U-Save Auto Rental of America, Inc. v. Barton

Filing 170

ORDER denying 33 Motion to Quash; denying 37 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 45 Motion to Alter Judgment; denying 56 Motion to Quash; denying as moot 79 Motion to Stay Proceedings; denying without prejudice 107 Motion Issuance of Writ of Execution re 103 Application for Writ; denying 140 Motion to Quash for the reasons set out in the order. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on May 13, 2016.(SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
U-SAVE AUTO RENTAL OF AMERICA, INC.
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15cv348-DPJ-FKB

ROBERT M. BARTON

DEFENDANT
ORDER

This case is before the Court on a number of post-judgment motions: Plaintiff’s Motion
to Quash Writ of Garnishment [33]; Defendant’s Motion to Correct Judgment as to Prejudgment
Interest Award [37]; Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Post Judgment Interest Award
and Alter or Amend Judgment [45]; Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Writ of Garnishment Directed at
Regions Bank [56]; Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Proceedings to Enforce Judgment [79];
Defendant’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution [107]; and Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash
Writ of Garnishment Targeting Regions Bank [140]. The Court held a hearing on the matters on
May 2, 2016. Having fully considered the parties’ submissions and arguments, the Court rules
as follows.
I.

Defendant’s Motion to Correct Judgment as to Prejudgment Interest Award [37]
In its February 12, 2016 Order [28], the Court confirmed the arbitration award entered in

favor of Defendant Robert M. Barton and against Plaintiff U-Save Auto Rental of America, Inc.
(“U-Save”). The arbitrator awarded “prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the rate of 8 %
per annum.” Award [22-1] at 8. Barton now files this motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a), asking the Court to “amend the Final Judgment entered on February 12, 2016,
to specifically reflect August 22, 2013, as the start date for purposes of calculating prejudgment
interest . . . .” Def.’s Mot. [37] at 3.

Rule 60(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising
from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the
record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). “To be correctable under Rule 60(a), the ‘mistake must not be
one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of recitation, of the sort that a clerk or
[scrivener] might commit, mechanical in nature.’” Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647 F.3d 188,
193–94 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Galiardi, 745 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1984); Dura-Wood
Treating Co., Div. of Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. v. Century Forest Indus., Inc., 694 F.2d 112,
114 (5th Cir. 1982)). In other words, “[a] Rule 60(a) motion ‘can only be used to make the
judgment or record speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say something other than what
originally was pronounced.’” Id. at 194 (quoting In re Galiardi, 745 F.2d at 337; 11 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2854 (2d ed. 1977)).
The Court concludes that the “correction” Barton seeks is not the type Rule 60(a) covers
because it remains unclear what Barton sought in arbitration and what the arbitrator awarded. In
his March 2014 arbitration demand, Barton sought $949,736.30, plus arbitration costs and
interest. Demand [11-4] at 1. Barton later clarified his damages calculation in two letters to USave’s lawyers, both of which stated that “Barton seeks pre-judgment interest calculated as 8%”
from the date of the last salary payment, i.e., September 1, 2013. Oct. 8, 2014 Letter [7-9] at 2;
Jan. 29, 2015 Letter [7-10] at 1–2. And he took that same approach in his pre-arbitration brief.
See Barton’s Pre-Arbitration Br. [11-5] at 10 (“Barton seeks pre-judgment interest calculated as
8% on [the amount of damages] from the date of the last salary payment through the date of the
award in this case . . . .”).

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But Barton proposed a different trigger date in his post-arbitration Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
Section 75-17-7 of the Mississippi Code provides for the assessment of
prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Prejudgment interest is an essential
component of compensatory damages which is necessary to make an injured party
whole. In breach of contract cases, prejudgment interest is typically assessed
from the date of the breach through the date of the award on a compounded basis.
Post-judgment interest accrues on a compounded basis from the date of the award
until such time as it is paid in full. Section 75-17-7 grants discretion to the trial
court to set the applicable rate of interest, but the Mississippi Supreme Court has
routinely affirmed the use of an 8% interest rate for prejudgment and
postjudgment awards.
Barton’s Post-Arbitration Br. [7-2] at 30 (citations omitted). This submission shifted the focus
from September 1, 2013—the date Barton was last paid—to an undefined date of first breach.
The focus shifted again with Barton’s Proposed Award to the arbitrator, which included
“prejudgment interest at 8% compounded annually from December 1, 2014 . . . .” Hrg. Ex. P1
[163]. Of course the arbitrator declined to adopt any of the various proposed accrual dates and
instead merely awarded “prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the rate of 8 % per annum.”
Award [22-1] at 8.
Barton now argues for an even earlier accrual date. As he correctly notes, the arbitrator
found that on “more than one occasion[],” U-Save “provided written notification to Barton that it
was terminating the relationship.” Id. at 6–7. The arbitrator did not make a finding as to when
those “occasions” occurred or whether they constituted breaches. Nevertheless, Barton argues
that U-Save breached its duties on those dates and that a simple review of the arbitration record
shows they occurred August 22, 2013, and September 6, 2013. He further contends that the
earlier of these dates represents the correct accrual date. Def.’s Mem. [38] at 6.

