information under the statute.

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Second, Plaintiffs’ interpretation would also conflict with, or render a nullity,
other related statutes. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C. § 1974,197 State
elections officers are required to preserve “all records and papers which come into
[their] possession relating to any application, registration . . . or other act requisite to
voting in such election.” 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (emphasis added). Congress authorized
only the Attorney General to inspect these documents, but even he may not disclose
any record except to Congress, other government agencies, or in a court proceeding
or when otherwise ordered to do so by a court. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1974b, 1974c.
Under Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision, however,
any individual may simply request, orally or in writing, these documents from the
States and Counties and are entitled to them in unredacted form. Further, contrary to
the explicit restrictions imposed upon the Attorney General to keep records
confidential under Section 1974, there is no limit on the NVRA requestor’s ability to
disclose or disseminate that information. See Bettencourt, H-08-3332, slip op. [Doc.
# 35] at 13. Plaintiffs’ interpretation thus flies in the face of Section 1974.
Third, the Court notes that the Public Disclosure Provision was not drafted in
a vacuum. Congress enacted the NVRA in 1993, thirty-eight years after it passed the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.,198 thirty-seven years after it
passed the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., and
nineteen years after enacting the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a et seq., all of

197

On September 1, 2014, 42 U.S.C. § 1974 will be recodified as 52 U.S.C. § 20701; 42
U.S.C. § 1974b will be recodified as 52 U.S.C. § 20703; and 42 U.S.C. § 1974c will
be recodified as 52 U.S.C. § 20704.

198

Under the new codification system, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 will be recodified as 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301.

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which express Congress’s concern for individuals’ privacy interests. Mississippi
enacted its Public Records Act in 1983, at approximately the same time that other
States enacted similar public disclosure-type laws.199 Both Federal and State laws
generally guard against disclosure of sensitive personal information, including with
regard to information provided in voter registration documents.200 On the other hand,
as noted, there is no restriction in the NVRA as to who may request records under that
law and no limit on the requesters’ use or further dissemination of the information
once disclosed. Plaintiffs’ unrestrained interpretation of required NVRA disclosures
would create a gaping hole in the statutory landscape whereby personal, otherwise
protected information would lose its protection once a citizen registered to vote. It
is hard to imagine that in enacting the NVRA, Congress intended to abrogate all
protections provided for by Federal and State laws against the disclosure of private
and confidential information. See Bettencourt, H-08-3332, slip op. [Doc. # 35] at 13
(“It is a reasonable interpretation that Congress omitted exclusions for other, more

199

See, e.g., C AL. G OV’T C ODE § 6250 et seq. (“California Public Records Act,” first
passed in 1968); G A. C ODE A NN. § 50-18-70 et seq. (“Georgia Open Records Act,”
first passed in 1959); 5 ILL. C OMP. S TAT. 140/1 et seq. (“Illinois Freedom of
Information Act,” first effective in 1984); N.Y. P UB. O FF. L AW § 84 et seq. (“New
York Freedom of Information Law,” first passed in 1977); T EX. G OV’T C ODE § 552
et seq. (“Texas Public Information Act,” enacted in 1993 and repealing a previous
version of the Act passed in 1973).

200

See, e.g., C AL. G OV’T C ODE § 6254.4 (voter registration documents); G A. C ODE A NN.
§ 50-18-72(a)(20)(A) (exempting from disclosure “[r]ecords that reveal an
individual’s social security number, mother’s birth name . . . day and month of
birth . . .”); 5 ILL. C OMP. S TAT. 140/7(1)(c) (exempting from disclosure “[p]ersonal
information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . .”); N.Y. P UB. O FF. L AW
§ 8(2)(b) (excepting from disclosure records that “if disclosed would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); T EX. G OV’T C ODE § 552.102(a) (same).

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general, personal information in amendments to the VRA because state and federal
legislative schemes existed to protect the information.”).
In short, the Court concludes that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision does
not require States to make available to all requesters entirely unredacted voter
registration records in all circumstances. Rather, the Public Disclosure Provision
designates for disclosure a broad array of documents concerning voter registration
and removal, but does not, as a general proposition, prohibit a State from protecting
voter registrants’ SSNs and birthdates as highly personal and sensitive information.201
iii.

