Moon v. Guest et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION dismissing this action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and as seeking monetary relief. Any state law claims asserted in this civil action are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by District Judge Henry T. Wingate on 10/30/14 (TRS)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
ALAN KEITH MOON, #140499
VERSUS
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-cv-617-HTW-LRA
MICHEAL GUEST, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff Alan
Keith Moon, an inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, brings this pro se
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Micheal Guest, District Attorney for Rankin
County; Vikki Williams, Assistant District Attorney for Rankin County; and Rankin County,
Mississippi.1 The Court, having liberally construed the pleadings in consideration with the
applicable law, finds that this case should be dismissed.
I.
Background
Moon states that he is currently incarcerated based on a four-year sentence for “child
support/child abandonment.” Resp. [10] at 1. The subject of this Complaint is his prior
conviction for false pretense entered by the Rankin County Circuit Court. In regards to the false
pretense conviction, Moon alleges that Assistant District Attorney Williams “got the indictment
by not telling the truth” because she knew that a post dated check was a civil matter and not a
crime. Id. He further claims that District Attorney Guest “oversees” all criminal cases in Rankin
County, therefore, Guest should have “stopped the criminal proceeding on the [false pretense]
indictment because a post dated check is a civil matter.” Id. Moon complains that he “served 20
months on a sentence that [he] never should’ve had,” and that as a convicted felon he can no
1
Moon was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. See Order [8].
longer “bear arms” or vote. Id. at 1-2. As relief, he seeks monetary damages for being “falsely
incarcerated” and for “defamation of [ ] character.” Compl. [1] at 4.
II.
Analysis
Title 28 U.S.C. §1915 applies to prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis in this Court.
Section 1915(e)(2) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal -- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” The law “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of
the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Macias v. Raul A., 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). Since the Court has
permitted Plaintiff Moon to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, his Complaint is subject to
sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2).
A.
Absolute Immunity
District Attorney Guest and Assistant District Attorney Williams, as criminal
prosecutors, “enjoy absolute immunity from claims for damages asserted under § 1983 for
actions taken in the presentation of the state’s case.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir.
1994). This immunity extends to the “prosecutor’s actions in initiating the prosecution and in
carrying the case through the judicial process.” Id. As the Fifth Circuit has clearly stated, the
“decision to file or not file criminal charges is protected by prosecutorial immunity.” Quinn v.
Roach, 326 F. App’x 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th
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Cir. 1990) (“The decision to file or not file criminal charges falls within this category of acts that
will not give rise to section 1983 liability.”). Moon disagrees with the prosecutors decision to
initiate criminal charges and maintain the criminal prosecution for false pretense based on his
belief that he did not commit a crime. The Court finds the alleged actions taken by Guest and
Williams are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Lampton v.
Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 2011)(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
Therefore, District Attorney Guest and Assistant District Attorney Williams are entitled to
absolute immunity from the claims asserted in this § 1983 Complaint.2
B.
Respondeat Superior
A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 when its official policies or customs
violate the Constitution. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However,
“a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691.
Moon provides no official policy or custom of Rankin County that is responsible for the alleged
constitutional deprivations associated with his false pretense conviction and resulting
incarceration. Rather, he claims Rankin County “employees” violated his constitutional rights
when he was indicted, convicted, and incarcerated for false pretense, when a file was lost, and
when he faced certain consequences associated with being a convicted felon. Resp. [10] at 1.
The Court finds that Moon has merely named Rankin County as the employer of Guest and
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The Court finds it unnecessary to determine if Moon’s claims are Heck barred or untimely
because absolute immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985). An immunity determination is a “threshold question, to be resolved
as early in the proceedings as possible.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit has found that “it is appropriate for the district courts to resolve the question of absolute
immunity before reaching the Heck analysis when feasible.” Id.
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Williams.3 Since Moon seeks to hold the County vicariously liable for another’s actions, he
cannot maintain this § 1983 case against Rankin County. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691
(concluding that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor”).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for defamation of character
based on his false pretense conviction, he is not entitled to relief under § 1983. See Oliver v.
Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990)(finding claims for defamation based on inmate’s
contention that defendants filed false reports thereby injuring his reputation did not give rise to
§ 1983 liability).
III.
Conclusion
The Court has considered the pleadings and applicable law. For the reasons stated, this
civil action is dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and as seeking monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This dismissal will count as a “strike” in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Any state law claims asserted in this civil action are dismissed without
prejudice.
A Final Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 30th day of October, 2014.
s/ HENRY T. WINGATE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
Moon was provided an opportunity to name any other individuals as Defendants and he was
directed to state how each Defendant, including Rankin County, violated his constitutional rights. See
Order [9].
Memorandum Opinion
Civil action no. 3:14-cv-617-HTW-LRA
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