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There are two big problems with all of this. First, although Barton consistently used the
phrase “pre-judgment interest”—which would accrue from the date of the breach through the
date of a court’s judgment—what he described during arbitration was actually pre-award
interest—accruing from the date of the breach through the date of the arbitrator’s award. Cf.
Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar Inter., Ltd., 718 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that
distinction between post-judgment and post-award interest “makes a difference”). The arbitrator
followed Barton’s terminology while providing no clues as to whether he intended a distinction.
Second, the date from which the pre-judgment interest award was to accrue is simply not clear.
The arbitrator could have intended to award pre-judgment interest from any of the dates or
events Barton suggested during arbitration. Or he could have intended for pre-judgment interest
to run from the date of the award through the date of any ultimate judgment entered after the
filing of an action to confirm the award.
Stated simply, fixing the accrual date for pre-judgment interest involves legal and factual
determinations that go well beyond the ambit of Rule 60(a). Had this Court entered the order
awarding pre-judgment interest without an accrual date, then perhaps Rule 60(a) would have
offered an available avenue to remedy the oversight. See Aldon Industries, Inc. v. Don Myers &
Associates, Inc., 547 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1977). But in the present context, the Court does not
know what the arbitrator intended and cannot simply insert an omitted finding.
What Barton really seeks is modification. As U-Save notes, however, Barton did not ask
the arbitrator to modify the award to provide the missing accrual date under Arbitration Rule 40.
Nor did he move this Court to modify the arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 11, and the time to

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do so has now expired. See 9 U.S.C. § 12 (“Notice of a motion to . . . modify . . . an award must
be served upon the adverse party . . . within three months after the award is filed or delivered.”).
Instead, in his Counter-Claim to Confirm Arbitration Award, Barton asked the Court to
“confirm the arbitration award in the form of a judgment and that it further confirm the amount
and duration of prejudgment interest owed on the award.” Countercl. [4] at 5 (emphasis added).
He went slightly farther in his memorandum, stating that “[t]he Court should further confirm that
the award of prejudgment interest is to be computed from August 22, 2013, which is the date USave confirmed in writing that it was terminating Barton without ‘Cause’ and was therefore
obligated to provide Section 5 benefits which it failed to do.” Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. to
Confirm Arbitration Award [8] at 20.
From these bare requests, the Court did not appreciate that Barton was actually seeking
modification of the arbitration award. See L. U. Civ. R. 7(b) (“Any written communication with
the court that is intended to be an application for relief or other action by the court must be
presented by a motion in the form prescribed by this Rule.”). More significantly, the arbitrator
never mentioned August 22, 2013 in his award. So to “confirm” it as the accrual date would
require review of the arbitration record followed by a finding of law and fact that this
date—which is just one of many Barton has proposed—is the correct date. While the Court is
not unsympathetic to Barton’s position, his request goes well beyond confirming an arbitration
award and well beyond correcting a clerical-type mistake under Rule 60(a). Barton’s Rule 60(a)
motion is therefore denied.