Birthdates, Like Social Security Numbers, Are
“Uniquely Sensitive.”

Moreover, even if the NVRA could be construed to require disclosure of
unredacted documents, including birthdates, in certain circumstances such as those
presented in Project Vote, the Court would nevertheless conclude that birthdates must
be redacted in the case at bar. Congress, in enacting the NVRA, expressed the goal,
inter alia, “to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens
who register to vote in elections for Federal office.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)
(emphasis added). In other words, Congress sought to ensure that the NVRA
increased, not discouraged, voter registration and participation. See Project Vote, 752
F. Supp. 2d at 710. It is for that reason the district court in Project Vote concluded
that SSNs are “precluded from disclosure, as disclosure of that information would
undermine the purposes of the statute.” Id. at 711. That court recognized that SSNs
are “uniquely sensitive and vulnerable to abuse” and that requiring States to disclose

201

The Court again notes that Plaintiffs have requested disclosure of the Requested
Documents without redaction of voter registrants’ birthdates, but do not seek
disclosure of SSNs.

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SSNs pursuant to an NVRA records request would make citizens hesitant to register
to vote. Id. at 711-12; see also Project Vote, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 781-82.
The Court is persuaded that disclosure of individuals’ birthdates raises serious
concerns similar to disclosure of SSNs, particularly when the birthdate disclosures
are in conjunction with the disclosure of individuals’ full names and current
addresses. Birthdates, when combined with other identifying information available
in voter registration records, can be used to obtain—both legally and improperly—a
host of other highly personal information about an individual, particularly in this day
of computers with vast searching powers. See Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48
v. KPNX Broad. Co., 955 P.2d 534, 539 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc). “With both a name
and birth date, one can obtain information about an individual’s criminal record,
arrest record (which may not include disposition of the charges), driving record, state
of origin, political party affiliation, social security number, current and past
addresses, civil litigation record, liens, property owned, credit history, financial
accounts, and, quite possibly, information concerning an individual's complete
medical and military histories, and insurance and investment portfolio.” Id. Indeed,
birthdates, when combined with name and place of birth, “can reveal social security
numbers.” Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas, 354
S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2010). Also problematic is that individuals may use their
birthdates as a password or personal identification number for their bank, credit card,
and internet-based accounts. Companies often use birthdates as a security measure
to verify an individual’s identity.
For these reasons, various courts have recognized in the context of FOIA
litigation that birthdates are sensitive information and have construed FOIA’s

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“Exemption 6” to protect the disclosure of birthdates.202 See, e.g., Havemann v.
Colvin, 537 F. App’x 142, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2013) (determining that certain data, such
as birthdates, can “function as unique identifiers because they can be combined with
other available information to identify specific individuals” and concluding that the
release of that data would implicate individuals’ privacy concerns); Oliva v. United
States, 756 F. Supp. 105, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that “the release of the
social security numbers and dates of birth . . . would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy” and that “social security numbers, and dates of birth,
are a private matter, particularly when coupled with the other information plaintiff has
received”); see also, e.g., Schoenman v. F.B.I., 575 F. Supp. 2d 136, 164 (D.D.C.
2008) (determining that Federal agency properly withheld certain information,
including birthdates, pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6).203
Similarly, the Federal Courts recognize that birthdates are highly sensitive.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require litigants to redact birthdates and SSNs

202

Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure under the FOIA “personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.” Other courts have looked to FOIA in construing the
NVRA. See Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (citing FOIA cases for the
proposition that SSNs may be redacted in disclosing documents under the NVRA);
Bettencourt, H-08-3332, slip op. [Doc. # 35] at 16.

203

In U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post. Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982), the Supreme
Court upheld the privacy of birthdates and other personal information. In dicta, the
Court expressed some skepticism about the sensitivity of this information, noting that
“[i]nformation such as place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment
history, and comparable data is not normally regarded as highly personal.” Id. at 600.
The Court nevertheless concluded that such information “would be exempt from any
disclosure” if it was contained in a file covered by Exemption 6 and “would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id. Since 1982, the public’s
concerns about misuse of personal information has grown exponentially.

