Williams v. Hinds County Board of Supervisors et al

Filing 70

Memorandum Opinion and Order. Granting in part and denying in part 53 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion is granted as to Defendants Hinds County, Sheriff Victor Mason, and Warden Mary Rushing and denied as to the remaining Defendants. Signed by Magistrate Judge Linda R. Anderson on 9/27/2019. (ACF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN LEIGH WILLIAMS
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:17cv508LRA

HINDS COUNTY WARDEN MARY RUSHING;
HINDS COUNTY; HINDS COUNTY SHERIFF
VICTOR MASON; DEPUTY SHERIFF TONY
ALEXANDER; DEPUTY SHERIFF BRANDON
WILLIAMS and CORRECTIONS DEPUTY
EBENEZER DERA MOLA

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Warden Mary Rushing, Sheriff Victor Mason, Deputy Ebenezer Daramola [misidentified as
“Dera Mola” in Complaint], Deputy Tony Alexander, Deputy Brandon Williams and Hinds
County, Mississippi [Doc. #53]. The Motion has been briefed by all of the parties, and it is ripe
for a decision. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion as to Warden Mary
Rushing, Sheriff Victor Mason, and Hinds County, but denies the Motion as to Deputy Tony
Alexander, Deputy Ebenezer Daramola, and Deputy Brandon Williams.
The Plaintiff, Kevin Leigh Williams, was housed as a pretrial detainee in the Hinds
County Detention Center [HCDC] in Raymond, Mississippi, at various times, beginning in
August, 2016, and continuing intermittently until he filed this Complaint on June 27, 2017. On
July 26, 2017, Williams was convicted of aggravated assault in Copiah County and was
sentenced on that date. Williams’s Complaint has two primary bases: first, he contends that
conditions at HCDC were so bad that they violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, he
charges that the cells are nasty; there is black mold in the showers; the vent covers are clogged
with dirt; there are no fire exits; the ventilation system is inadequate; he had to sleep on the floor

for a week; the toilets leaked; there was no heat in the winter, and the outdoor recreation door is
welded shut. During the hearing held in this matter on February 15, 2018, Williams admitted
that his injuries from these conditions were limited to “sustained injuries, mental injuries – I say
mental injuries because I didn’t actually, you know, sustain an injury from that. But I could later
on in the future as far as the black mold, I know.” [Transcript of Omnibus Hearing held on
February 15, 2018, p. 13].
Williams also contends that he was subjected to excessive force while housed at HCDC.
On March 8, 2017, during a search of his cell, Williams saw an officer throwing his papers onto
the floor. When he complained, Deputy Sheriff Tony Alexander kicked him, stomped on the
back of his neck, then hit him with a heavy flashlight. Defendant Deputy Sheriff Brandon
Williams witnessed the assault by Alexander and failed to intervene to protect Williams. When
Williams asked Sergeant Don Jackson 1 and Deputy Ebenezer Deramola to take him to medical,
they refused to do so. According to Williams, Defendant Victor Mason, Sheriff of Hinds
County, failed to correct the misuse of force and verbally threatened Williams. Mason was also
responsible for the conditions of the jail and failed to correct them. Defendant Mary Rushing,
the Warden of the Hinds County Detention Facility, learned of the misuse of force, but she failed
to instruct and/or supervise her deputies and was deliberately indifferent to the conditions at the
jail. Williams sued Hinds County and Defendants Rushing and Mason primarily in their
supervisory roles.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in relevant part, that “[t]he court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

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As Williams was told during the hearing held in this matter on February 15, 2018, Jackson, who is no longer
employed by Hinds County and could not be located by the United States Marshals Service, has never been served
with process, and he is not a Defendant.

