Mungia v. Hinds County Detention Center Board of Supervisors et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL: Defendant Hinds County Detention Center Board of Supervisors is dismissed. It is further ordered that Hinds County Court System is dismissed with prejudice as immune. The remainder of this case shall proceed as set out herein. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 3/15/16 (copy of NEF and order mailed to Telse Shalin Mungia #98619, Hinds County Detention Center, 1450 County Farm Road, Raymond, MS 39154) (LWE)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

TELSE SHALIN MUNGIA, # 98619
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16cv54-TSL-RHW

HINDS COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, TYRONE
LEWIS, and HINDS COUNTY COURT
SYSTEM

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL
This matter is before the court sua sponte.

Pro se

plaintiff Telse Shalin Mungia is a pretrial detainee at the Hinds
County Detention Center.
confinement.

He challenges the conditions of his

The court has considered and liberally construed

the pleadings.

As set forth below, defendants Hinds County

Detention Center Board of Supervisors and Hinds County Court
System are dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Mungia alleges that on August 9, 2013, he was arrested on a
drug charge and detained in the Hinds County Detention Center.
He says he was held for seventy-two days without a court
appearance.

The charge was dismissed, and he was released.

Mungia next claims that on December 23, 2015, he was
arrested based on a warrant from Hinds County for the 2013 charge
that was supposedly dropped.

Since then, he has been detained at

the Hinds County Detention Center.

He claims to have again been

denied an initial appearance, although he allegedly was arraigned
on January 11, 2016, denied bond, and has been appointed counsel.
Mungia further alleges that during his 2013 stay at the
Hinds County Detention Center, he was subject to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement.

For the first ten days, he contends

he was in a holding cell with fifteen other people, and he:
was confined to my matt [sic] [and] my legs and feet
had pain [be]cause my blood could not flow there were
so many people in the room. I was confine[d] to my
matt [sic] 24/7. They would never bring us outside or
anywhere to stretch our legs. There was no movement at
all.
(Compl. at 5).
ten days.

He claims he only had one shower in those first

He also asserts that he was racially harassed by

correctional officers.
According to the Complaint, after Mungia was moved to a
cell, he had to sleep on an iron rack with no mattress for nine
days.

There were no lights, and there was so much black mold he

could smell and taste it.

Food was served on the floor, and he

was locked down in the dark twenty-four hours a day.
Mungia maintains that he wrote several grievances on all of
the above conditions but none were answered.

It is not clear if

he maintains that the same conditions exist today.
Mungia filed this action on January 29, 2016, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

Although he later added habeas claims, those were

severed and opened in civil action number 3:16cv188-TSL-RHW, on
March 14.

He seeks damages for the conditions of his confinement
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as well as the 2013 alleged denial of a court appearance.

He

also seeks damages for the alleged denial of bond and an initial
appearance in 2015.

Mungia sues the Hinds County Detention

Center Board of Supervisors, former Sheriff Tyrone Lewis, in his
official capacity only, and the Hinds County Court System.
DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, applies to
prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis in this court.

The

statute provides in pertinent part, “the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action .
. . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. §

The statute “accords judges not only the

authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of
the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

Denton v.

“[I]n an action proceeding

under [28 U.S.C. § 1915, a federal court] may consider, sua
sponte, affirmative defenses that are apparent from the record
even where they have not been addressed or raised.”
Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990).

Ali v.

“Significantly, the

court is authorized to test the proceeding for frivolousness or

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maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing
of the answer.”

Id.

The court has permitted Mungia to proceed

in forma pauperis in this action.

His Complaint is subject to

sua sponte dismissal under § 1915.
First Mungia sues the “Hinds County Detention Center Board
of Supervisors” and Sheriff Lewis, in his official capacity, for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
by a board of supervisors, however.
Hinds County Sheriff.

The jail is not run

Rather, it is run by the

Miss. Code Ann. § 19-25-69.

Therefore,

the Board of Supervisors is dismissed as a nonexistent entity.
Next, Mungia sues the State court under § 1983 for the
alleged denials of court appearances and bond.

These claims

against the State court are actually against the State court
trial judge or judges in charge of Mungia’s two criminal cases.
A judge enjoys absolute immunity from a civil action when
performing within his judicial capacity.
F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1995).

Hulsey v. Owens, 63

“Absolute immunity is immunity

from suit rather than simply a defense against liability, and is
a threshold question ‘to be resolved as early in the proceedings
as possible.’”

Id. (quoting Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284

(5th Cir. 1994)).

Judicial immunity can be overcome only by a

showing that the actions complained of were non-judicial in
nature, or by showing that the actions were taken in the absence
of all jurisdiction.

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).

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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals announced a four factor
test to determine whether a judge acted within the scope of his
judicial capacity.
2005).

Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir.

The four factors are:

(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal
judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the
courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the
judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered
around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether
the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in
his official capacity.
Id.

In applying the four factors to the facts alleged, it is

clear that the State court judges are absolutely immune from this
lawsuit.

The decisions as to whether and when to set hearings

and to set a bond in a criminal matter are clearly within the
normal judicial function which arose out of the judges’ official
capacities.

Furthermore, there is no indication that these

actions occurred outside of the courtroom or judges’ chambers.
The controversy undisputedly centers around criminal cases
pending before the Hinds County judges.

Consequently, the court

finds Mungia cannot maintain this action against the Hinds County
Court System.

It is dismissed.

The remainder of this case shall proceed against Sheriff
Lewis, in his official capacity.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons
stated above, defendant Hinds County Detention Center Board of
Supervisors should be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant Hinds
County Court System is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as immune.

The

remainder of this case shall proceed.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 15th day of March, 2016.

/s/Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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