Chipley v. Yazoo County, Mississippi et al
Filing
118
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying as moot 105 MOTION to Strike 101 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion ; denying as moot 98 MOTION to Strike 96 Memorandum in Support re: Study / Report of Lindsay M. Hayes; granting 78 MOTION for Summary Judgment Premised on Qualified Immunity; granting 84 Second MOTION for Summary Judgment BY DEFENDANT, SARGENT SHARKEY BROWNLOW, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, on the state law claim of negligence, denying the motion as to plaintiff's 1983 claim; denying as moot 117 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Authorities in Support of 78 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 4/20/18 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
MARIE RHODES CHIPLEY, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE DECEDENT, MICHAEL WILLIAM RHODES,
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF ALL WRONGFUL
DEATH BENEFICIARIES AND AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
MICHAEL WILLIAM RHODES, DECEASED
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16cv901TSL-RHW
YAZOO COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; SHERIFF
JACOB SHERIFF, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; SERGEANT
SHARKEY BROWLOW, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CAPTAIN GARY
EDWARDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; SANDRA BANKS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; WARDEN MARY RUSHING,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On December 24, 2014, less than twelve hours after being
arrested and incarcerated in the Yazoo County Regional
Correctional Facility, Michael Rhodes committed suicide.
His
daughter, Marie Rhodes Chipley, for herself and on behalf of
Rhodes’ estate and wrongful death beneficiaries, filed the present
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of Rhodes’
constitutional rights by Yazoo County; Yazoo County Regional
Correctional Facility (YCFCF); the arresting officer, Simon
Stubblefield; Yazoo County Sheriff Jacob Sheriff; YCRCF Warden
Mary Rushing1; YCRCF Captain Gary Edwards; and various jail
employees, including Sergeant Sharkey Brownlow, Sandra Banks and
Sederick Clark.
negligence.
She also included a state law cause of action for
The case is presently before the court on separate
motions for summary judgment by defendant Sharkey Brownlow, in his
individual capacity,2 and by defendants Sheriff, Rushing, Edwards
and Banks, in their individual capacities.3
responded in opposition to the motions.
Plaintiff has
The court, having
considered the memoranda of authorities, together with
attachments, submitted by the parties, concludes that Brownlow’s
motion should be denied and the motion of Sheriff, Rushing,
Edwards and Banks should be granted.
Background Facts
The following undisputed facts are drawn from the record
evidence.4
On December 23, 2014, the Yazoo County Sheriff’s
Office received a report that plaintiff’s decedent, Michael
1
Mary Rushing was the warden, and Gary Edwards a deputy
warden at YCRCF at the time of Michael Rhodes’ death. Gary
Edwards became warden in January 2015 when Rushing left to take a
job with the Hinds County Sheriff’s Department.
2
This is Brownlow’s second motion for summary judgment.
The first was dismissed without prejudice and a second motion
promptly refiled.
3
There were originally two more movants, Shirley Paige
and Sederick Clark; however, after the motion was filed, plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed those defendants.
4
The court will note where facts are in dispute.
2
Rhodes, had run off the road and damaged some property and then
left the scene.
Deputies Simon Stubblefield and Dave Collins,
responding to this call, separately drove to Rhodes’ residence.
When they arrived, they found Rhodes sitting in his vehicle in the
woods near his home; the vehicle was stuck in the mud.
Family
members at the scene reported that Rhodes, who had been drinking,
was in the vehicle with a gun to his head, threatening to harm
himself.
The family asked the officers to back off, since Rhodes
was reportedly upset by their presence.
The officers backed away
for about twenty minutes, and after the family was able to get the
gun away from Rhodes, they returned at the family’s request and
took Rhodes into custody.5
Stubblefield then transported him to
the Yazoo County Regional Correctional Facility.
Because it was apparent to Stubblefield that Rhodes was
intoxicated and unable to walk, he radioed ahead to the jail to
request assistance with Rhodes.