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in all court filings.204 State courts also have held that analyzing State Freedom of
Information laws protect against disclosure of birthdates. See Governor’s Office of
Admin. v. Purcell, 35 A.3d 811, 812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (concluding that the
“personal security exception” to Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law guarded against
disclosure of “the month and day of birth of almost 70,000 state employees); Tex.
Comptroller of Public Accounts, 354 S.W.3d at 338 (concluding that state comptroller
could redact birth dates of “144,000 state employees” from records sought under state
Public Information Act request); Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, 955 P.2d at
538-40 (concluding that individuals have a privacy interest in their birthdates and
permitting 25 state school districts to refuse to disclose the “birth dates of all active
and substitute public school teachers”).
One of the reasons that governments seek to protect birthdates and SSNs from
disclosure, and warn the public against voluntary disclosure of that information, is to
mitigate the risk of identity theft.205 Identity theft is an ever-growing concern in this
204

See F ED. R. C IV. P. 5.2(a) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or
paper filing with the court that contains an individuals social-security number,
taxpayer-identification number, or birth date . . . a party or nonparty making the filing
may include only . . . (2) the year of the individual’s birth . . .”).

205

See, e.g., Daniel Bertoni, Identity Theft: Governments Have Acted to Protect
Personally Identifiable Information, but Vulnerabilities Remain, U.S. Gov’t
A ccountability Office (June 17, 2009), at 2, available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122769.pdf (“Protecting personally identifiable
information in federal systems, such as names, dates of birth and SSNs, is critical
because its loss or unauthorized disclosure can lead to serious consequences for
individuals.”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Guidance on the Protection of Personal
Identifiable Information, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ppii.htm (last visited
August 29, 2014) (warning Federal contractors about improper disclosure of
“personal identifiable information,” including birthdates); Office of the Attorney
(continued...)

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nation in the “age of big data”206 and is fueled by the disclosure, whether intentionally
or inadvertently, of personal information such as birthdates. Corporate tightening of
security in response to recent major data breaches, and the news coverage
surrounding those breaches, are evidence of the public’s concern.207
Endorsing Plaintiffs’ position here—that “all records” in the NVRA Public
Disclosure

Provision

means

automatic

disclosure

of

voter registrants’

birthdates—would enable any person or organization, regardless of residency,
citizenship, or purpose, to obtain almost all personal information, including

205

(...continued)
General of the State of Tennessee, Protecting Yourself from Identity Theft, available
at http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/cpro/protectingidentity.html (last visited August
29, 2014) (“All of your personal identifying information should be protected, whether
it is financial information, your Social Security number, birth date or other, similar
information.”); Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas, Identity Theft,
available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/consumer/identity_theft.shtml (last
visited August 29, 2014) (“Identity theft occurs when someone uses your personal
identifying information without your permission. This information may include your
name, address, driver license number, Social Security number, mother’s maiden name,
birth date . . .”).

206

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “[a]pproximately 16.6 million persons
or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of one or more incidents of
identity theft [in] 2012,” the most recent year for which statistics are available. See
Erika Harrell & Lynn Langton, Victims of Identity Theft, 2012, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf.

207

The Fifth Circuit focused on identity theft risks in denying disclosure of other
personal information under FOIA. See Sherman v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 244 F.3d 357,
365 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Rather, the concern is that simultaneous disclosure of an
individual’s name and confidential SSN exposes that individual to a heightened risk
of identity theft and other forms of fraud.”).

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birthdates, of millions of people208 through simple written requests.209 Plaintiffs have
suggested no limits on how, by whom, and under what conditions this data may be
obtained.

