Mardis v. Lauderdale County Sheriffs Department et al
Filing
35
ORDER granting 29 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Michael Moss. Signed by Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo on 1/28/2016. (TSB)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRIS RYAN MARDIS
V.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv550-JCG
MICHAEL MOSS, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
MICHAEL MOSS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BEFORE THE COURT is a Motion for Summary Judgment [29], filed by
Defendant Officer Michael Moss [“Defendant Moss”]. Chris Ryan Mardis
[“Plaintiff”] has filed a Response [33]. Plaintiff is a post-conviction inmate in the
custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections [“MDOC”], serving a sentence
for escape and felony DUI. He is proceeding in this suit pro se and in forma
pauperis.
An omnibus hearing, which also served as a Spears1 hearing, was held on
February 3, 2015. At the omnibus hearing, Plaintiff was able to provide additional
details surrounding his claims. Having considered the submissions of the parties,
the pleadings and record on file, and the relevant legal authority, the undersigned
concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment [29] should be granted inasmuch
as Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies pertaining
to the allegations asserted against Defendant Moss.
1
Spears. v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 15,
2014, advancing an excessive force claim, a failure to protect claim, a general
complaint regarding the grievance system in place, and seeking money damages.
Compl.[1] at p. 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint named Lauderdale County Sheriff’s
Department, Lauderdale County Detention Facility, Billie Sollie, Ward Calhoun,
Unknown Major Robinson, and Unknown Sergeant Rush. Plaintiff’s Complaint
generally alleges that he has “safety and security” concerns regarding being
“unlawfully” housed as a pretrial detainee with convicted inmates at the
Lauderdale County Detention Facility. Id.; see also Pl.’s Resp. [12] to Court Order,
at p. 2. Plaintiff further complains of the grievance system in place stating that
there is “total disregard and neglect as far as the grievance system goes.” Compl.
[1] at p. 4.
Plaintiff filed a Motion [2] for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, which the
Court granted by Order [8] entered on September 18, 2014. A second Order [9] was
issued that same day directing Plaintiff to provide certain additional information on
or before October 8, 2014. On September 26, 2014, Plaintiff moved to amend [10]
his Complaint. On October 29, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
and added Defendant Moss. Order [11]. This Order further directed Plaintiff to
show cause for his failure to comply with a previous Court Order [9]. On November
14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Response [12] in compliance with the Court’s Order [9],
resulting in the dismissal of the Lauderdale County Sheriff’s Department, the
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Lauderdale County Detention Facility, Billie Sollie, and Ward Calhoun as named
Defendants. Order [13]. The Court further directed that summons be issued to
Lauderdale County, Unknown Major Robinson, Unknown Sergeant Rush, and
Unknown Officer Moss. Order [13], entered November 19, 2014. An Answer [17]
was filed on behalf of Lauderdale County, Unknown Moss, Unknown Robinson, and
Unknown Rush on January 7, 2015.
On February 3, 2015, the Court conducted the Omnibus Hearing wherein
Plaintiff clarified his claims by his sworn testimony. On February 4, 2015, an
Order [25] was entered reassigning the above captioned cause upon consent.
The instant Motion [29] for Summary Judgment was filed on April 23, 2015.
Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant’s Motion and the Court thereafter
issued an Order [32] to Show Cause. Plaintiff’s Response [33] was received and
filed on June 5, 2015.2
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The mere existence of a factual dispute does
not by itself preclude the granting of summary judgment.” St. Amant v. Benoit, 806
F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1987). “The requirement is that there be no genuine
2
The docket reflects that since the filing of his Complaint, Plaintiff has been
transferred to the South Mississippi Correctional Institution [“SMCI”].
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issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)(emphasis in original). In other words, “[o]nly disputes over the facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. “The Court reviews all evidence in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.” Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d
383, 391 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717
F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2013). “Once the moving party has initially shown that
there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's cause, the nonmovant must come forward with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for
trial.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Washington, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.
2002) (quotations omitted). “Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences,
and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003).
B.
Exhaustion
1.
The PLRA
“Prisoner litigation continues to ‘account for an outsized share of filings’ in
federal district courts.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)(citing Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006)). “Most of these cases have no merit; many are
frivolous. Our legal system, however, remains committed to guaranteeing that
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prisoner claims of illegal conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to
law. The challenge lies in ensuring that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not
submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit. ” Id.
