Goldsmith v. Strickland et al

Filing 53

ORDER granting 48 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball on 9/29/15. (Copy mailed to Plaintiff at address on docket sheet.) (YWJ)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
KENNETH RAY GOLDSMITH, #129296
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv626-FKB

DANIEL STRICKLAND, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment [48] and a supporting
memorandum filed by Defendants Daniel Strickland, James Rutland, Ben Blaine, Eddie
Thompson, Bryan Bailey,1 David King, and Pattie Temple (“Rankin County Defendants”).
Plaintiff has filed a letter that the Court construes as a Response [51] in opposition to the Motion.
The Court has previously considered and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Keefe
Commissary Network (“Keefe”). See Order at [52]. Having considered the filings, the Court
finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment [48] should be granted based on Goldsmith’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to his remaining claims against the Rankin County
Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Rankin County Defendants are hereby
dismissed without prejudice.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff is a former pretrial detainee at the Rankin County Jail (“Jail”), and he is
currently housed at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution. According to Plaintiff’s
complaint, the Rankin County Defendants violated his constitutional rights during his time of
incarceration at the Jail during certain periods of time in 2013 and 2014, while he was a pre-trial

1

Although “Brian Bailey” is named as a defendant, counsel makes clear that the proper
spelling of defendant’s name is “Bryan Bailey.” See [49] at 1.

detainee, and after he was convicted. Defendants are the Sheriff of Rankin County, Bryan
Bailey; James Rutland, Chief of Security; Daniel Strickland, a Jail officer; Ben Blaine, Jail
Administrator; Eddie Thompson, Chief Deputy; David King, Jail shift leader; and Pattie Temple,
Jail employee.
The Court held an omnibus hearing2 in this matter, at which time it conferred with
Plaintiff and counsel for all Defendants in this suit founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At that
hearing, the parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all
further proceedings in the case and order the entry of final judgment, and the District Judge
subsequently entered an order of reference. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Goldsmith is
proceeding in this matter in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and pro se.
As stated above, Goldsmith alleges that the Rankin County Defendants violated his
constitutional rights during his confinement at the Jail. Goldsmith’s claims are contained in his
original Complaint [1] and in a Response [10] to an Order from the Court.
In his original Complaint [1], Goldsmith makes various claims regarding the general
living conditions at the Jail, as well as a claim for excessive force. Goldsmith alleges that he was
attacked by Defendant Strickland after Goldsmith kicked on his cell door during the booking
process. [1] at 4-5. He complains that he was subjected to lockdown for over fifty days as a
result of the incident. Id. at 5. He alleges that he was subjected to extended lockdowns at
various times during his incarceration at the Jail. Id. at 8-10. He also complains that Defendants
denied him adequate medical services and access to disciplinary due process. Id. at 5. He
complains that he wrote and filed several grievances about these conditions, without results. Id.

2

See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
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He also alleges that Defendants denied him access to the Jail’s rules and regulations. Id. He
alleges that, on one occasion, Defendants made him stay outside in cool weather about one-half
day without proper clothing. Id. He asserts that mail addressed to him from the outside world
was lost. Id. He alleges that the food was served cold. Id. at 10. Finally, Goldsmith asserts that
he contracted a rash while he was in isolation because of the cell’s filthy conditions. Id.
In a Response [10] to the Court’s Order [6] asking for more information about his claims,
Goldsmith asserted that Defendant Bailey violated his constitutional rights when he allowed his
employees to cause physical harm to him. [10] at 1. He also alleged that Defendant King
allowed his employees to “do as they choose.” Id. In the Response, Plaintiff also asserted that
the Jail staff denied him yard call, and that Defendants King, Rutland, Thompson, and Bailey
should be held accountable for the denial of yard call. Id.
At the omnibus hearing, Goldsmith testified that he wrote letters or grievances related to
his complaints about Jail conditions to the Jail’s administration. [48-2] at 34. He also testified
that he mailed copies of these letters and grievances to his home for safekeeping. Id. at 33. The
remainder of his testimony essentially reiterated the claims he had made in his Complaint [1] and
the Response [10].
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The Rankin County Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting
several bases for dismissal. Defendants first argue that Goldsmith has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as is required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), and, thus,
this matter should be dismissed. Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to

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dismissal on the merits of Goldsmith’s claims. Plaintiff failed to file a formal response to the
Motion for Summary Judgment, but he did send a Letter [51] in which he asks the Court to allow
him to continue this action.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in relevant part, that “[t]he court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An
issue of fact is genuine if the "'evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch and Center, 174 F.3d 629,
633 (5th Cir. 1999)(quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 618 (1998)). Issues of fact are material if “resolution of the issues might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law." Lemoine, 174 F.3d at 633. The Court does not,
"however, in the absence of any proof, assume the nonmoving [or opposing] party could or
would prove the necessary facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994)(en banc)(emphasis omitted). Moreover, the non-moving party's burden to come forward
with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986), is not satisfied by "conclusory allegations" or by "unsubstantiated
assertions," or by only a "scintilla" of evidence. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
The Court now turns to the exhaustion argument.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Statutory and case law requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies, regardless
of the relief sought. The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, as amended by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), states the following:

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No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(Supp. 2000). In Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), the Supreme
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, revised as a part of the PLRA, requires an inmate to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing an action with respect to prison conditions, regardless of
the relief offered through administrative procedures. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. The United States
Supreme Court further explained that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory and
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. See Porter v.
Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983 (2002); see also Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007)(reaffirming that
exhaustion is mandatory; stating that it is an affirmative defense).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reiterated the principles
found in these cases. In Gonzales v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth Circuit
recognized that exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to suit is mandatory, and that district
courts have no discretion to stay § 1983 prisoner cases when they are filed before prisoners have
exhausted administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit concluded, as follows:
District courts have no discretion to excuse a prisoner’s failure to properly
exhaust the prison grievance process before filing their complaint. It is irrelevant
whether exhaustion is achieved during the federal proceeding. Pre-filing
exhaustion is mandatory, and the case must be dismissed if available
administrative remedies were not exhausted.
Id. at 788. The Court is mindful, however, that because “exhaustion is an affirmative defense,
the burden is on [the movant] to demonstrate that [a prisoner plaintiff] failed to exhaust available

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administrative remedies.” Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).3
Nevertheless, “[i]t is not enough to merely initiate the grievance process or to put prison
officials on notice of a complaint; the grievance process must be carried through to its
conclusion.” Walker v. East Miss. Corr. Facility, 2013 WL 4833901 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 11,
2013)(citing Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001)(finding that filing an
initial grievance, without more, did not equate to exhaustion)); see also Tompkins v. Holman,
2013 WL 1305580 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 26, 2013)(dismissing § 1983 complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies when prisoner filed a grievance, but did not complete the ARP
before filing his lawsuit). Exhaustion is mandatory, “irrespective of the forms of relief sought
and offered through administrative avenues.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 739.
In this case, Goldsmith does not allege that he suffered from any ailment which
prohibited him from pursuing administrative remedies. See Ferrington v. Louisiana Department
of Corrections, 315 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2002)(Plaintiff-inmate’s blindness did not excuse him
from exhausting administrative remedies.); see also Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863 (5th Cir.
2003)(excusing non-exhaustion of administrative remedies because of physical injury and
subsequent rejection of grievance due to untimeliness).
Rankin County Defendants have provided a copy of the grievance procedure at the Jail.
[48-6]. Rankin County Defendants have also provided evidence demonstrating, and Goldsmith
admitted at the omnibus hearing, that he was familiar with the grievance procedure at the Jail.

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The Court previously denied Defendant Keefe’s Motion to Dismiss [16] based on lack of
exhaustion of administrative remedies because Defendant Keefe did not meet its burden to
present evidentiary support for its position that Goldsmith did not complete the grievance
procedure. See Order [52]. The Court, however, granted the Motion to Dismiss on other bases.
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See [48-2] at 40. Furthermore, on four different occasions in 2013 and 2014, Goldsmith
participated in a Jail Orientation Program and signed a form acknowledging that he understood
Jail procedures. [48-3] at 122, 124, 130, and 134.
On the other hand, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with adequate proof to rebut
Defendants’ arguments that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to all of his
claims. Goldsmith alleges that he wrote letters and grievances related to his claims to Jail
personnel. However, despite testifying that he sent copies of these letters or grievances to family
for safekeeping, he has failed to provide copies of them in response to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Jail has provided copies of his entire jail record, see [48-3], and it contains only
two grievance letters addressed to Defendant Rutland. [48-3] at 86, 127. One of the letters is
unrelated to the claims against these Defendants. See id. at 127. There is no evidence,
furthermore, demonstrating that he completed the administrative process with regard to the
vague claims of abuse he makes in the other letter. See id. at 86.
Unsubstantiated assertions are insufficient to create a real controversy regarding material
facts. See Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96–97 (5th Cir. 1994). Despite Goldsmith’s testimony
that he kept copies of grievances and letters related to his claims, he has failed to produce them.
As the evidence stands, Goldsmith’s unsubstantiated assertions are the only evidence supporting
his arguments that he attempted to exhaust and did exhaust his administrative remedies. This
evidence is simply not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Accordingly, for these reasons, the Court hereby grants the Rankin County Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment Based on Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons explained in this Opinion, the Court finds that the Motion
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for Summary Judgment filed by Rankin County Defendants based on Plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should be granted. Goldsmith’s claims are hereby dismissed
without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED, this the 29th day of September, 2015.
/s/ F. Keith Ball
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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