Alexander v. State of Mississippi et al
Filing
111
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 86 MOTION to Dismiss; granting motion Nos. 60 , 62 , ]64], 66 , 68 , 70 , 82 , 98 to dismiss federal claims; denying as moot Motions to Strike - Docket Nos. 90 , 91 . 92 . 93 , 94 , 95 , [96 ] and 97 ; granting 79 MOTION to dismiss; denying 72 MOTION for relief from civil rights violations; granting 26 MOTION to Dismiss; granting 81 MOTION to Dismiss the Lawrence County Board of Supervisors, as set out h erein. As the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, those claims will be dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 11/17/15 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
JAMES ALEXANDER
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15CV129TSL-RHW
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AND
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND
CHANCERIES, EACH, OF THE COUNTIES OF:
LAWRENCE (KEVIN RAYBORN)
PEARL RIVER (DAVID EARL JOHNSON)
JEFFERSON (DELORES FRYE)
HINDS (EDDIE JEAN CARR)
MADISON (RONNY LOTT)
RANKIN (LARRY SWALES)
COPIAH (STEVE AMOS)
LAMAR (WAYNE SMITH)
MARSHALL (CHUCK THOMAS)
LINCOLN (TILLMON BISHOP)
AND
CITY COUNSEL AND (CITY CLERK)
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Most of the defendants herein have filed motions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c) to dismiss
and/or for judgment on the pleadings, which are now pending before
the court for decision.
Plaintiff James Alexander has responded
to these motions and has filed his own “Pro Se Special Appearance,
Motions for Relief from Civil Rights Violations, Particularly of
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 3,
Sections No. 16, No. 24 and No. 25 of the Mississippi
Constitution, Through Release of Title Deeds to Land and Property
Owned in Above Noted Counties and City, Pursuant to the
Mississippi Code of 1972 Governing Land Lien Purchases and
Redemptions; and Motions for Payment of All Applicable Damages;
and Motions for Reimbursement of All Relative Litigation Costs,
including Attorneys’ Fees; and/or Relief in the Form of Monetary
Penalties in Value of Land for Which Title Deeds Continue to be
Withheld.”
Having considered these motions, the court concludes
that defendants’ motions to dismiss/for judgment on the pleadings
should be granted and plaintiff’s motion for relief – which in
substance is in the nature of a motion to amend – should be
denied.
The Amended Complaint
On May 7, 2015, plaintiff James Alexander, proceeding pro se,
filed an amended complaint1 in this cause against the State of
Mississippi, the Boards of Supervisors and Chancery Clerks of the
Counties of Lawrence, Pearl River, Jefferson, Hinds, Madison,
Copiah, Lamar, Marshall and Lincoln Counties, and the City Counsel
and City Clerk of the City of Brookhaven.2
In this amended
1
Plaintiff has previously filed his original complaint on
February 24, 2015. While summons was issued, that complaint
apparently was never served on any defendant.
2
Plaintiff’s amended complaint recites that other
individuals are involved, as well, including “justices chancellor
Cynthia Brewer of Madison County, Chancellor Shoemake of Lawrence
County....; Marshall County Tax Collector, Kay Pace; Madison
County Chancery Office Clerk, Kim Sievers and Judge Mammie Kin,
Kim Horn and Stephanie [no last name provided] of the Madison
County Justice of the Peace Offices.” However, he has not named
any of these individuals as defendants or served them with
process.
2
complaint, Alexander alleges that over a period of approximately
twenty-five years, he purchased land through tax sales in these
various counties throughout Mississippi, and yet following the tax
sales and subsequent statutory two-year waiting period, the
chancery clerks in these counties have systematically and
continuously refused to provide him the property deeds as required
by Mississippi Code Annotated § 27-45-3l.
He states that he is in
possession of between 300 to 400 redemption receipts that the
respective chancery clerks have refused to honor.
