Brown et al v. Madison County, Mississippi et al

Filing 340

ORDER denying 231 Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class, and finding as moot 291 Motion; finding as moot 307 Motion to Exclude; finding as moot 316 Motion to Exclude; finding as moot 318 Motion to Exclude; finding as moot 320 Motion to Exclude; denying 209 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 211 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 218 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 220 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 222 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 228 Motion for S ummary Judgment; finding as moot 237 Motion; denying 256 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 263 Motion to Strike; finding as moot 269 Motion for Hearing; finding as moot 270 Motion in Limine; finding as moot 272 Motion in Lim ine; finding as moot 274 Motion to Strike; finding as moot 285 Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs are hereby granted thirty days, up to and including February 4, 2019, to file an Amended Complaint in this case setting forth the proposed classes they seek to certify, and correcting the pleading deficiencies identified in this Opinion and Order. Signed by District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr., on 01/04/2019. (sc)

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

LATOYA BROWN, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-cv-347-WHB-LRA

MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification.

Having

considered

the

pleadings

as

well

as

supporting and opposing authorities, the Court finds the Motion
should presently

be

denied

because

membership

in

all

of

the

proposed classes cannot be ascertained, and there is doubt as to
whether all of the class members have been harmed in essentially
the same way.1

The Court, however, will not now dismiss the class

action claim but, instead, will grant Plaintiffs an opportunity to
amend their Complaint to cure the defects discussed by the Court
herein.

As Plaintiffs will be granted an opportunity to amend

their Complaint, the Motions of Defendants for Summary Judgment on
the claims alleged in the current complaint will be dismissed,

1

Because the Court finds the Motion for Class
Certification should be dismissed because of pleading issues, and
it is not required to consider the merits of class certification,
all motions filed in conjunction with the Motion for Class
Certification, which include motions seeking to strike
evidence/pleadings in support and/or opposition to that Motion,
will be denied as moot.

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 2 of 17

without prejudice.

I.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Plaintiffs in this civil action are all Black residents of
Madison

County,

Mississippi,

who

allege

that

they

have

been

subjected to one or more racially-discriminatory policing policy.
According to Plaintiffs, for the past twenty years the Madison
County Sheriff’s Department (“MCSD”) has implemented a “coordinated
top-down program” under which Blacks are methodically targeted for
suspicionless searches and seizures.

Plaintiffs further allege:

Pursuant to the Policing Program, the MCSD employs a
series of integrated tactics to systematically conduct
unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes,
cars, and property on the basis of race.
During the
course of these illegal searches and seizures, MCSD
deputies routinely detain members of the Black community
without probable cause, and often issue citations and
make arrests either without legal justification or to
recover outstanding fines and fees, typically for minor
infractions.
Compl., ¶ 52.

The tactics allegedly used by the MCSD include the

concentrating of vehicular roadblocks in and around predominately
Black neighborhoods, apartment complexes, and businesses, which has
resulted in greater number of Blacks being stopped and arrested.
Id. at ¶¶ 57-76.
the

roadblock

Plaintiffs maintain that the primary purpose of

system

used

by

the

MCSD

is

to

“target

Black

motorists, their passengers, and their vehicles for unreasonable
searches and seizures.”

Id. at ¶ 76. The other alleged purposes

for the roadblock policy include the unconstitutional general
2

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 3 of 17

interest in crime control, and the desire to enrich the coffers of
the county.

Id. at ¶¶ 77-79.

Plaintiffs maintain that any claim

by the MCSD that the roadblocks are conducted to verify drivers’
licenses, vehicle registrations, or other traffic safety purposes
is pretextual.

Id. at ¶ 80.

Another allegedly racially disciminatory policing tactic used
by the MCSD is pedestrian checkpoints, which Plaintiffs maintain
are also concentrated in predominantly Black neighborhoods. Id. at
¶ 81.

According to Plaintiffs, any individual stopped during a

pedestrian checkpoint is typically required to produce a driver’s
license or some other form of identification that is then run
through police data bases to determine whether there are grounds
for arresting the individual.

Id. at ¶ 87.

Plaintiffs allege

that the “primary purpose of these pedestrian checkpoints is to
conduct a fishing expedition to find any possible basis, no matter
how tenuous, for issuing citations to and/or arresting members of
the Black community.”