When they arrived at the jail,
they were met by Sergeant Sharkey Brownlow, who was working as a
floor supervisor at the jail.
the car and into the jail.
Brownlow helped get Rhodes out of
Once inside the jail, Brownlow and
Stubblefield took Rhodes into the booking room.
5
Brownlow told the
As to the basis for the arrest, Stubblefield has
explained that the family was still concerned that Rhodes might
harm himself or someone else. He further stated that he had
authority to arrest Rhodes for leaving the scene of an accident,
destruction of private property and possible DUI.
3
booking officer, Sandra Banks, to skip the standard booking
procedure, ostensibly because Rhodes was too intoxicated to answer
questions.6
Stubblefield helped Brownlow get Rhodes changed into
inmate clothing and together, they helped Rhodes walk to a
segregation/isolation cell.
Stubblefield then departed the jail.
Brownlow checked on Rhodes a couple or a few times during the
night and in the early morning hours (though the evidence as to
how often is contradictory).
When Brownlow checked on Rhodes
around 5:30 a.m. on December 24, he discovered that Rhodes had
committed suicide; he had used the sheet to make a noose and
hanged himself from the top bunk.
Strips of sheet were found
hanging from the light fixture and a chair in the cell, suggesting
failed attempts at suicide.
At the time of Mr. Rhodes’ suicide, YCRCF had in place a
“Suicide Plan for County Offenders”, which provided, among other
requirements, that:
1. All threats ... of intentional self-injury shall be
taken seriously and REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO MEDICAL
STAFF for directions and appropriate medical
treatment and mental health evaluation. ...
6
Brownlow testified that he tried to talk to Rhodes when
Rhodes arrived at the jail but Rhodes “just wasn’t saying
anything. He just wasn’t responding. ... He wouldn’t say
anything. He just didn’t respond to me.” According to
Stubblefield, however, while Rhodes was too intoxicated to walk,
he had no problem communicating and was cooperative in providing
information that Stubblefield needed to fill out his arrest
card/report.
4
2. An officer must stay with the offender at all times.
3. The offender is to be placed in the medical isolation
cell (C1006) for continual observation by an officer.
4. Offender should be dressed out in suicide watch
garments, and all items must be removed from the
cell that may be used to injure him/her self (pants,
shirts, linens, towels, razors, strings of any kind,
etc).
5. Once the offender is dressed in suicide garments and
all items have been removed from the offender, a
correctional officer will be posted outside the
medical isolation cell to physically observe the
offender.
6. Offender must be under CONTINUOUS observation AT ALL
TIMES.
(Emphasis in original).
There was also a written policy requiring
that “[i]nmates who have ... exhibited suicidal tendencies will be
housed in a more secure location than the general population.
Correctional Staff will observe these inmates no less frequently
than fifteen (15) minute intervals.”
And, there were segregation
policies which required that inmates in segregation “be personally
observed by a correctional staff member at least every FORTY (40)
minutes on an irregular schedule. ... Suicidal inmates shall be
under continuous observation....”
It is undisputed that none of
these policies was followed in the case of Michael Rhodes.
All the individual defendants have moved for summary judgment
as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them in their individual
capacities on the basis of qualified immunity.
They also contend
they are entitled to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims
5
Act (MTCA), Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq. as to plaintiff’s
state law claim for negligence.
Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 prohibits the deprivation of constitutional
rights under color of state law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To
establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant official, acting under color of
state law, caused the deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
845 F.3d 580, 599 (5th Cir. 2016).
Anderson v. Valdez,
The doctrine of qualified
immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808,
172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)).
“Qualified
immunity gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.
When properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 743, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
6
When an official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff has
the burden to overcome the defense by showing that “(1) the
defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and
(2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light
of clearly established law at the time of the violation.”
v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011).
Porter
“A government
official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the
time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are]
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 741, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)).
The
Supreme Court has cautioned against defining “‘clearly established
law ... at a high level of generality,’ since doing so avoids the
crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.”
