Brown v. Hood et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 49 Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set out in the Order. But Brown may file a motion to amend within 10 days of the entry of this Order. Signed by Chief District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on July 25, 2018. (SP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
LEONARD BROWN
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-50-DPJ-FKB
JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Plaintiff Leonard Brown brings this suit under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an
alleged sexual assault and related offenses he suffered while incarcerated. Defendant Officer
Adrian Keys, in his official and individual capacities, seeks dismissal of Brown’s claims based
on Eleventh Amendment immunity, state-law immunity, and qualified immunity. Mot. [49]. For
the reasons that follow, Keys’s motion is granted, but Brown will be given leave to seek to
amend.
I.
Background
Brown, a post-conviction state inmate, says that “Officer Lucker” sexually assaulted him
on July 24, 2015, while Brown was housed at the South Mississippi Correctional Institute
(“SMCI”). After that, Defendants allegedly denied Brown’s requests for medical care and then
retaliated against Brown for complaining about the way he had been treated. Relative to Keys,
Brown alleges that he and another officer ultimately escorted Brown to SMCI’s medical
department and told the nurse that the warden would decide whether Brown received medical
care.
Brown filed this lawsuit against a number of Defendants, including Keys, on January 23,
2017. In it, he asserts § 1983 claims for violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as state-law tort claims.
Brown also seeks equitable relief, including a declaration that Defendants violated his rights and
an injunction prohibiting future enforcement of the inmate exception to the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act (“MTCA”). Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m). Keys moved to dismiss the claims
against him, and the issues he raised have been fully briefed.
II.
Standards
A.
Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “challenge[s] the subject matter
jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161
(5th Cir. 2001). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found based on: “(1) the complaint
alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Id.
“[T]he party asserting jurisdiction”—here, the plaintiff—“bears the burden of proof that
jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Id.
B.
Rule 12(b)(6)
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as
true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v.
Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188
F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). But “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Factual allegations
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must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations and
footnote omitted).
III.
Analysis
Keys seeks dismissal on three grounds. He says that the Eleventh Amendment bars
claims asserted against him in his official capacity; the inmate exception of the MTCA bars all
state-law claims; and qualified immunity precludes the federal claims against him in his
individual capacity. In response, Brown acknowledges that the Court’s previous Order [51]
addressing similar motions filed by different defendants establishes “the law of the case on the
similar claims here” and effectively concedes, while preserving his arguments for purposes of
appeal, dismissal of his official-capacity and state-law claims against Keys. Pl.’s Mem. [53] at 2
n.4, 6–7. Keys’s motion is therefore granted as to those claims, and the Court will address only
the individual-capacity § 1983 claims.
Keys asserts qualified immunity as to Brown’s § 1983 claims against him in his
individual capacity.
[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil
damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be
legal. This immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law. Accordingly, we do not deny immunity unless
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate. The basic steps of this court’s qualified-immunity inquiry are
well-known: a plaintiff seeking to defeat qualified immunity must show: (1) that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599–600 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted, punctuation
altered).
Courts use a two-step analysis to determine whether qualified immunity applies. “[A]
court addressing a claim of qualified immunity must determine first whether the plaintiff has
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adduced facts sufficient to establish a constitutional or statutory violation.” Collier v.
Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001)). Second, if a violation has been alleged, the Court must determine “‘whether [the
officer’s] actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of
the conduct in question.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404,
411 (5th Cir. 2007)). And “[w]hen a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden is on the
plaintiff to ‘demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.’” Coleman v. Marion Cty., No. 2:14CV-185-DPJ-FKB, 2015 WL 5098524, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 31, 2015) (quoting McClendon v.
City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002)).
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, “to hold that the defendant violated the law at step one of the
qualified-immunity analysis . . . is simply to say that the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 384 (5th Cir. 2011); accord Hinojosa
v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified
immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity
defense with equal specificity.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). With this
framework in mind, the Court addresses Brown’s claims.
The sum total of the allegations against Keys are found in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the
Complaint:
38. After being in the holding cell for three and a half days [following the alleged
sexual assault], the plaintiff was allowed to go back to his regular cell when,
approximately 15 minutes later, the defendants, K-9 Officer Keys (first name
unknown) and Captain Johnson (first name unknown), came and escorted him to
the holding area where he was told to go to the medical unit.
39. While he was in the medical unit, the plaintiff requested why it took so long
to provide medical attention for his injuries caused by the sexual assault and a
nurse told the plaintiff that he should not have been denied medical attention
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whereupon the defendants, Officer Keys and Captain Johnson, responded that the
warden would have to decide if he needed medical attention.
Compl. [1] ¶¶ 38–39 (emphasis added). Brown says these allegations show that “Keys was
deliberately indifferent to Mr. Brown’s need for medical treatment by a physician for a serious
medical condition—a sexual assault.” Pl.’s Mem. [53].
The Eighth Amendment “impos[es] a duty on prison officials to ‘ensure that inmates
receive adequate . . . medical care.’” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment when his conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs, constituting an “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” The mere delay of medical care can also constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation but only “if there has been deliberate indifference that
results in substantial harm.”
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)). Under the
“deliberate indifference” standard, “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment . . . only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
Keys says Brown’s allegations fail to establish his deliberate indifference to Brown’s
serious medical needs. Indeed, all Keys is alleged to have done is respond to the nurse’s
statement that Brown should “have been” given medical care, while delivering Brown to the
medical unit for treatment. Brown does not allege plausible facts that Keys denied him care or
that Keys’s statement to the nurse caused the denial or further delay of medical care.
These allegations fall well short of those in the case on which Brown relies, McCorvey v.
Styles, 607 F. App’x 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2015). There, the plaintiff was an inmate who alleged he
was sexually assaulted by a prison guard. An officer took the plaintiff to the prison’s medical
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unit “and expressly requested . . . that [he] be examined, including application of an oral swab
and a rape kit.” Id. The defendant, a nurse on duty, “refused that request” and the plaintiff
“received neither a medical exam nor mental health treatment until he again requested
assistance.” Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of the defendant’s qualified-immunity motion,
finding that the defendant “refused to treat [the plaintiff’s] serious medical needs despite being
aware of those needs.” Id.
Brown’s allegations against Keys contain no similar facts indicating Keys effectively
denied or delayed medical treatment. Brown fails to state a claim that Keys was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, so Keys is
entitled to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claims under § 1983.1
IV.
Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not specifically addressed would not
have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Keys’s Motion to Dismiss [49] is granted.
But Brown may file a motion to amend within 10 days of the entry of this Order.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 25th day of July, 2018.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1
That said, in his brief, Brown argued his claim against Keys differently from the way
the claim is pleaded. See Pl.’s Mem. [53] at 2 (“The plaintiff alleges that Officer Keys was
informed about the assault and . . . the plaintiff’s request for medical treatment. The plaintiff
alleges that Officer Keys denied his request for medical treatment.”). If Brown has
nonconclusory facts he can plead consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in support
of this claim, the result might be different. The Court will therefore give Brown 10 days within
which to file a motion to amend. See Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“[A] plaintiff’s failure to meet the specific pleading requirements should not automatically or
inflexibly result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice to re-filing. Although a court may
dismiss the claim, it should not do so without granting leave to amend, unless the defect is
simply incurable or the plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after being afforded
repeated opportunities to do so.” (citation omitted)). Pursuant to Uniform Local Rule 15, any
such motion should include “a proposed amended pleading [as] an exhibit.”
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