BBC Baymeadows, LLC v. City of Ridgeland, Mississippi

Filing 196

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part discovery motions 87 118 140 142 and 146 . Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 10/13/2015. (ACF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
BBC BAYMEADOWS, LLC
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:14CV676-HTW-LRA

CITY OF RIDGELAND, MISSISSIPPI
CONSOLIDATED, FOR
DISCOVERY PURPOSES, WITH
SUNCHASE OF RIDGELAND, LTD;
EVEREST PINEBROOK, L.P; RAINBOW/
RIDGELAND, LLC; RR APARTMENTS,
LLC; JORDAN RIDGE, LLC and
OAKBROOK, LLC
VS.

PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:14CV938-HTW-LRA

CITY OF RIDGELAND, MISSISSIPPI

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a plethora of discovery-related Motions that argue whether
or not certain privileges claimed by the Defendant, City of Ridgeland, apply to or protect certain
documents from discovery or apply to or limit deposition testimony, as follows:
1.

BBC Baymeadows, LLC’s Second Motion to Compel [Doc. 87];

2.

BBC Baymeadows, LLC’s Urgent and Necessitous Third Motion to Compel [Doc.
118];

3.

Motion of Non-Parties, Kevin Holder, Chuck Gautier, Wesley Hamlin, Scott Jones,
D. I. Smith, Brian Ramsey, and Ken Heard to Quash Deposition Subpoena Duces
Tecum and for Protective Order [Doc. 140];

4.

Motion of Non-Party Mayor Gene McGee to Quash Deposition Subpoena Duces
Tecum and for Protective Order [Doc. 142]; and

5.

City of Ridgeland’s Urgent or Necessitous Motion for Protective Order [Doc. 146].

By this Order, it is the Court’s intention to rule on whether the specific documents withheld are
protected by any of the various privileges asserted and also to set out the parameters of those
privileges, so that the parties can take the appropriate action with regard to deposition testimony,
as it is impossible at this juncture to foresee the specific questions that might be asked. Because the
relief sought by both parties will be incomplete, these Motions will be granted in part and denied
in part and terminated. To the extent future relief on these grounds is sought, new, particularized
Motions should be advised.
The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff's Fourth Motion to Compel [183], filed October 7,
2015, although the briefing is not completed. The parties should confer and attempt to apply the
principles of law and rulings set forth herein as to the issues referenced in that motion. The motion
may be withdrawn if an agreement can be reached, or, Defendant may file its written response.
Additional time will be granted for the briefing in an effort to facilitate this process.
The claims for relief in these cases are alleged to arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988,
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Constitution of the United States, the
Mississippi Constitution, and Mississippi common law. The state law claims appear to primarily
attack the procedure by which the City of Ridgeland accomplished the zoning changes at issue. The
federal law claims appear to primarily attack the zoning process itself and the City’s motivation for
the changes made. The discovery dispute currently before the Court relates to the federal law
claims, and federal common law regarding the privileges asserted applies. Fed. R. Evid. 501. As

2

a general rule, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving his entitlement to it. In re
Santa Fe Intern. Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001).
Attorney-Client Privilege. Because of the wide variety of communications withheld under
this privilege, the Court is compelled to set out what an attorney-client communication is, as well
as what it is not. Professor Wigmore defines the privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or the legal advisor (8) except the protection be waived.
Wigmore on Evidence § 2292 (2011 Supp.). The Restatement provides:
§ 68. Attorney-Client Privilege
Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege may
be invoked as provided in § 86 with respect to:
(1)
a communication
(2)
made between privileged persons
(3)
in confidence
(4)
for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.
Restatement Third, The Law Governing Lawyers § 69. Under the Restatement’s provisions, a
communication includes an expression through which a privileged person conveys information to
another privilege person or a record revealing that expression. Restatement Third, The Law
Governing Lawyers § 70. Privileged persons include the client, the lawyer, and the agents of each.
Id. A communication is made in confidence if, at the time it is made, the person communicating it
believes that no one but a privileged person will learn its contents. Id. The communication is for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice if it is made to a lawyer to obtain legal advice or made from
the lawyer and revealing confidential communications from the client. Id. In discussing the
boundaries of the privilege, the Fifth Circuit has stated:

3

Inquiry into the general nature of the legal services provided by counsel does not
necessitate an assertion of the privilege because the general nature of services is not
protected by the privilege. Further inquiry into the substance of the client’s and
attorney’s discussions does implicate the privilege and an assertion is required to
preserve the privilege. A client’s specific request to an attorney and pertinent
information related thereto fall within the reaches of the privilege. Additionally, the
research undertaken by an attorney to respond to a client’s request also falls within
the reaches of the privilege.
Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 1999). The privilege may be waived by
selectively disclosing portions of those communications; however, the privilege is not waived where
the party seeking protection has raised the defense of reliance of counsel, unless that party
voluntarily injected that issue into the case. Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 788 (5th
Cir. 1988). Finally, the privilege protects communications; it does not protect the underlying facts.
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981). The Court’s illustration of this principle is
instructive: “The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to
the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because
he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” Id.
A review of these authorities demonstrates that simply referencing an attorney’s name in a
writing does not make it a privileged document. Mentioning that an attorney was contacted likewise
fails to bring the document within the bounds of the privilege, unless the substance of a confidential
communication is disclosed. A document that merely notes that an attorney has failed to call most
certainly falls outside the scope of the privilege. These examples are relevant to the ruling of the
Court on the specific documents presented to it for in camera review, as noted below.

Work Product Privilege
4

The work product doctrine is codified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A), “Ordinarily, a party
may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or other agent).” It is distinct from, and broader than, the attorney-client
privilege. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). While litigation need not necessarily
be imminent, creation of the document must be primarily motivated by the need to aid in possible
future litigation. United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). Documents
assembled in the ordinary course of business are not protected by this doctrine. United States v. El
Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982). The documents must be confidential, and disclosure
must be inconsistent with the adversary system. Butler v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corrections,
Again, these are the principles that have guided the Court in the individual rulings listed below.
Legislative Privilege
The doctrine of legislative immunity arises from the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution of the United States. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 6. (“The Senators and Representatives . .
. . for any Speech or Debate in either House . . . shall not be questioned in any other Place.”)
Although state and local legislators are not covered by the federal Constitution, federal courts accord
state and local legislators similar protection under common law. Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 653 F.2d
1188, 1993 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (“[L]ocal legislators are entitled to
absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for conduct in the furtherance of their duties.”). The
doctrine extends to staff members, officers, or other members of a legislative body, although it is
“less absolute” when applied to these figures. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).

5

The fact that the activity in question was accomplished by a person occupying a legislative
office is not determinative. “Absolute immunity applies to activities, not offices.” Bryan v. City of
Madison, Miss., 213 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, “[l]egislative immunity protects officials
fulfilling legislative functions even if they are not ‘legislators.’” Lee v. Whispering Oaks Home
Owners Ass’n, 797 F. Supp. 2d 749 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Hughes, 948 F.2d at 920). Guidelines
for determining whether activity is legislative include whether the body is formulating policy or
enforcing it. Hughes v. Tarrant County Texas, 948 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1991):
The first test focuses on the nature of the facts used to reach the given decision. If
the underlying facts on which the decision is based are “legislative facts,” such as
“generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs,” then the decision is
legislative. If the facts used in the decisionmaking are more specific, such as those
that relate to particular individuals or situations, then the decision is administrative.
The second test focuses on the “particularity of the impact of the state action.” If the
action involves establishment of a general policy, it is legislative; if the action
single[s] out specific individuals and affect[s] them differently from others, it is
administrative.
Id. (quoting Cullen v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984). “[Z]oning is generally a legislative
activity.”). Weingarten Realty Investors v. Silvia, 376 F. App’x 408, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2010).
Weingarten involved property included in the City’s Comprehensive Plan as an area that would
“support large commercial retail use.” A developer purchased land for commercial development in
reliance on that statement, but, when he filed a rezoning application it was denied. The developer
claimed that denial was not a legislative act because it was not taken to establish a general zoning
policy but to single him out and thwart his development efforts.