Plumhoff v.
Rickard, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1056
(2014) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074).
To
find that the law was clearly established, “[the court] must be
able to point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of
persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in
question with a high degree of particularity.”
Morgan v. Swanson,
659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at
7
741, 131 S. Ct. 2074).
That does not mean that there must be a
case “directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”
Al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 741, 131 S. Ct. 2074.7
Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment
is required when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Typically
on a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial
burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
If the moving party demonstrates
an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, then
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with
specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial does exist.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
However, a
government official’s good faith assertion of a qualified immunity
7
The supervisory defendants have recently filed a motion
for leave to file supplemental authorities in support of their
motion for summary judgment, in which they purport to undertake to
advise the court of recent Supreme Court decisions setting forth
this standard. As these cases do no more than reiterate this
well-established standard, the court finds their proposed
supplementation superfluous but will allow it to be filed
nevertheless.
8
defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof.
Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005).
Once the
official asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden
to show there is a genuine and material dispute as to whether
qualified immunity applies.
Castorena v. Zamora, 684 F. App'x
360, 363 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
See also Thompson
v. Upshur Cty., TX, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We do not
require that an official demonstrate that he did not violate
clearly established federal rights; our precedent places that
burden upon plaintiffs.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
Conversely, “[n]o genuine
dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.”
EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
When
evaluating whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact
exists, the court considers “all of the evidence in the record but
refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence.”
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins.
Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
In so doing, the court
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
9
party, even on a summary judgment motion based on qualified
immunity.
See Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir.
2010) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified
immunity, but all inferences are drawn in his favor.”).
Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights and Applicable Standards
Rhodes was a pretrial detainee during his incarceration at
YCRCF.
As such, the source of his constitutional rights was the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
A pretrial detainee has
“a clearly established ... right not to be denied, by deliberate
indifference, attention to his serious medical needs.”
Hare v.
City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
“includes protection from known suicidal tendencies.”
This
Estate of
Pollard v. Hood Cty., Tex., 579 F. App'x 260, 265 (5th Cir.
2014).8
See Rhyne v. Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.
8
“Constitutional challenges by pretrial detainees may be
brought under two alternative theories: as an attack on a
‘condition of confinement’ or as an ‘episodic act or omission.’”
Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 644–45 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc)). A challenge to a condition of confinement
is a challenge to “general conditions, practices, rules, or
restrictions of pretrial confinement,” and is analyzed under the
standard of Bell v. Wolfish, which asks whether the condition is
“reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.”
Estate of Henson v. Wichita Cty., Tex., 795 F.3d 456, 463 (5th
Cir. 2015) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 644, and Bell, 441 U.S. 520,
539, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979)). “An
episodic-acts-or- omissions claim, by contrast, ‘faults specific
jail officials for their acts or omissions.’” Id. (quoting
Sherherd, 591 F.3d at 452). This standard requires proof of
subjective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s
constitutional rights. Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir.
10
1992) (“The failure to provide pre-trial detainees with adequate
protection from their known suicidal impulses is actionable under
§ 1983 as a violation of the detainee's constitutional rights.”).
“[A] prison official acts with deliberate indifference when
he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”
Hinojosa v.
Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1994)).
The deliberate indifference standard has both objective
and subjective prongs:
“Whether a risk is substantial and the
threatened harm is serious represents an objective test; whether
prison officials consciously disregarded the risk represents a
subjective one.”
Hinojosa, 807 F.3d at 665 (citation omitted).
The “subjective knowledge” prong “is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference
from circumstantial evidence, ... and a factfinder may conclude
that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very
fact that the risk was obvious.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.
1997). The claims herein are appropriately analyzed as episodicacts-or-omissions claims. See Flores v. Cnty. of Hardeman, Tex.,
124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Hare and Scott and
classifying claim arising out of inmate's suicide as an
episodic-acts-or-omissions claim, despite allegations regarding
jail's training and staffing policies).