Id. at ¶ 88.

The third allegedly discriminatory policing tactic about which
Plaintiffs complain is that MCSD deputies, while engaging in
unrelated duties, frequently enter the homes of Black residents
without consent, warrant, or probable cause, and then conduct
warrantless searches and seizures.

Id. at ¶¶ 91-96.

Plaintiffs

further allege that MCSD deputies will detain and/or restrain Black
individuals who are not suspected of wrong-doing.

3

Id.

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 4 of 17

The

final

discriminatory

policing

tactic

about

which

Plaintiffs complain is referred to as “Jump-Out Patrols”.

These

patrols are conducted by plainclothes deputies who “jump-out” of
unmarked vehicles, and allegedly detain and search individuals
without reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing or probable cause. Id.
at ¶¶ 97-104. Again, Plaintiffs allege that the Jump-Out Patrols
are frequently conducted in Black neighborhoods and in the vicinity
of Black businesses.

Id.

Plaintiffs allege that the tactics used

under the MCSD Policing Program have resulted in a disproportionate
rate of arrests between Whites and Blacks in Madison County. Id. at
¶ 106 (alleging that almost three quarters of the individuals
arrested in Madison County between May and September of 2016 were
Black).
According to Plaintiffs, the racially discriminatory policing
policies about which they complain were initiated in the 1980’s,
and were adopted and expanded at the time Randall Tucker (“Tucker”)
became Sheriff of Madison County, in 2012.

Id. at ¶¶ 134-35.

For

example, Plaintiffs allege that Tucker has maintained the preexisting General Roadblocks Policy that allows MCSD deputies to
“conduct random roadblocks.”

Plaintiffs challenge this policy on

the grounds that it does not place explicit, neutral limitations on
conduct

that

can

be

used

by

deputies

when

performing

the

roadblocks, and it does not require deputies to use race-neutral
criteria when selecting roadblock locations.

4

Id. at ¶¶ 139-40.

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 5 of 17

Plaintiffs

also

allege

that

Tucker

has

exhibited

deliberate

indifference toward the constitutional violations resulting from
the policing policies used by the MCSD as evidenced by his (1)
failing

to

investigate

complaints

of

racially

discriminatory

practices, (2) hiring a deputy who had a history of using excessive
force, (3) choosing to not establish rules or regulations that
would prohibit racial bias, (4) deciding to not maintain data
regarding the policies for statistical purposes, and (5) ceasing to
maintain records of complaints made against MCSD deputies.
¶¶ 146-68.
exhibited

Id. at

Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that Madison County has
deliberate

indifference

toward

the

constitutional

violations resulting from the policing policies used by the MCSD as
evidenced by its failing to (1) establish policies to prohibit
racially discriminatory policing practices and/or unreasonable
searches and seizures, (2) train and supervise MCSD personnel in
order

to

prevent

them

from

using

unconstitutional

policing

policies, (3) monitor MCSD deputies to ensure that the policing
policies they use comply with constitutional requirements, and/or
(4)

discipline

MCSD

policing practices.

deputies

who

use

racially

discriminatory

Id. at ¶¶ 169-74.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in
this Court seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 2000(d)
against Madison County, Sheriff Tucker, and multiple John Doe
Deputies.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs first request that they

5

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 6 of 17

be permitted to proceed as the following class:
People who (1) are, or who appear to be, Black and those
in their company, and (2) were, are, or will be in
Madison County, and (3) were, are, or will be subject to
the
MCSD’s
policy,
custom,
and/or
practice
of
systematically executing unreasonable searches and
seizures of persons, homes, cars, and property on the
basis of race.
Id. at ¶ 300.

As to themselves and the putative class members,

Plaintiffs request relief under Section 1983 on claims that their
constitutional rights, as protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, have been violated because the policing policies and
practices used by the MCSD are targeted at Blacks, and have
resulted in unreasonable searches and seizures (i.e. searches and
seizures

that

are

conducted

without

reasonable

suspicion

or

probable cause, and are often accompanied by the use of excessive
force).

Id. at ¶¶ 310-15.