Moreover, all this freely available personal information could be

disseminated at the requestor’s whim, or for financial or other gain, without limit.
Once disclosed to any requester, the voter registrants’ personal information may be
subject to unrestricted public viewing and examination.210
Existing voter registrants and potential registrants who knew that their
birthdates, along with their names, addresses, and potentially other identifying
information, could be disclosed to any requester without restriction on further
dissemination of the personal information “would understandably be hesitant to make
such information available for public disclosure.” See Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d
at 712. There is a substantial likelihood that many may decline to register altogether,
thus depressing voter registration. See Project Vote, 889 F. Supp. 23d at 782; cf.
Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff’s
208

In Mississippi alone, approximately 1.8 million voters were listed in the State’s poll
books during the June 2014 primary and primary runoff elections. Lennep Decl., ¶ 5.

209

Engelbrecht testified that, in her estimation, the NVRA entitles True the Vote to
obtain the dates of birth of all Mississippi voters if it so requests. Tr. at 62:19-23
(Engelbrecht Testimony). Engelbrecht also recognized that any individual may obtain
this information through a similar request. Id., at 65:2-6.

210

As the Project Vote Court recognized, the National Mail Voter Registration Form, a
Congressionally-approved form used to register voters, requires an applicant to
provide his birthdate. See Project Vote, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 781; see also National
Mail
Voter
Registration
Form,
available
at
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/Federal%20Voter%20Registration_6-2514_ENG.pdf. The Court is not persuaded, however, that Congress’s requirement that
applicants provide their birthdates, which is necessary to register applicants
accurately, indicates that Congress intended this information be disclosed, especially
under the circumstances present in this case.

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right to vote is “substantially burdened” by Virginia voter registration law that
“conditions [plaintiff’s] right to vote on public disclosure of his SSN”). The Court
finds no support for Plaintiffs’ contention that “[t]he issue of what private information
could be made public and how that balanced against election integrity was debated
and decided and culminated in the passage of the National Voter Registration Act.”211
There is no indication in the NVRA’s legislative history that Congress intended to
open up for inspection information within those records that is otherwise protected
as personal information under other Federal or State laws.212
Plaintiffs’ interpretation, therefore, contravenes the NVRA’s purpose and
historical bases for enactment, and would have the opposite effect than Congress
intended. The Court acknowledges that there may be circumstances that justify the
disclosure of voter registrants’ birthdates.213

However, the reasoning behind

Plaintiffs’ request—to distinguish among various voters with similar names in order
to ferret out cases of cross-over voting—does not justify the extensive disclosure they
seek. Plaintiffs have other available means to obtain information, such as voter
identification numbers and voter ages,214 to accomplish their goals without infringing
on the privacy interests of voter registrants.215

211

Tr., at 262:13-19 (Nixon Argument).

212

The Court has scoured the NVRA’s legislative history and has found no evidence that
members of Congress discussed whether birthdates or SSNs should be disclosed under
the Public Disclosure Provision.

213

The facts of Project Vote are a case in point.

214

See Tr. at 144:20-145:4 (Turner Testimony); Lennep Decl., ¶¶ 15-21.

215

Plaintiffs have articulated other reasons they need voter birthdates, but those reasons
(continued...)

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that, under the facts presented, the NVRA
Public Disclosure Provision does not require the disclosure of unredacted voter
registration documents, including voter registrant birthdates.
d.

The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision Does Not
Preempt Mississippi’s Redaction Provisions

The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision preempts Mississippi’s Redaction
Provisions only if the two statutes “directly conflict.” On the facts presented, the
Public Disclosure Provision does not require disclosure of voter registration records
that reveal all voter registrants’ birthdates. Plaintiffs thus have failed to show in this
case that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision directly conflicts with Mississippi’s
Redaction Provisions to the extent that they require redaction of birthdates from the
documents Plaintiffs have requested. The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision
accordingly does not preempt Mississippi’s significant State legislative determination
to protect SSNs and birthdates of registered voters from disclosure.216