11
Ct. 1970 (citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738,
122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002) (court “may infer
the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that
the risk of harm is obvious”) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114
S. Ct. 1970); Hinojosa, 807 F.3d at 665 (quoting Farmer).
“[T]o
avoid liability, ‘[p]rison officials charged with deliberate
indifference might show ... that they did not know of the
underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and
that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew
the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk
to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.’”
Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S. Ct. 1970); see also Farmer,
511 U.S. at 838, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (“an official's failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did
not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.”).
Under Farmer, “evidence that an official was aware of a
substantial risk to inmate safety does not alone establish
deliberate indifference.”
Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 177–78.
“[P]rison
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted.”
Id.
Indeed, “even if an officer responds without the
12
due care a reasonable person would use—such that the officer is
only negligent—there will be no liability.”
Id. (citing Davidson
v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106 S. Ct. 668, 88 L. Ed. 2d 677
(1986)).
The officer’s actions must rise to the level of
deliberate indifference, a high standard, before liability can be
found.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on the night of December 23, 2014,
both defendants Brownlow and Banks knew that Michael Rhodes was a
suicide risk and acted with deliberate indifference to his need
for protection.
She alleges that defendants Sheriff, Rushing and
Edwards implemented or failed to implement suicide prevention
policies, failed to train jail staff on suicide prevention
measures, and failed to supervise jail staff, which manifested
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of their
detainees.
She has thus alleged a constitutional violation at a
high level of generality.
See Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459.
The
question on the present motion is whether defendants' actions were
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.
Sharley Brownlow
Applying these standards, the court concludes that defendant
Brownlow’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity
should be denied.
Brownlow has admitted that Stubblefield told
him that shortly prior to Rhodes’ arrest, Rhodes had held a gun to
his head.
Brownlow also admits that Stubblefield told him that
13
Rhodes “might be a suicide risk.”
He claims, though, that he did
not take Stubblefield’s remark seriously and maintains that he
cannot be held liable because he was not actually aware that
Rhodes was a suicide risk.
He submits that because he believed
that Rhodes was not suicidal, it was not necessary to place him on
suicide watch.
He asserts claims that while this belief may have
been incorrect or “unsound,” it was not deliberately indifferent.
However, construing the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, there is obviously a factual issue as to whether
Brownlow knew that Rhodes was suicidal.
Brownlow testified that when he and Stubblefield first
brought Rhodes into the jail, Stubblefield asked him to “keep an
eye on [Rhodes] for the night” since Rhodes was intoxicated and “a
bad drunk.”
Stubblefield, he claims, did not say anything at that
time about Rhodes being suicidal.
Brownlow has explained that
since all the cells up front “in the suicide area” were full, he
decided to put Rhodes in an empty cell “in segregation” so that
Rhodes “could be by himself” instead of “in population,” where he
might have been at risk of getting “jumped” by another inmate.
Brownlow testified that after they had put Rhodes in the
segregation cell, as Stubblefield was walking out the door to
leave, he, Brownlow, asked Stubblefield why Rhodes’ clothes were
muddy; Stubblefield responded by telling Brownlow about going to
Rhodes’ house earlier in the day and about the family telling him
14
that Rhodes was pointing a gun to his head.
Brownlow testified
that when he asked Stubblefield for more information about the gun
incident, Stubblefield “laughed and joked and said that Mr. Rhodes
might be suicid[al].”9
Brownlow claims that Stubblefield was
“saying [this] as a joke”; that “it wasn’t like [Stubblefield] was
telling [him] that [Rhodes] was suicidal.
sarcastically speaking.”10
[He was] [j]ust
And Brownlow asserts that because of
the “sarcastic” manner in which Stubblefield said this, he did not
think Rhodes was actually suicidal.
He further states he does not
recall Stubblefield ever saying that Rhodes needed to be placed on
suicide watch.