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf

of the class, also request relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) on the
grounds that the subject policing polices have been partially
funded with federal dollars.

Id. at ¶¶ 321-24.

In addition to

seeking declaratory relief, Plaintiffs request that the Court issue
an injunction:
(1) barring the “MCSD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or
custom of unreasonably searching and seizing persons ... in the
absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause and on the basis
of race ... ”;

6

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 7 of 17

(2) requiring Madison County to establish an independent civilian
complaint review board to investigate complaints against the MCSD,
and to empower that board with the authority to (a) investigate the
policies and practices of the MCSD, (b) subpoena documents and hear
testimony during the course of its investigations, and (c) take
binding disciplinary action against MCSD deputies who are found to
have violated any individual’s civil rights;
(3) requiring that Madison County and Tucker institute training,
discipline, and promotion policies that are designed to eliminate
the current policies and practices of MCSD that have caused the
constitutional rights violations about which they complain;
(4) requiring that Madison County and Tucker appropriately and
adequately supervise MCSD personnel;
(5) requiring that Madison County and Tucker implement measures
under which deputies would be required to document, among other
things, the locations and results (i.e. number and nature of issued
citations/arrests, and the race and gender of those cited/charged)
of roadblock and checkpoint stops;
(6)

requiring

that

Madison

County

and

Tucker

retain

the

documentation referenced above in a computerized database;
(7) requiring that Madison County and Tucker publically disclose
data gathered through the above referenced documentation;
(8) requiring that Madison County and Tucker monitor and audit the
policies and practices of the MCSD to ensure they comply with
constitutional and statutory requirements;
7

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 8 of 17

(9) requiring that Madison County and Tucker (1) “acknowledge the
role of policing in past and present injustice and discrimination”
and (2) acknowledge “how it is a hurdle to the promotion of
community trust”; and
(10) requiring that Madison County and Tucker “embrace a guardian
mind

set

to

build

public

trust

and

legitimacy

by

adopting

procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and
external policies and practices to guide their interactions with
the citizens they serve.”
Plaintiffs have now moved for certification of their class
action claim.

II.

Analysis

Plaintiffs have moved for class action certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is well

settled that the district court must conduct a “rigorous analysis”
of all of the requirements for certification under Rule 23, see
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir.
1996)(citing General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147
(1982)), and that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that those
requirements are satisfied.

See e.g. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)(“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere
pleading

standard.

A

party

seeking

class

certification

must

affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule — that is,

8

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 9 of 17

he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”).

As a

general rule, a district court has broad discretion when deciding
a motion for class certification.

See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum

Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1998).
discretion,

the

court

plaintiffs’

claims

at

may
the

not

consider

certification

In exercising its
the

merits

of

the

stage,

see

Eisen

v.

Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), but may permissibly look
past the pleadings to the record and any other completed discovery
when deciding whether a class should be certified.
For a lawsuit to proceed as a class action, all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the alternative
requirements of Rule 23(b) must be satisfied.
F.3d at 411.

See Allison, 151

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).

As Plaintiffs have moved for certification
9

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 10 of 17

under Rule 23(b)(2), they also bear the burden of showing:
(b) Types of Class Actions.
A class action may be
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
...
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
In their Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs now seek
to certify classes different than the one presented in their
Complaint.

Again,

in

the

Complaint,

Plaintiffs

requested

certification of the following class:
People who (1) are, or who appear to be, Black and those
in their company, and (2) were, are, or will be in
Madison County, and (3) were, are, or will be subject to
the
MCSD’s
policy,
custom,
and/or
practice
of
systematically executing unreasonable searches and
seizures of persons, homes, cars, and property on the
basis of race.
Compl., ¶

300.

In

moving

for

class

certification, however,

Plaintiffs now seek to certify and represent a “Targeting Class”,
which would be comprised of “all Black persons who presently or in
the future will reside in or travel through Madison County.”

See

Mot. for Class Cert. [Docket No. 231], 3.

Plaintiffs also seek to

certify and represent two subclasses.

The first subclass is

referred to as the “Roadblock Subclass”, which would be comprised
of “all Black persons who travel or will travel by car through
majority-Black areas of Madison County.”

