Handy v. Madison County et al

Filing 63

ORDER denying 39 Motion for Summary Judgment Related Discovery and granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; All federal and state law claims alleged against Jamal Watkins, Jeremiah Thornton and John Wingard in their individual capacities are hereby dismissed. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr., on 07/25/2017.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

LATASHA HANDY, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-cv-370-WHB-JCG

MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on two motions that have been
filed in this wrongful death action.

Having considered the

pleadings, attachments thereto, as well as supporting and opposing
authorities the Court finds:
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment-Related Discovery is
not well taken and should be denied.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of
qualified immunity is well taken and should be granted.

I.

Factual Background and Procedural History

On September 5, 2015, Willie Handy, Jr., died while detained
at the Madison County Detention Center (“MCDC”) following an asthma
attack.

Thereafter, Latasha Handy (“Handy”), on behalf of herself

and Willie Handy’s heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries, filed a
lawsuit against Madison County, Mississippi, Madison County Sheriff
Randy Tucker, and MCDC Officers Master Sargent Jamal Watkins
(“Watkins”),

Jeremiah

Thornton

(“Thornton”),

John

Wingard

(“Wingard”), and Felicia Adams (“Adams”).

In her Complaint, Handy

alleges, inter alia, that “Defendants unlawfully battered, applied
mace, and choked Willie Handy., Jr., causing his asthma to flare
intensely resulting in his death.”
25], ¶ 9.

Second Am. Compl. [Docket No.

Handy also alleges that the defendants failed to (1)

provide necessary medical attention to Willie Handy, (2) adequately
train personnel to promptly identify individuals who are having
asthma attacks, and (3) promptly respond to Willie Handy’s requests
for medical care.

Based on these allegations, Handy seeks actual

and punitive damages on claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law
claims sounding in negligence.1
During the course of litigation, Officers Watkins, Thornton,
and Wingard, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on any claims
alleged against them in their individual capacities on the grounds
they are immune from such claims.

The pleadings on the Motion for

Summary Judgment provide the following facts with respect to the
events that preceded Willie Handy’s death.
Willie Handy had been detained at the MCDC numerous times
between May of 1995, and September of 2015.

See Mot. for Sum. J.

[Docket No. 35], Ex. A (McNeal Aff.), ¶ 1.

Willie Handy’s last

period of detention began on July 19, 2015, and ended with his
death on September 5, 2015.

Id. at ¶ 3.

1

There is no evidence

As Handy has alleged claims arising under federal law,
the Court may exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction in
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
2

before the Court that Willie Handy was choked or maced at any time
during his final period of detention.

Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5.2

In other

words, Handy has not provided any evidence to either contradict the
averments made by Major McNeal with respect to whether Willie Handy
was ever choked or maced during his last period of detention at the
MCDC, or to show that Willie Handy had been choked and/or maced
during that time period.
According to Officer Thornton, Willie Handy had been housed in
area “C4” while detained at the MCDC so he would be closer to the
medical unit.

Id., Ex. C (Thornton Aff.), ¶ 2.

Willie Handy had

a long history of asthma, and received respiratory treatments for
that disease.

See id. Ex. B (Palmer Aff.), ex. 1 at 35 (indicating

that Willie Handy had a documented medical history of asthma from
at least December of 2011).

On September 5, 2015, Officer Watkins

spoke with Willie Handy at approximately 4:00 p.m., at which point
Willie Handy did not appear in any distress. Id., Ex. E (Watkins
Aff.), ¶¶ 2, 3. Sometime thereafter, Willie Handy told Thornton he
wanted to go to the medical unit to have a breathing treatment
because his chest felt “tight”.

Id., Ex. C (Thornton Aff.), ¶ 3.

Willie Handy did not appear to be in any distress at that time. Id.

2

Willie Handy was once sprayed with mace at the MCDC
during an altercation on April 26, 2015. The altercation occurred
during a period of detention that began on March 13, 2015, and
ended on May 13, 2015. Following the altercation, Willie Handy
had no acute complaints, no signs of distress, and his oxygen
level was 99%. Id., Ex. A, exs. 1 and 2.
3

at ¶ 4.