(...continued)
do not hold water. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that disclosure of birthdates is
necessary: (1) “to connect such records with a voter’s official registration and
application to vote to ensure the voter is properly registered”; (2) to search
“conflicting or duplicate voter registrations across counties”; (3) to ensure a citizen
is “age-eligible to vote”; (4) to ensure eligibility of absentee voters who request to
vote by absentee ballot and are over 65 years of age; and (5) “to detect persons who
cast votes in the names of registered voters who are deceased.” Plaintiffs’ Summary
Judgment Motion [Doc. # 84], at 24 n.3. Plaintiffs’ putative justifications are overinclusive in light of the other tools Plaintiffs have available. Moreover, because the
issues of similar names or age qualifications concern only a subset of registrants and
voters, Plaintiffs’ purported need for birthdates in particular is, at best, premature.
216

The Court reiterates its conclusions from above that the NVRA Public Disclosure
Provision does not apply to some of the Requested Documents (poll books, absentee
ballot applications, and absentee ballot envelopes), and its ruling on Plaintiffs’ NVRA
(continued...)

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III.

PLAINTIFFS’ PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to make the

Requested Documents available for inspection with birthdates unredacted.217 The
Court has rejected Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims for procedural and substantive reasons
and thus no preliminary injunction is warranted.218 If, for some reason, this ruling
were altered by a higher court, the Court nevertheless would deny Plaintiffs’
preliminary injunction request. For the sake of completeness, the Court addresses
each of the preliminary injunction factors. No factor supports Plaintiffs’ request.
A.

Preliminary Injunction Standard

“To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the applicants must show (1) a
substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that
they will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) their substantial
injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party to be enjoined; and (4) granting the
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Steen, 732 F.3d at 386
(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey,
667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012)). The burden of proof on all four factors is always
on the plaintiff. Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir.
216

(...continued)
claims with respect to the other Requested Documents (the Voter Roll and Federal
Post Card Applications). See supra Part II.B.4.b. Thus, because Plaintiffs are not
entitled to the Requested Documents under the NVRA, there is no conflict between
the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision and Mississippi’s Redaction Provisions.

217

As the Court noted above, Plaintiffs have agreed to redaction of SSNs.

218

The Court notes that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court “may
advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the [preliminary injunction]
hearing.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 65(a)(2). The Court did not do so here because the parties
did not agree to advancing trial on the merits.

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1974). In determining whether to grant preliminary relief, the Court “must remember
that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not
be granted unless the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion.” Id.; see also
Voting for Am., 732 F.3d at 386.
B.

Analysis
1.

Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits

“To assess the likelihood of success on the merits, [courts] look to the
standards provided by the substantive law.” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 596
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The Court has held that Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims are procedurally barred and has
rejected Plaintiffs’ positions on the merits.219 At most, Plaintiffs’ position on their
entitlement to unredacted documents containing birthdates is subject to substantial
debate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of these claims. This preliminary injunction factor does not tip in
Plaintiffs’ favor.
2.

Irreparable Injury

Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial threat that they will suffer “irreparable
injury” if a preliminary injunction is denied. In this case, Plaintiffs seek voting
records concerning the June 24, 2014 Republican primary runoff election.
Mississippi is required to maintain the requested voting records for at least 22 months
after the election, more than sufficient time for this case to proceed to final
judgment.220 Defendants have definitively assured the Court that they will not destroy
219

See supra Part II, passim.

220

See 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (“Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period
(continued...)

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or alter the requested records. Plaintiffs apparently have a copy of Mississippi’s
Voter Roll and, to the extent that they do not, Defendants have agreed to produce it.
Defendants have also offered Plaintiffs redacted versions of the records. Plaintiffs
have not articulated any persuasive reason for the Court to require at this time
Defendants to produce the unredacted records Plaintiffs seek. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
have not shown they will suffer irreparable injury if they are required to wait until
final judgment before receiving access to the unredacted records they seek, should the
Court determine that they are entitled to such relief.221
Plaintiffs also assert a claim of “vote dilution” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend that they

220

(...continued)
of twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary election of
which candidates for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector,
Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, or Resident
Commissioner from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are voted for, all records and
papers which come into his possession relating to any application, registration,
payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election . . .”).