The Fifth Circuit disagreed,

stating, “The zoning decision affected contracts and had other ramifications, but the Defendants’
actions were legislative.” Id. at 411.

6

In this case, however, the “legislators,” i.e. city aldermen, are not defendants in this action.
The only Defendant is the City of Ridgeland, which has no legislative immunity. Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). The issue
here, then, is whether legislative immunity from liability extends to provide a legislative privilege
against providing evidence or testimony. The doctrines are related, but not the same. See Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977). There, the
issue was whether the Village’s refusal to change the zoning designation of a particular tract of land
was racially discriminatory. In affirming the lower courts’ denials of relief, the Supreme Court
noted the difficulty in proving discriminatory intent, “Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available.” Id. at 266. The Court then identified the types of evidence
that might establish a discriminatory intent: a clear pattern of racial impact from official action, the
historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision,
departures from the normal decisional process, and legislative history. Id. at 267-68. Then the
Court stated, “In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial to
testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even then such testimony frequently
will be barred by privilege.” Id. at 268 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974)
(executive privilege); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislative privilege)).
Some district courts in the Fifth Circuit have held that the associated evidentiary privilege
is qualified. In Perez v. Perry, 2014 WL 106927 at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014), the court held that
the legislative privilege can only be applied after a balancing of the interests of the party seeking

7

disclosure against the interests of the party claiming the privilege. That test includes the following
factors:
(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the availability of other
evidence; (iii) the ‘seriousness’ of the litigation and the issues involved; (iv) the role
of the government in the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future timidity by
government employees who will be forced to recognize that their secrets are violable.
Id. To similar effect was the decision on a Voter ID case claiming discriminatory intent on the part
of state legislators. Veasey v. Perry, Civil Action No. 2:13cv193, 2014 WL 1340077 at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 3, 2014). Another court came to the same decision regarding local legislators in Hobart
v. City of Stafford, 784 F. Supp. 2d 732, 763-64 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (excessive force case).
Applying those principles to the documents at issue in this litigation, the Court must first
review the documents to see whether they are legislative in nature. If the documents pertain to the
development of a zoning ordinance that would apply generally within the City, then the legislative
privilege will apply. If the information is relevant only to enforcement of the City’s ordinance on
a specific piece of property, the underlying action was not legislative, and the privilege will not
apply. Where the privilege is applied to the documents in the list below, the Plaintiff may seek a
further ruling on their discoverability by satisfying the balancing test noted above.
Deliberative Process Privilege
This privilege is more typically asserted in cases challenging the decisions of administrative
agencies. It is similar to the work product privilege, which protects the mental process of an
attorney, but it covers “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975). For federal agencies, the exemption has been
defined by FOIA, in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). That provision exempts from disclosure “inter-agency
8

or intra-agency memorandums of letters which would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency.” The privilege is designed to foster open and frank
discussion among the agency’s decision-makers. Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Prot.
Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 9 (2001). It covers inter-agency and intra-agency communications between and
among employees. In certain instances, it may cover communications with an outside consultant.
Id. at 10. The privilege does not, however, protect purely factual or objective material. EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-89 (1973); Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 881 (5th Cir.
1981). The determination of whether material is factual must be done on a case-by-case basis;
information cannot be deemed purely factual just because it includes facts. If the document contains
an assessment or evaluation of the facts, it is covered by the privilege. Skelton v. U.S. Postal
Service, 678 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1982). If, however, the factual material can be separated from the
material involving opinions, policy formations, and recommendations without compromising the
latter material, that information should be produced. Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d
873, 882 (5th Cir. 1981).
In an earlier case in this Court, Judge Barbour ruled that the deliberative process privilege
could not be applied to a state agency, even though jurisdiction over the case was based on a federal
question. Buford v. Holladay, 133 F.R.D. 487, 494 (S. D. Miss. 1990). He reached this conclusion
after an examination of state and federal common law, under which he found no authority for
extending this privilege beyond federal agencies. Id.; but see Thompson v. City of Meridian, 2011
WL 738443 at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 24, 2011) (dismissing motion to quash based on deliberative
process privilege as premature). In contrast, a Louisiana court applied the privilege to protect
predecisional and deliberative documents withheld by Louisiana’s Office of Financial Institutions.

