Davis v. Hinds County, Mississippi et al

Filing 93

ORDER denying 63 Motion for Reconsideration for the reasons set out in the Order. Signed by Chief District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on February 23, 2018. (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
CHAKAKHAN R. DAVIS
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-674-DPJ-FKB

HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
AND TYRONE LEWIS

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Plaintiff Chakakhan R. Davis seeks relief from this Court’s November 29, 2017 Order
[58] granting in part and denying in part her Motion to Amend Complaint [30]. Because Davis
still fails to demonstrate that the claims she wishes to pursue are plausible, the Court denies her
Motion for Prospective Relief and Reconsideration [63].
I.

Background
Davis says Defendants mistreated her during an arrest and subsequent incarceration

because she had previously filed a grievance with the Hinds County Sherriff’s Department. For
purposes of this motion, the relevant history relates to Davis’s proposed false-arrest and First
Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Hinds County, Mississippi; former Sherriff
Tyrone Lewis; and Officer Brenda Jones (the “Moving Defendants”).
Davis initiated this case by filing a pro se complaint in state court asserting various state
and federal claims, including a claim for false arrest. She did not, however, mention First
Amendment retaliation as the basis for any claim. After removal from state court, the Moving
Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Defs.’
Mots. [7, 9]. Lewis and Jones sought dismissal of all state- and federal-law claims against them,
while Hinds County sought dismissal of the state-law claims against it. Davis responded [11],
asserting a new claim against the Moving Defendants based on First Amendment retaliation.

On May 23, 2017, the Court ruled on Moving Defendants’ motions, finding first that
Davis never served Lewis or Jones. See May 23, 2017 Order [28]. Because of that, the Court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of their Rule 12(c) motions. The Court did, however,
consider the merits to determine whether allowing Davis an opportunity to cure defective service
would be futile. Id. at 5–7 (citing Gregory v. United States, 942 F.2d 1498, 1500–01 (10th Cir.
1991)). The Court stated that any futile claims would be dismissed without prejudice under Rule
12(b)(5) for lack of proper service. Id.1
After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court held that the federal claims, and most
of the state-law claims, Davis pleaded against Lewis and Jones were futile and should be
dismissed without prejudice—including the false-arrest claims. May 23, 2017 Order [28] at 18.
But based on Davis’s pro se status, the Court allowed her to seek leave to amend her Complaint
in two relevant ways: (1) to better articulate the newly proposed First Amendment retaliation
claims against the Moving Defendants; and (2) to re-plead her false-arrest claim against Hinds
County. Id. at 22.
Davis accepted the Court’s invitation to seek leave to amend, but she submitted a
proposed Amended Complaint [30-1] that was almost identical to her original Complaint.
So on November 29, 2017, the Court denied leave to amend except as to one unrelated claim
against Lewis. Nov. 29, 2017 Order [58] at 9.
Davis now seeks an order vacating the Court’s November 29, 2017 Order to the extent
the Court prevented her from amending her complaint as to First Amendment retaliation and
false arrest. See Pl.’s Mot. [63] at 25. For the following reasons, the Court denies her motion.

1

Contrary to Davis’s current assertion, the Court did not exceed its jurisdiction by dismissing
these claims on the merits under Rule 12(c). See Pl.’s Mot. [63] at 25–26.
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II.

Standards
Davis seeks reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). But because

the Order granted only partial dismissal, it was interlocutory, and the Court must consider
Davis’s request for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Cabral v.
Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2017). That rule states that interlocutory orders “may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’
rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “‘Interlocutory orders,’ such as grants of partial
[dismissal] . . . are left within the plenary power of the court that rendered them to afford such
relief from them as justice requires.’” McKay v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 701 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Zimzores v. Veterans Admin., 778 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1985)). Whether
to grant such relief is a matter left to the trial court’s discretion. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (stating that “interlocutory judgments are not
brought within the restrictions of [Rule 60], but rather they are left subject to the complete power
of the court rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires”).
III.

