Davis v. Hinds County, Mississippi et al
ORDER denying 85 Motion for Recusal. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 3/29/2017. Copy mailed to plaintiff at address listed on docket sheet. (AC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
CHAKAKHAN R. DAVIS
CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-874-CWR-LRA
HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI;
TYRONE LEWIS; JERRY ARINDER;
BRENDA JONES; JOHNNY JENKINS
Before the Court is the plaintiff’s motion to recuse the District and Magistrate Judges
assigned to this case.1 Docket No. 85. She argues that several unfavorable Court rulings reveal
the Judges’ “personal bias or prejudice concerning the plaintiff and deep seated favoritism
toward the defendants.” Id. at 7 & 11.
Federal law provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section (b) of that statute sets forth a number of additional
grounds for disqualification, including where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party,” “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding,” where “in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy,” or “has
been a material witness concerning it.” Id. § 455(b).
“The standard for judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is whether a reasonable
person, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s
impartiality.” Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 571 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The
standard for bias is an objective one: “it is with reference to the well-informed, thoughtful and
Because the plaintiff challenges the authority of these judges to hear her case, the Court has not awaited a response
from the defendants. They should be spared that expense.
objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Andrade v.
Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Similarly, another federal statute provides that:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
28 U.S.C. § 144. “The facts and reasons set out in the affidavit must give fair support to the
charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.” Parrish v. Bd. of
Com’rs of Alabama State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Those facts must be material, stated with particularity, show that the bias is personal
rather than judicial in nature, and, if true, would convince a reasonable person that bias exists.
United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 960 n.9 (5th Cir. 1986). Like a motion for disqualification
filed under § 455, motions pursuant to § 144 are resolved “by applying the reasonable man
standard to the facts and reasons stated in the affidavit.” Parrish, 524 F.2d at 100 (citation
It is well-established that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a
bias or partiality motion.” Andrade, 338 F.3d at 455 (citation omitted).
We note that remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving
of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support
a bias or partiality challenge. Not establishing bias or partiality are expressions of
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger that are within the bounds
A review of the remainder of § 144 casts doubt on whether it can be wielded in this case. The statute goes on to
state that it must be invoked within 10 days of the start of the term of court. The statute further requires “a certificate
of counsel of record stating that [the charge of bias] is made in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. Courts have found that
a pro se party “is without the means of satisfying the [statute’s] certificate of counsel requirement and is thus unable
to seek disqualification under § 144.” Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09-cv-386, 2009 WL 1033391, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ind.
April 16, 2009) (citing Robinson v. Gregory, 929 F. Supp. 334, 337 (S.D. Ind. 1996)). Any procedural defect is of
no moment, though, because the grounds for recusal based on bias or prejudice in § 144 are duplicated in §
455(b)(1). Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997, 1004 n.7 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548
(1994)). As a result, the Court will take up the motion on its merits.
of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal
judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration
– even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration – remain immune.
Matassarin, 174 F.3d at 571 (citations and ellipses omitted). “Courts must take care to ensure
that motions for recusal are not abused as a litigation tactic.” Ocean-Oil Expert Witness, Inc. v.
O’Dwyer, 451 Fed. App’x 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Considering the allegations against these authorities, Davis’s motion must be denied. Her
motion identifies no extra-judicial bias, prejudice, or favoritism toward any party. Rather, she
takes issue with a series of rulings which largely, but not uniformly, deny her the relief she has
requested. Those rulings are ordinary applications of the law, and this response is not the
appropriate way to express her displeasure with them. They fall well short of establishing any
basis for recusal.
The motion is denied.
SO ORDERED, this the 29th day of March, 2017.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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