Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, LLC

Filing 145

ORDER denying 60 Motion to Consolidate Cases; denying 62 Motion to Consolidate Cases. Signed by Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball on 6/25/18 (RBM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
V.

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-cv-757-DPJ-FKB

FAURECIA AUTOMOTIVE SEATING, LLC., and
FAURECIA MADISON AUTOMOTIVE SEATING, INC.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This cause is before the Court on two motions to consolidate, one [60] filed by Charles
Blount, and one [62] filed by Daisy Wilkerson. Blount, the plaintiff in Civil Action No. 3:17-cv854-CWR-LRA, and Wilkerson, the plaintiff in Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-853-LG-RHW, have
moved to consolidate their individual cases with this case, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-757-DPJFKB. Having considered the motions, responses, and rebuttals of the parties, the Court finds that
the motions to consolidate should be denied.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed this case on behalf of
fifteen claimants (“EEOC claimants”) who were former hourly employees of Johnson Controls,
Inc. (“JCI”) at its plant in Madison, Mississippi. It alleges that in 2011, Faurecia Automotive
Seating, LLC., and Faurecia Madison Automotive Seating, Inc., (collectively “Faurecia”)
announced that they were acquiring JCI’s Madison facility. [37] at 4. Faurecia informed JCI’s
hourly employees that Faurecia would consider all JCI Madison hourly employees for
employment. Id.; [39] at 4. The EEOC alleges that Faurecia failed to hire the EEOC claimants
because they were disabled, regarded as disabled, had a record of a disability, or because of their
association with an individual who had a disability, and as such violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). [37] at 4. The EEOC’s suit names only the Faurecia entities as
defendants. See [37].
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Blount and Wilkerson are also former JCI Madison hourly employees who were not hired
by Faurecia after it purchased JCI Madison. Like the EEOC, they are suing Faurecia for violations
of the ADA. See 3:17-cv-853-LG-RHW at [1]; 3:17-cv-854-CWR-LRA at [1]. Unlike the EEOC,
however, Blount and Wilkerson have sued JCI. Id.
Blount and Wilkerson argue that their cases should be consolidated with this case. The
EEOC does not oppose consolidation; Faurecia and JCI both do. [65]; [70]; [72].
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may consolidate
multiple pending actions “involving a common question of law or fact ... [and] may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(a). With broad discretion in determining whether to consolidate actions, federal courts
consider many factors, including:
(1) whether the actions are pending before the same court, (2) whether common
parties are involved in the cases, (3) whether there are common questions of law
and/or fact, (4) whether there is risk of prejudice or confusion if the cases are
consolidated, and if so, is the risk outweighed by the risk of inconsistent
adjudications of factual and legal issues if the cases are tried separately, (5) whether
consolidation will conserve judicial resources, (6) whether consolidation will result
in an unfair advantage, (7) whether consolidation will reduce the time for resolving
the cases, and (8) whether consolidation will reduce the cost of trying the cases
separately.
In re Camp Arrowhead, Ltd., No. CIVA SA-10-cv-170-XR, 2010 WL 841340, at *1 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 8, 2010); see also Crest Audio, Inc. v. QSC Audio Prod., Inc., No. 3:12-cv-755-CWR-FKB,
2016 WL 3249217, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2016).
Considering these factors, the Court finds that Blount’s case and Wilkerson’s case should
not be consolidated with the EEOC’s case. When Blount and Wilkerson filed their motions to
consolidate, EEOC and Faurecia had already conducted a significant amount of discovery,
including serving and responding to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and

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requests for admission. See [28]-[33], [41]-46]. Since then, the EEOC and Faurecia have noticed
or taken twenty-nine depositions. See [88]-[95], [103]-[121], [123]. Further, the EEOC and
Faurecia have already designated experts. See [87], [128]. Consolidating the cases, and adding
three additional parties to the EEOC case, would cause another round of written discovery and
necessitate many, if not all, of the 29 deponents being redeposed. In addition, consolidation would
cause another round of expert designations, increase the number of experts, and expand expert
discovery. All of these things would expand the scope and extend the time of discovery, increase
the number and issues of dispositive and expert-related motions, and delay the trial of this case.
Consolidation would also result in a significant risk of prejudice to JCI. In the present
posture of these cases, JCI is a defendant in two, single-plaintiff cases. Blount and Wilkerson
propose that this Court drag JCI into a case with fifteen claimants whose claims are being
prosecuted by a federal agency, the EEOC. Consolidation would cause a drastic increase in JCI’s
cost of defense. Consolidation would also increase litigation costs for Faurecia and the EEOC.
Meanwhile, Blount and Wilkerson would reap the benefit of the EEOC doing some of their work
for them, both in discovery and at trial, and they would reap the benefit of a federal agency’s
presence at trial as a party plaintiff, even though the EEOC did not sue JCI and did not include
Blount or Wilkerson as EEOC claimants. Considering the impact of consolidation, the Court finds
that it would risk significant prejudice to JCI and an unfair advantage to Blount and Wilkerson.
Although the cases share some common questions of law and fact, consolidation would
introduce entirely new questions of law and fact into this case. For example, Blount and Wilkerson
assert an agency theory of liability against JCI. See 3:17-cv-854-CWR-LRA, [1] at ¶ 29; 3:17-cv853-LG-RHW, [1] at ¶ 29. The EEOC asserts no such agency theory, and in fact, did not file suit
against JCI in this case. In its defense, Faurecia will likely assert facts specific to Blount and

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Wilkerson as to why it did not hire them, which would add new questions of fact and law in this
case. The introduction of new questions of fact and law through adding Blount and Wilkerson as
plaintiffs and JCI as a defendant would increase the time and cost of discovery and trial and create
a risk of jury confusion, which would not exist if the cases are not consolidated.
The Court also considers whether the risks of prejudice and confusion are “outweighed by
the risk of inconsistent adjudications of factual and legal issues if the cases are tried separately.”
The Court finds that they are not. The jury in this case will not be deciding the facts as to why
Blount or Wilkerson were not hired. Likewise, legal decisions will be based on the facts specific
to Blount’s case and to Wilkerson’s case, respectively, which are not identical to all of the facts
specific to the fifteen separate EEOC claimants. The Court acknowledges that these cases may
share some common legal issues, but the risks of confusion and prejudice to JCI outweigh any
risks of inconsistent adjudications on those legal issues. The undersigned also notes that, to the
extent any risk of inconsistent adjudications exists, the risk could be removed by transferring
Blount’s and Wilkerson’s cases to the district judge and magistrate judge assigned to this case.
Whether the cases will be so transferred is in the discretion of the Chief District Judge.
In addition, the Court finds that consolidation would not reduce the time for resolving the
cases or the cost of trying the cases separately. In fact, consolidation would actually increase the
time necessary for resolving this case, since a new defendant and new liability theories would be
added, and as mentioned above, consolidation would drastically increase JCI’s costs of trial.
Although consolidation may conserve some judicial resources, the Court could conserve judicial
resources by transferring these cases to the same magistrate judge and district judge.

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For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Blount’s case and Wilkerson’s case
should not be consolidated with the EEOC’s case. Accordingly, the motion to consolidate [60]
filed by Blount and the motion to consolidate [62] filed by Wilkerson are denied.
The undersigned refers this matter to Chief District Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III, for
consideration of whether Blount v. Johnson Controls, Inc., et al, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-854CWR-LRA and Wilkerson v. Johnson Controls, Inc., et al, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-853-LGRHW should be transferred and reassigned as addressed above.
SO ORDERED, this the 25th day of June, 2018.

/s/ F. Keith Ball
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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