Alexander
alleges that he sent certified letters to the various chancery
clerks explaining his position and challenging them to provide to
him a written explanation of the basis for their refusal to honor
his redemption receipts; but they either did not respond or
provided him an incorrect and/or inadequate explanation.
Alexander alleges that the chancery clerks’ actions constitute
“ongoing violations of The Mississippi Code of 1972" and the
Mississippi Constitution, and “ongoing civil rights violations,”
particularly his right to equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
He
asserts that the State of Mississippi is liable as the “employer”
of the chancery clerks “as it failed to insure compliance and
accountability of its actors to said code of law, and by it, have
[sic] failed to protect, even denied [the Plaintiff] my Civil
Rights.”
As relief, he seeks an order requiring “release of Title
3
Deeds owned by me ... pursuant to the law of the Mississippi code
of 1972 governing lien Purchases and Redemptions” and for damages
in the amount of $20,000,000 associated with deprivation and
denial of the said title deeds.
Standard for Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)/12(c)
All but one of the defendant chancery clerks have moved for
dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and/or 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, of plaintiff’s sole federal claim,
namely, that he suffered a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection.3
Brookhaven City Clerk Mike Jinks has
likewise moved under Rule 12(c) to dismiss plaintiff’s federal
equal protection claim.4
Motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are
subject to the same standard.
418 (5th Cir. 2008).
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,
The central issue on both motions is whether
3
Madison County Chancery Clerk Ronny Lott has not filed a
motion to dismiss. However, the court may consider sua sponte
whether a claim should be dismissed for failure to state a viable
claim for relief. See Shawnee Int'l v. Hondo Drilling Co., 742
F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a district court may
sua sponte dismiss for failure to state a claim).
4
Previously the court granted motions to dismiss by the
Boards of Supervisors of Pearl River, Jefferson, Hinds, Madison,
Copiah, Lamar and Lincoln Counties on the basis that these were
not separate legal entities capable of being sued. The Marshall,
Lawrence and Rankin County Boards of Supervisors have now moved to
dismiss on the same basis. Their motions will be granted.
4
the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, states a valid claim for relief.
Id.
To state a claim
for relief, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672-73, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id.
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.’
Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’”
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
Equal Protection
The sole purported federal claim appearing in plaintiff’s
amended complaint is that he suffered a deprivation of his right
to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
“The Equal
Protection Clause protects individuals from governmental action
that works to treat similarly situated individuals differently.”
Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To state a
claim for an equal protection violation, the “plaintiff must
either allege that (a) a state actor intentionally discriminated
5
against [him] because of membership in a protected class or (b) he
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.”
Gibson v. Tex. Dep't of Ins.-Div. of Workers' Comp.,
700 F.3d 227, 238 (5th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Based on its
thorough review of plaintiff’s amended complaint, the court
concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation
of his right to equal protection.
Plaintiff repeatedly asserts in
his amended complaint that defendants violated his civil rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him “Equal Protection of
said rights and of its own Laws ... through ongoing violations of
The Mississippi Code.”
support this claim.
However, he has alleged no facts to
He has not alleged or even intimated that any
of the defendants intentionally discriminated against him because
of membership in a protected class or that he has been treated
differently from other similarly situated individuals.
In July, well after defendants had filed their answers and/or
motions to dismiss, plaintiff filed a document which is styled,
“Pro Se Special Appearance, Motions for Relief from Civil Rights
Violations, Particularly of the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 3, Sections No. 16, No. 24 and No. 25 of
the Mississippi Constitution, Through Release of Title Deeds to
Land and Property Owned in Above Noted Counties and City, Pursuant
6
to the Mississippi code of 1972 Governing Land Line Purchases and
Redemptions; and Motions for Payment of All Applicable Damages;
and Motions for Reimbursement of All Relative Litigation Costs,
including Attorneys’ Fees; and/or Relief in the Form of Monetary
Penalties in Value of Land for Which Title Deeds Continue to be
Withheld” (Motion for Relief).