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. R & L Inv. Prop., LLC v. Hamm, 715 F.3d 145, 149
(5th Cir. 2013). An issue of fact is genuine if the “‘evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable
factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch and
Center, 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 618 (1998)). Issues of fact are material if “resolution of the issues
might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Lemoine, 174 F.3d at 633. The Court
does not, “however, in the absence of any proof, assume the nonmoving [or opposing] party
could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the non-moving party's burden to come
forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), is not satisfied by “conclusory allegations” or by
“unsubstantiated assertions,” or by only a “scintilla” of evidence. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
This case is based upon 42 U.S.C. §1983, which prohibits the deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of state law. As the United States Supreme Court has taught,
“the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993).
The Eighth Amendment applies to the State of Mississippi and its agencies by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment for crimes. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296–97 (1991). The amendment's
protection extends to prohibit deprivations that are not specifically a part of a prison sentence,
but are suffered as the result of imprisonment. Id. at 297, citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

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(1976). The amendment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement,
including adequate medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Pretrial
detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the analysis is much the same. Hare
v. City of Corinth, MS., 135 F.3d 320, 326–7 (5th Cir.1998).
Most of Williams’s claims – that the cells are nasty; there is black mold in the showers;
the vent covers are clogged with dirt; there are no fire exits; the ventilation system is inadequate;
he had to sleep on the floor for a week; the toilets leaked; there was no heat in the winter, and the
outdoor recreation door is welded shut – should be treated as attacking the conditions of his
confinement. In order to succeed on a claim under § 1983 alleging unconstitutional jail
conditions, a pretrial detainee must establish that the complained-of conditions have been
imposed for a punitive purpose and that they have resulted in “serious deficiencies” in providing
for his “basic human needs.” Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir.2009). In a
conditions-of-confinement case, the “harm” is caused by the condition itself, such as when
inadequate food, heating, or sanitary conditions themselves constitute miserable conditions. Scott
v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir.1997); Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203, 206 (5th
Cir.2011) (the conditions of a pretrial detainees's detention may be so harmful or dangerous that
the conditions themselves may amount to impermissible “punishment.”).
Because he was a pretrial detainee during his stay in the HCDC, Williams had a clearly
established constitutional right to be free from punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir.1996). “Punishment” may be “the
manifestation of an explicit policy or restriction”; it may also be manifested by a de facto policy
if a pattern of conduct or condition is sufficiently extended or pervasive such that intent to punish
may be presumed. Id. at 452. Therefore, under the law Williams must prove the “existence of an

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identifiable intended condition or practice that was not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective.” Id. at 455. The practice may be an explicit policy, such as a written
rule, or it may also be manifested by a de facto policy. The latter must be by “... acts or
omissions sufficiently extended or pervasive ... to prove an intended condition or practice.” Id. In
such a case, the intent to punish may be presumed. Id. at 452.
As explained above, as a pretrial detainee, Williams must show there were serious
deficiencies in providing for “basic human needs” and that there was an intent to punish. The
conditions described by Williams concerning his stay in the HCDF do not rise to this level of
severity. The Court concludes that he has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the conditions in the HCDF were so deficient as to him to constitute an intent to punish him. The
law requires supporting evidence to counter the Defendants' claims of immunity. Additionally,
to establish municipal liability, Williams must show that a policy or custom was “adopted or
maintained with objective deliberate indifference to [Williams]'s constitutional rights.” Hare, 74
F.3d at 649 n. 4 (cited in Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir.1999)).
Williams has not pointed to any “explicit policy” that led to any injury. Scott, 114 F.3d
51, n. 2. The general conditions about which he complains are not shown to be an explicit policy
or a de facto policy that were so pervasive so as to prove it was intended or was a practice. The
Court concludes that Williams’s sworn statements concerning his conditions of confinement in
the HCDC are not sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether those conditions constituted
punishment and whether they resulted in serious deficiencies in the provision of his basic human
needs. Further, he set forth no evidence showing a de facto policy at the jail wherein an intent to
punish could be presumed. Williams did receive food, clothing, and medical care, and his proof

