Mangum v. Jackson Public School District

Filing 12

ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 6 Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Process. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 12/5/2016. (AC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
GABRIEL MANGUM

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-594-CWR-LRA

JACKSON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT

DEFENDANT

ORDER
Before the Court are the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff’s motion for an
extension of time to serve process. Docket Nos. 4, 6. For the reasons that follow, the case must
be dismissed.
I.

Factual and Procedural History
Gabriel Mangum is a longtime employee of the Jackson Public School District. In this

suit, he alleges that the principal of Brown Elementary School harassed him, retaliated against
him, and discriminated against him on the basis of disability, all in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
Mangum had previously brought his allegations to the attention of the federal government
by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In a
letter dated April 5, 2016, the United States Department of Justice, acting on behalf of the
EEOC, issued Mangum a “right to sue” letter. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d) (right to sue letter
issued by the Department of Justice when respondent is a political subdivision). The United
States Postal Service tracking number indicates that the letter was received by the Postal Service
on April 8 and delivered to Mangum’s attorney’s office on April 18.1 His attorney filed this suit
on July 28.

1

These dates are based upon the Court’s independent research, which was made possible because the Department of
Justice sent the right-to-sue letter by certified mail. The plaintiff did not allege on what date the letter was received,

II.

Law
Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies before pursuing employment discrimination claims in federal court. For
Title VII and ADA claims, exhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely
charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue. A plaintiff
must file her civil suit within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue-letter.
The requirement that a party file a lawsuit within this ninety-day limitations period
under Title VII and the ADA is strictly construed. Commencement of the ninetyday period begins to run on the day that notice is received at the address supplied
to the EEOC by the claimant. . . . This court routinely dismisses untimely claims
involving delays after receipt of the right-to-sue letter in the absence of a recognized
equitable consideration.

Garcia v. Penske Logistics, L.L.C., 631 F. App’x 204, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks,
citations, and brackets omitted); see Stokes v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 367 F. App’x 545, 547 (5th Cir.
2010).
III.

Discussion
Mangum’s suit was filed too late. Because his attorney received the right to sue letter on

April 18, his lawsuit was due on or before July 18.2 It was not filed for another 10 days. The
delay requires the suit to be dismissed.
Mangum’s complaint suggests that the 90-day clock started to run on April 28, when his
attorney read the right to sue letter. As the above cases explain, however, that is not the law.
Mangum’s response brief then presses that the resulting 10-day delay has not prejudiced
JPS. Again, that is not the standard. This Court cannot extend the 90-day window to file suit
unless the plaintiff has shown an entitlement to equitable tolling. See Stokes, 367 F. App’x at

and curiously, the defendant relies solely on the presumption of receipt set forth in Stokes v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 367
F. App’x 545, 547-48 (5th Cir. 2010) (presuming that right to sue letters are received between three and seven days
after mailing).
2
The ninetieth day is actually July 17, but because that was a Sunday, the time is extended a day. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(C).

2

548; Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011). And here, Mangum has not
argued that any of the grounds for equitable tolling apply.
IV.

Conclusion
The motion to dismiss is granted. Dismissal renders moot the plaintiff’s motion for an

extension of time to properly serve the defendant. A separate Final Judgment shall issue.
SO ORDERED, this the 5th day of December, 2016.

s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3