In contrast to Brownlow’s version of events, Stubblefield
testified that when he first arrived at the jail and he and
9
Brownlow signed a statement on March 8, 2017 prepared by
his attorney which recited that he had asked Stubblefield to tell
him more about the gun incident. He stated this in his
deposition, as well; but he also testified in his deposition that
he “didn’t really ask [Stubblefield] to tell me more about
that....” Regardless of whether Brownlow asked for more
information about the gun incident, it is undisputed that
Stubblefield told him that just prior to his arrest, Rhodes had
been pointing a gun to his head.
10
There is nothing to suggest that Brownlow thought
Stubblefield was joking when he reported that before he was
arrested, Rhodes had held a gun to his head for 45 minutes.
Brownlow admits Stubblefield told him this and offers no
explanation as to why he did not think this behavior indicated
that Rhodes was potentially suicidal. Stubblefield’s alleged
“joking” or “sarcastic” manner aside, Brownlow admitted that this
was something to be concerned about. Yet he still says he “didn’t
think [Rhodes] was suicidal.”
15
Brownlow were getting Rhodes out of the car and walking him into
the jail, he specifically told Brownlow that Rhodes “needed to be
placed on suicide watch because he might be suicidal due to the
fact that the family member stated that he had a gun to his head.”
Stubblefield states that he did not say this in a joking or
sarcastic manner and that there was no doubt that Brownlow heard
him.
Another officer who was present confirmed that Stubblefield
did not say this in a joking manner.
In addition to Stubblefield’s testimony, Marie Chipley
testified that she called the jail on the evening of December 23rd
and expressed concern to Brownlow because her father was
“threatening suicide” and had said that he “could not go on
living.”
Brownlow admits he spoke with Chipley, but claims she
only expressed concerns related to her father’s “drinking problem”
and nothing more.
For purposes of the present motion, the court must accept
Stubblefield’s and Chipley’s testimony as true.
In the court’s
opinion, their testimony is sufficient to permit a trier of fact
to find that Brownlow had actual knowledge of a substantial risk
of suicide, despite his professed belief otherwise.
If, in fact,
Brownlow knew that Rhodes was suicidal, then as a matter of
clearly established law, he had a duty to take measures for
Rhodes’ protection.
See Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 177-78 (stating that
“the law is clearly established that jailers must take measures to
16
prevent inmate suicides once they know of the suicide risk”).11
It
may not have been “established with any clarity as to what those
measures must be.”
Id.
Here, however, the record evidence
establishes that Brownlow essentially took no measures for Rhodes’
protection.
Instead, he gave Rhodes a mat, blanket and sheet,
dressed him in regular inmate clothing, put him in a segregation
cell with multiple tie-off points and then failed to check on
Rhodes at even arguably reasonable intervals.12
Any reasonable
officer in his position, assuming he knew Rhodes was a suicide
11
The Fifth Circuit has “highlight[ed] the importance of
appreciating the difference between the objective reasonableness
standard for qualified immunity ... and the subjective deliberate
indifference standard for section 1983 liability.” Thompson v.
Upshur Cty., TX, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). In Thompson,
the court explained that
examples of behavior that does (and does not) constitute
deliberate indifference are relevant in assessing the
scope of clearly established law and, therefore, are
relevant in determining whether the defendants' actions
were objectively reasonable. ... However, when the
defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate
that all reasonable officials similarly situated would
have then known that the alleged acts of the defendants
violated the United States Constitution. ... That is
different from the burden of establishing a genuine
issue as to the defendant's deliberately indifferent
subjective state of mind.
Id. (citations omitted).
12
Brownlow has given several different versions of how
often he checked on Rhodes. In the version most favorable to
plaintiff, he checked on him only twice, the last time around
12:30 a.m. Accepting that version as true, then it would follow
that Brownlow failed to check on Rhodes for more than five hours.
17
risk, would have known that these actions violated Rhodes’
constitutional rights.
The court acknowledges Brownlow’s claims that he was shorthanded and unable to perform all his duties and also check on
Rhodes as often as jail policy required.
