Holton v. Washington et al

Filing 39

ORDER granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 23 Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Centurion of Mississippi dismissed from lawsuit. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert H. Walker on May 29, 2018 (King, Steve)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
JOHNNY MILTON HOLTON
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV485-RHW

MTC et al

DEFENDANTS
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CENTURION’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Johnny Milton Holton, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil rights complaint alleging that Defendants failed to protect him from
assault by inmate O.D. Washington on April 7, 2017, at the East Mississippi Correctional
Facility (EMCF). Doc. [1]. Plaintiff and inmate Washington were both incarcerated at EMCF at
the time of the alleged incident. Defendant Centurion of Mississippi provided health care
services for EMCF at the time of the assault. Doc. [11] at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Centurion
failed to adjust inmate Washington’s medication to “control his frequent violent behavior.” Doc.
[1] at 5; Doc. [11] at 1. On January 5, 2018, Centurion filed a motion to dismiss. Doc. [23]. On
February 20, 2018, the Court conducted a screening hearing. Doc. [33]. Centurion then filed a
motion for summary judgment on April 17, 2018. Doc. [35]. Plaintiff has not filed a response to
the motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.
Law and Analysis
Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627
F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). Where the summary judgment evidence establishes that one of
the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action does not exist as a matter of law, all other

contested issues of fact are rendered immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986); Topalin v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992). In making its determinations
of fact on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence submitted by the
parties in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175,
178 (5th Cir. 1984).
The moving party has the duty to demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of a material
fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law to prevail on its motion. Union
Planters Nat’l Leasing v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1982). The movant accomplishes this
by informing the court of the basis of its motion, and by identifying portions of the record which
highlight the absence of genuine factual issues. Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1131. “Rule 56
contemplates a shifting burden: the nonmovant is under no obligation to respond unless the
movant discharges [its] initial burden of demonstrating [entitlement to summary judgment].”
John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.3d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). Once a properly supported motion
for summary judgment is presented, the nonmoving party must rebut with “significant probative”
evidence. Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978).
Defendant Centurion asserts that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior
to filing suit. In order to exhaust a claim, a prisoner’s grievance need only provide prison
officials with “fair notice” of the problem that will form the basis of the prisoner’s later-filed
lawsuit. Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 2012);
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516 (5th Cir. 2004). The grievance must be sufficient in
detail to give prison officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before
allowing the initiation of a federal lawsuit. Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 788. An inmate need not
present a full-fledged legal theory in his grievance. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 518. Prisoner

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grievances are not required to allege a specific legal theory or facts that correspond to all of the
required elements of a particular legal theory. Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir.
2003).
In the Administrative Remedy Program grievance filed by Plaintiff, he complained of the
assault by inmate Washington and the injuries received by Plaintiff in the assault. Doc. [35-2].
Plaintiff also requested that inmate Washington “be segregated under observation in medical
until such time as he has been properly treated with a medication regime to control his violent
out burst before he is allowed to return to general population.” Id. at 4-5. He alleges that the
“medical dept.” is responsible for the assault because they left inmate Washington, “a proven
unstable and severly [sic] violent psychocit [sic] inmate in general population” without “any
attempt to reduce the imminent threat caused by this inmate.” Id. Whether Plaintiff’s ARP put
Defendant Centurion on fair notice of the claim is a close question. Regardless, as will be
discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Centurion lack any constitutional
merit.
At the screening hearing, Plaintiff testified under oath that he received prompt medical
treatment for his injuries from the April 7, 2017, incident. Doc. [33] at 16. He further admitted
that he has no complaints about medical treatment received subsequent to the incident. Id.
Hence, by his own admission, Plaintiff does not state a cause of action for deliberate indifference
or inadequate medical care for treatment of his own injuries. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Centurion failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to inmate
Washington for treatment of his psychotic condition, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a
constitutional claim on behalf of inmate Washington. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
255 (1952); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986).

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Centurion is a private corporation; nevertheless, it may be sued under § 1983 by a
prisoner who has suffered an alleged constitutional injury. See Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training
Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003). Although not subject to vicarious liability for the
constitutional torts of its employees, a private corporation such as Centurion may be held liable
under § 1983 when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes, or is the moving force
behind, the alleged deprivation of federal rights. See Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d
437, 453 (6th Cir. 2014); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th
Cir. 2012); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff’s complaint and testimony fail to identify an official policy or custom of
Centurion that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury. At the screening
hearing, Plaintiff acknowledged that his claim against Centurion relates only to medical
treatment as prescribed to inmate Washington. Doc. [33] at 13. Plaintiff further admitted that he
did not know what kind of medical treatment inmate Washington received, what medications he
has been prescribed, or whether any of inmate Washington’s medications have been changed.
Id. at 12-13. At most, Plaintiff states a claim against employees of the medical department for
failing to adjust inmate Washington’s medication, which in turn caused inmate Washington to
assault Plaintiff. In other words, Plaintiff alleges vicarious liability of Centurion based on the
conduct of its employees. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim against
Centurion. The Court finds that Defendant Centurion’s motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgment should be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Centurion’s [23]
Motion to Dismiss and [35] Motion for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Centurion are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

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SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 29th day of May, 2018.

/s/ Robert

H. Walker

ROBERT H. WALKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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