221

The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured in regard to their
NVRA claims if not permitted to immediately “canvass the vote” to “determine
whether sufficient illegal ballots were cast in the Republican Primary . . . [so that] the
proper candidate is ensured to be a participant in the November general election for
Senate office.” Plaintiffs’ Reply [Doc. # 119], at 21. Plaintiffs in passing assert that
their First Amendment rights will be impaired if the Court fails to issue a preliminary
injunction. The cases on which Plaintiffs rely involved challenges specifically
involving voter registration activities, not post-election canvasses. The irreparable
injury found by the courts regarding those plaintiffs flowed from their First
Amendment claims. Here, Plaintiffs do not assert any such claims. Moreover, even
if Plaintiffs could show irreparable injury, the other preliminary injunction factors tip
in Defendants’ favor and warrant denial of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
injunction.

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need immediate access to the requested voting records to establish that claim.222 Even
if that claim is ripe and justiciable, it does not insert immediacy into this suit. The
NVRA is not a lawsuit discovery device. This factor therefore tilts in Defendants’
favor.
3.

Balance of Hardships

Unlike Plaintiffs, who will suffer no significant harm from denial of a
preliminary injunction, Defendant Hosemann has demonstrated substantial harm to
his interest if the Court grants the requested preliminary injunction. The State,
through Hosemann, has a significant interest in enforcing its enacted laws, including
the Mississippi Public Records Act. Mississippi law requires redaction of some of
the information that Plaintiffs seek. Permitting Plaintiffs access to unredacted voter
records at this early stage of the lawsuit would undermine Mississippi’s effort to
enforce its own laws. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013), application to vacate stay denied,
134 S. Ct. 506 (2013) (stating, in issuing stay of district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction pending appeal, that “the State necessarily suffers the irreparable harm of
denying the public interest in the enforcement of its laws”). Accordingly, this factor
weighs in Defendants’ favor.
4.

Disservice to the Public Interest

Finally, the Court concludes that granting Plaintiffs’ requested preliminary
injunction would disserve the public interest.

222

Because Mississippi, through

See Tr. at 12:18-13:19 (Nixon Argument) (“So what the records will show us -- if the
records are able to be obtained, the records will show us basically we’re going to
either debunk the myths or prove up a problem . . . . I am not representing to [the
Court] that we anticipate finding a problem. I just don’t know.”).

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Hosemann,223 is a Defendant, “its interest and harm merges with that of the public.”
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex., 734 F.3d at 419. To the extent Mississippi
suffers harm from the inability to enforce its laws, the Mississippi public—and
registered voters in particular—would suffer harm as well. See Planned Parenthood
of Greater Tex., 134 S. Ct. at 507 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of application to
vacate stay).224
Moreover, the harm to the public would be particularly onerous in this case.
Granting a preliminary injunction on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims requiring Defendants
to disclose to Plaintiffs voter registrants’ birthdates in the Requested Documents
would grant Plaintiffs the ultimate relief they seek. Once voter birthdates are
disclosed, the information becomes publically available for all time. The release
would nullify any defense to the claims regardless of the Court’s ultimate rulings on
the merits. See Enterprise Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana,
762 F.2d 464, 476 (5th Cir. 1985) (“A preliminary injunction, therefore, should not
grant relief properly awarded only in a final judgment, and it is an abuse of discretion
for the district court to issue a preliminary injunction which permits one party to
obtain an advantage by acting, while the hands of the adverse party are tied by the
223

Hosemann was sued in his official capacity as Secretary of State. See also, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas, 734 F.3d at 419 (noting that State of Texas
was the “appealing party” where Attorney General was sued in his official capacity).

224

“The Court of Appeals concluded that the fourth factor also favored the stay,
reasoning that the State’s interest in enforcing a valid law merges with the public
interest . . . . The dissent declines to criticize that reasoning, though we are
presumably meant to infer . . . that the dissent believes preservation of the status
quo—in which the law at issue is not enforced—is not in the public interest. Many
citizens of Texas, whose elected representatives voted for the law, surely feel
otherwise.” Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex., 134 S. Ct. at 507 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in denial of application to vacate stay).