A centerpiece of the PLRA’s effort to “reduce the quantity and improve the
quality of prisoner suits” is an “invigorated” exhaustion provision. Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). The PLRA provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42
U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
“Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is
mandatory.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. “The PLRA attempts to eliminate
unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons, and thus
seeks to ‘affor[d] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints
internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.’” Id. at 93 (quoting Porter,
534 U.S. at 525).3
Proper exhaustion is required. A prisoner cannot satisfy the exhaustion
requirement “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective
3
“In some instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate’s
grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate thereby
obviating the need for litigation. In other instances, the internal review might filter
out some frivolous claims. And for cases ultimately brought to federal court,
adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the
contours of the controversy.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
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administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 83-84:
The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance
system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison
grievance system will not have such an opportunity unless the grievance
complies with the system’s critical procedural rules. A prisoner who does
not want to participate in the prison grievance system will have little
incentive to comply with the system’s procedural rules unless
noncompliance carries a sanction . . . .
Id. at 95.
Exhaustion “is a threshold issue that courts must address to determine
whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time.” Dillon v.
Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 2010). “[J]udges may resolve factual disputes
concerning exhaustion without the participation of a jury.” Id.
2.
Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims
Defendant Moss moves for summary judgment relying in part on Plaintiff’s
sworn testimony that the alleged incident related to Defendant Moss occurred after
he filed the above captioned cause. Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to naming Moss as a Defendant. Mem.
[30] in Supp. of Mot. [29] for Summ. J. at p. 7.
Plaintiff opposes the instant Motion arguing that: “I was unaware that I was
failing to exhaust my remedy program. Even with that being said, the attack
happened and I’m seeking justice for these acts.” Pl.’s Resp. [33] at p. 1. Plaintiff
further states:
In defendants motion for dismissal it clearly states where I failed to
exhaust my grievance system. [sic] Which I in fact clearly stated at my
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omnibus hearing that I did in fact fail to do so. The reason being I’ve
already had difficulties dealing with the grievance system or legal
matters when came [sic] to jail administrators. They was [sic] failing to
do their jobs in other areas so that’s why I took matters further and
amended this matter in my suit.
Id. [emphasis added].
Nothing contained within Plaintiff’s Response indicates completion of any grievance
procedure regarding his allegations against Defendant Moss.
Moreover, the Official Transcript [27] for the Omnibus Hearing conducted on
February 3, 2015, clearly indicates that Plaintiff was aware that a grievance system
was in place at the Lauderdale Detention Facility. Tr. [27] at p. 31. Plaintiff
testified that he had taken advantage of the existing grievance system and had
submitted numerous complaints through same. Id. Plaintiff, while under oath,
confirmed that the instant Complaint was signed on July 7, 2014, the incident
complained of regarding Defendant Moss occurred on August 30, 2014, and the
amendment of his Complaint to add Defendant Moss was on September 26, 2014.
Id. at pp. 31-32.
THE COURT:
PLAINTIFF:
THE COURT:
PLAINTIFF:
. . . you sought to amend your lawsuit by adding - Officer Moss.
But you acknowledge that you have not exhausted
your administrative remedies before you did that.
Yes, sir.
Tr. [27] at p. 49.
Plaintiff cannot initiate matters on his own accord and he cannot bypass a
grievance system by amendment of his Complaint in this Court. The law is clear
that “[i]t is not enough to merely initiate the grievance process or to put prison
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officials on notice of a complaint; the grievance process must be carried through to
its conclusion.” Tompkins v. Holman, No. 3:12CV87-LRA, 2013 WL 1305580, at *1
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 26, 2013) (citing Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th
Cir. 2001)).
The record clearly indicates that Plaintiff did not complete the grievance
process relating to his allegations against Defendant Moss. The Affidavit, the
documents and record, together with Plaintiff’s own testimony, constitute
uncontroverted evidence in support of Defendant Moss’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff cannot undermine the ARP process by initiating litigation
against Moss in this Court prior to exhausting his administrative remedies. The
undersigned concludes that Defendant Moss has satisfied the burden of showing
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding Plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust his administrative remedies.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment
[29] filed by Officer Michael Moss is GRANTED, and he is dismissed as a
Defendant from the above captioned cause. The Court will issue a scheduling order
in order for this cause to proceed forward against the remaining named Defendants.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 28th day of January, 2016.
s/ John C. Gargiulo
JOHN C. GARGIULO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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