Hampton v. Sollie

Filing 8

ORDER denying 6 Motion to Dismiss. Hearing to be scheduled for early 2017. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 12/9/2016. Copy mailed to plaintiff at address listed on docket sheet. (AC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
JARVIS HAMPTON

PLAINTIFF

V.

CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-725-CWR-LRA

BILLIE SOLLIE

DEFENDANT
ORDER

Before the Court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss. After reviewing the allegations and
applicable law, the motion will be denied.
I.

Factual and Procedural History
Jarvis Hampton is a pretrial detainee in the custody of Lauderdale County, Mississippi.

He filed this habeas petition in this Court alleging that he has been incarcerated without having
been appointed a defense attorney. He seeks dismissal of the charges and release for what his
complaint suggests is a violation of his constitutional rights to counsel and a speedy trial.
The State of Mississippi has responded on behalf of Lauderdale County. It says Hampton
has been detained on a murder charge since February 2016, when he received an initial
appearance before a municipal court judge and had bail set at $100,000. According to the State,
during that initial appearance Hampton claimed he was represented by an attorney. The State
continues, “[u]pon information and belief, Respondent submits that Hampton’s case is currently
under investigation, and the file has not yet been turned over to the District Attorney’s Office.”
II.

Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts the

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and makes reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To proceed, the complaint “must contain a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 677-78
(quotation marks and citation omitted). This requires “more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” but the complaint need not have “detailed factual
allegations.” Id. at 678 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The plaintiff’s claims must also
be plausible on their face, which means there is “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation
omitted).
III.

Discussion
A.

Substantive Law

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The speedy trial guarantee “is one of the most basic rights
preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967). It reflects a
fundamental belief that forcing someone to stay in “lengthy pretrial detention” is “essentially . . .
punishment.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10,
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016) (No. 14-1457).
The speedy trial right is specifically designed “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It
often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most
jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail
is simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.
Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is
serious.

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Id. at 532-33; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (explaining that
detaining an individual “may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his
friends”). The Court added that jails are “generally deplorable . . . institutions” which can have
“a destructive effect on human character.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 520 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
At some juncture in a criminal prosecution the government’s lengthy, inexplicable
delay, in the face of vigorous demands for an immediate trial, is so offensive to the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial that a Court must intervene
regardless of whether the defendant has been incarcerated, subjected to public scorn
and obloquy, or impaired in his ability to defend himself.
Hoskins v. Wainwright, 485 F.2d 1186, 1188 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973).
B.

Analysis

The State contends that Hampton’s petition should be dismissed because he has not
alleged “special circumstances.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S.
484, 489 (1973). It is true that there must be “special circumstances” before a federal court can
dismiss pending state charges on the basis of a speedy trial violation.1 Id. Because those
circumstances are by definition unusual, in a typical case the federal court can only force the
State “to grant [the defendant] a prompt trial.” Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 228 (5th
Cir. 1987).
Here, though, Hampton’s petition claims both an excessively-delayed trial and a denial of
counsel. (The allegation of having no attorney must be taken as true on a motion to dismiss,
despite the State’s contrary assertion.) And the State has pointed to no authority indicating that it

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“[T]he Fifth Circuit has not clarified what ‘special circumstances’ might warrant an exception from this rule.”
Hartfield v. Osborne, No. 4:14-CV-3120, 2015 WL 1880449, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2015). “Other courts have
focused on whether state procedures are sufficient to protect a petitioner’s constitutional rights without pretrial
intervention.” Id. (citation omitted).

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is typical (i.e., not special) for a person to be incarcerated on a charge (in this case murder) for 10
months without being indicted or even having an attorney appointed to assist him. See, e.g.,
Goodrum v. Quarterman, 547 F.3d 249, 257 (5th Cir. 2008) (“As the Supreme Court has
observed, courts generally view a delay of approximately one year as sufficient to require a full
Barker analysis. This is the rule in the Fifth Circuit.”). The lack of counsel impairs the efficacy
of every other constitutional right guaranteed in a criminal proceeding, from the right to demand
a speedy trial, to the right not to incriminate oneself, to the general advice an attorney can give
on the substantive charge and the procedural issues involved. At the very minimum, the
attorney’s presence itself provides some comfort to his client because the attorney is there to
protect his rights. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
Given the allegations, the motion to dismiss will be denied and the case shall proceed to
an omnibus hearing in early 2017.
IV.

Conclusion
The motion is denied. The Court intends to set this matter for an omnibus hearing

alongside other Lauderdale County speedy trial habeas petitions now pending in this district.
Counsel for the State is directed to forward a copy of this Order to Lee Thaggard, counsel
for Lauderdale County.
SO ORDERED, this the 9th day of December, 2016.

s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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