Marcoon v. Rankin County Circuit Court and Jail et al

Filing 21

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL: For the reasons set out in the Order, Defendants Rankin County Circuit Court and Kent McDaniel are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to judicial immunity. Defendant Rankin County Jail is dismissed without prejudice. The claims against Defendant Rebecca Boyd are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to quasi-judicial immunity and as frivolous. This dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The remainder of this case shall proceed. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on April 20, 2016.(SP)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

WALTER DON MARCOON, # 2015040333
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15cv662-DPJ-FKB

RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, et
al.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL
This pro se prisoner case is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of partial
dismissal. Plaintiff Walter Don Marcoon challenges the conditions of his confinement, as well
as his criminal proceedings. The Court has considered and liberally construed the pleadings. As
set forth below, Defendants Rankin County Circuit Court, Rankin County Jail, Court Clerk
Rebecca Boyd, and Judge Kent McDaniel are dismissed. The remainder of this case shall
proceed.
I.

Background
Marcoon is a pretrial detainee housed in the Rankin County Jail. Although he does not

specify the criminal charge, Marcoon claims he was arrested around April 2015. Pl.’s 1st Resp.
[12] at 9. Marcoon alleges that he has been held without an arraignment, assistance of counsel, a
bond reduction, an initial appearance, or hearings. Id. Marcoon also accuses Circuit Court Clerk
Rebecca Boyd of “not answering [his] repeated request . . . for legal materials,” which he claims
he needed in order to file motions in his criminal case for his defense and release. Id. at 2-3.
Besides Marcoon’s criminal proceedings, he also complains about the conditions of his
confinement. Marcoon alleges that Sheriff Bryan Bailey, jail administrators Lieutenant James
Rutland and Amanda Thompson, and Rankin County are denying Marcoon access to legal

materials, court addresses, and notary services. As a result, Marcoon “had to write [his] own
bond reduction motion and statement suppression motion w[ith]out legal books to reference
w/and [sic] [he] had to send in the bond motion w[ith]out notarization on [his] indigent
application. [His] motions were barely acceptable.” Id. at 7. Marcoon also claims that he is
subjected to a violent environment, excessively cold temperatures, unsanitary food, mail
tampering, “dangerous molds,” and overcrowding. Id. at 1. Marcoon contends that he has lost
sixteen pounds while incarcerated, due to insufficient meals. Finally, Marcoon maintains that he
is denied x-rays and medications for his lower back, which are allegedly needed “due to previous
surgery.” Pl.’s 2d Resp. [15] at 1. This, Marcoon contends, has caused him “extreme back . . .
and lower leg pain.” Id. Finally, Marcoon alleges that he has been deprived of his Bibles,
toiletries, and clothing that he bought from the jail commissary.
Marcoon brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages against the
Rankin County Circuit Court, Rankin County Jail, Boyd, Bailey, Rutland, Judge Kent McDaniel,
Thompson, jail nurse Tonya Mangum, and Rankin County. To the extent Marcoon seeks habeas
relief in his state criminal proceedings, those claims were severed and opened in civil action
number 3:15cv781-CWR-FKB, on October 29, 2015.
II.

Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, applies to prisoners proceeding in forma

pauperis in this Court. One of the provisions reads, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time
if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The statute “accords judges not only the

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authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose
factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “[I]n an
action proceeding under [28 U.S.C. § 1915, a federal court] may consider, sua sponte,
affirmative defenses that are apparent from the record even where they have not been addressed
or raised.” Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). “Significantly, the court is
authorized to test the proceeding for frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of
process or before the filing of the answer.” Id. The Court has permitted Marcoon to proceed in
forma pauperis in this action. His Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal under § 1915.
A.

Rankin County Circuit Court and Judge Kent McDaniel

Marcoon first claims that both the state court and state trial judge have denied him an
initial appearance, an arraignment, assistance of counsel, bond reduction, and hearings. These
complaints are about actions taken in the course and scope of Judge McDaniel’s role as judge
over Marcoon’s criminal case.
A judge enjoys absolute immunity from a civil action when performing within his
judicial capacity. Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1995). “Absolute immunity is
immunity from suit rather than simply a defense against liability, and is a threshold question ‘to
be resolved as early in the proceedings as possible.’” Id. (quoting Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279,
284 (5th Cir. 1994)). Judicial immunity can be overcome only by a showing that the actions
complained of were non-judicial in nature, or by showing that the actions were taken in the
absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
The Fifth Circuit has announced a four-factor test to determine whether a judge acted

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within the scope of his judicial capacity. Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005).
The four factors are:
(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2)
whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as
the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending
before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge
in his official capacity.
Id. at 515. In applying the four factors to the facts alleged, it is clear that Judge McDaniel is
absolutely immune from this lawsuit. The decisions as to whether and when to conduct certain
hearings and proceedings, whether to appoint counsel, and whether to reduce bail are clearly
within the normal judicial functions which arose out of Judge McDaniel’s official capacity.
Furthermore, there is no indication that his actions occurred outside the courtroom or his
chambers. The controversy undisputedly centers around a criminal case pending before him.
Consequently, this Court finds that Marcoon cannot maintain an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the state court or Judge McDaniel.
B.

