Pitts v. City of Madison County, Mississippi et al

Filing 100

ORDER granting 71 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 73 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 89 Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration; granting 93 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 02/27/2018.(mm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
JOANNE PITTS

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 3:15-cv-892-CWR-LRA

CITY OF MADISON, MISSISSIPPI, et al.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
On December 4, 2017, this Court granted summary judgment to the Madison Defendants
on all claims except for Plaintiff Joanne Pitts’ Fourteenth Amendment claim against Investigator
Terrell in his individual capacity. See Pitts v. City of Madison, Miss., No. 3:15-CV-892-CWRLRA, 2017 WL 6003645, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 4, 2017). The parties submitted supplemental
briefs and cross-motions for reconsideration. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in
part and denies in part the Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, and grants the Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration.
I.

Law
Motions for reconsideration serve a “narrow purpose.” Nationalist Movement v. Town of

Jena, 321 F. App’x 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2009). “The court must strike the proper balance between
two competing imperatives: (1) finality, and (2) the need to render just decisions on the basis of
all the facts.” Edward H. Bolin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993).
“Whatever may be the purpose of [a motion for reconsideration] it should not be supposed that it
is intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.” Atkins v.
Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
II.

Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

This Court previously held that a genuine dispute exists as to whether Investigator Terrell
intentionally undervalued Pitts’ car so that it would be subject to administrative forfeiture rather
than judicial forfeiture under Mississippi law. See Pitts, 2017 WL 6003645, at *6. Terrell asks the
Court to reconsider this finding. He argues that the Court improperly relied on an unsigned
affidavit.
Indeed, unsigned affidavits are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Roy v.
U.S. Dept. of Agric., 115 F. App’x 198, 200 (5th Cir. 2004). But after reviewing the audio
recording of Terrell’s deposition, the Court still finds that a genuine dispute exists as to whether
Terrell intentionally undervalued Pitts’ car so that it would fall under the provisions of
administrative forfeiture.
Since Pitts has evidence of a constitutional violation, the Court must proceed to decide if
Terrell’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the
challenged conduct occurred. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001). “The
touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct
conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the
clearly established law.” Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000).
Therefore, “[e]ven law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly commit a
constitutional violation are entitled to immunity.” Glenn, 242 F.3d at 312 (quotations marks and
citation omitted).
For a right to be clearly established, “the contours of that right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Bishop v.
Arcuri, 674 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly instructed that clearly established law must not be defined “at a high level

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of generality.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (admonishing a lower court for
“fail[ing] to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to
have violated the Fourth Amendment”); see Estate of Dunn Gray v. Dalton, No. 1:15-CV-061SA-DAS, 2017 WL 564035 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 10, 2017). Instead, the plaintiff must identify
clearly established law that is “particularized” to the facts of the case. Id. Although the Supreme
Court does not require a case directly on point, existing precedent must have placed the statutory
or constitutional question “beyond debate.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552.
Here, Pitts has failed to provide any case law involving sufficiently similar
circumstances. As noted by the Defendants, the “vast majority of cases involving due process
claims regarding civil forfeiture turn on whether the property owner was provided proper notice
of the forfeiture.” Docket No. 90 at 11. Holladay v. Roberts, the case on which Pitts relies, is no
different. 425 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Miss. 1977). On a motion to dismiss, the Holladay court held
that the statute providing for forfeiture to state agency violated due process in failing to provide
for any notice to the owner of the seized vehicle prior to forfeiture. Id. at 65. But it is undisputed
that Pitts received proper notice. She has not shown that her issue—being put to administrative
instead of judicial forfeiture—was clearly established as a due process violation.
The lack of any particularized case law precludes the Court from finding that Terrell’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.1 Therefore, the Court
grants summary judgment to Investigator Terrell as to Pitts’ Fourteenth Amendment claim.
III.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

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The Court is compelled to grant summary judgment, but must underscore its strong disapproval with the conduct
alleged in this case. As the Court has noted, a genuine dispute exists as to whether the officer intentionally
undervalued Pitts’ car with the intent to deprive her of certain constitutional protections. Law enforcement officers
should not engage in subterfuge to deprive one of her constitutional protections. The constitution is what shields our
fellow citizens from oppressive and autocratic government actions. The conduct exhibited here as alleged brings
discredit to law enforcement and cause those they serve to distrust them.

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On January 2, 2018, Pitts filed a cross-motion for reconsideration asking this Court to
reconsider her state law claims against the City of Madison, specifically conversion and a due
process violation under the Mississippi Constitution. The Court had dismissed these claims on
the ground that Pitts failed to meet the notice of claim requirement in the Mississippi Tort Claims
Act. See Pitts, 2017 WL 6003645, at *8.
Pitts asserts that she did in fact provide written notice of her claims, and that even if she
failed to comply with the notice requirement, Defendants’ failure to raise the defense would
constitute a waiver of such a defense. See Stuart v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 21 So. 3d 544, 550
(Miss. 2009). This point is well-taken.
The Court grants Pitts’ motion but declines to rule on the merits of her remaining state
claims. In the Fifth Circuit, the “general rule” is that “courts should decline supplemental
jurisdiction [over state law claims] when all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated
from a case.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Warrantech Corp., 461 F.3d 568, 578
(5th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to this authority, the Court will decline supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state-law causes of action.
IV.

Conclusion
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration is granted and her remaining state law claims are remanded to the
Circuit Court of Madison County.
SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of February, 2018.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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