In this submission, plaintiff sets
forth, at length, his position as to the correct interpretation of
Mississippi law regarding defendants’ tax lien obligations, and he
further purports to undertake to show, among other things,
“specific points of Civil Rights violations on part” of the
chancery clerks, for whose acts and/or omissions the State is
alleged to be accountable.
In addition to alleging violation of
his equal protection rights, plaintiff refers in this submission
to violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, to
which there was not so much as a passing reference in his amended
complaint.
A number of defendants have moved to strike plaintiff’s
motion for relief on the basis that it appears to be a second
amended complaint that was filed without leave of court, in
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
They ask that in
the event the court does not consider this to be a second amended
complaint, “the court provide guidance as to the exact nature of
this pleading.”
Plaintiff has filed a response to the motions to
strike in which he attempts to explain the document.
7
He states:
“[M]y July filing was ... a file of my case brief and exhibits
applicable to the argument and detailed facts of my suit against
the State of Mississippi and its actors....
I simply request that
of decision made in this matter, [defendants] not be relieved of
any obligation pursuant to all applicable requirements of the law
and court in this case.”
The court is unsure as to the proper characterization or
treatment of plaintiff’s motion for relief.
If plaintiff had
intended it as an amended complaint – an intention which he
appears to disavow – it would be stricken for noncompliance with
Rule 15.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing that after a
responsive pleading has been filed, “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave”).
It also could be interpreted as a motion to
amend to expound upon the factual basis of his existing claim(s)
and to add a claim for alleged due process violations.
In that
case, the motion would be denied on the basis of futility.
See
Carney v. Lewis, No. 3:14CV286TSL-JCG, 2014 WL 7231772, at *4
(S.D. Miss. Dec. 18, 2014) (stating that “[w]hile Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15 provides that ‘court[s] should freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires,’ the court may deny
leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.”); see also
Hopson v. Chase Home Finance LLC, Civil Action No.
3:12CV505TSL–JMR, 2014 WL 1411811, at *16 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 11,
8
2014) (denying request to amend as futile where the plaintiffs
“failed to articulate any factual basis to support any other
claims that would be more plausible than the ones they have
already attempted to assert”).
As in his amended complaint, plaintiff refers in his motion
for relief to the defendant chancery clerks’ “[o]ngoing violations
of my Civil Rights” based on “more than twenty-five (25) years
failure to release deeds and/or payments with interest as required
by Statutes of Mississippi Tax Code of 1972 regarding tax lien
obligation ....”
However, as in his amended complaint, while
plaintiff contends his equal protection rights were violated, he
does not assert/allege/argue that he was treated differently from
any similarly situated person or persons, whether on account of
his membership in a protected class or otherwise.5
5
In the next to last paragraph of this 35-page document,
plaintiff states:
Said defendants have with contentment repetitively
violated my civil liberties in heartless and determined
acts of denial of release of my deeds or applicable
payments. As being conducted by a race of individuals
without understanding of the standard struggles of black
men to gain wealth, through the senselessness of it all,
it remains impossible for me to rule out racism as a
factor in the ongoing resistance.
To the court’s knowledge, this is the only reference to race (or
his membership in a protected class) in any of plaintiff’s
submissions in this case. And even in this statement, he does not
allege he was discriminated against because of his race. He
states only that he cannot rule out racism. Moreover, nowhere in
this document does he claim that he was treated differently from
any other similarly situated person or persons.
9
Plaintiff asserts in his motion for relief that his due
process rights were violated.
However, the facts he has recited
as apparent support for this assertion would not state a viable
claim for relief against any of the named defendants.
In this
regard, plaintiff refers to the “Chanceries’ ... gross failure of
Due Process of law governing Mississippi land acquisitions and
their determined refusal to honor my purchaser’s rights on tax
purchase and redemption lien obligations as per the Statutes of
Mississippi Tax Code of 1972.”