However, not only do the
jail logs fail to substantiate this claim, but the fact that he
would prioritize other duties, like handing out snacks, over
monitoring a suicidal inmate, is reflective of deliberate
indifference.
Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, he did not merely fail to check on Rhodes
at the intervals dictated by the jail’s suicide prevention policy,
he failed to check on him at all for five hours.
No officer in
his position could have thought this was constitutionally
permissible.
See Shepard v. Hansford Cty., 110 F. Supp. 3d 696,
710–11 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (finding deliberate indifference where
officer’s violations of jail’s fifteen-minute face-to-face suicide
watch policy “were pervasive and intentional”; where on multiple
occasions “she consciously chose to prioritize her other jail
duties” over her suicide watch duties; and where she never
informed the sheriff that she was unable to perform all the
required duties by herself and she never sought help with
maintaining the fifteen-minute suicide watch).
Based on the foregoing, it is manifest that Brownlow is not
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
18
Sandra Banks
Sandra Banks was the booking/intake officer on duty when
Rhodes was brought into the jail.
Banks has testified that she
had no interaction with Rhodes and neither Stubblefield nor
Brownlow expressed any concern to her that Rhodes might be
suicidal.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary.
Plaintiff does assert that Banks ignored “an obvious risk of
suicide,” but she fails to explain how the risk of suicide would
have been obvious to Banks.
She suggests that Banks would have
overheard Stubblefield tell Brownlow that Rhodes might be
suicidal, but plaintiff offers no evidence to this effect, only
speculation.
It is undisputed that Banks did not complete the booking
process on Mr. Rhodes, either because Sergeant Brownlow, her
supervisor, told her not to do so and/or because Mr. Rhodes’
condition prevented her from doing so.
Plaintiff notes that the
intake screening form utilized at the jail included questions
about the inmate’s mental state.
She argues that had Banks
completed the screening process, as was her duty as the booking
officer, then she would have discerned that Mr. Rhodes might be
suicidal.
She submits, alternatively, that had Banks kept Mr.
Rhodes in the booking area until she was able to complete the
booking process, as was indicated by jail policy, then she would
have been able to keep him under observation.
19
However, plaintiff
has pointed to no evidence that Banks actually knew that Rhodes
was a suicide risk and accordingly, she cannot have acted with
deliberate indifference.
Supervisory Liability
Supervisory officials may not be held liable under § 1983 on
a theory of vicarious liability.
Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245
F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Monell v. Dept.
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed.
2d 611 (1978) (supervisory officials cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious
liability).
Rather, supervisory officials can only be held liable
for their own unconstitutional conduct.
Brown v. Callahan, 623
F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989)).
This generally means that a supervisor may be held liable “‘only
if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the
constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional
policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.’”
Porter, 659 F.3d at 446 (quoting Gates v. Texas Dep't of Prot. &
Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)).
“A supervisor
may also be liable for failure to supervise or train if: ‘(1) the
supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate
official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or
supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the
20
failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate
indifference.’” Id. (quoting Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d
388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009)).
In the present case, plaintiff does not contend that Sheriff,
Rushing or Edwards had direct personal involvement in any of the
alleged acts or omissions which led to Michael Rhodes’ death.
Rather, they assert that these defendants are liable based on
their failure to adopt, implement and/or otherwise execute a
constitutionally adequate “suicide watch” policy, failure to train
jail staff on how to recognize suicidal behavior and provide
appropriate medical attention, and failure to supervise jail
staff.
For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that
defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to these claims
based on their qualified immunity.
First, the record evidence does not support plaintiff’s
contention that defendants failed to implement policies on suicide
detection and prevention.
Sheriff Sheriff did testify that he was
not familiar with any jail policies or procedures relating to
suicidal inmates and that to his knowledge, any policies that may
have existed were not followed prior to December 23, 2014.