10

Id. The second subclass

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 11 of 17

is the “Pedestrian Subclass”, which would be comprised of “all
Black persons who travel or will travel by foot in Madison County’s
majority-Black neighborhoods.”

Id.

Plaintiffs contend that the

common questions with respect to the proposed classes include:
[W]hether (i) the MCSD has a policy of targeting Black
communities and racially profiling Black individuals, and
whether this policy violates the Equal Protection Clause;
(ii) whether the MCSD has a policy, custom, or consistent
practice of conducting roadblocks in majority-Black areas
of Madison County for purposes of crime control, and
whether the roadblocks carried out pursuant to this
policy are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments; and (iii) whether the MCSD has
a policy, custom, or consistent practice of engaging in
searches and seizures of Black persons in Madison County
in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion,
and if so, whether the searches and seizures carried out
pursuant to this policy are consistent with the
requirements of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 3-4.
Before conducting a Rule 23 analysis with respect to any of
the proposed classes, the Court must determine whether membership
in those classes is ascertainable by objective criteria.

See e.g.

Frey v. First Nat’l Bank SW, 602 F. App’x 164, 168 (5th Cir.
2015)(“We have stated that “in order to maintain a class action,
the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and
clearly ascertainable.”)(internal citations omitted). Although the
Court recognizes that the strict ascertainability requirements
associated with class action claims seeking damages under Rule
23(a) do not apply with the same vigor to class actions complaints
seeking prospective injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), here the

11

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 12 of 17

Court would have no ability to ascertain the membership of the
proposed subclasses.
The Roadblock Subclass sought to be certified by Plaintiffs
would be comprised of Black persons traveling by car “through
majority-Black areas of Madison County.” Similarly, the Pedestrian
Subclass would be comprised of Black persons traveling on foot “in
Madison County’s majority-Black neighborhoods.”

These subclasses

beg the questions of “What constitutes a majority-Black area or a
majority-Black neighborhood?”, and “Where are such areas and/or
neighborhoods are geographically located in Madison County?”

Thus

this case differs greatly than those upon which Plaintiffs rely in
arguing that an ascertainability requirement does not apply in
civil rights actions.
For example, Plaintiffs cite to Marrow v. Washington, 277
F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Tex. 2011), a case in which a class comprised of
members of racial or ethnic minority groups who were subject to
being stopped by law enforcement for alleged traffic violations was
certified.

In Marrow, however, the class was specifically limited

to individuals who were traveling in, through, or near the City of
Tenaha, Texas.

Similarly, in the case of Johnson v. City of

Opelousas, a class was certified comprising of “all persons who
have been or in the future will be arrested or detained under §
18.8.1 of the Opelousas Code”.

Because the class was limited to

individuals who were arrested or detained under a city ordinance,

12

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 13 of 17

membership in the class would have necessarily been limited to
individuals within the boundaries of the city.

In both of these

cases, membership in the classes was readily ascertainable based on
the

class

definition

that

delineated

specific

geographic

boundaries, i.e. city limits.
Here, because the phrases majority-Black areas and majorityBlack neighborhoods are vague and ambiguous, the Court finds
Plaintiffs have failed to show that membership in those classes can
be ascertained with any degree of certainty. Additionally, because
membership in the subclasses cannot be ascertained with any degree
of certainty, it is impossible to find that the majority of the
subclass members face future harm as is required to certify a class
under Rule 23(b)(2).

See

Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493

F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2007)(explaining that “Rule 23(b)(2)
certification is ... inappropriate when the majority of the class
does not face future harm.”).

For these reasons, the Court finds

the Motion for Class Certification, to the extent it seeks to
certify the proposed Roadblock Class and Pedestrian Class, should
be denied.
The Court likewise finds that the Targeting Class, which would
be comprised of “all Black persons who presently or in the future
will reside in or travel through Madison County”, cannot presently
be certified.
respecting

this

According to the pleadings, the common question
class

is

“whether

13

the

MCSD

has

a

policy

of

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 14 of 17

targeting

Black

communities

and

racially

profiling

Black

individuals, and whether this policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause.”

Mot. for Class Cert., 3.