9

Janvey v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 2015 WL 2453730 at *3 (M.D. La. May 22, 2015). In fairness,
however, it does not appear that the agency’s status as an arm of the state, rather than the federal,
government was raised. Similarly, a Texas court found that the privilege applied to documents held
by a city’s Police Chief’s Advisory Action Board. Doe v. San Antonio, 2014 WL 6390890 at *
(W.D Tex. Nov. 17, 2014); see also Kluth v. City of Converse, Texas, 2005 WL 1799555 at *2
(W.D. Tex. July 27, 2005). In so doing, the court cited numerous cases across the country where
the privilege had been applied in the context of lawsuits against police departments, although
admitting that “the issue has never been directly addressed in the Fifth Circuit . . . .” Id. at *3.
Another Louisiana court discussed the privilege with regard to a state agency, although ultimately
finding the material at issue not protected because it was not predecisional. Gulf Prod. Co., Inc. v.
Hoover Oilfield Supply, 2011 WL 1321607 at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2011); see also Klein v. Jefferson
Parish School Bd., 2003 WL 1873909 at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2003).
The Court is of the opinion that Judge Barbour’s well-reasoned opinion in Buford should
control in this instance and preclude the application of the deliberative process privilege to a nonfederal agency. As Judge Barbour noted, however, the analysis of this issue should include a
recognition of any pertinent privilege created by state law, “‘where they can be accomplished at no
substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy.’” Buford, 133 F.R.D. at 493-94
(quoting Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). In an abundance of
caution, therefore, the Court has undertaken a review of state law to determine whether the
deliberative process privilege has been recognized under Mississippi law since Judge Barbour issued
his opinion. The review turned up no more recent case or legislation that would justify a change in

10

the holding in Buford. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the deliberative process privilege
does not apply to the documents at issue in this case.
Based on the analysis of the various privileges outlined above, the Court has reviewed the
documents withheld by the City of Ridgeland and described in the various privilege logs that have
been presented to the Court. In addition to the privileges asserted, in a few instances, the City
objected to producing the information on grounds that it was irrelevant. Where the nature of the
information clearly brought it within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the Court has indicated
that it need not be produced.

Privilege Log of Documents Withheld from Production
Tab Description
Ruling
1

Email transmittal of
Engagement Letter

Not exempt; no confidential information included

2

Email response, re:
budgeting for attys

Not exempt; no confidential information included

3

Email response, re:
budgeting for attys

Not exempt; no confidential information included

4

Email forwarding
Assgmt & Assump.
Agreement

Not exempt; no confidential information included

5

Email, re: previous doc

Not exempt; no confidential information included

6

Email, re: continuance

Not exempt; no confidential information included

7

Email, re: continuance

Not exempt; no confidential information included

8

Email forwarding
Transcript

Not exempt – transcript of public hearing

9

Email discussing proposed
motion

Not exempt; no attorney client conversation disclosed

11

10

Email notice that lawsuit
imminent

Not exempt; no attorney client conversation disclosed

11

Email forwarding proposed
minutes

Not exempt; no confidential information included

12

Email, re: legal implications Exempt as attorney-client communication
of media inquiry

13

Email, re: conversation with Not exempt; no attorney client information disclosed;
atty for another party
conversation with third party

14

Email transmitting previous Not exempt for same reasons as Doc #13
document

15

Email transmitting previous Not exempt for same reasons as Doc #13
documents to counsel

16

Email transmitting proposed Not exempt; no advice or strategy discussed
Bill of Exceptions as
reviewed and approved by
attys