In
fact, however, all Sheriff’s testimony establishes is that he was
not personally aware of any policies and was not personally aware
of whether any policies were followed because he had little to no
personal involvement in or knowledge of jail operations, including
21
the adoption and implementation of jail policies and procedures
and training of jail employees on such policies and procedures.
That is because he delegated
all authority and responsibility for
jail operations to his warden, who he expected would handle all
these matters on his behalf.
He expected to become involved, he
stated, only if there was a problem; and prior to Michael Rhodes’
death, he was not aware of any problem with respect to jail
employees’ handling of suicidal inmates.
The record shows that in January 2014, then-Warden Mary
Rushing, signed into effect comprehensive policies for the jail,
which included suicide detection and prevention policies and
procedures and which expressly provided for training of jail staff
on all policies and procedures.
The record indicates that
training on jail policies was provided in October 2014; and
thereafter, in early November 2014, Rushing sent a memorandum to
all jail staff “RE: Suicide Plan for County Offenders”, in which
she directed all jail staff to “go over Suicide Plan at shift
change briefing.
This plan must be follow [sic] for all Offenders
placed on Suicide.
Please read and adhere to the attached written
plan.”13
With reference to plaintiff’s failure-to-train theory, the
law is clear that “[w]ithout notice that a course of training is
13
This is the Suicide Plan for County Offenders quoted,
supra, page 4-5.
22
deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be
said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will
cause violations of constitutional rights.”
Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 62, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011).
Accordingly, to establish deliberate indifference based on a
failure to train, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
notice of the need for different or additional training.
do so in one of two ways:
She can
“First, [she] can show that a pattern
of similar incidents put the [defendants] on notice that [their]
training was producing unconstitutional results.
See Sanders–
Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010). ...
Or, second, [she] can show that the ‘single incident exception’
applies, in which case proving a pattern is unnecessary.”
Anderson v. Marshall Cty., Miss., 637 F. App'x 127, 134–35 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 67, 196 L. Ed. 2d 34 (2016).
Plaintiff herein has no evidence of a pre-existing pattern of
similar incidents.14
Therefore, she must rely on the single-
incident exception to establish deliberate indifference.
This is
a limited exception that applies only when there is an obvious
need for specific training and the unconstitutional consequences
of failing to train are “so patently obvious” that an official may
be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of
14
The evidence shows that there were no previous suicides
at the jail.
23
violations.
Connick, 563 U.S. at 64, 131 S. Ct. 1350.
Put
another way, a single incident may serve as a basis for liability
only if the plaintiff “prove[s] that the ‘highly probable’
consequence of a failure to train would result in the specific
injury suffered, and that the failure to train represents the
moving force behind the [c]onstitutional violation.”
Estate of
Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375,
385-86 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t may happen that in light of the
duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for
more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, a
supervisor might reasonably be found to be deliberately
indifferent.”) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390,
109 S. Ct. 1197).
make.
This is an “extremely difficult” showing to
Anderson, 637 F. App'x at 134.
See also Walker v. Upshaw,
515 Fed. Appx. 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he possibility of
single-incident liability based on a failure to train is rare, and
... a single incident is usually insufficient to demonstrate
deliberate indifference.”).
In the Fifth Circuit, “the exception
is generally reserved for those cases in which the government
actor was provided no training whatsoever.”
Pena v. City of Rio
Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018).
In fact, with one
exception, the Fifth Circuit “has consistently rejected
application of the single incident exception.”
24
Arevalo v. City of
Farmers Branch, Texas, No. 3:16-CV-1540-D, 2018 WL 1784508, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2018).
That one exception was the case of
Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000), which the
Fifth Circuit has distinguished in numerous subsequent cases.
See, e.g., Davis, 406 F.3d at 386 (explaining that single incident
liability was found in Bryan based on an “utter failure to
train”); McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 442–43 (5th
Cir. 2001) (explaining that court found liability in Bryan under
single incident exception because county “failed to provide any
training or supervision for a young, inexperienced officer with a
record of recklessness[,]” and noting that “there is a difference
between a complete failure to train, as in Bryan, and a failure to
train in one limited area”) (emphasis in McLendon).