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writ.”); see also W.A. Mack, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886, 890 (7th
Cir. 1958) (“A preliminary injunction does not issue which gives to a plaintiff the
actual advantage which would be obtained in a final decree.”); Harlem Algonquin,
LLC v. Canadian Funding Corp., 742 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(“[G]ranting a plaintiff final relief at the outset of the case would completely undercut
the protections due a defendant . . . the defendant would often suffer a harm that
cannot be undone.”). Thus, the public interest is harmed by an injunction requiring
disclosure, as Plaintiffs seek. The fourth preliminary injunction factor, too, weighs
in favor of Defendants.
For these reasons, the Court would deny Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
injunction if it had to reach the issue.
IV.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY’S SANCTIONS MOTION
The Republican Party moves for Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiffs and their

counsel requiring them “to reimburse the Party for its fees, costs, and expenses in this
action.”225
A.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) applies to any civil suit in
federal district court. Monetary sanctions may be awarded against offending
attorneys for violations of Rule 11(b)(2), which requires that a party’s legal
contentions, claims, and defenses be “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
225

Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion [Doc. # 67], at 1-2. The Republican Party
served its Sanctions Motion on July 11, 2014, and filed the Motion on August 4, 2014,
over 21 days later, as contemplated by Rule 11(c)(2). See F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(c)(2)
(“The Motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented
to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn
or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court
sets.”).

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argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); Marlin v. Moody Nat’l Bank, 533 F.3d 374, 380 (5th
Cir. 2008). Monetary sanctions may also be awarded against either attorneys or the
parties if “the factual contentions [do not] have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will [not] likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3), 11(c)(5)(A);
Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 2006).
“[T]he standard under which the attorney is measured under Rule 11 is an
objective, not subjective, standard of reasonableness under the circumstances.”
Jenkins v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 263-65 (5th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, an attorney’s good faith will not, by itself, protect against the imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions. Childs v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 29 F.3d 1018, 1024
(5th Cir. 1994).
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 provides that a lawyer is required to
“‘stop-and-think’ before . . . making legal or factual contentions.”

Advisory

Committee Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993 Amendments); see also generally
Advisory Committee Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (2007 Amendments). The Fifth
Circuit has articulated a “snapshot rule,” whereby “Rule 11 liability is assessed only
for a violation existing at the moment of filing.’” Marlin, 533 F.3d at 380; see also
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(“Like a snapshot, Rule 11 review focuses upon the instant when the picture is
taken—when the signature is placed on the document.”)).
B.

Analysis

The Republican Party appears to raise two reasons why sanctions against
Plaintiffs and their counsel are appropriate in this case. First, the Republican Party
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contends that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the documents
they seek under the NVRA.226 Second, the Republican Party argues that it is not a
proper party to this lawsuit because it does not possess the records in question,
Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence to suggest that the Republican Party has the
records, and Plaintiffs’ legal claims are therefore frivolous as pleaded.227
While Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Republican Party do not pass muster
on summary judgment, the Court concludes at this time that sanctions against
Plaintiffs are not warranted. Among the documents Plaintiffs seek through this
lawsuit are absentee ballot applications and envelopes. Plaintiffs apparently were
under the impression at the time they filed suit that the Republican Party controlled
access to those documents.228 Furthermore, the Republican Party is involved in the
administration of the primary and primary runoff elections. The Court does not reach
Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim for vote dilution, but should Plaintiffs
prevail it is at least arguable that the Republican Party is a necessary party to this case

226

See Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion [Doc. # 67], at 5-8.

227

See id., at 4-8.

228

See Plaintiffs’ Response [Doc. # 131], ¶¶ 3, 10; Letter from Gayle Parker to Phil
Harding [Doc. # 106-2] (stating that Harding should direct question regarding missing
absentee ballot applications and envelopes to the “executive committee members”
because “the Republican Party was in charge of the conduct of the Republican Runoff
Election”). The Republican Party disputes Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the letter, and
contend that the Circuit Clerk was referring to the County Executive Committee, not
the Republican Party, a statewide organization. See Republican Party’s Reply [Doc.
# 141], at 2. The Republican Party also notes that this letter was written on July 17,
2014, eight days after Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. See Republican Party’s Reply
[Doc. # 145], at 9. Even if the Republican Party is correct, Plaintiffs appear to have
been under the impression at the time they filed this case that the Republican Party
had constructive possession of some of the documents they sought.