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fails to show that his conditions of confinement constituted punishment and resulted in serious
deficiencies in the provision of Plaintiff's basic human needs.
Williams did not testify that he had direct personal contact with Sheriff Mason, other than
his contention that Mason had threatened, within his earshot, to “blow the jail up with all of us
inmates inside it, and [on] another occasion, he would beat us.” [Transcript, p. 10.] 2 As noted
above, Williams has also failed to establish that a de facto policy existed with an intent to punish
him, and the conditions described by him do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
Accordingly, Defendants Mason, Hinds County, and Rushing, as supervisory, or municipal
Defendants, are entitled to summary judgment on the issues regarding the conditions at the
HCDC.
However, Williams's claim that Deputy Tony Alexander used excessive force during the
shakedown of his cell on March 8, 2017, cannot be disposed of so easily. The standard for a
pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is a solely objective one. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135
S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). As the Supreme Court has taught, “[T]he Due Process Clause protects
a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989). Such “punishment” can consist of actions taken with an
“expressed intent to punish.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. However, even in the absence of an
expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the
actions are not “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or that the
actions “appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id., at 561.

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In the Eighth Amendment context, our circuit has recognized as a general rule that ‘mere threatening language and
gestures of a custodial office[r] do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations.’ McFadden v. Lucas, 713
F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Coyle v. Hughes, 436 F.Supp. 591, 593 (W.D.Okla, 1977); accord Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 n. 7 (2d Cir. 1973) (the use of words, no matter how violent, does not comprise a § 1983
violation), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, (1973); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979) (verbal
harassment consisting of sheriff's threat to ‘hang’ prisoner does not state constitutional deprivation actionable under
§ 1983).

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The use of an objective standard protects an officer who acts in good faith, and courts
defer to the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise
reasonable solutions to the problems they face. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012). To prevail on an excessive force claim,
therefore, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of
force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.
Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff asserting an excessive
force claim must have suffered at least some form of injury resulting from the use of clearly
excessive force, although it is unnecessary to reach an arbitrary level of seriousness. The extent
of the injury may be considered, however, in determining if the force used was malicious,
wanton or unnecessary. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995.
Federal courts have limited officers’ liability for excessive force, applying it only to
situations in which the use of force was the result of an intentional and knowing act. Kingsley,
135 S. Ct. at 2474. Moreover, an officer enjoys qualified immunity and is not liable for
excessive force unless he has violated a “clearly established” right, such that “it would [have
been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Even where an officer can be held liable, there may
be no municipal liability. “[T]to establish municipal liability based on an employee's episodic
act or omission, a plaintiff must show the violation ‘resulted from a municipal policy or custom
adopted and maintained with objective deliberate indifference.’” Garza v. City of Donna, 922
F.3d 626, 637 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2008)).
That being the standard for liability, and construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Williams, the Court cannot discern, at this juncture, any legitimate governmental

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interest that was served by assaulting Williams as he alleges, despite the Defendants’ suggestion
that Alexander was “restoring order and security by using force.” The Defendants’ argument
that Williams’s claim should be dismissed because he suffered only de minimis injuries is
likewise unavailing. That argument was decisively rejected by the Supreme Court in Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (“An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose
his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.”); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992); Wilson v. Rheams,
494 F. App’x 469, 470 (5th Cir. 2012).
Williams has not satisfactorily established that Defendants Mason and Rushing were
involved in the search, nor has he established that the alleged assault was the result of any policy
for which they or Hinds County would have been responsible. These Defendants are entitled,
therefore, to summary judgment on these claims. With respect to Defendant Alexander,
Defendant Williams, who allegedly observed the assault but failed to intervene, and Deputy
Deramola, who failed to take Williams for medical treatment, there are genuine issues of
material fact that preclude the entry of summary judgment. Thus, the Motion for Summary
Judgment will be denied for these Defendants at this time, and this matter will be placed on the
Court’s trial docket.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment submitted
by the Defendants [53] be GRANTED as to Defendants Hinds County, Sheriff Victor Mason,
and Warden Mary Rushing and DENIED as to Defendants Tony Alexander, Deputy Brandon
Williams, and Deputy Ebenezer Deramola. The Clerk of the Court shall alter the docket to
reflect the dismissal of Hinds County, Sheriff Mason, and Warden Rushing.

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IT IS SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of September 2019.

/s/ Linda R. Anderson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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