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that at the time of
Michael Rhodes’ death, Sergeant Brownlow had worked as a jailer at
the jail for approximately seven years.
Over those years, the
facility had housed numerous suicidal inmates,15 and yet there were
no incidents of suicide.
Moreover, training records produced by
defendants show that Brownlow had received extensive prior
training, including training by the Mississippi Department of
15
Gary Edwards estimated there had been hundreds of
suicidal inmates.
25
Corrections in October 2014 that covered suicide prevention.16
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this training was deficient in
any respect.17
The evidence thus forecloses applicability of the
single-incident exception as a means of establishing liability on
a failure to train theory.
See Riggins v. City of Indianola,
Miss., 196 F. Supp. 3d 681, 693–95 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (failure to
train theory failed where evidence showed that official received
training, including a state certification course and twenty-four
annual hours of training).
It follows that defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.
16
Defendants have produced a roster sheet for an October
2, 2014 training session at the jail which purports to show that
Brownlow, among others, received training on suicide prevention.
Plaintiff points to what she contends are indicia of the
document’s having been fabricated (e.g., the document has a
completely different format than those from other training
sessions conducted the same month, and shows Gary Edwards as
warden, when the warden at the time was actually Rushing). She
asks that in the event the court finds the document relevant, she
be allowed discovery aimed at confirming (or dispelling) her
suspicions regarding the genuineness of the document. Because the
record otherwise demonstrates that Brownlow received training by
the State of Mississippi, including training on suicide
prevention, the subject document is not particularly relevant.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for discovery will be denied. It
follows that defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s Rule 56(d)
declaration should and will be denied as moot.
17
Plaintiff cites evidence the fact that Sergeant Brownlow
scored only 50% on a post-training test given after an October
2014 training session by YCRCF should have alerted defendants that
Brownlow needed additional training. The court is not persuaded
that his performance on a single test would have made it obvious
to defendants that he would likely commit a constitutional
violation if not given additional training, particularly since he
had worked at the jail for seven years without incident.
26
Plaintiff last argues, based on Brownlow’s claim that he was
unable to adequately monitor Rhodes because he was short-handed,
that “[i]f the jury accepts that short staffing caused Michael
Rhodes’ death, then Mary Rushing and Gary Edwards are directly
implicated under a failure to supervise theory of individual
liability” because they were aware that the jail had experienced
significant correctional officer attendance issues prior to Mr.
Rhodes’ death.
However, it is undisputed that when he realized he
would be short-staffed, Sergeant Brownlow informed Rushing that he
could manage without additional help.
And, as with the failure to
train allegation, defendants could hardly have been deliberately
indifferent to a need for greater supervision (or, more
pertinently, for additional staffing) by the mere fact that the
jail was short-staffed at times, where there had been no prior
suicides as a result.
State Law Negligence Claim
Defendants Brownlow, Sheriff, Banks, Rushing and Edwards have
all moved to dismiss plaintiff’s state law negligence claim
against them on the basis of their immunity under § 11-465(3) of
the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
Plaintiff has not opposed this
aspect of defendants’ motion, which does appear to have merit.
Accordingly, the state law negligence claim will be dismissed.
27
Conclusion
Based on all of the foregoing, it is ordered that the motion
of defendant Sharkey Brownlow for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim is denied, and his motion for for summary judgment on
the state law claim of negligence is granted.
It is further
ordered that the motion of defendants Sheriff, Banks, Rushing and
Edwards for summary judgment in their individual capacities as to
plaintiff’s federal and state law claims is granted.18
SO ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2018.
/s/ Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
The supervisory defendants have filed a motion to strike
the reference in plaintiff’s response brief to a Study/Report of
Lindsay M. Hayes. The court did not rely on this study/report,
and accordingly, will deny the motion to strike as moot.
28
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?