Mardis v. Kemper Neshoba Regional Correctional Facility

Filing 32

Memorandum Opinion and Order. The 1 Complaint filed Plaintiff is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)and (ii). Final Judgment shall be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 10/27/2015. (ACF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER RYAN MARDIS
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV716-LRA

KEMPER COUNTY

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge sua sponte for evaluation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2), applies to prisoner proceedings in forma pauperis and provides that "the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .(B) the action or
appeal -- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief." A plaintiff’s claim shall be dismissed if “it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact,
such as when a prisoner alleges the violation of a legal interest that does not exist.”
Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1998).
The parties appeared and participated in an omnibus hearing before the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on March 18, 2015, at the Jackson Federal
Courthouse in Jackson, Mississippi. Christopher Ryan Mardis (“Plaintiff” or “Mardis”)
appeared pro se, and Defendants were represented by J. Chadwick Williams, Allen,
Allen, Breeland & Allen, PLLC, P. Box 751, Brookhaven, Mississippi 39602.

The hearing was conducted under the authority of Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d
179 (5th Cir. 1985), and its progeny. Mardis explained his claims under oath to the Court,
and this explanation has been considered in conjunction with the allegations contained in
the Complaint and pleadings.
FACTS
Jurisdiction of this case is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was initially
housed at the Lauderdale County Detention Facility [LCDF] in May of 2014. He was
charged with robbery and a parole violation at that time. Mardis testified that he was
having problems and getting into physical altercations with the other inmates at LCDF.
He was finally “jumped on” by other inmates and was transferred to the Kemper County
Jail “for safety and security issues.”
Upon his arrival in Kemper County, Mardis contends that his file had the notation
that he should not be housed around Terrance Reed, an inmate he had problems with in
LCDF. Yet the first Sunday there, he went to church. Terrence Reed walked in
afterwards and tried to hit Mardis. Mardis defended himself, and they began fighting in
church. Mardis was sent back to his zone and told that he would be transferred back to
LCDF as a result of the fight. Plaintiff testified that he was not hurt as a result of the
fight, as Reed “couldn’t fight, not really.” Neither of them hurt the other. They were
never housed near each other again, as the officials made sure of it. When asked what his
damages were, Mardis testified that he had to “sit there and be miserable....You had to sit

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there and be housed with people that you didn’t want to be housed with you. You were
uncomfortable at all times.”
Mardis claims that Lauderdale County should not have sent its prisoners to
Kemper County. Furthermore, Kemper County should not house all of its inmates
together. According to Mardis, it houses Lauderdale County inmates with Kemper
County inmates, both misdemeanors and state inmates...”they just mingle us all together.”
Mardis testified that his claim is based on safety and security issues and wrongful
housing.
Mardis also testified that he was housed in Kemper County for about three weeks,
and then he escaped by jumping over a fence. Kemper County labeled Mardis as “armed
and dangerous” after the escape, and this was reported by the news stations. This caused
a civilian to “act as a hero” and shoot at Mardis. He was arrested three miles from the
jail. He was not shot or injured when arrested after the escape, but he is suing Kemper
County for libel and slander because some county official (possibly the warden) reported
that he was armed and dangerous. Mardis claims this was untrue because he had no
weapon and he had never been convicted of a violent crime.
Plaintiff testified regarding his specific complaints, and the Court refers to his
sworn testimony from this hearing [See transcript at 31]. The Court also refers to the
initial Complaint and pleadings for other details of the claims against Defendant.

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LEGAL ANALYSIS
Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners
from violence by other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Cantu v.
Jones, 293 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 2002). To establish a failure-to-protect claim under
section 1983, Plaintiff must show that he is/was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to
his need for protection. Newton v. Black, 133 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 1998); Neals v.
Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, to act with deliberate indifference,
"the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw the inference." Newton, 133
F.3d at 308 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Whether a prison official had the
requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact. Neals, 59 F.3d at 533.
Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Board of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty v. Brown, 530 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
Mardis conceded to the Court that he was not physically injured by inmate Reed
or any other inmate; he suffered mentally due to being housed near Reed. 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e) provides that "[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.

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The "physical injury" required by § 1997(e) "must be more than de [minimis] but need
not be significant." Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999).
In this case, considering the facts as stated by Mardis, no constitutional claim has
been alleged because he suffered no actual physical injury resulting from the prison
officials' purported failure to protect him. See Castellano v. Treon, 79 Fed.Appx. 6 (5th
Cir. 2003) (no error in dismissing failure to protect claim as frivolous when there is no
actual physical injury); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
statutory bar of recovery for emotional or mental damages absent a physical injury);
Luong v. Hatt, 979 F.Supp. 481, 485 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (citing statutory bar in failure to
protect case). Although the inmate Reed began to assault him, Reed “couldn’t really
fight,” and Mardis was never actually injured except "mentally." Furthermore, Mardis
was then transferred to Lauderdale County and the transfer rendered moot any claims for
injunctive relief. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th
Cir. 1991).
The Court in Farmer clearly stated that "[n]ot every injury by one prisoner at the
hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for
the victim's safety." 511 U.S. at 834. In this case, Mardis had no injury, and the law does
not allow him to recover a monetary judgment against Kemper County under these
circumstances.
Mardis contends that Kemper County “mingles” all the inmates convicted of
misdemeanors and felonies, as well as Kemper and Lauderdale inmates. However, it is
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not per se unconstitutional to house pretrial detainees and convicted inmates together.
Galo v. Gusman, Civil Action No. 13-4874-SS, 2014 WL 1689305 at *1 (E.D. La., Apr.
29, 2014). Some circumstances permit the housing of pretrial detainees with convicted
inmates. Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1993). There is no
constitutional prohibition in housing two counties’ inmates together under any
circumstances. Since Mardis was not harmed due to his housing, no further analysis of
this issue is necessary.
Mardis includes a state law libel and slander claim against Kemper County for
allegedly telling the news stations that he was “armed and dangerous” after he admittedly
escaped. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.

The Court finds that the facts asserted by Mardis do not state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and his Complaint is frivolous under the law. For this reason, it is
the recommendation of the undersigned that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Final Judgment in favor of Defendant
Kemper County shall be entered.
SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of October 2015.

/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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