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II.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Post Judgment Interest Award and Alter or
Amend Judgment [45]
Turning to the Court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s post-judgment interest award, U-

Save asserts that the Court’s order on this point involved a legal error in view of the Fifth
Circuit’s pronouncement in Tricon that “an arbitration panel may not establish a post-judgment
interest rate itself.” 718 F.3d at 457 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While it is
true that the applicable interest rate in federal court is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, a full reading
of Tricon does not support U-Save’s argument.
Significantly, Tricon recognizes that “parties may agree to submit the question of
postjudgment interest to arbitration.” Id. at 457. And where
an arbitrat[or] sets a postjudgment interest rate as a matter of contract
interpretation, its award is entitled to almost absolute deference. In such a case,
the district court would be required to enforce the award even if the intent to
contract around [the federal statutory interest rate] did not seem clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal to the court.
Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).
The Tricon parties had submitted the issue of post-judgment interest to arbitration
because
[t]heir agreement authorized arbitration for “[a]ny and all differences and disputes
of whatsoever nature arising out of this Agreement.” Also, Tricon specifically
asked for “post-judgment interest, as provided by the parties’ contract,” in its
amended specification of claims for arbitration, and in its closing statement,
Tricon demanded “post-judgment interest on its damages in the amount of 8.5%
per annum.” Vinmar disputed Tricon’s claim for interest, contending that there
was “no written agreement or other authority authorizing Tricon’s claim for
interest.” Because the parties agreed to submit the issue of postjudgment interest
to arbitration, the arbitration panel had the authority to award a non-statutory rate.

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Id. at 458 (footnote omitted). But the Fifth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court that
the arbitration panel had not unambiguously set a non-statutory rate of post-judgment interest
where the panel had awarded “‘post-award’ rather than postjudgment’ interest.” Id. at 459.
Here, as in Tricon, Barton asked the arbitrator to award him post-judgment interest at a
rate other than the federal statutory rate. See Barton’s Post-Arbitration Br. [7-2] at 30; Hrg. Ex.
P1 [163]. And U-Save has not directed the Court to any record evidence indicating that it
objected to having that issue submitted to the arbitrator. Under Tricon, the parties submitted the
issue to the arbitrator, who therefore had the authority to award a non-statutory rate of postjudgment interest, which he did.
U-Save also directs the Court to Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P. v. Hill, 782 F.3d
240 (5th Cir. 2015). In Campbell, the arbitration panel awarded the prevailing parties damages,
attorney’s fees, “and pre- and post-judgment interest of five percent per annum . . . .” Id. at 243.
The district court vacated most of the arbitration award, including “the award’s providing a fivepercent rate for post-judgment interest.” Id. at 244. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, observing that
the parties had not briefed the issue on appeal but, at oral argument, the prevailing parties
“agreed that, should the award be reinstated in full, the district court on remand would . . .
impose post-judgment interest under the federal rate.” Id. at 246. So the issue was effectively
conceded, making the Fifth Circuit’s remand for “further proceedings . . . including . . . setting,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, the rate for post-judgment interest,” essentially dicta. Id.
So Tricon, not Campbell, controls. And under Tricon, the parties submitted the issue to
the arbitrator. This Court was therefore “required to enforce the award even if the intent to

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contract around § 1961 did not seem clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal to the court.” Tricon,
718 F.3d at 458.
U-Save has not demonstrated a right to relief from the Court’s judgment under Rule
59(e). See Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Rule 59(e) ‘serve[s]
the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or to present newly
discovered evidence.’” (quoting Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989)).
U-Save’s Rule 59(e) motion is denied.
III.

Plaintiff’s Motions to Quash [33, 56, 140]
U-Save has moved to quash three writs of garnishment [31, 82, 131] issued to Regions

Bank. It makes two primary arguments in its motions: (1) the writs were not served pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(a), which requires that process “must be served by a United
States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed for that purpose,” and (2)
the writs are “defective on [their] face as the judgment balance is misstated” given the
outstanding questions with regard to pre- and post-judgment interest. Pl.’s Mem. [141] at 9.
Starting with service, U-Save relies on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel.
Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1966). In Tanos, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to quash a writ of garnishment for improper service.
There, the judgment creditor effected service of process of the writ using a Florida county sheriff
pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.3(c). The court noted that the applicable Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (then Rule 4(c)) provided that “[s]ervice of all process shall be made by
a United States marshal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for
that purpose.” Tanos, 361 F.2d at 839. The court concluded that because Florida Rule 1.3(c) “is