He goes on to state:
Ongoing, multitude of years, failure to follow
procedures of the Law of Mississippi Tax Code of 1972
has occurred by refusal on part of noted Chanceries of
noted Counties to release property deeds and/or make
monetary restitution to me as required by law,
perpetuates a violation of the 14th Amendment and of the
due process laws of this nation.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
property interests; however, the mere deprivation of a property
interest by government officials, without more, does not violate
the Due Process Clause; the deprivation must be without due
process.
See Brooks v. Miller, 620 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Miss.
1985).
A mere deprivation of a life, liberty or property
interest suffered at the hands of an individual acting
under color of state law is insufficient to establish a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, the deprivation must be without due
process. As a general proposition, due process requires
some sort of a pre-deprivation hearing. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S. Ct. 2701,
5705-06, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556-57 (1972). However, in
10
cases where the particular deprivation is the result of
random and unauthorized conduct by state employees,
rather than an “established state procedure,” see Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36, 102 S. Ct.
1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 277-78 (1982), a pre-deprivation
hearing is obviously impractical. In these cases,
whether the conduct inflicting the deprivation may be
characterized as negligent or intentional, an adequate
post-deprivation remedy will satisfy due process. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203, 82
L. Ed. 2d 393, 407 (1984) (intentional conduct); Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S. Ct. at 1916, 68 L.
Ed. 2d at 432 (negligent conduct).
Id.; see also Schoppa Family v. Kupersmith, 54 F. App'x 592 (5th
Cir. 2002) (explaining that under the Parrratt/Hudson doctrine,
where a Ҥ 1983 plaintiff alleges he has been deprived of property
without due process of law by a state officer's random and
unauthorized intentional conduct, rather than by an established
state procedure, there is no infringement of procedural due
process rights if there is an adequate state post-deprivation
remedy.’”).
Presumably, plaintiff’s position is that Mississippi state
tax sales statutes give him a property interest, protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, in the right of redemption and/or monies he
has tendered for the payment of property taxes on the properties
at issue.
Ausuming this is true, he still has not asserted a
viable due process claim because he has an adequate postdeprivation remedy under state law.
In Alexander v. Taylor, Civil
Action No. 3:02CV91-B-B (S.D. Miss. Jan. 24, 2003), a prior
lawsuit brought by this plaintiff and one L.J. Newsome against the
11
Marshall County Chancery Clerk, the plaintiffs had purchased a
number of parcels of property at tax sales and paid the delinquent
taxes to protect their investment, following which the record
owners redeemed their properties.
The plaintiffs filed suit
alleging that they were deprived of property without due process
when the chancery clerk failed to collect from the redeeming
landowners the amounts the plaintiffs had paid for delinquent
taxes and to reimburse the plaintiffs for the monies they had
paid.
The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing the
chancery clerk to issue them tax deeds to the property or,
alternatively, for reimbursement of the taxes they had paid.
The
court held that even if the plaintiffs were deprived of a property
interest in the monies they had paid, the deprivation was not
without due process, as state law provided them an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
The court stated:
Mississippi statutes provide the plaintiffs with
adequate post-deprivation remedies and the process they
are due under the law. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann.
§ 27-45-27,6 the amounts paid for taxes on the land
6
That statute states:
The amount paid by the purchaser of land at any tax sale
thereof for taxes, either state and county, levee or
municipal, and interest on the amount paid by the
purchaser at the rate of one and one-half percent
(1-1/2%) per month, or any fractional part thereof, and
all expenses of the sale and registration, thereof shall
be a lien on the land in favor of the purchaser and the
holder of the legal title under him, by descent or
purchase, if the taxes for which the land was sold were
due, although the sale was illegal on some other ground.
The purchaser and the holder of the legal title under
12
after its sale for delinquent taxes are a lien on the
land in favor of the purchaser. See Op. Att'y Gen. No.
93-0501, Hollimon, Sept. 8, 1993. The plaintiffs are
entitled to enforce their lien through a bill in
chancery. The plaintiffs may also, as they have done
here, seek a writ of mandamus. While this court
declines to issue such a writ in the present case,
instead reserving that determination for a state forum,
the existence and adequacy of the remedy precludes a
cognizable claim for violation of due process.