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for purposes of implementing a remedy.

Accordingly, the Court denies the

Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion at this time.
V.

RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT
Rule 54(b) provides for entry of a final judgment as to some but not all claims

in a lawsuit “if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 9 (1980).
Entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) requires a finding that the ruling is
final as “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a
multiple claims action” and that there is “no just reason for delay” in entering the
final judgment. Curtiss-Wright Corp. at 7-8; see also Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime
(Am.), Inc., 650 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2011).
A Rule 54(b) final judgment “reflects a balancing of two policies: avoiding the
danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate
appeal and avoid[ing] piecemeal appeals.” Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207
F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir.2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A court
should consider such factors as: “(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the
unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not
be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the
reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the
presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against
the judgment sought to be made final; [and] (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay,
economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of
competing claims, expense, and the like.” Abecassis v. Wyatt, 2010 WL 2671576, at
*2 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2010) (Rosenthal, J) (quoting Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491,
495 (6th Cir. 2003)). Rule 54(b) motions are disfavored and should be granted only
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“when there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would
be alleviated by immediate appeal.” PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison County Waste
Mgmt., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Court concludes that entry of final judgment is proper on Plaintiffs’ NVRA
claims. The Court has scoured the July 24th Hearing record, the parties’ briefing, and
the summary judgment record and concludes that Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims fail on
multiple grounds as a matter of law. Thus, no future development at the trial level
will require the Court to consider these claims again or will moot these claims.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim is independent of their NVRA claims.
Entry of final judgment on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims will not impact the disposition
of Plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim. Finally, Plaintiffs have stressed that “time is of the
essence,” and the Court agrees. Entry of final judgment on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims
will facilitate Plaintiffs’ appeal of this Court’s decision disposing of those claims,
should Plaintiffs wish to do so. Accordingly, the Court enters final judgment on
Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For a variety of reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims fail

as a matter of law. First, nearly all of Plaintiffs’ requests on which they base their
NVRA claims did not meet the notice and cure requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg9(b). Second, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the Requested Documents they seek
in this case under the NVRA. Neither poll books nor absentee ballot applications and
envelopes fall within the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision. Mississippi’s Voter
Roll does fall within that provision, but Plaintiffs already have a copy of the Voter
Roll and Defendant Hosemann has conceded that it is disclosable under the NVRA
Public Disclosure Provision. Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to properly request Federal
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Post Card Applications. Third, even if the NVRA required disclosure of the
Requested Documents, the NVRA would not require Defendants to supply Plaintiffs
with unredacted records disclosing birthdates under the facts of this case. For all
these reasons, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate on Plaintiffs’
NVRA claims.
The Court recognizes that, in many respects, this is a case of first impression.
Future cases are likely to arise where litigants dispute the contours of the NVRA
Public Disclosure Provision. To ameliorate confusion among the requesters of
NVRA documents and election officials at State and County levels who maintain
NVRA records, as well as to avoid potentially conflicting rulings by different courts,
the Court urges Congress to clarify the scope of the NVRA Public Disclosure
Provision in light of other longstanding laws and the important competing interests
of electoral transparency and voter registrants’ privacy.
For all these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc.
# 8] is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion [Doc. # 67]
is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Delbert Hosemann’s Summary Judgment Request
[Doc. # 114] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Copiah County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc. # 79] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Hinds County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Docs. # 80 and # 81] is GRANTED. It is further

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ORDERED that Defendant Jefferson Davis County’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. # 82] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docs. # 83
and # 84] is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Rankin County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Docs. # 85 and # 86] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Republican Party’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the
alternative, for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 87 and # 88] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Lauderdale County’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. # 89] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Delbert Hosemann’s Motion to Strike [Docs. # 116
and # 117] is DENIED. Finally, it is
ORDERED that final judgment is entered against Plaintiffs on Counts 1 and
2 of their Amended Complaint (the “NVRA claims”).
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 29th day of August, 2014.

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