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not a rule peculiarly applicable to service of writs of garnishment,” but rather “is a rule
applicable generally to service of process in civil actions,” Federal “Rule 4(c) . . . governs the
service of writs of garnishment issued in a proceeding in a federal court . . . .” Id. So service by
a Florida county sheriff was insufficient.
This case is distinguishable from Tanos because Mississippi has a statute that addresses
the method of service “peculiarly applicable” in garnishment proceedings. Section 11-35-9 of
the Mississippi Code provides that “[a] writ of garnishment . . . shall be served as a summons is
required by law to be executed . . . .” And under Mississippi law, service of a summons is
governed by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which permits service “by any person who is
not a party and is not less than 18 years of age.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).1
So while Barton resorted to service under Mississippi’s generally applicable rule for
service of process, he did so at the behest of the statute “peculiarly applicable to service of writs
of garnishment.” Tanos, 361 F.2d at 839. The Court concludes that service of the writs of
garnishment was sufficient. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. The Jane R. Her Engines, No. 971176, 2000 WL 825679 (E.D. La. 2000) (concluding that service of writ under Louisiana law

1

U-Save asserts that even under Mississippi law, Barton’s use of a private process server
did not comply with Mississippi statutory law concerning service of a summons. U-Save points
to section 19-25-37 of the Mississippi Code, which explains that “[e]very sheriff, by himself or
his deputy, shall from time to time execute all notices, writs, and other process, both from courts
of law and chancery, and all orders and decrees to him legally issued and directed within his
county . . . .” But the statute does not say that a summons must be served by a sheriff or deputy,
and another Mississippi statute makes it plain that “the form, issuance, service, waiver, return,
amendment and time limits of [a summons] shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-5(1) (emphasis added). So the garnishment statute requires
a writ to be served as a summons is served, and section 13-3-5(1) explains that a summons is
served pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, with which Barton complied. USave’s reliance on section 19-25-37 is misplaced.
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was appropriate where statute regarding method of service in garnishment proceedings provided
service “shall be made in the manner provided for the service of citation” (quoting La. Code Civ.
Proc. art. 2412(C)).2
Even if service was insufficient, Regions—the party to which the three writs were
directed—waived that insufficiency when it answered them. See Answers [91, 113-2, 136]; Y-D
Lumber Co. v. Humphreys Cnty., 2 So. 3d 793, 796 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Roy v. Heard,
38 Miss. 544, 545 (1860)). And while the garnishment statutes provide that the debtor “may
contest, in writing, the answer of the garnishee,” they do not give the debtor the right to
resuscitate a waived defense of insufficiency of process. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-35-47; cf.
Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co. Inc., 608 So. 2d 324, 332 (Miss. 1992) (“[W]here a statute
enumerates and specifies the subject of things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned . . . .” (quoting Sw. Drug Co. v.
Howard Bros. Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 779 (Miss. 1975)). In sum, the
manner in which the writs were served provides no basis for quashing them.
U-Save’s remaining argument is that the writs are invalid because they reference an
incorrect balance on the judgment. As noted above, both parties moved to alter or amend with
respect to the interest awards. U-Save initially provided no authority to support its position that
uncertainty regarding the amount of the judgment provides a basis for quashing an otherwise
proper writ, but the Court permitted post-hearing briefs addressing the issue. Having reviewed

2

Under Louisiana law, “[c]itation is the official summons or notice to a defendant to
appear in person or in responsive pleadings before the court.” La. Prac. Civ. Pretrial § 7:17.
10

those filings and the relevant authority, the Court concludes that this uncertainty does not require
an order quashing the writs.
Section 11-35-23 of the Mississippi Code contemplates the possibility that the amount of
the judgment underlying a writ of garnishment could be modified but does not indicate that such
a change would render the writ invalid or ineffective:
The court issuing any writ of garnishment shall show thereon the amount of the
claim of the plaintiff and the court costs in the proceedings and should at any time
during the pendency of said proceedings in the court a judgment be rendered for a
different amount, then the court shall notify the garnishee of the correct amount
due by the defendant under said writ.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-35-23(2). Similarly, in John W. McGrath Corp. v. Vera CruzCia.
Naviera, S.A., the court reversed the chancery court’s decision to quash writs of attachment
where the underlying judgment found the judgment debtor liable to the judgment creditor but did
not specify an amount of damages. 256 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 1971). The court explained that,
rather than quashing the writs, “the chancery court should have taken the case under
consideration and continued the case until” the amount of damages was fixed. 256 So. 2d at 510.
Here, as in John W. McGrath Corp., “there is no contingency as to [U-Save’s] liability. . .
. The only contingency . . . is the amount of this liability.” Id. Under these circumstances, there
is no basis for quashing the writs. U-Save’s motions to quash are denied.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Proceedings to Enforce Judgment [79]
U-Save’s motion to stay proceedings asks the Court to halt all of Barton’s judgment-

enforcement efforts “pending the disposition of Barton’s Rule 60 motion to correct judgment and
U-Save’s Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider and alter judgment.” Pl.’s Mem. [80] at 3. The Court
has now ruled on those two motions, so the motion to stay is denied as moot.