Thornton contacted the medical unit, and was advised that

Willie Handy could be brought down for a breathing treatment once
the female detainees had left the unit.

Id. at ¶ 5.

Wingard

the

later

escorted

approximately 6:15 p.m.

Willie

Handy

to

medical

Id., Ex. D (Wingard Aff.), ¶ 3.

Officer
unit

at

At that

time, Willie Handy did not appear to be experiencing any breathing
problems, and was not showing any signs of distress.

Id.

See also

id., Ex. C (Thornton Aff.), ¶ 7 (Thornton averring he witnessed
Willie Handy being escorted to the medical unit, and that Willie
Handy was not in any distress at that time).
Willie Handy presented at the medical unit at approximately
6:17 p.m., complaining of shortness of breath and wheezing, and
requesting a new inhaler and breathing treatment.
(Palmer Aff.), ¶¶ 4, 5.

Id., Ex. B

Willie Handy was assessed by Sheoashie

Palmer, R.N. (“Palmer”), who measured his heart rate to be 95 beats
per minute, his respiratory rate to be 20 breaths per minute, and
his oxygen saturation level to be 95%.

Id. at ¶ 8.

Although

Willie Handy had some wheezing, he indicated he was “fine” and
could wait for his breathing treatment.

During the time the

breathing treatment was later being administered, Willie Handy did
not appear to be in any distress.

Id. at Ex. C (Thornton Aff.), at

¶ 9 (Thornton averring that at the time Willie Handy was being
given the breathing treatment, he was watching the people passing
by the medical unit, talking to the nurse, and was not displaying

4

any signs of distress).

There were no changes in Willie Handy’s

vital signs after the breathing treatment was given, and he was
kept near the medical unit for observation.

Id., Ex. B (Palmer

Aff.), ¶¶ 8, 9.
While

under

observation,

Willie

Handy

developed

labored

breathing at which point he was brought back to the medical unit.
Id. at ¶ 10.

At that point, while there were no changes in his

heart or respiratory rate, Willie Handy’s oxygen saturation level
was measured at 82%.

Id. at ¶ 11.

Palmer immediately began giving

Willie Handy a second breathing treatment.

Id. at ¶ 12.

During

this treatment, Willie Handy became diaphoretic and restless and
was given a Decadron (steroid) injection. Id. at ¶ 13. Thereafter,
Willie Handy became unresponsive, and Palmer immediately began to
perform CPR and requested that an ambulance be called.

Id. at ¶

15.
The next time Watkins, Thornton, and/or Wingard saw Willie
Handy was after the three were summoned to the medical unit.

Upon

their arrival, Willie Handy was being administered CPR by the
medical staff.

Id., Ex. E (Watkins Aff.), ¶¶ 6, 7; Id., Ex. D

(Wingard Aff.), ¶¶ 4, 5; Id., Ex. C (Thornton Aff.), ¶ 10.
Thornton accompanied Willie Handy both in the ambulance where
emergency medical technicians continued to perform CPR, and in the
emergency room where Willie Handy was declared dead.
(Thornton Aff.), ¶¶ 12, 13.

Id., Ex. C

Watkins, Thornton, and Wingard each

5

aver that they never choked or maced Willie Handy, and never
witnessed such actions being taken against Willie Handy by any
other officer.

Id., Ex. E at (Watkins Aff.), ¶ 10; Id., Ex. D

(Wingard Aff.), ¶6; Id., Ex. C (Thornton), ¶¶ 14, 15.

The cause of

Willie Handy’s death was identified as “Acute Asthma Exacerbation
(Status Astematicus)”.

See Resp. [Docket No. 40], Ex. D.

The Court now considers the motions before it.

II.
A.

Discussion

Motion for Summary Judgment-Related Discovery
In addition to responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Handy has requested leave to conduct summary judgment-related
discovery.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit permits immunity-related discovery in cases in which “the
defendant’s immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual
question”, “the district court is unable to rule on the immunity
defense without further clarification of the facts”, and the
discovery requested is “narrowly tailored to uncover only those
facts needed to rule on the immunity claim [and] are neither
avoidable nor overly broad.”
507-08 (5th Cir. 1987).

Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504,

Here, Handy seeks leave to (1) conduct

discovery to “fully ascertain each and every officer, jailer,
medical provider, and other possible witnesses present at MCDC” at
the time of Willie Handy’s death; (2) depose multiple individuals
6

including the responding paramedics, the coroner, and the medical
examiner who performed Willie Handy’s autopsy; and (3) subpoena
unedited

surveillance

video

and

investigatory

files

from

the

Madison County District Attorney as well as the Mississippi Bureau
of Investigation. Mot. for Discovery [Docket No. 39], Ex. A, ¶¶ 2,
6.3

The Court finds these requests should be denied because they

are clearly overly broad in that they seek information that has not
been shown to have any bearing on the claim of immunity raised on
summary judgment.

Handy also seeks discovery to determine whether

the actions of any of the summary judgment movants were motivated
by

policy

or

practice,

and/or

to

“test

the

Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.

credibility” of their affidavits.

strength

and

The Court finds

these requests should likewise be denied because the defense of
qualified immunity is predicated on the individual conduct of the
state actor, and the Court does not make credibility determinations
on summary judgment.
In

sum,

although

Handy

argues

that

she

is

in

need

of

additional discovery in order to respond to the immunity defenses
raised on summary judgment, such general statement of need is
insufficient

to

BancTexasGroup,

warrant
Inc.,

Rule

989

56(d)

F.2d

3

discovery.

1435,

1442

See

(5th

Krim

Cir.

v.

1993)

According to Movants, the surveillance video produced to
Handy was not edited, and neither the Madison County District
Attorney nor the Mississippi Bureau of Investigations undertook
any investigation into Willie Handy’s death. Resp. [Docket No.
43], Ex. 2.
7

(explaining that “vague assertions that additional discovery will
produce needed, but unspecific facts” does not warrant discovery
under Rule 56(d)). Accordingly, the Court will deny Handy’s Motion
for Discovery.

B.

Motion for Summary Judgment

1.

Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in

relevant part, that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
R. CIV. P. 56(c).

FED.

The United States Supreme Court has held that

this language “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also, Moore v. Mississippi Valley
State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1989); Washington v.
Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988).

The

party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
8

identifying

those

portions

of

the

record

that

it

believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

The movant need not, however, support

the motion with materials that negate the opponent’s claim.

Id.

As to issues on which the non-moving party has the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party need only point to portions of the
record that demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claim.

Id. at 323-24.

The non-moving party must

then go beyond the pleadings and designate “specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Summary

judgment

can

be

granted

Id. at 324.
only

if

the

demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.

record
It is

improper for the court to “resolve factual disputes by weighing
conflicting evidence, ... since it is the province of the jury to
assess the probative value of the evidence.”

Kennett-Murray Corp.

v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1980).

Summary judgment is

also improper if the court merely believes it unlikely that the
non-moving party will prevail at trial.

National Screen Serv.

Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., 305 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 1962).

2.

Analysis

a.

Federal Law Claims
Thornton, Watkins, and Wingard have moved for summary judgment

on Handy’s federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to the extent
9

those

claims

are

alleged

against

them

in

their

individual

capacities, on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Under the

doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established

statutory

or

constitutional

rights

of

which

a

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

reasonable person would have known.”

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When considering motions raising a qualified
immunity claim, courts apply a two-step analysis. First, the Court
must determine whether, “viewing the summary judgment evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

See Freeman v. Gore, 483

F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007)(other citations omitted).

If there

is no showing that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated, the analysis ends.

Id. at 410-11.

If, however, a

constitutional rights violation is shown, the court must then
consider

“whether

the

defendant’s

actions

were

objectively

unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
conduct in question.”

Id. at 411 (citing Tarver v. City of Edna,

410 F.3d 745, 750)(5th Cir. 2005)(other citations omitted).

In

making this determination, the Court applies an “objective standard
based on the viewpoint of a reasonable official in light of the
information then available to the defendant and the law that was
clearly established at the time of the defendant’s actions.”

10

Id.