Analysis
Davis presents a 32-page memorandum explaining why she should be allowed to pursue

the First Amendment and false-arrest claims. The First Amendment claim obviously falls under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the false-arrest claim is less clear. When discussing her false-arrest claim,
Davis at times references theories that would apply in the § 1983 context, see Pl.’s Mot. [63] at
16−17, but her most direct statement asserts that the Court should not have dismissed her “State
Law false arrest claim,” see id. at 17. Either way, reconsideration is denied.
While Davis’s brief offers lengthy and often redundant discussions regarding the law, it
fails to demonstrate that she can factually plead plausible claims—something her first and

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second complaints and previous memoranda also failed to do. The Court has already considered
all relevant evidence that Davis mentions in her most recent motion, and its last two orders
addressed those issues in full. See May 23, 2017 Order [28]; Nov. 29, 2017 Order [58]. There is
no need to go through all that again; the Court adopts its earlier analysis and that found in Hinds
County’s response. See Def.’s Resp. [71].
That said, there are seven issues in Davis’s motion that the Court will briefly address;
none of the other issues raised would make a difference.
First, Davis continues to conflate her excessive-force claim with her proposed First
Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. [63] at 11. Evidence that excessive force may
have occurred is not sufficient to establish the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim,
much less municipal liability. See Nov. 29, 2017 Order [58] at 6 n.2.
Second, some arguments seem to assume that the Court has dismissed claims other than
those raised in the Moving Defendants’ motions. For example, Davis seems to think the Court
dismissed her § 1983 claims against Hinds County (other than the First Amendment claim), but
Hinds County filed no such motion, so there is no order addressing those claims. Davis also
seems to think that the Court dismissed her false-arrest claims on the merits as to Defendants
other than Lewis and Jones. See Pl.’s Mot. [63] at 18. But Lewis and Jones are the only
individual defendants who sought dismissal.2
Third, Davis suggests that the Court erred in finding she had not pleaded a plausible
claim against Defendant Lewis for failure to train or supervise related to the use of excessive
force by guards at the jail. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. [63] at 15. But the Court previously held “that

2

The Court did dismiss Defendants Bobby Melson and Chris Maddox, but it is not clear they
were involved in the arrest, and, in any event, the Court dismissed them under Rule 4(m). See
June 19, 2017 Order [36].
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Davis has pleaded a plausible claim against Lewis for failure to train or supervise the detention
center staff.” Nov. 29, 2017 Order [58] at 8 (emphasis added). That claim remains.
Fourth, Davis asserts that “newly discovered evidence” requires reconsideration. More
precisely, she claims that a law-enforcement officer from another jurisdiction had a “secret crush
. . . [and] would not even ask to see my driver’s license during a road block.” Pl.’s Mot. [63] at
22. Davis says that from these facts, “retaliation by the County and Sheriff Lewis can plausibly
be inferred.” Id. Assuming this evidence is truly “new”—which is not apparent—it is
speculative as to the Moving Defendants and fails to demonstrate a plausible First Amendment
claim against them.
Fifth, Davis says the Moving Defendants committed fraud on the Court. Id. at 24. But
taking a contrary legal position is not fraud.
Sixth, Davis says that a state-court judge dismissed the charges against her “because there
was not probable cause for Ms. Davis[’s] arrest and detention.” Id. at 18. She also says the
arrest was retaliatory. Id. at 19. But she does not appear to address the bar to state-law liability
under Mississippi Code section 11-46-9(1)(c). And as for retaliation, there is nothing beyond
conjecture linking the arrest to Davis’s prior grievance—much less the Moving Defendants.
Davis has had multiple opportunities to explain the claims related to the arrest. Those that
survived Hinds County’s motion to dismiss will go forward, but the others remain dismissed.
Finally, Davis argues “that this court should vacate its order denying recusal entered on
September 25th 2017.” Pl.’s Mot. [63] at 27 (emphasis in original). Davis seems to say recusal
is required because the Court rejected her legal arguments. Id. at 28. To begin with, the Court
entered no orders on September 25, 2017, and there have been no motions seeking recusal. To
the extent Davis now seeks recusal, adverse rulings are not—by themselves—grounds for

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recusal. See Ex parte Am. Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 44 (1913) (observing that recusal was
“never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings
made”).
IV.

Conclusion
The Court denies Davis’s Motion for Prospective Relief and Reconsideration [63].
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 23rd day of February, 2018.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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