Court Clerk Rebecca Boyd

Marcoon separately sues Circuit Court Clerk Rebecca Boyd, accusing her of refusing to
rule on his motions, schedule hearings, and send him legal materials.
1.

Rulings and Hearings

The Court first considers Marcoon’s claims that Boyd refused to rule on his motions and
schedule hearings. “Court clerks ‘have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising
from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” Clay
v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir 2001) (quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.3d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.
1981)). For example, in Clay v. Allen, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a claim

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against a court clerk for excessive bail. 242 F.3d at 682. “Since the judge had used his
discretion in setting the bail and [the clerk] merely followed the judge’s wishes, [the clerk]
derive[d] absolute immunity from the judicial function of the act.” Id.
As discussed previously, whether and when to set hearings in Marcoon’s criminal case
was a normal judicial function that arose out of Judge McDaniel’s official capacity. See Lewis v.
City of Waxahachie, 503 F. App’x 249, 250 (5th Cir. Dec. 18, 2012); Doyle v. Camelot Care
Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 623 (7th Cir. 2002). The same is true for the decision of whether to act
on Marcoon’s motions. Jones v. Judge of the 129th, 113 F. App’x 603, 604 (5th Cir. Oct. 20,
2004). Boyd is therefore entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the lack of rulings and hearings
in Marcoon’s criminal case. See In re: Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002); Rodriguez v.
Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v. City of Waxahachie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152075, 3:10cv2578 at *11-12 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2011) (holding allegations “that certain
motions were denied or were not set for a hearing” were insufficient to overcome clerk’s quasijudicial immunity).
2.

Legal Materials

This leaves the allegation that Boyd failed to send Marcoon legal materials such as
unspecified statutes, court rules, addresses, a dictionary, and “legal concordance.” Pl.’s 1st
Resp. [12] at 7. Marcoon claims he needs these materials in order to file pretrial motions in his
criminal case. Without these, Marcoon contends that Boyd is denying him “any access to the
court for the purpose of filing motions necessary in my defense and release from custody.”
Compl. [1] at 4.
As a court clerk in a Mississippi state court, Boyd “merely ha[s] a duty to file and docket

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all papers filed in each court case.” Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 168-69 (5th
Cir. 1996) (finding circuit clerk was not liable for failing to provide a nolle prosequi order to a
criminal defendant or his counsel, resulting in continued incarceration) (citing, Miss. Code Ann.
§ 9–7–171 (duty of circuit clerk to keep a “general docket”); Miss. Code Ann. § 9–7–175 (duty
to keep a “criminal docket”); Miss. Code Ann. § 9–7–177 (duty to keep an “appearance
docket”)). If “no duty to act existed, the failure to act [does] not violate the constitution.” Id. at
169. As Boyd did not have a legal duty to provide unspecified legal research to Marcoon, she
cannot be held to have violated his constitutional rights by not answering his repeated requests
for the materials. This claim against Boyd will be dismissed as frivolous, and this dismissal
counts as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g).
C.

Rankin County Jail

Marcoon next sues the Rankin County Jail. Mississippi law determines whether
Marcoon can sue the jail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). Under Mississippi law, a county jail is not a
separate legal entity which may be sued, rather it is an extension of the county. Tuesno v.
Jackson, No. 5:08cv302-DCB-JMR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61416 at *2-3 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 30,
2009). Therefore, the jail is dismissed.
The Court notes that Marcoon has also named the County as a Defendant. Therefore, any
allegations against the jail will be construed as allegations against the County.
III.

Conclusion
The Rankin County Circuit Court and Judge McDaniel are entitled to judicial immunity.

The Rankin County Jail is dismissed as a non-legal entity, not subject to suit. Boyd is entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity to the extent that she is accused of refusing to rule or set hearings in

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Marcoon’s criminal case. The denial of access claim against her is frivolous, and Marcoon is
accordingly assessed a strike pursuant to § 1915 (g). The case shall proceed against the
remaining Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons stated above,
Defendants Rankin County Circuit Court and Kent McDaniel are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to judicial immunity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Rankin County Jail is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the claims against Defendant
Rebecca Boyd are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to quasi-judicial immunity and
as frivolous. This dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The remainder
of this case shall proceed.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 20th day of April, 2016.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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