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V.

Defendant’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution [107]
Finally, Barton asks the Court to issue a writ of execution regarding stock U-Save holds

in Peakstone Financial Services, Inc. In response, U-Save initially argued that “Barton
improperly enrolled his federal court judgment on the judgment roll of Madison County,
Mississippi since on the date on which he enrolled the judgment, the judgment was not a final
judgment as the 14-day automatic stay mandated by Rule 62(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure had not expired.” Pl.’s Mem. [126] at 4.
U-Save provided no authority for its position, and Barton responded with a list of
persuasive authority to the contrary. Def.’s Reply [129] at 2–3 (collecting cases). The Court
concludes that Barton’s recording of the judgment in Madison County before the 14-day period
expired under Rule 62(a) does not impact the effectiveness of the enrolled judgment as a lien on
U-Save’s assets in Madison County. See Cadence Bank, N.A. v. Latting Road Partners, LLC,
No. 09-2540, 2010 WL 4261230, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 22, 2010) (“[G]enerally courts hold
that the recording of a judgment and other similar actions do not violate Rule 62(a)’s automatic
stay.”) (collecting cases).
Though U-Save’s original argument is not persuasive, it raised a new one during oral
argument—that Barton did not strictly comply with the Mississippi statutes governing the
recording of a foreign judgment, rendering the enrolled judgment ineffective to make the
judgment a lien on U-Save’s assets.3 Specifically, U-Save argues that because Barton enrolled a

3

In its response, U-Save cited the code sections on which it relies—sections 11-7-191,
11-7-195, and 11-7-197 of the Mississippi Code—but for a different proposition: that “[a]
judgment must be enrolled on the judgment roll of the county where the judgment debtor’s assets
are located for the judgment to be a lien on the judgment debtor’s assets.” Pl.’s Mem. [126] at 2.
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copy of this Court’s judgment itself, rather than an abstract of the judgment, the enrollment is
fatally defective.
Section 11-7-197 of the Mississippi Code provides that a judgment entered by a United
States District Court situated in Mississippi “shall not be a lien upon or bind the property of the
defendant” within a Mississippi county “until an abstract thereof shall be filed in the office of
the clerk of the circuit court of the county and enrolled on the judgment roll, in the manner and
on the terms hereinbefore provided in Section 11-7-195.” (Emphasis added).
Barton did not technically comply with this requirement, and the limited authority the
Court has located indicates that the failure to file an abstract of the Court’s judgment—rather
than the judgment itself—with the Madison County Circuit Clerk makes the judgment
ineffective as a lien against U-Save’s property in Madison County. For example, in Bergen v.
State, the Mississippi Supreme Court held:
Manifestly, simply enrolling a foreign judgment on the judgment-roll is not
sufficient to acquire a lien. The statute forbids a lien until certain conditions
precedent are fulfilled. The necessary conditions precedent are: First, filing the
abstract, duly certified, and payment of fees for filing, recording, and enrolling;
second, filing the abstract, and recording it in a separate book kept for that
purpose, noting on record the time of filing.
58 Miss. 623, 626 (1881); see also In re Shavers, 418 B.R. 589, 604 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2009)
(“In order to acquire [] a lien, the judgment creditor must comply with the statutory mechanism
provided for its creation. He must obtain a certified abstract of the judgment from the clerk of
the court in which it was rendered, and enroll it in ‘The Judgment Roll’ book or books
maintained by the circuit clerk in the county in which the property is located.” (citations
omitted)). Despite the belated nature of U-Save’s argument, it appears correct. Moreover,

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Barton can readily correct the error. Therefore, Barton’s motion for a writ of execution is denied
without prejudice.
VI.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments. Those not specifically addressed

would not have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Correct
Judgment as to Prejudgment Interest Award [37] is denied; Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider
Ruling on Post Judgment Interest Award and Alter or Amend Judgment [45] is denied;
Plaintiff’s Motions to Quash [33, 56, 140] are denied; Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Proceedings to
Enforce Judgment [79] is denied as moot; and Defendant’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution [107] is denied without prejudice.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 13th day of May, 2016.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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