Id.
This court would note, further, that Mississippi law
recognizes that a chancery clerk’s “[f]ailure to make required
payments constitutes ‘misfeasance in office’ and permits a suit
against the clerk on his official bond.”
Alexander v. Taylor, 928
So. 2d 992, 998 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006); see also Miss. Code Ann.
§ 25-45-1 (“For a failure so to report or to pay over the sums to
the parties entitled thereto as herein required, he shall be
liable on his official bond to a penalty of one percent (1%) per
month on the amount withheld.”).
As plaintiff has adequate post-
deprivation remedies under state law, he has no cognizable due
him by descent or purchase, may enforce the lien by bill
in chancery, and may obtain a decree for the sale of the
land in default of payment of the amount within some
short time to be fixed by the decree. In all suits for
the possession of land, the defendant holding by descent
or purchase, mediately or immediately, from the
purchaser at tax sale of the land in controversy, may
set off against the complainant the above-described
claim, which shall have the same effect and be dealt
with in all respects as provided for improvements in a
suit for the possession of land. But the term “suits
for the possession of land,” as herein used, does not
include an action of unlawful entry and detainer.
Miss. Code. Ann. § 27-45-27.
13
process claims based on alleged failures by the defendant chancery
clerks to comply with their alleged statutory duties.
Alexander also asserts in his motion for relief that he has
suffered violations of his due process rights in connection with
litigation he previously brought in Lawrence and Madison Counties.
While his specific contentions are unclear, they all relate to
rulings made by state courts in cases brought by Alexander.
In
this regard, he states, among other things, that despite his
repeated requests, Lawrence County Chancellor David Shoemake has
failed to comply with an October 2011 ruling by the Mississippi
Court of Appeals in a case that plaintiff brought in state court.
Plaintiff has no viable due process claim on the basis of this
allegation.
Assuming his claim is true, plaintiff’s recourse is
not a due process claim in this court but a petition for writ of
mandamus in the state’s appellate courts.
Alexander further asserts that Madison County Chancellor
Cynthia Brewer’s opinion forever barring him from filing suit
against the State of Mississippi or the Madison County Chancery
Clerk with regard to certain parcels of property violates his due
process rights, as does the Mississippi Court of Appeals and/or
Mississippi Supreme Court’s handling of his appeal of Chancellor
Brewer’s ruling.7
Plaintiff’s motion suggests the state appellate
7
It appears from plaintiff’s motion for relief that the
appeal was dismissed as his notice of appeal was not timely filed.
14
court dismissed his appeal of the chancellor’s ruling on the
erroneous basis that his notice of appeal was not timely filed.
Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable in this court. Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts do not have jurisdiction
to review final judgments of state courts; only the Supreme Court
has that power.
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983).
“The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine occupies ‘narrow ground’: it bars only ‘cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.’”
Avdeef v. Royal Bank of Scotland,
P.L.C., No. 14-11039, 2015 WL 3541188, at *5 (5th Cir. June 8,
2015) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005)).
The
Fifth Circuit has explained that
“[a] state court judgment is attacked for purposes of
Rooker-Feldman when the [federal] claims are
‘inextricably intertwined’ with a challenged state court
judgment, or where the losing party in a state court
action seeks what in substance would be appellate review
of the state judgment.” Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank,
N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(second alteration in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). However, Rooker-Feldman “does
not preclude federal jurisdiction over an ‘independent
claim,’ even ‘one that denies a legal conclusion that a
state court has reached.’” Id. (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S.
at 293, 125 S. Ct. 1517). Indeed, the doctrine
“generally applies only where a plaintiff seeks relief
that directly attacks the validity of an existing state
15
court judgment.” Id. If the plaintiff claims damages
for injuries caused by the defendants' actions–even
those occurring during litigation-rather than injuries
arising from a state-court judgment itself, the federal
suit is not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Truong, 717
F.3d at 383.
Avdeef, 2015 WL 3541188, at *5.