(citing Tarver, 410 F.3d at 750 (“If officers of reasonable
competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff’s rights were
violated, the officer’s qualified immunity remains intact.”)).
In her Complaint, Handy alleges that the defendants violated
Willie

Handy’s

rights

as

protected

by

the

Eighth/Fourteenth

Amendment by denying/delaying his access to adequate medical care.4
Although the Eighth Amendment “does not, by its precise
words, mandate a certain level of medical care for
prisoners,” Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th
Cir. 1999), the Supreme Court has interpreted it as
imposing a duty on prison officials to “ensure that
inmates receive adequate ... medical care.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment when his conduct demonstrates
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs, constituting an “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
The mere delay of medical care can also constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation but only “if there has been
deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial
harm.” Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir.
1993).
Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006).
Beginning with Sargent Watkins, the record shows that he spoke

4

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has held that the “State owes the same duty under the Due Process
Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] and the Eighth Amendment to
provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic
human needs, including medical care and protection from harm,
during their confinement; and (2) that a state jail official’s
liability for episodic acts or omissions cannot attach unless the
official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate
indifference to that risk.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74
F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996).

11

to Willie Handy at approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 5, 2015, at
which point Willie Handy was not in any distress, and had his
inhaler with him.
2-3.

See Mot. for Sum. J., Ex. E. (Watkins Aff.), ¶

Watkins also avers that after being informed that Willie

Handy requested to go to the medical unit, he (Watkins) instructed
Wingard to escort Willie Handy to the unit.

Id. at ¶ 4.

Finally,

Watkins avers that he did not choke or apply mace to Willie Handy.
Id. at ¶ 10.
In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Handy has
submitted a report from her expert witness, Deaunte B. Thompson,
M.D., who opines that Willie Handy’s death resulted because “mace
was applied which triggered Mr. Handy’s Asthma [and] then he
suffered

an

asthma

attack

leading

to

Status

suffocating resulting in his untimely death.”
No. 40], Ex. E (Thompson Report).

Asthmaticus

and

See Resp. [Docket

Dr. Thompson also opines that

Willie Handy’s death “is a result of not seeking the appropriate
medical care” and that had Willie Handy been given “an Albuterol
inhaler or transferred to an acute care facility where an Albuterol
nebulization treatment could have been administered”, he would not
have died.
unwarranted

Id.

Finally, Dr. Thompson opines that “there was an

delay

or

denial

of

medical

contributed to Willie Handy’s death.”

5

care

that

caused

or

Id.5

As discussed below, there is no evidence in the record to
show that Watkins, Thornton or Wingard choked or maced Willie
Handy prior to his fatal asthma attack. Likewise, there is no
12

Based on the evidence before it, the Court finds Handy has
failed to show that there exists a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to whether Watkins acted with deliberate indifference
to Willie Handy’s medical needs.

First, with respect to Dr.

Thompson’s opinion that Willie Handy died because he was subjected
to mace that caused him to suffer an asthma attack, there is no
evidence that Watkins either choked or maced Willie Handy prior to
the asthma attack, or otherwise engaged in any activity that
allegedly triggered that attack.
(Watkins Aff.), ¶ 10.

See Mot. for Sum. J., Ex. E.

There is likewise no evidence that Watkins

was aware of any other individual’s having choked or maced Willie
Handy.

Id.

Second, with respect to Dr. Thompson’s opinions that

Willie Handy’s death resulted because he was not provided timely
medical care in the form of inhaler or nebulizer treatments, there
is no evidence that Watkins had taken any action to either delay or
deny Willie Handy’s access to medical care.

To the contrary, the

record shows that when Watkins saw Willie Handy at 4:00 p.m.,
Willie Handy was not in any distress and had his inhaler with him.
Id. at ¶ 2-3.

Then, after being informed that Willie Handy

requested to go to the medical unit, Watkins arranged for him to be

evidence that Watkins, Thornton or Wingard purposefully denied
and/or delayed Willie Handy’s access to medical treatment. Thus,
the Court finds that Dr. Thompson’s opinions that Willie Handy’s
asthma was triggered because he was subjected to mace, that he
was not timely provided medical treatment for the asthma attack,
and that the delay in treatment resulted in his death, have not
been shown to be applicable to these three particular defendants.
13

escorted to the unit where he was given a respiratory and other
medical treatment by Palmer.