Even if the Court were to find

that the requirements of Rule 23(a) were satisfied with respect to
this

proposed

class,

it

could

not

presently

find

that

the

requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) have likewise been satisfied.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently again held that the following three requirements must be
satisfied before a class can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2):
“(1) class members must have been harmed in essentially the same
way; (2) injunctive relief must predominate over monetary damage
claims; and (3) the injunctive relief sought must be specific.”
Ward v. Hellerstedt, --- F. App’x ---, 2018 WL 5045675, at 10 (5th
Cir. Oct 16, 2018)(internal citations omitted). “[S]atisfaction of
these requirements is premised on common behavior by the defendant
toward the class, as opposed to the presence of common issues.” Id.
Class members are “‘harmed in essentially the same way’ where they
have each been subject to the same allegedly wrongful policy,
despite variations in the degree of damages suffered by each.” Id.
Here, the policy underlying the common question presented by
the Targeting Class concerns the targeting of Black communities and
the racial profiling of Black individuals.

It has not been shown,

however, that all of class representatives have been subjected to
the alleged policy.

For example, in the Complaint, Plaintiffs

14

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 15 of 17

Khadafy and Quinnetta Manning allege that MCSD deputies stormed
their

apartment,

and

demanded

that

they

sign

statements regarding one of their neighbors.

false

witness

Compl. at ¶ 211.

When they refused, the deputies allegedly hand-cuffed Khadafy
Manning and choked him.

Id. at 221.

After Khadafy Manning again

refused to sign the false witness statement, the deputies allegedly
dragged him out of his apartment, shoved him into a patrol car, and
beat him on the head and chest.

Id. at ¶¶ 228 and 231.

Khadafy

Manning further alleges that several months later, MCSD deputies
retaliated

against

him

by

again

placing

him

in

hand-cuffs,

searching his vehicle, and issuing him a citation for driving with
a suspended license.

Id. at 237-38.

While the alleged actions taken by the MCSD deputies are
constitutionally suspect, there has been no showing that they were
taken based on a wide-spread policy aimed at targeting Black
communities and/or engaging in racial profiling.

Instead, the

allegations suggest that the Mannings were specifically sought out
by the MCSD deputies based on their living in close proximity to
the

neighbor

against

whom

the

deputies

wanted

false

witness

statements, and then Khadafy Manning was allegedly subjected to a
false arrest and the use of excessive force when he refused to
provide such statement.

Because the allegations in the Complaint

do not show that the Mannings were subjected to the same Black
community-wide targeting/racial profiling policies that form the

15

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 16 of 17

common question underlying the Targeting Class, i.e. they were not
harmed in essentially the same way as the other putative members of
the class, the Targeting Class cannot presently be certified under
Rule 23(b)(2).
In sum, the Court finds that the class and subclasses proposed
by Plaintiffs in this case cannot now be certified because the
members of the subclasses are not ascertainable, and it has not
been shown that all of the members of Targeting Class, which would
necessarily include class representatives Khadafy and Quinnetta
Manning, have been harmed by the allegedly discriminatory policy
that forms the common question with respect to that class.

As

opposed to dismissing the class action claim at this time, however,
the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint to
attempt to cure the defects in their allegations.

As Plaintiffs

will be granted leave to amend their Complaint, the Motions of
Defendants

for

Summary

Judgment

will

be

dismissed,

without

prejudice, thereby permitting Defendants to again seek summary
judgment after the amended complaint is filed or the time period
for so doing has expired.

IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification [Docket No. 231] is hereby denied.

16

Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 340 Filed 01/04/19 Page 17 of 17

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are hereby granted
thirty days, up to and including February 4, 2019, to file an
Amended Complaint in this case setting forth the proposed classes
they seek to certify, and correcting the pleading deficiencies
identified in this Opinion and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions of Defendants for
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims [Docket Nos. 209, 211, 218,
220, 222, 228, and 256] are hereby dismissed without prejudice
thereby permitting Defendants to again seek summary judgment after
the amended complaint is filed, or the time period for so doing has
expired.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

all

other

motions

filed

in

conjunction with the class certification issue [Docket Nos. 237,
263, 269, 270, 272, 274, 285, 291, 307, 316, 318, and 320] are
hereby dismissed as moot.
SO ORDERED this the 4th day of January, 2019.

s/ William H. Barbour, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17