Alexander has no “independent
claim”; the point of his purported due process claim here is to
seek relief from the state court’s rulings.
The court lacks
jurisdiction to consider any such claim.
Alexander’s motion for relief references 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
which he says was violated by the acts and omissions of the
chancery clerks.
That statute states that “All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.”
42 U.S.C. § 1982.
To state a claim under § 1982,
Alexander must allege that he is a member of a racial minority and
that defendants intentionally engaged in discrimination against
him.
Cox v. Phase III, Investments, No. CIV.A. H-12-3500, 2013 WL
3110218, at *11 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2013) (citing Chapman v.
Arlington Housing Auth., 145 Fed. App’x 496, 497 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Alexander has not alleged that he was intentionally discriminated
against based on his race.
See Watson v. Land Am. Austin Title,
338 F. App'x 352, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
plaintiff did not have a viable claim against the defendants under
16
§ 1982 because he had not alleged “‘an intentional act of racial
discrimination by a defendant’”) (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804
F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1986)).
In his amended complaint, plaintiff has not articulated any
factual basis to support any federal claim for relief.
That
complaint is therefore due to be dismissed with prejudice.8
His
motion for relief, to the extent it may reasonably be construed as
a request to amend, does not set forth a factual basis for any
federal claim for relief that would be any more plausible than the
one he attempted to assert in his amended complaint.
As the court
has found that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief
8
The Fifth Circuit has stated that
“[g]enerally a district court errs in dismissing a pro
se complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to
amend.” Bazrowx [v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th
Cir. 1998)]. On the other hand, when a pro se
petitioner has been given several opportunities to amend
his claims, dismissal is proper. Castro Romero v.
Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 353 (5th Cir. 2001). In Bazrowx,
we implied that it is harmless error to dismiss a case
for failure to state a claim without giving the
plaintiff an opportunity to amend if the plaintiff has
alleged his best case or if the dismissal is without
prejudice. 136 F.3d at 1054.
Lerma v. Falks, 338 F. App'x 472, 474 (5th Cir. 2009). In his
responses to the various defendants’ motions to dismiss his
federal claim(s), Alexander has neither requested to amend – which
suggests he has already alleged his “best case” – nor has he
offered a factual basis that would support an amendment that would
state a claim for violation of his equal protection rights.
17
under federal law, the question arises whether this court should
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”
The Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]he general
rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial,” Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco
Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009), though “this rule
is neither mandatory nor absolute,” id., and ”[d]istrict courts
enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal
claims are dismissed,” Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.
1993).
Here, because the federal claim is being dismissed at the
very earliest stages of litigation, the factors of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity suggest that this court
ought to decline jurisdiction over Alexander’s remaining claims
for violation of state law.
Those claims will therefore be
dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that each of the
following motions is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of
18
plaintiff James Alexander’s federal claims:
the motions to
dismiss federal claims filed by Wayne Smith, Earl Johnson, Delores
Frye, Steve Amos, Eddie Jean Carr, Kevin Rayborn and Mike Jinks
[[Dkt. Nos. 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 82, 98]; motion to dismiss by
the Marshall County Board of Supervisors [Dkt. No. 79]; the motion
to dismiss of the Rankin County Board of Supervisors and Larry
Swales [Dkt. No. 86]; the motion to dismiss of the Lawrence County
Board of Supervisors and Kevin Rayborn [Dkt. No. 81]; the motion
of the State of Mississippi and Attorney General Jim Hood, in his
official Capacity [Dkt. No. 26].
It is further ordered that the
complaint against defendants Madison county Board of Supervisors
and Ronny Lott is dismissed sua sponte; that plaintiff James
Alexander’s “Motion for Relief” is denied [Dkt. No. 72]; and that
the various motions to strike plaintiff’s “Motion for Relief” are
denied as moot [Dkt. Nos. 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 and 97].
Finally, as the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims, those claims will
be dismissed without prejudice.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Rule
58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED this 17th day of November, 2015.
/s/ Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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