Id. at ¶ 4.

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds there is no
evidence that Watkins’s actions either caused Willie Handy to
suffer the asthma attack, or that he denied or delayed Willie
Handy’s

request

treatment.

to

go

to

the

medical

unit

for

a

breathing

Because there does not exist a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to whether Watkins deprived and/or
delayed Willie Handy’s access to adequate medical care, the Court
finds Watkin’s cannot be held individually liable on the Section
1983 claims alleged against him under the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
As regards Sargent Wingard, the record shows that he escorted
Willie Handy and several other male prisoners to the medical unit
at approximately 6:15 p.m. on September 5, 2015. See Mot. for Sum.
J., Ex. D (Wingard Aff.), ¶ 3.

At that time, Willie Handy was not

exhibiting any signs of distress and was not experiencing any
breathing problems.

Id. at ¶ 3.

Wingard also avers that he did

not choke or apply mace to Willie Handy.

Id. at ¶ 6.

Based on the evidence before it, the Court finds Handy has
failed to show that there exists a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to whether Wingard acted with deliberate indifference
to Willie Handy’s medical needs.

First, there is no evidence that

Wingard either choked or maced Willie Handy prior to the asthma

14

attack, or otherwise engaged in any activity that allegedly caused
that attack.

See id. ¶ 6.

There is likewise no evidence that

Wingard was aware of any other individual’s having choked or maced
Willie Handy.

Id.

Second, there is no evidence that Wingard had

taken any action to either delay or deny Willie Handy’s access to
medical care.

The record shows that while Wingard escorted Willie

Handy to the medical unit for the purpose of receiving a breathing
treatment, and that Willie Handy was not exhibiting any distress or
breathing problems while being escorted.
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds there is no
evidence that Wingard’s actions either caused Willie Handy to
suffer the asthma attack, or that he denied or delayed Willie
Handy’s requests to go to the medical unit. Because there does not
exist a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
Wingard deprived and/or delayed Willie Handy’s access to adequate
medical care, the Court finds Wingard cannot be held individually
liable on the Section 1983 claims alleged against him under the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
Finally, as regards Officer Thornton, the record shows that
Willie Handy requested to be taken to the medical unit for a
breathing treatment because his chest was starting to feel tight.
See Mot. for Sum. J., Ex. C (Thornton Aff.), ¶ 3.

At that time,

Willie Handy was watching television, and was not exhibiting any
signs of distress. Id. at ¶ 4. Thornton then contacted the medical

15

unit for permission to bring Willie Handy for the requested
treatment, and was told that Willie Handy could be brought after
the female inmates left the unit.

Id. at ¶ 6.

Thornton avers that

when he saw Willie Handy later being escorted to the medical unit,
Handy was not in any distress, and was carrying his inhaler.
at ¶ 7.

Id.

Thornton also saw Willie Handy while the latter was

receiving his breathing treatment in the medical unit, and again
Willie Handy was not exhibiting any signs of distress.

Id. at ¶ 9.

Finally, Thornton avers that he did not choke or apply mace to
Willie Handy.

Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.

Based on the evidence before it, the Court finds Handy has
failed to show that there exists a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to whether Thornton acted with deliberate indifference
to Willie Handy’s medical needs.

First, there is no evidence that

Thornton either choked or maced Willie Handy prior to the asthma
attack, or otherwise engaged in any activity that allegedly caused
that attack.

See id. ¶ 14.

There is likewise no evidence that

Thornton was aware of any other individual’s having choked or maced
Willie Handy.

Id., ¶ 15.

Second, there is no evidence that

Thornton had taken any action to either delay or deny Willie
Handy’s access to medical care.

The record shows that Thornton

contacted the medical unit for permission to bring Willie Handy for
a breathing treatment after Handy requested a treatment, and that
Willie Handy was not exhibiting any distress or breathing problems

16

at

the

time.

breathing

Willie

problems

when

Handy

was

Thornton

likewise
later

not

saw

exhibiting

him,

first

any

being

escorted to the medical unit (while carrying his inhaler with him),
and second receiving the breathing treatment.