17

Email notice, re:
Baymeadows has started
repairs and it is raining

Not exempt; no confidential information disclosed

18

Email forwarding previous
document

Not exempt for same reasons as Doc #17

19

Email forwarding court
order

Not exempt; no confidential information disclosed

20

Email, re: conversation

Exempt as attorney-client communication

21

Email forwarding schedule
for zoning ordinance

Exempt as work product

22

Email forwarding draft of
new zoning ordinance with
highlighted changes to atty

Exempt as work product

23

Email forwarding later
proposed zoning ordinance

Exempt as work product

12

with highlighted changes
to atty
24

Email forwarding later
Exempt as work product
proposed zoning
ordinances with highlighted
changes to atty

25

Email forwarding proposed
zoning ordinances with
highlighted changes to atty

Exempt as work product

26

Email forwarding latest
zoning ordinance to Mayor
with copies to counsel and
cover letter discussing
atty work, opinions

Exempt as work product

27

Email forwarding Zoning
Commissioner’s questions
to counsel

Exempt as work product

28

Email forwarding final
version of Zoning
Ordinance to counsel

Not exempt; no confidential information disclosed

Privilege Log of Meeting Minutes with Mayor
Bates No.
Description
Ruling
13833
13830
13825
13823
13818

Conversation with attys, re:
condo
Code Enforcement email
Attorney Work
Attorney work & handwritten comment
Lamar Bailey
Comprehensive Plan Sched
Attorney work

13777

Attorney Questions
Apt. Mgr Meeting

13774

Attorney Work

Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Irrelevant
Not exempt, no attorney-client communication
Not exempt under attorney-client communication;
first two bullet points exempt under legislative
privilege; second two bullet points not exempt
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Not exempt as attorney-client communication; exempt
under legislative privilege
Not exempt as attorney-client communication
13

13759
13757
13755

13754
13752
13750
13748
13746
13745
13743
13740
13735
14834
14836
14838
14840
14842
14843
14844

14845
14846

14847
14848
14849
14849
14851

Baymeadows update
Apartment info
Attorney Questions
Log village

Exempt; attorney-client communication
Not exempt as attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Not exempt as attorney-client communication or
legislative privilege
Baymeadows update
Not exempt as attorney-client communication, as date
that brief is due is not confidential
Baymeadows update
Not exempt as attorney-client communication
Same as previous document Same as previous document
Hester Cabin Bldg Permit
Not exempt as attorney-client communication
SER Legislation redaction Exempt; attorney-client communication
South Wheatley
Not exempt as attorney-client communication
SER
Not exempt as attorney-client communication
OARC
Exempt; attorney-client communication
South Wheatley
Exempt; attorney-client communication
City center
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Amortization
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Comments, re: Chris Bates Exempt; irrelevant & confidential personnel matter
Comments on work
Not exempt; no attorney-client communication
assigned to attys
Same as previous document Same as previous document
Same as previous document Same as previous document
Comments, re: L. Bailey
Exempt; irrelevant
Comments, re: legal work
Not exempt; no attorney-client communication
Comments, re: Legal work Exempt; attorney-client communication
Comments, re: L. Bailey
Exempt; irrelevant
Comments, re: conversation Exempt; attorney-client communication
with attorney on plan
Comments, re: legal work
First two bullet points exempt as legislative privilege;
second two bullet points not exempt
Comments, re: L. Bailey
Exempt; irrelevant
Comments, re: legal work
Exempt; legislative privilege
Comments, re: urban
Not exempt; no confidential information disclosed
renewal
Comments, re: legal work
Exempt; deliberative process
Comments, re: plan update Not exempt; no attorney-client communication
Comments, re: Renaissance Exempt; irrelevant
Comments, re: Northpark
Exempt; irrelevant
Comments, re: SE Ridgeland Exempt; attorney-client communication
Comments, re: OARC
Possibly irrelevant; attorneys to clarify
Comments, re: paternity
Exempt; irrelevant
leave
Comments, re: SE Ridgeland Not exempt; no attorney client communication;
exempt as legislative privilege
14

14855
14857
14860
14861
14862
14863
14871
14879

Comments, re: paternity
Exempt; irrelevant
leave
Comments, re: sick leave
Exempt; irrelevant
Comments, re: 21-19-11
Possibly irrelevant; attorneys to clarify
Appears to have redaction, but not discussed in privilege log
Comments, re: work on
Property Maintenance Code
Comments, re: work on
school residency
Comments, re: Property
Maintenance Code
Comments, re: City Center
Contract
Attorney Questions
Apt. Manager Meeting

Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
No attorney-client communication; Exempt as
legislative privilege
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
No attorney-client communication
Not exempt as attorney-client communication or
legislative privilege
Not exempt as attorney-client communication or
legislative privilege
Exempt; Irrelevant
Not exempt; no attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Not exempt; no attorney-client communication
Exempt; attorney-client communication

14880
14881
14883
14887
14913

Attorney Questions
Attorney Questions
Attorney Questions
Work on Baymeadows
Attorney Fees

14914

Hester Cabin Bldg. Permit

14921

Cherry Laurel
South Wheatley
South Wheatley
South Wheatley
Amortization of NonConformities
S Wheatley Lawsuit
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Amortization of NonNo attorney-client communication; exempt as
Conformities
legislative privilege
Same as preceding document Same as preceding document
Baymeadows
No attorney-client communication
Amortization of NonSame as Docs.14933, 14935
Conformities
Amortization of NonNot exempt as attorney-client communication; not
Conformities
exempt as
Amortization of NonExempt as attorney-client communication; not exempt
Conformities
as legislative privilege
Baymeadow
Not exempt as attorney-client communication; not
confidential

14925
14927
14929
14930
14933
14935
14937
14938
14942
14943

15

14945

14947
14948
14950
14951
14953
14958
14960
14966
14970

Butler Snow Agreement

Exempt as Attorney-client communication; not
exempt as legislative privilege
Baymeadows
Not exempt as attorney-client communication; not
confidential
Butler Snow Agreement
Same as preceding document
Zoning Ordinance
No communication; not exempt as legislative
privilege
Appears to have redaction, but not mentioned in privilege log
Baymeadows
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Zoning Ordinance
Exempt; attorney-client communication
Zoning Ordinance
Not exempt as attorney-client communication; not
exempt as legislative privilege
Zoning Ordinance
Not exempt as attorney-client communication; not
exempt as legislative privilege
Zoning Ordinance
Not attorney-client communication; exempt as
legislative privilege
Meeting Note change
Not attorney-client communication; exempt as
legislative privilege

OTHER REDACTED DOCUMENTS
Description
Ruling
11/2/09 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
2/16/10 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
8/9/10 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
8/23/10 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
4/18/11 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
8/15/11 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
9/26/11 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
8/15/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
7/8/13 Staff Meeting Notes
First redaction not exempt, no confidential information;
second and third redactions exempt as legislative privilege
7/22/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication
8/19/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
9/30/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
2/16/10 Staff Meeting Notes
Exempt as attorney-client communication
10/7/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
10/14/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
10/28/13 Staff Meeting Notes
Not exempt, no confidential information
6/15/11 email from Gene McGee
Not exempt; communication with attorney for another party
6/23/11 email from Alan Hart
Not exempt; communication with attorney for another party
11/19/09 email
Exempt as attorney-client communication and work product
SER Project Update
Exempt as work product and legislative privilege

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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the following Motions are hereby GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part, as outlined above:
1.

BBC Baymeadows, LLC’s Second Motion to Compel [Doc. 87];

2.

BBC Baymeadows, LLC’s Urgent and Necessitous Third Motion to Compel [Doc.
118];

3.

Motion of Non-Parties, Kevin Holder, Chuck Gautier, Wesley Hamlin, Scott Jones,
D. I. Smith, Brian Ramsey, and Ken Heard to Quash Deposition Subpoena Duces
Tecum and for Protective Order [Doc. 140];

4.

Motion of Non-Party Mayor Gene McGee to Quash Deposition Subpoena Duces
Tecum and for Protective Order [Doc. 142]; and,

5.

City of Ridgeland’s Urgent or Necessitous Motion for Protective Order [Doc. 146].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, City of Ridgeland, produce the documents
described above as not exempt to the Plaintiffs on or before October 28, 2015.
SO ORDERED, this the 13th day of October, 2015.

S/ Linda R. Anderson____________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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