Because there does

not exist a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
Thornton deprived and/or delayed Willie Handy’s access to adequate
medical care, the Court finds Thornton cannot be held individually
liable on the Section 1983 claims alleged against him under the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
Having found that there does not exist a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Watkins, Wingard and/or
Thornton allegedly caused Willie Handy to suffer an asthma attack,
or took any action to delay or deny Willie Handy’s access to
medical

treatment,

the

Court

finds

their

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity should be granted,
and the federal law claims alleged against them in their individual
capacities should be dismissed.

b.

State Law Claims
Watkins, Thornton and Wingard have moved for summary judgment

on the state law negligence claims alleged against them.

Under

Mississippi law, the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), codified
at Mississippi Code Ann. Section 11-46-1, et seq., provides the
exclusive civil remedy for tort actions against the state, its

17

political subdivisions, and its employees. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 1146-7(1).

See also City of Jackson v. Harris, 44 So.3d 927, 932

(Miss. 2010) (“[T]he MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy for
tort actions against the state, its political subdivisions, and its
employees.”

Watkins, Thornton and Wingard argue that they cannot

be held liable under the MTCA based on their occupations at the
MCDC, and the fact that Willie Handy was detained at that facility.
In support of this argument, Watkins, Thornton and Wingard cite
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-9, which provides in
relevant part:
(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within
the course and scope of their employment or duties shall
not be liable for any claim:
...
(m) of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is
an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal
farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless
of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any
detention
center,
jail,
workhouse,
penal
farm,
penitentiary or other such institution when the claim is
filed;
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(m).
Handy,

however,

argues

that

the

movants

can

be

held

individually liable under the MTCA if they were acting outside the
course and scope of their employment, i.e if their “conduct
constituted

fraud,

criminal offense.”

malice,

slander,

defamation

MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(2).
18

or

any

other

In support of her

claim, Handy argues that Watkins, Thornton and Wingard acted with
malice by (1) ignoring Willie Handy’s obvious need for medical
care, (2) failing to ensure that Willie Handy was provided an
inhaler to keep with him, and (3) making him wait for his breathing
treatment

while

other

inmates

were

treated.

None

of

these

arguments are supported by the evidence in the record.
First, there is no evidence that Watkins, Thornton and/or
Wingard ignored Willie Handy’s request to be taken to the medical
unit for a breathing treatment.

Instead, the record shows that

after Willie Handy requested to go to the medical unit, Thornton
called

the

medical

unit

for

permission

to

bring

him

for

a

treatment, Watkins instructed an officer to escort Willie Handy to
the unit, and Wingard escorted him as directed.

There is likewise

no evidence that Willie Handy was in any acute distress during this
time period.

Second, there is no evidence that Willie Handy was

not provided an inhaler that he could keep with him. The evidence
shows that both Watkins and Thornton saw Willie Handy with his
inhaler.

Although Willie Handy told Palmer that his inhaler was

empty when he presented at the medical unit, there is no evidence
in

the

record

showing

that

Willie

Handy

made

any

of

these

defendants aware that he needed a medication refill at any time.
Finally, there is no evidence that Watkins, Thornton or Wingard
made Willie Handy wait so that other inmates could be treated
first. According to Palmer, she specifically asked Willie Handy if
19

he could wait for his breathing treatment after he was escorted to
the medical unit, and Handy indicated that would be fine. There is
simply no evidence that Watkins, Thornton or Wingard made any
decisions as to the timing of Willie Handy’s breathing treatment
after Handy was escorted to the medical unit.

Accordingly, the

Court finds that Handy has failed to show that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Watkins,
Thornton or Wingard are protected under the immunity provided by
the MTCA.

The Court will, therefore, grant summary judgment as to

the state law claims alleged against these defendants in their
individual capacities.

IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment Related Discovery [Docket No. 39] is hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion of Defendants Jamal
Watkins, Jeremiah Thornton, and John Wingard for Summary Judgment
[Docket No. 35] is hereby granted.
All

federal

and

state

law

claims

alleged

against

these

defendants in their individual capacities are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED this the 25th day of July, 2017.

20

s/ William H. Barbour, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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